A deflationary theory of reference

The article first rehearses three deflationary theories of reference, (1) disquotationalism, (2) propositionalism (Horwich), and (3) the anaphoric theory (Brandom), and raises a number of objections against them. It turns out that each corresponds to a closely related theory of truth, and that these are subject to analogous criticisms to a surprisingly high extent. I then present a theory of my own, according to which the schema “That S(t) is about t” and the biconditional “S refers to x iff S says something about x” are exhaustive of the notions of aboutness and reference. An account of the usefulness of “about” is then given, which, I argue, is superior to that of Horwich. I close with a few considerations about how the advertised theory relates to well-known issues of reference, the conclusions of which is (1) that the issues concern reference and aboutness only insofar as the words “about” and “refer” serve to generalise over the claims that are really at issue, (2) that the theory of reference will not settle the issues, and (3) that it follows from (2) that the issues do not concern the nature of aboutness or reference.     

On truth and reference in postmodern science

Abstract:

If the defenders of typical postmodem accounts of science (and their less extreme social-constructivist partners) are at one end of the scale in current philosophy of science, who shall we place at the other end? Old-style metaphysical realists? Neo-neo-positivists? … Are the choices concerning realist issues as simple as being centered around either, on the one hand, whether it is the way reality is “constructed” in accordance with some contingent language game that determines scientific “truth”; or, on the other hand, whether it is the way things are in an independent reality that makes our theories true or false? If, in terms of realism, “strong” implies “metaphysical” in the traditional sense, and “weak” implies “non-absolutist” or “non-unique”, what - if anything - could realism after Rorty’s shattering of the mirror of nature still entail? In accordance with my position as a model-theoretic realist, I shall show in this article the relevance of the assumption of an independent reality for postmodern (philosophy of) science - against Lyotard’s dismissal of the necessity of this assumption for science which he interprets as a non-privileged game among many others. I shall imply that science is neither the “child” of positivist philosophy who has outgrown her mother, freeing herself from metaphysics and epistemology, nor is science, at the other end of the scale, foundationless and up for grabs.     

Beyond statistical inference: A decision theory for science

Traditional null hypothesis significance testing does not yield the probability of the null or its alternative and, therefore, cannot logically ground scientific decisions. The decision theory proposed here calculates the expected utility of an effect on the basis of (1) the probability of replicating it and (2) a utility function on its size. It takes significance tests—which place all value on the replicability of an effect and none on its magnitude—as a special case, one in which the cost of a false positive is revealed to be an order of magnitude greater than the value of a true positive. More realistic utility functions credit both replicability and effect size, integrating them for a single index of merit. The analysis incorporates opportunity cost and is consistent with alternate measures of effect size, such as r2 and information transmission, and with Bayesian model selection criteria. An alternate formulation is functionally equivalent to the formal theory, transparent, and easy to compute.     

I. Formal theory in social science

Contemporary social science tends to suffer from too many misplaced attempts at mathematical or game‐theoretical formulation, and much effort is wasted in either propounding such formulations, or in showing their inanity. Jon Elster does not entirely escape this himself, but Logic and Society is truly remarkable in pointing the way to some possibly very relevant formalizations. These are particularly to be found in the chapter on ‘contradictions of society’. There Elster attempts to delineate the properties of certain self‐frustrating predicaments of action, and to relate them as well to Hegelian‐Marxist conceptions of contradiction. It may be, however, that the relevance of this analysis is restricted to societies whose form of life has become atomistic, and whose members thus function in an individual‐calculative way in many spheres of life. But even so, formalizations of the kind Elster provides would be useful in defining one kind of historically evolved society among others.     

A critique of prospect theory and framing with particular reference to consumer decisions

Prospect theory is criticized in this article for being borrowed from psychology without appropriate acknowledgement, for requiring mathematical calculations that are beyond the average person, for not investigating information processing during prospect theory choices, and for lacking application to real‐world decisions—such as important product and service choices made by consumers. Further criticism is leveled at the prospect theory‐derived technique known as “framing,” which is based on one‐sided presentation of information and would be unethical in most consumer behavior situations.     

Bringing life history theory into relationship science

In this article, I review three longitudinal studies that have investigated how exposure to more versus less predictable environments shunt individuals down different developmental pathways. After describing key principles of life history theory and how stress can shape social development over time, I discuss an interrelated set of findings from the Minnesota Longitudinal Study of Risk and Adaptation. Collectively, these studies reveal the pathways through which exposure to more unpredictable, chaotic early‐life environments prospectively forecast engaging in riskier behaviors and shorter‐term, more opportunistic, and less investing orientations to mating and parenting in one or both genders. I conclude by discussing the broader goals underlying this program of research.