On the Rationality of our Response to Testimony

The assumption that we largely lack reasons for accepting testimony has dominated its epistemology. Given the further assumption that whatever reasons we do have are insufficient to justify our testimonial beliefs, many conclude that any account of testimonial knowledge must allow credulity to be justified. In this paper I argue that both of these assumptions are false. Our responses to testimony are guided by our background beliefs as to the testimony as a type, the testimonial situation, the testifier's character and the truth of the proposition testified to. These beliefs provide reasons for our responses. Thus, we usually do have reasons, in the sense of propositions believed, for accepting testimony and these reasons can provide evidence for the testimonial beliefs we form.     

The effects of labelling,expert testimony,and information processing mode on juror decisions in SVP civil commitment trials

Expert witnesses offering testimony in sexually violent predator civil commitment trials may use diagnostic labels that are either familiar (e.g. ‘psychopath’) or unfamiliar (e.g. ‘paraphilia’) to jurors. Using predictions based on cognitive experiential self-theory, we explored the influence of testimony type (clinical versus actuarial) and diagnostic label (psychopath versus paraphilia) on jurors motivated to adopt either an experiential processing mode (PM; in which heuristic cues may be strongly relied upon) or an analytic rational PM. Consistent with previous research, our results indicated that when given a psychopathic diagnostic label, mock jurors motivated to process information experientially were more influenced by clinical testimony, whereas mock jurors induced into a rational mode were more influenced by actuarial testimony. However, experientially oriented jurors given a paraphilia diagnostic label did not show the expected influence of clinical expert testimony, and instead were more persuaded by actuarial testimony. These findings are discussed from a judgement and heuristics cues framework. The implications of several procedural suggestions are examined. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Defense of Reductionism about Testimonial Justification of Beliefs

This paper defends reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs against two influential arguments. One is the empirical argument to the effect that the reductionist justification of our trust in testimony is either circular since it relies on testimonial evidence or else there is scarce evidence in support of our trust in testimony. The other is the transcendental argument to the effect that trust in testimony is a prerequisite for the very existence of testimonial evidence since without the presumption of people's truthfulness we cannot interpret their utterances as testimony with propositional contents. This paper contends that the epistemic subject can interpret utterances as testimony with propositional contents without presupposing the credibility of testimony, and that evidence available to the normal epistemic subject can justify her trust in testimony.     

Anxiety,Learning, and Instruction (Book)

When witnesses at a trial offer testimony that is vivid, it may be more persuasive than the same testimony offered in a pallid manner. In this paper we elucidate three categories of variables (inferential, attentional/memorial, and affective) that are likely to mediate the effects of the vividness of testimony on jury judgments. These variables are then used to explain discrepant findings among mock juror experiments investigating vividness effects. Finally, we discuss the implications of vividness effects for the legal system.     

Risk Assessment in the Law: Legal Admissibility,Scientific Validity,and Some Disparities between Research and Practice

Risk assessment expert testimony remains an area of considerable concern within the U.S. legal system. Historically, controversy has surrounded the constitutionality of such testimony, while more recently, following the adoption of new evidentiary standards that focus on scientific validity, the admissibility of expert testimony has received greater scrutiny. Based on examples from recent appellate court cases involving sexual violent predator (SVP) hearings, we highlight difficulties that courts continue to face in evaluating this complex expert testimony. In each instance, we point to specific problems in courts' reasoning that lead it to admit expert testimony of questionable scientific validity. We conclude by offering suggestions for how courts might more effectively evaluate the scientific validity of risk expert testimony and how mental health professionals might better communicate their expertise to the courts. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Doing without Desert

The idea of 'moral responsibility' is typically linked with praise and blame, and with the notion of 'the voluntary'. It is often thought that if we are free, in the relevant sense, we may "deserve" praise or blame; otherwise, we do not. But when we look at whether and why we need the notions of praise and blame, we find that they are not as intimately connected with desert as many philosophers have thought. In particular, this paper challenges the idea that forms of evaluation and behavior tied to our "reactive attitudes" (especially resentment) best further morality's aims, properly understood.     

Relativism,Disagreement and Testimony

This article brings together two sets of data that are rarely discussed in concert; namely, disagreement and testimony data. I will argue that relativism yields a much more elegant account of these data than its major rival, contextualism. The basic idea will be that contextualists can account for disagreement data only by adopting principles that preclude a simple account of testimony data. I will conclude that, other things being equal, we should prefer relativism to contextualism. In making this comparative point, I will also defend self‐standing relativist accounts of disagreement and testimony data.     

Clinician testimony in suicide litigation: A cause to be uneasy

This is an illustrative article rather than a research study. We offer opinions and recommendations about what we view as unfortunate clinician testimony in suicide‐related malpractice cases, testimony that – inadvertently or not – supports or encourages inadequate care of suicidal patients. The principles apply to both psychiatrists and non‐psychiatrists, although the former appear more often in our work. We particularly consider the roles and testimony, in court or at deposition, of psychiatrists, whether as defendants, expert witnesses, or fact witnesses. We cite examples of what we view as poor, disingenuous, dishonest and even dangerous testimony that we believe moves the profession toward unsafe patient care. The examples illustrate what we (and sometimes others) describe as normalization of deviance, pre‐suit puffery, self‐serving defendant testimony, expert pride supplanting testimonial responsibility, expert arrogance, expert parroting of attorney suggestions, witness ignorance and avoiding facts, unconscious expert bias, inexperience thwarting justice, misleading use of terms such as “predictability,” and expert witnesses who lack the direct‐care experience that jurisdictions often require in order to opine about defendant clinicians' day‐to‐day patient care. The examples often reveal concerns beyond the category chosen, and should not be expected to convey all of the facts of a particular case.     

Democracy,Tolerance, Aquinas

Democracy is more than a collection of institutions, laws, and freely contested sources of authority. It is also an ideal. If we think of this ideal in republican terms, in terms of resistance to domination through the practices of mutual accountability, and if we recall that democratic life invariably comes with loss, then those of us who inhabit a democratic political society will need to locate, and then cultivate, responses to loss that do not undermine our commitment to this ideal. Tolerance, one such response, is widely recognized and yet poorly theorized. Thomas Aquinas did not recognize it, but he did praise and endorse its act, toleration, and he does offer resources for bringing the virtue into focus and identifying some of the distinguishing features of its democratic variant.     

THE NATURE OF TESTIMONY

Abstract:  I discuss several views of the nature of testimony and show how each proposal has importantly different problems. I then offer a diagnosis of the widespread disagreement regarding this topic; specifically, I argue that our concept of testimony has two different aspects to it. Inadequate views of testimony, I claim, result either from collapsing these two aspects into a single account or from a failure to recognize one of them. Finally, I develop an alternative view of testimony that captures both aspects of the nature of testimony and thereby provides the basis for an illuminating theory of testimony's epistemological significance.     

Attitudes,Tracing, and Control

There is an apparent tension in our everyday moral responsibility practices. On the one hand, it is commonly assumed that moral responsibility requires voluntary control: an agent can be morally responsible only for those things that fall within the scope of her voluntary control. On the other hand, we regularly praise and blame individuals for mental states and conditions that appear to fall outside the scope of their voluntary control, such as desires, emotions, beliefs, and other attitudes. In order to resolve this apparent tension, many philosophers appeal to a tracing principle to argue that agents are morally responsible (only) for those attitudes whose existence can be traced back, causally, to a voluntary action or omission in the past. My aim in this article is to critically evaluate this tracing strategy and to argue that it gives us a misguided picture of when and why we are morally responsible for our attitudes. I argue that we should accept a ‘judgment sensitivity’ condition of moral responsibility rather than a ‘voluntary control’ condition, and defend this account against various objections.     

The impact of hedged testimony on judgments of credibility

We tested whether people are attuned to critical memory factors, such as age at the timing of encoding and hedge words when judging the credibility of testimony. In two experiments, participants read a 19‐year‐old's testimony regarding a sexual assault. We manipulated whether participants learned that the assault occurred 4 years ago (when the claimant was 15 years old) or 15 years ago (when the claimant was 4 years old) and whether the claimant used hedge words in her testimony. In Experiment 2, we included a cross‐examination. Without the cross‐examination, participants rated the testimony as more credible when the assault had occurred 15 years ago. However, with the inclusion of a cross‐examination, participants rated the testimony more reliable when the event occurred 4 years ago and the claimant did not use hedge words. We discuss the implications our results have, particularly for historical cases, where memory is a key factor.     

Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity

Many philosophers believe that there exist distinctive obstacles to relying on moral testimony. In this paper, I criticize previous attempts to identify these obstacles and offer a new theory. I argue that the problems associated with moral deference can't be explained in terms of the value of moral understanding, nor in terms of aretaic considerations related to subjective integration. Instead, our uneasiness with moral testimony is best explained by our attachment to an ideal of authenticity that places special demands on our moral beliefs.     

Character and Knowledge: Learning from the Speech of Experts

This paper discusses the ways in which a person’s character (ethos) and a hearer’s emotional response (pathos) are part of the complex judgments made about experts’ claims, along with an actual assessment of those claims (logos). The analysis is rooted in the work of Aristotle, but expands to consider work on emotion and cognition conducted by Thagard and Gigerenzer. It also draws on some conclusions of the general epistemology of testimony (of which expert testimony is a special subset), where it is argued that we learn not just from the transmission of another’s beliefs, but from the words they speak. This shifts the onus in testimony away from the intentions of a speaker onto the judgments of an audience, capturing better its social character and reflecting our experience of receiving testimony. I conclude, however, that accepting the arguments of experts involves much more than simply believing what they say.     

Justification,sociality, and autonomy

Theories of epistemically justified belief have long assumed individualism. In its extreme, or Lockean, form individualism rules out justified belief on testimony by insisting that a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if he or she possesses first-hand justification for it. The skeptical consequences of extreme individualism have led many to adopt a milder version, attributable to Hume, on which a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if he or she is justified in believing that there is testimony in favor of the proposition deriving from a reliable source. I argue that this Humean individualism also leads to skepticism in a wide range of cases; it makes it impossible for a layperson to be justified on expert testimony. In addition, I argue that the apparent motivation for the Humean view, an insistence on intellectual autonomy in justification, does not succeed in motivating it. I then explore the contours of a collectivist view of justification on testimony, with special attention to the place of a subject's intellectual autonomy in such justification. I try to bring empirical results of the psychology of persuasion to bear on the epistemological issues.     

PROBLEMS OF SINCERITY

ABSTRACT It is undeniable that the assumption of sincerity is important to assertion, and that assertion is central to the transmission of beliefs through human testimony. Discussions of testimony, however, often assume that the epistemic importance of sincerity to testimony is that of a (fallible) guarantee of access to the actual beliefs of the speaker. Other things being equal, we would do as well or better if we had some kind of unmediated access to the beliefs of the other person, without the risks involved in the overt act of speaking, and the assumption of sincerity in speech is the closest we can come to this access. Contrary to this picture, I argue that sincerity has a quite different epistemic role to play in testimony than that of an indicator of the speaker's beliefs. The epistemology of testimony requires reference to the speaker as agent, and not just the speaker's beliefs, as well as a sense of 'expression of belief that links it to the specifically addressive relation to another person.     

Testimony,testimonial belief,and safety

Philosophical Studies - Can one gain testimonial knowledge from unsafe testimony? It might seem not, on the grounds that if a piece of testimony is unsafe, then any belief based on it in such a way...     

Natural conversations as a source of false memories in children: Implications for the testimony of young witnesses

Research on factors that can affect the accuracy of children’s autobiographical remembering has important implications for understanding the abilities of young witnesses to provide legal testimony. In this article, we review our own recent research on one factor that has much potential to induce errors in children’s event recall, namely natural memory sharing conversations with peers and parents. Our studies provide compelling evidence that not only can the content of conversations about the past intrude into later memory but that such exchanges can prompt the generation of entirely false narratives that are more detailed than true accounts of experienced events. Further, our work show that deeper and more creative participation in memory sharing dialogues can boost the damaging effects of conversationally conveyed misinformation. Implications of this collection of findings for children’s testimony are discussed.     

“Good job, you’re so smart”: The effects of inconsistency of praise type on young children’s motivation

Previous research has demonstrated that generic praise (“good drawer”) is related to children giving up after failure because failure implies the lack of a critical trait (e.g., drawing ability). Conversely, nongeneric praise (“good job drawing”) is related to mastery motivation because it implies that success is related to effort. Yet children may receive a mixture of these praise types (i.e., inconsistent praise), the effects of which are unclear. We tested how inconsistent praise influenced two components of motivation: self-evaluation and persistence. Kindergarteners (N = 135) were randomly assigned to one of five conditions in which consistency of praise type was varied. After two failure scenarios, children reported self-evaluations and persistence. Results indicated that more nongeneric praise related linearly to greater motivation, yet self-evaluation and persistence were impacted differently by inconsistent praise types. Hearing even a small amount of generic praise reduced persistence, whereas hearing a small amount of nongeneric praise preserved self-evaluation.