Portuguese-Canadian Emigrant Descendents in Multicultural Canada: Ambiguous Identity in a Sure-Footed Nation or Cultural Awareness in an Uncertain Country?

This paper examines the ways the descendents of Portuguese-Canadian immigrants contemplate and formulate their identities. Through qualitative, open-ended interviews, the research demonstrates how these individuals contest ideas of ‘being Portuguese’ and ‘being Canadian’ within the frameworks of the Canadian multicultural policy. Refusing to be positioned outside the nation and Anglo/Francophone conformity, these individuals produce their own meanings of identity by working through their own personally identified multiethnic bodies to the national body politic, where some of them see their own selves as intrinsically ‘multicultural’ and contributors to the very definition of a Canadian identity. Challenging the tropes of the Canadian multicultural narrative, these descendents, thus, develop nuanced models of cultural citizenship, illustrating that national identities are formed and transformed in relation to representation. Through the process of narrative analysis, my endeavour of this article are twofold: on one hand, to illuminate the role of these individuals who, as active actors, are shaped by the social worlds they delve in and, on the other, to explicate how the roles played out by these actors can contribute to the construction of ‘a Canadian identity’.     

Thirteen Ways of Looking at a ‘Ritual’

‘Ritual’ has long been a key concept in anthropology and many ‘rituals’ have been identified, described, and interpreted. In most cases, those interpretations have been generated and presented by anthropologists. Occasionally, however, the interpretations of participants themselves are presented and can be equally multifarious. These sets of ways of looking at ‘ritual’ may or may not overlap. In this paper, I present thirteen ways of looking at one particular ‘ritual’—the (British) Quaker meeting for worship—and suggest that ways of looking are sometimes shared by academics and adepts. I conclude from this, firstly, that we are likely to produce an impoverished understanding of social phenomena when we ignore the interpretations of protagonists and, secondly, that to eschew a multivocal appreciation of ‘ritual’ will result in an unnecessarily crude representation of social life.     

Making sense of ourselves: self-narratives and personal identity

Some philosophers take personal identity to be a matter of self-narrative. I argue, to the contrary, that self-narrative views cannot stand alone as views of personal (or numerical) identity. First, I consider Dennett’s self-narrative view, according to which selves are fictional characters—abstractions, like centers of gravity—generated by brains. Neural activity is to be interpreted from the intentional stance as producing a story. I argue that this is implausible. The inadequacy is masked by Dennett’s ambiguous use of ‘us’: sometimes ‘us’ refers to real human beings, and sometimes ‘us’ refers to selves or fictional characters. Second, I consider Schechtmann’s view that self-narratives create persons (in the sense that she calls ‘characterization’ or personality. I argue that the sense in which a self-narrative creates a person cannot stand on its own: a person must already exist (in the sense of numerical identity) in order for there to be a self-narrative. Finally, I offer my own account of persons.     

(Dis)armed friendship: impacts of colonial ideology on early Quaker attitudes toward American Indians

Quakers’ early relations with American Indians (especially the Lenne Lenape, later known as the Delaware Indians) were generally positive. Core Quaker principles were simplicity, integrity, equality and peace – principles that could coincide well with those of the similarly egalitarian Lenne Lenape, who had been designated peacekeepers by the Iroquois Confederacy. Although the relationship was different than that of other settlers and American Indians, it was still suffused with colonial ideology. From the founding of Pennsylvania to the period of Grant’s ‘Peace Policy’, Quakers had to negotiate two wars and changing attitudes to North American Indians by American Presidents and government. The paper focuses on corresponding shifts in Quaker attitudes and policies. Our interest is in Quaker responses to Native Americans over time, finding that Quakers became increasingly distanced from the Indians and focused on acculturation. In their zeal to become acceptable to American Governments and through that, assist Native Americans, Quakers had, in fact, assimilated themselves.     

Quaker ideology,colonialism and American Indian education

William Penn, the Quaker who founded Pennsylvania, set out to found a ‘Holy Experiment’ based on Quaker ideals. While he regarded the Native American Indians whose land he purchased as spiritual equals, he still expected them to convert to Christianity and live under British law. Later, Quakers continued to follow this goal, eventually becoming leaders, under President Grant, in the residential school system for Native American Indian children. They supported assimilation, contributing to the destruction of native culture and society, in contradiction to their principles of equality and integrity. This paper explores the process by which Quakers came to feel it necessary to pursue such measures in spite of their egalitarian beliefs.     

Prudence and Person-Stages

Persons care about their future selves. They reason about their future selves’ interests; they plan for their future selves’ happiness and they worry about their future selves’ suffering. This paper is interested in the interplay between diachronic prudential reason and certain accounts of the metaphysics of personal identity that fall under the broad umbrella ‘conventionalist’. Some conventionalists conclude that under certain conditions there are intractable decisions for there is no fact of the matter regarding whether a person-stage ought (prudentially) to φ. This paper suggests otherwise. These decisions are not intractable if we allow that it is sometimes rational for a person-stage to discount the utility of certain future person-stages. The paper then goes on to explore an alternative position that conventionalists might occupy which does not involve any such discounting: prudential relativism. According to prudential relativism, it is impossible to offer a single, correct, answer to the question: should person-stage, P, φ at t? For according to prudential relativism there is no stage-independent stance from which to evaluate whether a person-stage ought to φ. Yet it is not, for all that, intractable, from P’s perspective, whether or not to φ.     

This White ‘I’: The Reciprocal Shame of Oppressor and Oppressed

Abstract

Vice’s answer to the question of this white ‘I’ who must try to live well in South Africa, configures shame, political silence and humble self-reconfiguration. I accept her insightful analysis of ‘whiteness’ in terms of the oppressor’s shame, but find that her specification of identity does not accommodate the multiplicity of privilege/oppression relations in which individuals participate. Since this implies that many South Africans, albeit unevenly, share the oppressor’s shame, her advice concerning ‘whites only’ political withdrawal seems inappropriate and curiously self-subversive. Focussing instead on her reflections concerning moral emotions in ethically-compromised selves, which should motivate self-reconfiguration, and drawing from Kristeva on ‘forgiveness’, I argue that compromised selves in privilege/oppression relations cannot reconfigure themselves independently, and should rather negotiate on-going forgiveness relationships. Further, since privileged and oppressed shoulder different but reciprocal ethical responsibilities, besides considering the privileged self who should appeal for forgiveness,¹ one must address a gap in Vice’s argument concerning the reciprocal shame of the oppressed.     

Negotiating Multiplicity: Adaptive Asymmetries within Second-Generation Turks’ “Society of Mind”

If identities are socially produced, what happens when individuals grow up participating in divergent or conflicting social contexts? This article reports on research with second-generation Turkish adolescents in London. Using the concept of the dialogical self, the research examines the dialogical structure of these young Turks’ selves. The analysis is Bakhtinian and seeks to identify the different discourses through which these young Turks talk about themselves. Three distinct discourses, or I-positions, are identified. These are then related to the sociocultural context within which these youth live, and specific attention is given to the constraints on these youth in expressing aspects of their identity. We demonstrate that the asymmetries and tensions within these adolescents’ dialogical selves are adaptive to the fractured and asymmetrical social contexts in which they are embedded.     

Contributors

The ‘imagined community’ (famously defined by Benedict Anderson) could not be created out of nothing. It built upon previously existing identities. And though nineteenth-century nationalism is often seen as essentially secular, the most powerful of these identities were frequently religious. Indeed the clergy often played a major role in promoting a national consciousness. While a ‘national church’ readily saw itself as the embodiment of the nation’s past history, present identity and future aspirations, religious minorities usually had a more ambivalent relationship with a nationalism that was always in some degree exclusive. And even in the case of a ‘national church’, the interests of politicians and ecclesiastics were not always the same. Moreover some nineteenth-century nationalisms were defined in ways to which religion was largely irrelevant, or were in explicit opposition to the Catholic Church. Nonetheless, in ways that varied in kind and degree from country to country, nationalism and Christianity came to be intertwined in nineteenth-century Europe. National identities were to an important degree defined by reference to specific Christian traditions, their history, their forms of worship, and their heroic figures. At the same time nationalism often came to be seen as an integral part of Christianity. Readiness to die for the motherland was presented as a Christian duty and, in particular, Christian preachers of this era were strongly influenced by the concept of a God-given national mission, which justified nationalist claims and might sometimes justify war.     

Is Narrative Identity Four‐Dimensionalist?

The claim that selves are narratively constituted has attained considerable currency in both analytic and continental philosophy. However, a set of increasingly standard objections to narrative identity are also emerging. In this paper, I focus on metaphysically realist versions of narrative identity theory, showing how they both build on and differ from their neo‐Lockean counterparts. But I also argue that narrative realism is implicitly committed to a four‐dimensionalist, temporal‐parts ontology of persons. That exposes narrative realism to the charge that the narratively constituted self, on the one hand, and the self that is the object of much of our everyday self‐reference and self‐experience, on the other, can't be the same thing. This conclusion may well force narrativists to abandon metaphysical realism about narrative selves—which, in turn, may leave the invocation of ‘narrativity’ as identity‐constituting somewhat under‐motivated.     

The Anomalous Wellbeing of Disabled People: A Response

Disabled people frequently find themselves in situations where their quality of life and wellbeing is being measured or judged by others, whether in decisions about health care provision or assessments for social supports. Recent debates about wellbeing and how it might be assessed (through subjective and/or objective measures) have prompted a renewed focus on disabled people’s wellbeing because of its seemingly ‘anomalous’ nature; that is, whilst to external (objective) observers the wellbeing of disabled people appears poor, based on subjective assessments, people with disabilities report a good quality of life. In this paper, I examine an article by the philosopher Dan Moller in which he seeks to explain this ‘disability paradox’. Despite agreeing with his analysis that there is more to what people value than happiness, his explanation reflects some of the difficulties presented in philosophical accounts which seek to understand the lives of disabled people: this includes an analysis which fails to problematise definitions of wellbeing and who has the ‘voice’ to do the defining; which negates the multiple identities and subject positions that disabled people occupy; and which lacks recognition of the social contexts which mediate disabled people’s lives. I suggest that there is a need to incorporate disabled people’s voices into research which deepens our empirical knowledge about the relationship between impairment and wellbeing, including the social circumstances that shape disabled people’s agency.     

Evil acts not evil people: their characteristics and contexts

Abstract: The problem of evil has vexed philosophers and theologians for centuries and anthropologists, sociologists, psychoanalysts and analytical psychologists in more recent times. Numerous theories have been proposed but there is still little agreement on such basic questions as the nature of evil, what constitutes and motivates an evil act, and how we resolve conflicts between individuals and groups in which evil acts are being committed. I am proposing that evil should be used as an adjective, and not as a noun. As such it should be employed to qualify acts of persons rather than their character. This change would enable us to eschew foundational explanations of evil and, therefore, to examine evil acts in their contexts and so better discern their nature and motivation. I will contend that evil acts begin when an individual makes, or members of a group make, assertions about the ‘naturalness’ of their own acts and, correspondingly, the ‘unnaturalness’ of the acts of others. I will suggest that this results from the anxiety that ensues when they cannot adequately signify their experience of these acts. When this occurs, those so treated are dispossessed of their ‘personhood’, allowing members of the ‘natural’ group to violate their ‘boundaries' with impunity. These violations can range from the relatively innocuous such as being ignored to the extreme such as genocide. I am asserting that all these acts should be termed evil as they derive from the same semiotic process of ‘naturalizaton’. I will discuss ways of preventing individuals or groups from embarking on the process of ‘naturalization’ and describe the types of contexts that might reduce or eliminate the commission of evil acts by those already engaged in their perpetration. To demonstrate these ideas I will use examples from my personal experience, from analytic theory and from the ‘troubles' in Northern Ireland.     

Plenary address – A year of living ‘dangerously’: Reflections on risk,trust, trauma and change

This paper examines the role of emotions in the construction and performance of mis/trustful relations; with medical professionals, their technologies, and ultimately, with oneself. Using personal experience of two common conditions as illustrative examples, it questions what it means and feels like to trust, and how, where and by whom such feelings can be enhanced or undermined. It explores some of the ways in which discourses of risk are mobilized and embodied to create a crisis of trust, asking; what kind of selves and emotionalities surface, and what are the health outcomes, when bodies are viewed as ‘at risk’? Visualizing technologies that probe the interior for data play an increasingly prominent role in healthcare, and are typically considered more trustworthy sources of knowledge about the body than anything that might be produced by the tech-free sensing self. However, not all (even ‘physical’) trauma can be seen or quantified, and not all information is equal. The paper reflects on the emotional dissonance that ensues when one's own perceptions and representations are at odds with those of medical experts for whom one is supposed to perform trust. It examines the feeling rules that are broken when we fail to appreciate our treatment at their hands, and asks: What happens when we resist expert author-ity by telling different stories about our embodied selves, ones that make space for emotions in contexts where they are rarely seen to count, and where only what can be measured matters?     

Implicit person theories influence memory judgments: the circumstances under which metacognitive knowledge is used

This work focuses on the influence of implicit theories on recognition judgments. We argue that to understand how a recognition task is solved, it is necessary to study inferential processes because individuals might use their metamnestic knowledge (‘I would have known that!’) as a basis for replacing missing recollective experiences with inferential processes (Strack & Bless, 1994 ). In the present study, individuals' preexisting implicit personality theory (Dweck, 1996 ) was measured and was identified as a moderating variable for the use of metamnestic knowledge. After participants had studied word lists their metamnestic knowledge concerning these lists was manipulated. The results of a subsequent recognition task revealed that individuals used these metacognitively based inferences only when they assumed personal stability (‘entity theory’). Participants who believed in personal variability (‘incremental theory’) did not draw similar inferences when recollective experiences were missing. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘We’re all poor nuts and things happen,and we just get mixed in wrong,that’s all’ lessons for psychotherapy from Eugene O’Neill’s play,Anna Christie

Anna Christie, by the Irish American playwright Eugene O’Neil, is a powerful play, depicting hurt emotions, injured selves and the hardened exteriors that people fashion to blame and afford a measure of protection. It relays the story of an abandoned daughter and her reunion with her father, their (relative) reconciliation, and meeting a new man, and the consequences of her revelation of prostitution. From textual analysis of the play, the paper explores themes of shame, repudiation and self-protection, including the formidable, or ultimate defence of ‘unassailability’. It is argued that the psychotherapist has something valuable to learn from this harrowing and evocative work of literature.     

Gendered contours of contemporary South Asian religious practices in the context of migration: second-generation Jain women and men in Britain and the US

Viewing religion through the social constructionist lens and adopting the methodological approach of ‘lived religion’, this article draws attention to the gendered contours of contemporary Jain practice. Although Jain dharma is a non-theistic, non-institutionalised religion, gender differences are embedded within lay practice in India. In contrast, analysis of qualitative data (interviews conducted with 50 second-generation, middle- and upper middle-class Jain women and men in Britain and the US) reveals a gender convergence in patterns of everyday religious practice and performance. I argue that the social turn in late modern societies, together with the dominance of a neo-orthodox approach among diasporic Jains, facilitates this convergence. Further, shifting patterns of religious practices suggest that religion is an important site for the negotiation of gender identities in the context of migration. The construction of Jain religious selves enables young Jains—both women and men—to navigate multiple and contradictory femininities and masculinities and to display more affective, relational, and compassionate selves in late modern societies.     

Evolution and Personality: What Should a Comprehensive Theory Address and How?

Personality is arguably the most integrative area of psychology; yet, it is an area about which evolutionary psychologists have had comparatively little to say. This is unfortunate because evolutionary theory holds great potential as a framework that can link together the disparate aspects that make up a person. We suggest that progress in evolutionary personality psychology will be helped by clarification of precisely what an evolutionary theory of personality would need to address. To this end, we first describe and assess some extant contributions by theorists attempting to understand personality from an evolutionary perspective. Next, we endorse a working definition of what personality entails and outline three types of personality differences – character traits, goals/motives, and selves/identities – that any comprehensive evolutionary theory of personality should address. Finally, we suggest an approach forward, one where evolved species‐typical motives orient people toward adaptive ends and result in the differentiation of individuals’ unique selves.     

Reply to Catriona Mackenzie

In her excellent critique of my book Self to Self (2006), Catriona Mackenzie highlights three gaps in my view of the self. First, my effort to distinguish among different applications of the concept ‘self’ is not matched by any attempt to explain the interactions among the selves so distinguished. Second, in analyzing practical reasoning as aimed at self-understanding, I speak sometimes of causal-psychological understanding (e.g. in the paper titled ‘The Centered Self’) and sometimes of narrative self-understanding (e.g. in ‘The Self as Narrator’), but I never explain how these two modes of self-understanding are related. Third, I never explain how my account of autonomous agency can be reconciled with my interpretation of Kant's (e.g., in ‘A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics’). In this reply to Mackenzie, I agree with her about all three of these gaps, and I offer some (admittedly incomplete) ideas about how they might be filled.