Regress,unity, facts,and propositions

The problem, or cluster of problems, of the unity of the proposition, along with the cluster of problems that tend to go under the name of Bradley’s regress, has recently again become a going concern for philosophers, after having for some time been regarded as primarily of historical interest. In this paper, I distinguish between the different problems that tend to be brought up under the heading of the unity of the proposition, and between different related regress arguments. I present my favored solutions to these problems.

     

Transference perspectives of story telling

Every story teller tells his stories to an imagined reader who is his transference imago. The evident validity of this proposition in the psychoanalytic process is paralleled in the literary process. Disjunctures between process or form and content and the uses of active and passive voices in the grammatical sense reveal the workings of transference in the writer's attempts, through his narrative voice, to influence the imagined reader or imago. Clinical and literary examples are employed to demonstrate these issues.     

A Plea against Apologies

What, if anything, gives us the right to ask the victim of our wrongdoing for forgiveness? After some conceptual clarifications, I attempt to lay open a paradoxical structure in apologies. Apologies are made in a spirit of humility: if the offender recognizes his guilt, he will see the victim?s negative emotions towards him as proper and justified. Nevertheless, by begging for forgiveness, he tries to change the victim?s negative feelings towards him. Thus, by apologizing, the offender tries to bring about a state of affairs which, if genuinely repentant and remorseful, he has no reason to want to bring about. In what follows, I examine various attempts to dissolve this paradox. These include offering reasons for apologies that are independent of our wish to alter the victim?s feeling of resentment and construing apologies as expressive or as mixed speech acts. All of these attempts, or so I argue, fail. Some of them fail to provide justificatory reasons for asking for forgiveness, others fall short of explaining why apologies can be accepted or rejected, still others cannot give a convincing account of the relation between remorse and asking for forgiveness or fail to distinguish between redressing a harm and redressing a moral wrong. The upshot of the argument is that an offender who recognizes his own guilt has no rational reason for asking for forgiveness. In many cases, not offering one?s apologies is a sign of taking guilt seriously.     

Prohibited Pictures: Political Education and Platonic Elitism

This paper attempts to bring out the contemporary significance for the philosophy of education of Plato's strictures in the Republic against mimetic art forms. The argument follows a route which leads through an examination of Wittgenstein's picture theory of the proposition to the conclusion that this theory is itself a kind of picture which exercises over the intellect the selfsame erotic magnetism which Plato feared would corrupt the rulers of his ideal state.     

A counterexample to the contrastive account of knowledge

Many epistemologists treat knowledge as a binary relation that holds between a subject and a proposition. The contrastive account of knowledge developed by Jonathan Schaffer maintains that knowledge is a ternary, contrastive relation that holds between a subject, a proposition, and a set of contextually salient alternative propositions the subject’s evidence must eliminate. For the contrastivist, it is never simply the case that S knows that p; in every case of knowledge S knows that p rather than q. This paper offers a counterexample to the contrastive account of knowledge. Part 1 summarizes the contrastive theory developed by Schaffer in a series of recent papers. Part 2 presents an example from a class of cases characterized by compatibility between the proposition p and each of the alternative propositions that occupy q. In such cases the alternative propositions that partially constitute the ternary contrastive relation play no role in the acquisition of knowledge. Part 3 considers and rejects potential responses to the counterexample. The paper concludes that the contrastive theory is not a general account of knowledge.     

Gatekeepers and the “Chomskian revolution”

The widely believed folk history of the confrontation between an established neo-Bloomfieldian generation and the revolutionary advances of transformational grammarians bears little relation to the open access to publication that Noam Chomsky encountered in the 1950s. Although a rhetoric of revolutionary conflict appeared, it cannot be attributed to attempts by the established generation to suppress new ideas, as in Thomas Kuhn's morphology of scientific revolutions. The central neo-Bloomfieldian gatekeeper, Bernard Bloch, fostered the diffusion of Chomsky's ideas and promoted the careers of Chomsky and Robert Lees. Other prominent neo-Bloomfieldians, regarding Chomsky as continuing the work of his teacher Zellig Harris, were sympathetic to his ideas and ready to concede his advances in syntactic theory. Nonetheless, Chomsky and his followers adopted an aggressive stance, denying the value of preceding work in structuralist linguistics. Although the case is anomalous for Kuhn's theory, it fits a sociological theory of scientific revolutions.     

论朱熹对"继善成性"说的规范

"继善成性"是易学哲学的重要问题.朱熹解释"继善成性"总体上不是为字义的通顺,而在为他的理学本体论作论证.理上气下的基本原则通过易学的语言进一步得到贯彻.善与性、天与人、未发与已发、天理流行与人物成性等,虽也体现了天人之间的密切关联,但又不能将一般天理与已具形质的人性混淆起来."继善成性"说的优长,就在于它将由天至人的生成序列,解释为一个以天道为本而构筑本性的思辨逻辑,同时兼顾个体形质生成带来的特殊性.而本性只是"存"而非"成",以卫护本然之性纯善无恶的假定.     

差异中的医学人类学与社会学意义——对《中国人群死亡及其危险因素流行水平、趋势和分布》数据的透视

从医学人类学的视角对《中国人群死亡及其危险因素流行、趋势和分布》一书进行了评述,认为本书以大量的数据重新论证了医学人类学和社会医学的基本命题,也给读者带来了一些关于"人类发展与疾病流行"关系的思考。     

Was Wittgenstein an Analytic Philosopher? Wittgenstein vs Russell

This article is in six main sections.In the first three sections,some indication of how and why philosophers have differed in their response to the title question is given by describing Wittgenstein's encounters with Camap,and by examining Wittgenstein's commitment to clarity and argument in philosophy,illustrating this commitment by reference to his Philosophical Investigations discussion of the will.In the remaining three sections,Russell is taken as a paradigm example of a central kind of analytic philosopher.The answer to the title question is unfolded by sketching Wittgenstein's and Russell's treatments of a few philosophical topics and problems,focusing on theories and questions surrounding propositions,judgments,and their constituents,in particular Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment and the question of the unity of the proposition.This approach displays,and does not merely assert,Russell's deployment of (sometimes repeated variants of) technical solutions to philosophical problems and how that deployment contrasts with Wittgenstein's attempts to make such problems disappear.     

Wittgenstein on Verification and Seeing-As, 1930–1932

This article examines the little-explored remarks on verification in Wittgenstein's notebooks during the period between 1930 and 1932. In these remarks, Wittgenstein connects a verificationist theory of meaning with the notion of logical multiplicity, understood as a space of possibilities: a proposition is verified by a fact if and only if the proposition and the fact have the same logical multiplicity. But while in his early philosophy logical multiplicities were analysed as an outcome of the formal properties of simple objects and simple signs, Wittgenstein in the early 1930s connects the notion of logical multiplicity with the notion of ways of seeing. I will argue that the relevant ways of seeing are closely similar to seeing-as or aspect seeing. According to Wittgenstein's view in the early 1930s, logical multiplicities are part of our perceptual experience of propositions and facts. In this sense, the verification relation depends on how we experience propositions and facts as being surrounded by a logical space of possibilities. Strikingly, Wittgenstein's way of thinking about the verification relation offers solutions to a set of seemingly intractable problems connected with the versions of verificationism developed by members of the Vienna Circle.     

Ethics,Identity and the Boundaries of the Person

Abstract

Ethical theories and theories of the person constrain each other, in that a proposition about the person may be a reason for or against an ethical proposition, and conversely. An important class of such propositions about the person concern the boundaries of the person. These boundaries enclose a person's defining properties, which constitute his identity. A person's identity may partly determine and partly be determined by his ethical judgments. An equilibrium between one's identity and one's ethical judgments is the counterpart, at the personal level, of the philosophical ideal of reflective equilibrium between a theory of the person and an ethical theory.     

Giving the sceptic a good name

The word ‘sceptic’ usually refers to a theoretical figure whose philosophical importance lies exclusively in his challenge to any attempt to justify the belief in the possibility of knowledge. But the label was once applied to living persons ‐ the so‐called Pyrrhonists ‐ whose scepticism encompassed a way of life. Following Sextus Empiricus's portrayal of the Pyrrhonists, Arne Naess has provided comprehensive arguments both in rebuttal of the frequent claims either that scepticism is logically inconsistent or that at least it is impossible to put into practice, and in support of scepticism as a fruitful philosophical attitude. The present essay attempts a critical consolidation of Naess's case for scepticism by drawing more explicitly than he does on his work in empirical semantics. The notion of degrees of preciseness is used to outline a philosophically interesting rationale for the Pyrrhonist's persistent abstention from any act or action that commits him to the truth of a proposition, and also to indicate why possible, or even inevitable lapses on the Pyrrhonist's part need not seriously prejudice either his status as a sceptic or the philosophical value of his sceptical ideal.     

PROSPERO'S PAPER

The writer proposes that the interplay between the hermeneutics of psychoanalysis and literature can illuminate understanding of the transference and countertransference at large in an analytic treatment. Writing about the work with a young woman who had been persistently sexually abused as a child and who developed anorexia in her adolescence so severe that her life was endangered both by the illness and by attempts at suicide, the author finds his reading of Shakespeare's The Tempest a powerful informant to the work. Interpreting the object relations represented by Prospero and Miranda and the process of their integration into new mental structures lends the analytic work an additional level of understanding, in particular in relation to the oedipal bond between patient and analyst. When the analyst is confronted by the imminence of his own death towards the end of the analysis, his reading of Prospero's relinquishment of his magical powers and his release of his daughter into sexual maturity and independence helps the patient to replace her destructive inner objects with more reparative and benign ones as she develops a capacity for concern and mourning.     

Showing,Analysis and the Truth-Functionality of Logical Necessity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus

This paper aims to explain how the Tractatus attempts to unifylogic by deriving the truth-functionality of logical necessityfrom the thesis that a proposition shows its sense. I first interpret the Tractarian notion of showing as the displaying ofwhat is intrinsic to an expression (or a symbol). Then I argue that, according to theTractatus, the thesis that a proposition shows its sense implies the determinacy of sense, the possibility of the complete elimination of non-primitive symbols, the analyticity thesis and the strong analyticity thesis. The picture theory emerges as what provides the only acceptable account of an elementary proposition, subject to the constraint that a proposition must show its sense. The picture theory and the analyticity thesis then entail the contingency thesis (that an elementary proposition is contingent) and the independence thesis (that elementary propositions are mutually logically independent) which, together with the strong analyticity thesis, imply that all logical propositions are tautologies.     

Depressive rumination in an analysand after a traumatic treatment

The author attempts to understand the underpinnings of a ruminative depression that occurred in a patient after a troubled first analysis. Negative therapeutic reaction is often assumed to be the result of a patient's unconscious guilt or masochism and thus an intrapsychic phenomenon, but the author asserts that iatrogenic phenomena in the form of persistent misunderstandings and enactments that remain unanalyzed contribute to a destructive treatment experience. The analysand may relive the failed treatment again and again in his or her mind in an attempt to resolve it. The author asserts that a traumatic treatment experience can foster depressive rumination.     

James Hillman: the unmaking of a psychologist Part one: his legacy

This two‐part essay offers a critical assessment of Hillman's archetypal psychology and enquires into its viability as a psychological model. The first part explores his legacy and reviews the metapsychological frame in which his work operates. It considers the relation between his thought and Jung's, and argues that Hillman's work is not so much post‐Jungian as pre‐Jungian. The second part is primarily intrapsychic; it explores Hillman's character, as discerned through his writings and interviews, and considers his work as an expression of the puer aeternus. It is argued that the puer prefers to live in an eternal dream‐state resistant to growing up: yet denial of the maturational impulse will only lead to it happening anyway but in a negative form. The paper considers how Hillman's model was ‘unmade’ by the missing developmental element of his thought. Development is an archetypal and bio‐psychological necessity, and if rejected it can ruin any system that refuses to take it seriously. In Hillman's case this manifested in the form of a repressed masculine shadow, destroying the credibility of his earlier work. The two‐part paper attempts to weave an objective appraisal with a running commentary based on the author's personal engagement with the man and his work.     

The power of ideas: esotericism,historicism, and the limits of discourse

This article is a response to the reviews by Giovanni Filoramo, Olav Hammer, Bernd-Christian Otto, Marco Pasi, and Michael Stausberg of Wouter J. Hanegraaff's book Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected Knowledge in Western Culture. The author attempts to clarify his view of the relation between history and theory, and between intellectual history and discourse theory in particular; he provides a summary of his motivations for writing the book and of its main argument; he concludes by addressing a number of theoretical issues raised by the respondents.     

Vattimo’s Renunciation of Violence

For Gianni Vattimo, the renunciation of violence is the starting point for constructing a post foundational politics. So far, criticism of Vattimo’s argument has focused on his larger commitment to metaphysical nihilism and whether the renunciation of violence is a thicker principle than his post foundational philosophy can support. I argue that Vattimo’s renunciation of violence can also be criticized for two other reasons. First, Vattimo attempts to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable uses of violence through an under developed idea of self-defense. Second, despite his attention to the political and philosophical impact of mass communications technology, Vattimo ignores emerging technological challenges to our understanding of violence. Nonetheless, I argue that Vattimo’s renunciation can still serve as a useful starting point for contemporary political thinking. What Vattimo’s logic shows is that we can enhance the moral standing of democracy by decisively detaching its practices and institutions from historical artifacts of political violence.     

Did Rorty’s Pragmatism Have Foundations?

Abstract

There is an overt tension between Rorty’s pragmatist critique of philosophy and his apparent epistemological and metaphysical commitments, which it is instructive to examine in order to assess not only Rorty’s overall position, but also renewed contemporary interest in pragmatism and its metaphilosophical implications. After showing why Rorty’s attempts to limit the scope of his critique failed to resolve this tension, I try reading him as a constructive metaphysician who was attempting to balance a causal account of the language / world relation with panrelationism. However, Rorty intended these commitments to be interpreted in light of his pragmatism about vocabularies, and relied upon a ‘social standpoint strategy’ to render his overall position consistent. I conclude that to the extent that this strategy succeeds, it removes almost all of the argumentative force from Rorty’s pragmatism.     

Testing Kohn's self-reliance hypothesis among high school adolescents

Melvin Kohn and his associates have established that self-reliance promotes a sense of well-being (lower levels of fatalism) among adults. The present study attempts to test this proposition among adolescents. Instead of the usual job-related activities, however, it incorporates an alternative measure of self-reliance--high school curriculum assignment. Consistent with previous findings among adults, the results of this study show that self-reliance among adolescents also promotes a sense of well-being: students enrolled in tracks where close supervision is kept to a minimum and the exercise of initiative is emphasized tended to exhibit lower levels of fatalism. The implications of this finding for adolescents are discussed.