Socrates and psychotherapy

This article examines the basic philosophical ideas of Socrates and how these ideas form a basic part of the philosophical foundation of psychotherapy. His influence is analyzed by observing how Kierkegaard and Nietzsche view his contribution. The controversial thesis of I.F. Stone's recent book,The Trial of Socrates, is used to re-examine the man and his philosophy.He teaches moral philosophy at Notre Dame College in Baltimore, Maryland.     

Socrates and Superiority

I propose an alternative interpretation of the Crito. The arguments that are typically taken to be Socrates' primary arguments against escape are actually supplementary arguments that rely on what I call the Superiority Thesis, the thesis that the state and its citizens are members of a moral hierarchy where those below are tied by bonds of obligation to those above. I provide evidence that Socrates holds this thesis, demonstrate how it resolves a number of apparent difficulties, and show why my interpretation is preferable to competing interpretations.     

Rhetoric and Psychiatry: A Szaszian Perspective on a Political Case Study

Conclusion The study of rhetoric and the assumption that rhetors generate the grounding for persuasion have been at the root of Thomas Szasz’s psychiatric critiques for almost two generations. His corpus has consistently pointed to a psychiatric rhetoric which creates, rather than discovers, “mental illnesses,” a metaphorical pseudo-medical labeling which, when accepted, confounds the attribution of adult responsibility and substitutes instead an infantilizing dependency.     

斯密问题与苏格拉底问题的再思考

本文通过对两个“问题”的分析 ,说明现代经济学不能仅仅以自利最大化为其单一的理论论证目标。以自利为目的的单纯的经济价值观念是造成现代道德危机以及经济与道德之间的价值紧张的根源。本文力求揭示经济伦理对现代社会多元价值取向的积极意义 ,苏格拉底问题即始终关注人类的存在问题 ,在现代社会仍具有根本意义。     

Socrates on the Moral Mischief of Misology

In Plato’s dialogues, the Phaedo, Laches, and Republic, Socrates warns his interlocutors about the dangers of misology. Misology is explained by analogy with misanthropy, not as the hatred of other human beings, but as the hatred of the logos or reasonable discourse. According to Socrates, misology arises when a person alternates between believing an argument to be correct, and then refuting it as false. If Socrates is right, then misanthropy is sometimes instilled when a person goes from trusting people to learning that others sometimes betray our reliance and expectations, and finally not to placing any confidence whatsoever in other people, or, in the case of misology, in the correctness or trustworthiness of arguments. A cynical indifference to the soundness of arguments generally is sometimes associated with Socrates’ polemical targets, the Sophists, at least as Plato represents Socrates’ reaction to these itinerant teachers of rhetoric, public speaking and the fashioning of arguments suitable to any occasion. Socrates’ injunctions against misology are largely moral, pronouncing it ‘shameful’ and ‘very wicked’, and something that without further justification we must ‘guard against’, maintaining that we will be less excellent persons if we come to despise argument as lacking the potential of leading to the truth. I examine Socrates’ moral objections to misology which I show to be inconclusive. I consider instead the problem of logical coherence in the motivations supposedly underlying misology, and conclude that misology as Socrates intends the concept is an emotional reaction to argumentation on the part of persons who have not acquired the logical dialectical skills or will to sort out good from bad arguments. We cannot dismiss argument as directed toward the truth unless we have a strong reason for doing so, and any such argument must itself presuppose that at least some reasoning can be justified in discovering and justifying belief in interesting truths. The relevant passages from Socrates’ discussion of the soul’s immortality in the Phaedo are discussed in detail, and set in scholarly background against Socrates’ philosophy more generally, as represented by Plato’s dialogues. I conclude by offering a suggestive list of practical remedies to avoid the alienation from argument in dialectic with which Socrates is concerned.     

Socrates on How Wrongdoing Damages the Soul

There has been little scholarly attention given to explaining exactly how and why Socrates thinks that wrongdoing damages the soul. But there is more than a simple gap in the literature here, we shall argue. The most widely accepted view of Socratic moral psychology, we claim, actually leaves this well-known feature of Socrates’ philosophy absolutely inexplicable. In the first section of this paper, we rehearse this view of Socratic moral psychology, and explain its inadequacy on the issue of the damaging consequences of wrongdoing. We then go on to provide our own account of the way in which injustice damages the soul, and then draw conclusions about how Socratic moral psychology should be understood.     

Diagrams: Socrates and Meno's slave

Abstract

When do two mental items belong to the same life? We could be content with the answer ‐just when they have certain volitional qualities in common. An affinity is noted between that theory and Berkeley's early doctrine of the self. Some rivals of the volitional theory invoke a spiritual or physical owner of mental items. They run a risk either of empty formality or of causal superstition. Other rivals postulate a non‐transitive and symmetrical relation in the set of mental items. They must allow in consequence either for joint ownership of one and the same mental item, or for incompatible simultaneous decisions by one and the same person, or for new forms of death. This makes them disquieting. Another rival invokes a transitive and symmetrical relation defined in terms of co‐consciousness. Even that allows for incongruous simultaneities. The volitional theory is free from such disadvantages.     

Political Rhetoric,Immigration Attitudes,and Contemporary Prejudice: A Mexican American Dilemma

Abstract

The authors examined political candidates' social stereotypes of Mexican immigrants in mainstream media accounts. From those popular themes, they formed semantic differential scales, which they administered to participants (N = 201) with 1 of 4 scenarios describing an illegal immigrant: of Mexican vs. English Canadian descent and with vs. without several parking tickets. Consistent with contemporary theories of prejudice (J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner, 1996), the participants indicated the greatest agreement with the pejorative themes when the immigrant described was of Mexican descent and had accumulated parking tickets. Psychologically, the parking tickets served as a nonethnic rationale for discriminating against that ethnic group. The authors discuss the social and public policy implications of Mexican immigration as a political phenomenon.     

“Family Values” and Political Persuasion: Impact of Kin-Related Rhetoric on Reactions to Political Campaigns1

Within the framework of dual-process models of persuasion, it was hypothesized that including references to kin in a persuasive speech might either (a) promote greater scrutiny of the message by making it seem more value-relevant, or (b) serve as a simple peripheral cue of value congruence. Republicans, Democrats, and Independents read a political speech that varied by argument quality (strong/weak), kin terms (absent/present), and the speaker's party affiliation. Results indicated that Democrats scrutinized the message more when kin terms were used, whereas such terms appeared to discourage message elaboration on the part of Republican participants, but only when used by an in-group member. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the efficacy of political rhetoric using kin terms.     

Socrates and the Ethic of Resistance: Comments on Buss

I respond to Sarah Buss first by considering Socrates as an exemplar of courageous resistance to injustice, then by adding two caveats: exemplary resistance seems to flow from very diverse psychological profiles, and cowardice may not always be best understood as expressing fearful self-attachment.     

Socrates and the Unity of the Virtues

In the Protagoras, Socrates argues that each of the virtue-terms refers to “one thing” (εν: 333b4). But in the Laches (190c8–d5, 199e6–7), Socrates claims that courage is a proper part of virtue as a whole, and at Euthyphro 11e7–12e2, Socrates says that piety is a proper part of justice. But A cannot be both identical to B and also a proper part of B – piety cannot be both identical to justice and also a proper part of justice. In this paper we argue that coherent sense can be made of Socrates' apparently conflicting claims. The key to understanding Socrates' position, we will argue, is the central role of wisdom among the virtues. It is through the relationship of each virtue to wisdom that each may be said to be the same as all of the others, on the one hand, and also that some virtues may be regarded as proper parts of some other virtues, or as proper parts of virtue in general, on the other.     

价值相对主义就是价值虚无主义——苏格拉底论正义与定义

价值相对主义否认普遍价值和价值一般,只讲价值的相对性、随意性和主观性,其实质是价值虚无主义。从西方哲学史来看,探讨普遍定义的方法,始于苏格拉底,也是柏拉图相论的来源。苏格拉底的探索并非相对主义、怀疑主义、虚无主义、不可知论的,而是由怀疑开始而终于确定。     

Political and Nonpolitical Authority in Values Education

This article is an examination of the political (public consensus) and nonpolitical authority as a basis for values education in a democratic society. The author advocates that nonpolitical authority can be a basis for defending the teaching of values in public schools.     

Undergraduate Education in Political Psychology

This article describes ways in which political psychology can be incorporated into undergraduate course curricula. The challenges of teaching political psychology to undergraduate students are discussed, and possibilities for the content and structure of undergraduate courses in political psychology are examined in the context of active learning. Suggestions for the development of an undergraduate major in political psychology are offered.