Is understanding explanatory or objectual?

Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that “objectual” understanding, i.e. the understanding we have of a large body of information, cannot be reduced to explanatory concepts. In this paper, I show that Kvanvig fails to establish this point, and then propose a framework for reducing objectual understanding to explanatory understanding.     

Individualism versus collectivism or versus authoritarianism?

Although there has been progress in the definition, antecedents, and consequences of individualism and collectivism, there are some fundamental issues that need to be resolved. This study examined two such issues: the dimensionality of individualism and collectivism, and the relationship of these constructs to authoritarianism. Thirty-eight American undergraduates judged the similarity among 15 concepts that have previously been shown to be reflective of elements of individualism, collectivism, and authoritarianism. Multidimensional scaling revealed two dimensions: individualism versus authoritarianism and active collectivism versus withdrawal from group involvement. Unlike the conception by Hofstede (1980) that individualism and collectivism are opposites, these results strongly suggest they are orthogonal. Furthermore, authoritarianism was construed as the opposite of individualism. Implications of these findings for future research are discussed.     

Conditioned reinforcement: Neglected or outmoded explanatory construct?

The construct of conditioned reinforcement has been challenged over the past two decades, both as an adequate explanation of behavior in various situations (e.g., behavioral chains) in which it was previously regarded as crucial and in terms of the validity of the concept of conditioned value on which it is based. Recent research is reviewed that answers these criticisms and vindicates the importance of the construct. Also discussed are unanswered empirical issues regarding the concept and its implications for behavioral phenomena of major importance for general-process learning theory, such as autoshaping and imprinting.     

Developing the explanatory dimensions of part–whole realization

Philosophical Studies - I use Carl Gillett’s much heralded dimensioned theory of realization as a platform to develop a plausible part–whole theory. I begin with some basic desiderata...     

Popper’s three worlds and attitudes to the explanatory gap

The thesis is explored that Popper’s three worlds may be used as an intuition pump to reveal the insight that all three attitudes to the explanatory gap (that there is no gap, an unclosable gap, or a closable gap) are true from different perspectives. Ontologically, there is only one world and no gap. Epistemically, there is an irresolvable duality, an unclosable gap. From the point of view of scientific theory, there is a soluble problem, that of providing a principled account of the relation between phenomenal features of consciousness and functional accounts in terms of behaviour, neurophysiology and physics. Requirements for filling the gap are examined in more detail, and attempts to fill the gap are discussed. It is argued that, on current knowledge, it appears that only at the level of sub-atomic physics can parallels with phenomenal features of consciousness be found that are sufficiently powerful to provide a transparent account.     

Does intermittence in induced rotary movement have any explanatory significance?

Induced rotary movement has been reported to start and stop repeatedly during 1 min of observation. This has been taken as evidence for the involvement either of cyclorotational optokinetic nystagmus or of roll vection. Both assertions are dubious. Regarding cyclorotational optokinetic nystagmus, available evidence shows that it is too weak to be important in induced rotary movement. Also, induced rotary movement and cyclorotational optokinetic nystagmus are affected differently by the velocity of eliciting stimulation. Regarding roll vection, the conditions for its intermittence do not match those for induced rotary movement. Also, although aftereffects for induced rotary movement are negative, those for roll vection are positive and negative. Intermittence in induced rotary movement may be parsimoniously explained as characteristic of a weak effect.     

Constructionism versus what?

Constructionism is a theoretical perspective with great potential usefulness for the study of religion. However, the theory is often assumed rather than clarified, and it is often reduced to its extreme relativistic versions. As a result, its value has stagnated even as talk of constructs has proliferated. Constructionism has been portrayed as the other of religion's two realisms: theological and phenomenological. It has been cast in the role of a conveniently discounted counter-position. Constructionist work in the study of religion, by failing to clarify its theoretical basis adequately and by too often accepting the role of antagonist to realism, shares responsibility for this misleading and detrimental characterisation. Lack of due attention to theory has obscured the status and claims of constructionism. This theoretical perspective is not necessarily reductionist or radically relativist, and it is not simply the opposite of realist or sui generis approaches to religion. Constructionism can help us understand how historically and culturally contingent religious phenomena arise from the raw materials of our physical and social worlds.The first two sections of this article present a brief sketch of the development and key characteristics of constructionism, illustrating something of its breadth and variety. In the third section a consideration of constructionism in religious studies demonstrates the need to clarify three key issues. First, constructionist approaches are not necessarily anti-realist and so can be consistent with critical theological or sui generis perspectives. Second, the overwhelming lack of explicitly developed theory has obscured and obstructed the usefulness of constructionism in religious studies. Third, the relationship between constructionism and other theoretical positions needs to be clarified.     

Constructionism versus what?

Constructionism is a theoretical perspective with great potential usefulness for the study of religion. However, the theory is often assumed rather than clarified, and it is often reduced to its extreme relativistic versions. As a result, its value has stagnated even as talk of constructs has proliferated. Constructionism has been portrayed as the other of religion's two realisms: theological and phenomenological. It has been cast in the role of a conveniently discounted counter-position. Constructionist work in the study of religion, by failing to clarify its theoretical basis adequately and by too often accepting the role of antagonist to realism, shares responsibility for this misleading and detrimental characterisation. Lack of due attention to theory has obscured the status and claims of constructionism. This theoretical perspective is not necessarily reductionist or radically relativist, and it is not simply the opposite of realist or sui generis approaches to religion. Constructionism can help us understand how historically and culturally contingent religious phenomena arise from the raw materials of our physical and social worlds.

The first two sections of this article present a brief sketch of the development and key characteristics of constructionism, illustrating something of its breadth and variety. In the third section a consideration of constructionism in religious studies demonstrates the need to clarify three key issues. First, constructionist approaches are not necessarily anti-realist and so can be consistent with critical theological or sui generis perspectives. Second, the overwhelming lack of explicitly developed theory has obscured and obstructed the usefulness of constructionism in religious studies. Third, the relationship between constructionism and other theoretical positions needs to be clarified.     

Sensorimotor theory,cognitive access and the ‘absolute’ explanatory gap

Sensorimotor Theory (SMT) is the claim that it is our practical know-how of the relations between our environments and us that gives our environmental interactions their experiential qualities. Yet why should such interactions involve or be accompanied by experience? This is the ‘absolute’ gap question. Some proponents of SMT answer this question by arguing that our interactions with an environment involve experience when we cognitively access those interactions. In this paper, I aim to persuade proponents of SMT to accept the following three claims. First, that appeals to cognitive access fail to answer the absolute gap question. Second, that SMT can be read in a way that rejects the gap question. Third, that if proponents of SMT are prepared to read SMT in a way that rejects the absolute gap question, then they can also reject the claim that cognitive access is needed to explain experience.     

When did atoms begin to do any explanatory work in chemistry?

During the 19th century atomism was a controversial issue in chemistry. It is an oversimplification to dismiss the critics' arguments as all falling under the general positivist view that what can't be seen can't be. The more interesting lines of argument either questioned whether any coherent notion of an atom had ever been formulated or questioned whether atoms were ever really given any explanatory role. At what point, and for what reasons, did atomistic hypotheses begin to explain anything in chemistry? It is argued that 19th‐century atomic accounts of constant proportions and isomerism had little to offer, whereas a non‐atomic explanation of chemical combination was developed. Not until the turn of the century did atomism begin to do serious explanatory work in chemistry.     

Little Bayesians or little Einsteins? Probability and explanatory virtue in children's inferences

Like scientists, children seek ways to explain causal systems in the world. But are children scientists in the strict Bayesian tradition of maximizing posterior probability? Or do they attend to other explanatory considerations, as laypeople and scientists – such as Einstein – do? Four experiments support the latter possibility. In particular, we demonstrate in four experiments that 4‐ to 8‐year‐old children, like adults, have a robust latent scope bias that leads to inferences that do not maximize posterior probability. When faced with two explanations equally consistent with observed data, where one explanation makes an unverified prediction, children consistently preferred the explanation that does not make this prediction (Experiment 1), even if the prior probabilities are identical (Experiment 3). Additional evidence suggests that this latent scope bias may result from the same explanatory strategies used by adults (Experiments 1 and 2), and can be attenuated by strong prior odds (Experiment 4). We argue that children, like adults, rely on ‘explanatory virtues’ in inference – a strategy that often leads to normative responses, but can also lead to systematic error.     

Abstract versus Causal Explanations?

In the recent literature on causal and non-causal scientific explanations, there is an intuitive assumption (which we call the ‘abstractness assumption’) according to which an explanation is non-causal by virtue of being abstract. In this context, to be ‘abstract’ means that the explanans in question leaves out many or almost all causal microphysical details of the target system. After motivating this assumption, we argue that the abstractness assumption, in placing the abstract and the causal character of an explanation in tension, is misguided in ways that are independent of which view of causation or causal explanation one takes to be most accurate. On major accounts of causation, as well as on major accounts of causal explanation, the abstractness of an explanation is not sufficient for it being non-causal. That is, explanations are not non-causal by dint of being abstract.     

Are explanatory trials ethical? Shifting the burden of justification in clinical trial design

Most phase III clinical trials today are explanatory. Because explanatory, or efficacy, trials test hypotheses under “ideal” conditions, they are not well suited to providing guidance on decisions made in most clinical care contexts. Pragmatic trials, which test hypotheses under “usual” conditions, are often better suited to this task. Yet, pragmatic, or effectiveness, trials are infrequently carried out. This mismatch between the design of clinical trials and the needs of health care professionals is frustrating for everyone involved, and explains some of the challenges inherent in attempts to enhance knowledge translation and encourage evidence-based practice. The situation is more than simply frustrating, however; it is potentially unethical. Clinical trials must be socially valuable in order to (1) warrant the risks they impose on human research subjects and (2) fairly and efficiently assess new clinical interventions. Most bioethicists would agree that trials that have no social value, for instance, because their results do not have the potential to advance clinical care, should not be performed. What is less widely appreciated is that given limited research resources, trials that are more socially valuable should be preferred to trials that are less socially valuable when all else is equal. With respect to clinical trial design, I argue that while explanatory trials often have some social value, many have less social value than their pragmatic counterparts. On the basis of this general ethical assessment, I provide a preliminary defense of the position that clinical researchers should aim to conduct pragmatic trials, that is, that researchers face a burden of justification related to any idealizing elements added to trial designs.     

The scientific use of ‘representation’ and ‘function’: avoiding explanatory vacuity

Nearly all of the ways philosophers currently attempt to define the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function’ undermine the scientific application of those terms by rendering the scientific explanations in which they occur vacuous. Since this is unacceptable, we must develop analyses of these terms that avoid this vacuity. Robert Cummins argues in this fashion in Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. He accuses ‘use theories’ of representational content of generating vacuous explanations, claims that nearly all current theories of representational content are use theories, and offers a non-use theory of representational content which avoids explanatory vacuity. One task I undertake in this article is to develop an alternative non-use theory which avoids an objection fatal to that theory. My second task is to adapt Cummins’ argument to criticize most current analyses of ‘function,’ which undermine scientific explanation in an analogous way. Though Cummins does not explicitly argue in this manner, his own analysis of ‘function,’ by avoiding any appeal to use, avoids the explanatory vacuity to which they succumb. Consequently, I endorse Cummins’ notion of function. However, although use theories fail as analyses of the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function,’ they can still make significant contributions to the sciences employing these terms. For, while philosophers seeking to define ‘representation’ and ‘function’ must avoid incorporating representational and functional uses into their definitions, scientists must still find a way to determine which representations and functions are being used. Suitably re-construed use theories of representation and function may in many cases assist them in this task.     

What triggers helping versus harming of ambivalent groups? Effects of the relative salience of warmth versus competence

According to the behavior from intergroup affect and stereotypes (BIAS) map, groups stereotyped as cold and competent receive active harm and passive facilitation, whereas groups stereotyped as warm and incompetent receive active facilitation and passive harm. Extending previous research, we conducted four studies to examine what determines helping and what determines harming behaviors toward ambivalent groups. In Study 1 (N = 58) we demonstrated that groups stereotyped as cold and competent evoke intentions of active harm due to a relative salience of their lack of warmth, whereas they elicit intentions of passive facilitation due to a relative salience of their competence. In Study 2 (N = 88) we demonstrated that groups stereotyped as warm and incompetent elicit intentions of active facilitation due to a relative salience of their warmth, whereas they elicit intentions of passive harm due to a relative salience of their lack of competence. Studies 3 (N = 54) and 4 (N = 67) replicated these findings and further demonstrated that the effects on active, but not passive, behaviors were mediated by distinct emotions. Implications for ambivalent groups are discussed.     

Why do adolescents use drugs? A common sense explanatory model from the social actor's perspective

Analysis was made of the common sense explanations of 60 Mexican teenage illicit drug users in rehabilitation to determine their drug use debut. The explanatory model was separated into three blocks, two of which contained common sense aspects: interaction between subject's plane and the collectivity; and relationship between subject's interior (subject-family) and exterior (environment or group-pressure). Based on these data, we propose that drug use debut may be linked to subjects' emotional vulnerability which originates in the family image and renders them more susceptible to the influence of others. This kind of reasoning points to a more passive than active, and more social than personal dynamic in drug use debut, important factors for developing preventative measures.     

Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition

The prominence of Bayesian modeling of cognition has increased recently largely because of mathematical advances in specifying and deriving predictions from complex probabilistic models. Much of this research aims to demonstrate that cognitive behavior can be explained from rational principles alone, without recourse to psychological or neurological processes and representations. We note commonalities between this rational approach and other movements in psychology - namely, Behaviorism and evolutionary psychology - that set aside mechanistic explanations or make use of optimality assumptions. Through these comparisons, we identify a number of challenges that limit the rational program's potential contribution to psychological theory. Specifically, rational Bayesian models are significantly unconstrained, both because they are uninformed by a wide range of process-level data and because their assumptions about the environment are generally not grounded in empirical measurement. The psychological implications of most Bayesian models are also unclear. Bayesian inference itself is conceptually trivial, but strong assumptions are often embedded in the hypothesis sets and the approximation algorithms used to derive model predictions, without a clear delineation between psychological commitments and implementational details. Comparing multiple Bayesian models of the same task is rare, as is the realization that many Bayesian models recapitulate existing (mechanistic level) theories. Despite the expressive power of current Bayesian models, we argue they must be developed in conjunction with mechanistic considerations to offer substantive explanations of cognition. We lay out several means for such an integration, which take into account the representations on which Bayesian inference operates, as well as the algorithms and heuristics that carry it out. We argue this unification will better facilitate lasting contributions to psychological theory, avoiding the pitfalls that have plagued previous theoretical movements.