Believability and syllogistic reasoning

In this paper we investigate the locus of believability effects in syllogistic reasoning. We identify three points in the reasoning process at which such effects could occur: the initial interpretation of premises, the examination of alternative representations of them (in all of which any valid conclusion must be true), and the "filtering" of putative conclusions. The effect of beliefs at the first of these loci is well established. In this paper we report three experiments that examine whether beliefs have an effect at the other two loci. In experiments 1 and 2 subjects drew their own conclusions from syllogisms that suggested believable or unbelievable ones. In the third experiment they evaluated conclusions that were presented to them. The data show that beliefs both affect the examination of alternative models and act as a filter on putative conclusions. We conclude by showing how some types of problem and some problem contents make the existence of alternative models more obvious than others.     

Sentential synonymity judgment

Despite the acknowledged theoretical importance of sentential synonymity, there has been little interest in the psychological mechanisms responsible for recognizing it. Here an attempt is made to explore ways in which specific models originally devised for other particular psycholinguistic tasks (e.g., sentence-picture verification, three-term series problems, syllogistic reasoning) can be generalized to synonymity judgment and ways in which recent psychosemantic theories can be made more specific to deal with this same paradigm. Differential predictions from these models are derived for a set of spatiotemporal bidimensional comparative synonym pairs (e.g., High before Low, First above Second), and an experiment to test these predictions is reported. It is argued that, although the results are consonant with predictions from one type of model, they do not favor it definitively. This is because models of this type do not detail how bidimensional comparatives can be parsed into the same propositional representation and because other models can be subjected to further post hoc modifications to account for the data. Finally, general problems arising from attempts to adapt existing models to new tasks are discussed.     

Sentential Connectives and Translation

In the first exposition of the doctrine of indeterminacy of translation, Quine asserted that the individuation and translation of truth-functional sentential connectives like ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’ are not indeterminate. He changed his mind later on, conjecturing that some sentential connectives might be interpreted in different non-equivalent ways. This issue has not been debated much by Quine, or in the subsequent literature, it is, as it were, an unsolved problem, not well understood. For the sake of the argument, I will adopt Quine’s background assumption that all the semantic features of a language can be reduced to the speakers’ dispositions toward assent and dissent, as far as only the truth-conditional core of the meaning of sentences is concerned. I will put forward an argument to the effect that the speech dispositions of most, if not all, English (French, Italian, etc.) speakers constrain a unique translation of their connectives. This argument crucially relies on an empirical conjecture concerning the behaviour of these operators.     

Sentential logics and Maehara Interpolation Property

With each sentential logic C, identified with a structural consequence operation in a sentential language, the class Matr ^* (C) of factorial matrices which validate C is associated. The paper, which is a continuation of [2], concerns the connection between the purely syntactic property imposed on C, referred to as Maehara Interpolation Property (MIP), and three diagrammatic properties of the class Matr* (C): the Amalgamation Property (AP), the (deductive) Filter Extension Property (FEP) and Injections Transferable (IT). The main theorem of the paper (Theorem 2.2) is analogous to the Wroński's result for equational classes of algebras [13]. It reads that for a large class of logics the conjunction of (AP) and (FEP) is equivalent to (IT) and that the latter property is equivalent to (MIP).     

Embodied Simulations Are Modulated by Sentential Perspective

There is considerable evidence that language comprehenders derive lexical‐semantic meaning by mentally simulating perceptual and motor attributes of described events. However, the nature of these simulations—including the level of detail that is incorporated and contexts under which simulations occur—is not well understood. Here, we examine the effects of first‐ versus third‐person perspective on mental simulations during sentence comprehension. First‐person sentences describing physical transfer towards or away from the body (e.g., “You threw the microphone,” “You caught the microphone”) modulated response latencies when responses were made along a front‐back axis, consistent with the action‐sentence compatibility effect (ACE). This effect was not observed for third‐person sentences (“He threw the microphone,” “He caught the microphone”). The ACE was observed when making responses along a left‐right axis for third‐person, but not first‐person sentences. Abstract sentences (e.g., “He heard the message”) did not show an ACE along either axis. These results show that perspective is a detail that is simulated during action sentence comprehension, and that motoric activations are flexible and affected by the pronominal perspective used in the sentence.     

Sentential constants in systems near R

An Ackermann constant is a formula of sentential logic built up from the sentential constant t by closing under connectives. It is known that there are only finitely many non-equivalent Ackermann constants in the relevant logic R. In this paper it is shown that the most natural systems close to R but weaker than it-in particular the non-distributive system LR and the modalised system NR-allow infinitely many Ackermann constants to be distinguished. The argument in each case proceeds by construction of an algebraic model, infinite in the case of LR and of arbitrary finite size in the case of NR. The search for these models was aided by the computer program MaGIC (Matrix Generator for Implication Connectives) developed by the author at the Australian National University.     

Sentential context and the interpretation of unambiguous words

Two experiments were carried out in order to investigate how the linguistic context (in the form of a sentence) facilitates the interpretation of unambiguous words. Experiment I established that if a sentential context as a whole is sufficient to evoke an inference that calls to mind a particular aspect of a word's meaning, the presence of a verb with appropriate selectional restrictions does not enhance the process. Experiment II showed that when no other cues are provided within a sentence, both verbs and adjectives are effective in enhancing a specific aspect of the meaning of a word. These findings were taken to support the hypothesis that in understanding a sentence, people instantiate particular aspects of the meanings of words in order to construct specific interpretations, and linguistic context guides this process of selection.     

Truth,Sentential Non-Compositionalit,and Ontology

The paper attempts to clarify some fundamental aspects of an explanationof the concept of truth which is neither deflationary nor substantive.The main aspect examined in detail concerns the ontological dimension of truth, the mind/language-world connection traditionally associated with the concept of truth. It is claimed that it does not make sense to defend or reject a relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension so long as the kind of presupposed or envisaged ontology is not made explicit and critically examined. In particular, it is shown that generally an objectual ontology is – often only implicitly – presupposed, i.e., an ontology admitting objects (substances), properties, relations, sometimes also facts, events, and the like. The paper demonstrates that such an ontology derives from the Principle of Semantic Sentential Compositionality and that this principle should be rejected. It introduces instead the Principle of Semantic Sentential Contextuality (or Context Principle) as the semantic basis of a new ontology, an ontology of primary states of affairs. After sketching such an ontology, it is shown that the relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension becomes intelligible.     

Perceived Believability Among Adolescents of Health Warning Labels on Cigarette Packs1

This study investigated the extent to which adolescents believe the health warning labels on cigarette packs, and the relationship of current smoking status and gender to the believability ratings. Subjects were 691 students in grades 5 through 12. MANOVAs revealed that, smokers, both male and female, reported significantly less belief in the validity of 3 of the health warning labels than nonsmokers. These findings support prior investigations which indicate that adolescent smokers are less likely to accept the specific health risks associated with smoking than nonsmokers. The results, however, also raise the question as to what value such health warning labels have as a deterrent to cigarette smoking.     

Alibi Believability: The Effect of Prior Convictions and Judicial Instructions

Undergraduates (N = 339) listened to a simulated police interview with a defendant concerning his alibi. We studied the impact of (a) the strength of the alibi evidence; (b) defendant's prior convictions; (c) judge's instructions on prior conviction evidence; and (d) perceivers' need for cognition (NFC) on alibi believability and defendant guilt ratings. Defendants previously convicted of the same crime as the current charge were seen as more likely to be guilty than defendants previously convicted of a different crime. Judge's instructions did not affect guilt ratings. NFC was less influential than anticipated, but did affect participants' understanding and recall of judicial instructions. Strong alibis were seen as more believable and led to lower guilt ratings than weak alibis.     

Sentential structure and the perceptual span in normal reading development

An eye-voice span paradigm was adopted to determine whether children use different aspects of sentence structure to facilitate decoding early in the course of reading development. Eightyfour Grade 1 and Grade 2 children, representing four levels of early reading competence, and 15 skilled adult subjects read from four textual conditions; materials varied in the extent to which the texts were semantically and/or syntactically constrained. The more precocious the young reader, the longer his reported span. The better readers' and the adults' advantage was greater the more linguistically constrained the reading material. These data support a continuous model fo reading development and are compatible with an interactive definition of early reading behavior.     

Revision algebra semantics for conditional logic

The properties of belief revision operators are known to have an informal semantics which relates them to the axioms of conditional logic. The purpose of this paper is to make this connection precise via the model theory of conditional logic. A semantics for conditional logic is presented, which is expressed in terms of algebraic models constructed ultimately out of revision operators. In addition, it is shown that each algebraic model determines both a revision operator and a logic, that are related by virtue of the stable Ramsey test.The author is grateful for a correction and several other valuable suggestions of two anonymous referees. This work was supported by the McDonnell Douglas Independent Research and Development program.     

信念修正的AGM理论

信念修正问题是一个富有活力的,正在发展的研究主题。这个主题包括了一大批背景不同、形态各异的理论。阿尔罗若(C．E．Alchourron)、加德福斯(P．Gardenfors)和梅金森(D．Markinson)共同建立的信念修正理论(简称AGM理论)是其中形成比较早的、影响最大的理论。本文说明信念修正的基本概念,并且对AGM理论进行述评.     

Verbal Integration: The Interaction of Participant Roles and Sentential Argument Structure

This paper explores the interaction between sentence level syntactic information and the semantic information that is carried with the verb during sentence comprehension. A cross-modal integration task was employed to examine whether the number of participant roles (thematic roles associated with the central meaning of the verb) causes an increase in processing load during integration of the verb into on-going sentence comprehension. The effect of preceding sentential structural information (varied with respect to the number of argument and/or adjunct NPs preceding the verb) was also manipulated. Independent of the structural information preceding the verb, verbs with two partici-pant roles were integrated into the sentence faster than verbs with three participant roles. This finding suggests that participant roles are stored with the representation of the verb and made immediately available during integration and comprehension. In addition, the syntactic distinction between arguments and adjuncts is also shown to play an immediate role in parsing and integration of language on-line.     

Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth

Journal of Philosophical Logic - The model of self-referential truth presented in this paper, named Revision-theoretic supervaluation, aims to incorporate the philosophical insights of Gupta and...     

Revision Without Revision Sequences: Circular Definitions

Journal of Philosophical Logic - The classical theory of definitions bans so-called circular definitions, namely, definitions of (say) a unary predicate P, based on stipulations of the form $Px...     

Rethinking Revision

We sketch a broadening of the Gupta-Belnap notion of a circular or revision theoretic definition into that of a more generalized form incorporating ideas of Kleene’s generalized or higher type recursion. This thereby connects the philosophically motivated, and derived, notion of a circular definition with an older form of definition by recursion using functionals, that is functions of functions, as oracles. We note that Gupta and Belnap’s notion of ‘categorical in L’ can be formulated in at least one of these schemes.

     

Facts and Possibilities: A Model‐Based Theory of Sentential Reasoning

This article presents a fundamental advance in the theory of mental models as an explanation of reasoning about facts, possibilities, and probabilities. It postulates that the meanings of compound assertions, such as conditionals (if) and disjunctions (or), unlike those in logic, refer to conjunctions of epistemic possibilities that hold in default of information to the contrary. Various factors such as general knowledge can modulate these interpretations. New information can always override sentential inferences; that is, reasoning in daily life is defeasible (or nonmonotonic). The theory is a dual process one: It distinguishes between intuitive inferences (based on system 1) and deliberative inferences (based on system 2). The article describes a computer implementation of the theory, including its two systems of reasoning, and it shows how the program simulates crucial predictions that evidence corroborates. It concludes with a discussion of how the theory contrasts with those based on logic or on probabilities.