The Epistemic Challenge of Hearing Child’s Voice

Classical conceptual distinctions in philosophy of education assume an individualistic subjectivity and hide the learning that can take place in the space between child (as educator) and adult (as learner). Grounded in two examples from experience I develop the argument that adults often put metaphorical sticks in their ears in their educational encounters with children. Hearers’ prejudices cause them to miss out on knowledge offered by the child, but not heard by the adult. This has to do with how adults view education, knowledge, as much as child, and is even more extreme when child is also black. The idea is what Miranda Fricker calls ‘epistemic injustice’ which occurs when someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Although her work concerns gender and race, I extrapolate her radical ideas to (black) child. Awareness of the epistemic injustice that is done to children and my proposal for increased epistemic modesty and epistemic equality could help transform pedagogical spaces to include child subjects as educators. A way forward is suggested that involves ‘cracking’ the concept of child and a different non-individualised conception of education.     

A tarnished silver lining: victim suffering and support for reparations

Groups around the world are seeking reparations for historical harms. In three studies, the authors examined if people are more inclined to support a historical victim group if the group continues to suffer today because of an earlier harm. In Study 1, participants perceived greater victim suffering when the harm was recent and the degree of perceived suffering positively related to victim group support. In Studies 2 and 3, the authors manipulated continued victim suffering and the feasibility of material reparations. Both variables affected victim group support, but experienced sympathy and injustice judgments mediated their effects. Suffering victims elicited more compassion when reparations seemed feasible but were treated the same as nonsuffering victims when reparations seemed unfeasible. Suffering victims were also treated equally irrespective of feasibility of reparations, whereas nonsuffering victims were treated significantly less favorably when reparations seemed feasible, versus unfeasible.     

How should citizens’ collective liability for state action be grounded?

This paper assesses one type of justification for collective liability – the democratic authorization account – according to which citizens can be held liable for what their state does, because they collectively authorize the state’s actions. I argue that the democratic authorization view, properly understood, has an implausibly narrow scope, which risks leaving many victims of injustice without compensation. Hence, I propose a subsidiary account that is wider in scope, and which applies to most cases of state-inflicted harm. This view picks out liable agents on the basis of (a) their ability to bear the compensatory burdens, (b) the incentives that the prospect of liability give citizens to hold their states in check, and (c) distributive concerns. Lastly, I address the relationship between citizens who are (merely) collectively liable for some harm, and citizens who are to some extent morally responsible (for instance in virtue of having endorsed the state-inflicted harm).     

Epistemic Privilege and Victims’ Duties to Resist their Oppression

Victims of injustice are prominent protagonists in efforts to resist injustice. I argue that they have a duty to do so. Extant accounts of victims’ duties primarily cast these duties as self‐regarding duties (say, of Kantian self‐respect) or duties based on collective identities and commitments. I provide an account of victims’ duties to resist injustice that is grounded in the duty to assist. I argue that victims are epistemically privileged with respect to injustice and are therefore uniquely positioned to assist fellow victims. Primarily, they discharge this duty through testimony: victims alert other actors to the need for assistance and initiate and coordinate resistance efforts. I briefly provide an account of oppression that ranges from persecution to structural injustice. Through the examples of torture and ‘manterrupting’, I illustrate the duty and its limits. I outline shortcomings in victims’ epistemic privilege and explore means by which these can be overcome. I respond to objections from demandingness and fairness, arguing that victims have an essential, albeit circumscribed, role to play in defeating injustice.     

Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content

The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person—that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person—it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm.     

The Imprudence of the Vulnerable

Significant numbers of people believe that victims of violent crime are blameworthy in so far as they imprudently place themselves in dangerous situations. This belief is maintained and fuelled by ongoing social commentary. In this paper I describe a recent violent criminal case, as a foil against which I attempt to extract and refine the argument based on prudence that seems to support this belief. I then offer a moral critique of what goes wrong when this argument, continually repeated as social commentary, is left unchallenged. The effect of failing to challenge this repeated argument is the view, held by many, that the vulnerable are imprudent; indeed, they are believed negatively responsible (partly or wholly) for the violence wrought upon their person. My central claim is that public declarations of blame are morally problematic partly because they focus responsibility away from perpetrators, and partly because they harm vulnerable citizens who, as a result of internalising such public blame, suffer unnecessary constraints on their liberty.     

Epistemic justice as a condition of political freedom?

I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political significance in relation to non-domination, and so to freedom. While it is only the republican conception of political freedom that presents nondomination as constitutive of freedom, I shall argue that non-domination is best understood as a thoroughly generic liberal ideal of freedom to which even negative libertarians are implicitly committed, for non-domination is negative liberty as of right—secured non-interference. Crucially on this conception, non-domination requires that the citizen can contest interferences. Pettit specifies three conditions of contestation, each of which protects against a salient risk of the would-be contester not getting a ‘proper hearing’. But I shall argue that missing from this list is anything to protect against a fourth salient threat: the threat that either kind of epistemic injustice might disable contestation by way of an unjust deflation of either credibility or intelligibility. Thus we see that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice can render a would-be contester dominated. Epistemic justice is thereby revealed as a constitutive condition of non-domination, and thus of a central liberal political ideal of freedom.     

Better late than early: The influence of timing on apology effectiveness

Two studies examined whether the timing of an apology influences its effectiveness. We hypothesized that victims who received apologies later in a conflict would feel more satisfied with the resolution of the conflict, primarily because they would have more opportunity for self-expression and would feel better understood. Undergraduates provided retrospective interpersonal conflict narratives (Study 1) and responded to a hypothetical scenario (Study 2) in which they were wronged. The results showed that later apologies were more effective than earlier ones, and that this effect was mediated by feeling heard and understood. The ramifications for creating a “ripeness” or readiness for conflict resolution are discussed.     

The Moral Taintedness of Benefiting from Injustice

It is common to focus on the duties of the wrongdoer in cases that involve injustice. Presumably, the wrongdoer owes her victim an apology for having wronged her and perhaps compensation for having harmed her. But, these are not the only duties that may arise. Are other beneficiaries of an injustice permitted to retain the fruits of the injustice? If not, who becomes entitled to those funds? In recent years, the Connection Account has emerged as an influential account that purports to explain cases such as Embezzlement. This account holds that benefiting from injustice can give rise to a corrective duty - that is, a duty of compensation - owed specifically to the victim of the injustice from which the recipient benefits. This duty is grounded in the connection between the victim and the beneficiary of a given injustice. This paper has two aims. First, I show that we must reject the Connection Account on the grounds that it risks failing correctly to identify those who become entitled to the fruits of injustice. I achieve this by developing and defending the fairness objection. Second, I offer an alternative account: the Moral Taintedness Account. This account states that, when identifying who is entitled to the fruits of injustice, the cause and the degree of the harm suffered by a victim are both relevant considerations, though it does not matter whether the victim is the victim of the injustice that gave rise to the fruits in question. This account avoids the problem associated with the Connection Account, and yields intuitive conclusions in an important range of test cases.     

Benefiting from Injustice and the Common-Source Problem

According to the Beneficiary Pays Principle, innocent beneficiaries of an injustice stand in a special moral relationship with the victims of the same injustice. Critics have argued that it is normatively irrelevant that a beneficiary and a victim are connected in virtue of the same unjust 'source'. The aim of this paper is to defend the Beneficiary Pays Principle against this criticism. Locating the principle against the backdrop of corrective justice, it argues that the principle is correct in saying that innocent beneficiaries of an injustice may have an extra reason to assist the victims of that injustice. This is because it may be necessary to defeat the immoral plan of the perpetrator of the injustice and because it may satisfy weak restitution. The conclusion is that the principle is distinctive from related views, such as that property should be returned to its rightful owner or that tainted benefits should be given up for general use.     

Performative Force,Convention, and Discursive Injustice

I explore how gender can shape the pragmatics of speech. In some circumstances, when a woman deploys standard discursive conventions in order to produce a speech act with a specific performative force, her utterance can turn out, in virtue of its uptake, to have a quite different force—a less empowering force—than it would have if performed by a man. When members of a disadvantaged group face a systematic inability to produce a specific kind of speech act that they are entitled to perform—and in particular when their attempts result in their actually producing a different kind of speech act that further compromises their social position and agency—then they are victims of what I call discursive injustice. I examine three examples of discursive injustice. I contrast my account with Langton and Hornsby's account of illocutionary silencing. I argue that lack of complete control over the performative force of our speech acts is universal, and not a special marker of social disadvantage. However, women and other relatively disempowered speakers are sometimes subject to a distinctive distortion of the path from speaking to uptake, which undercuts their social agency in ways that track and enhance existing social disadvantages.     

How Collusion Perpetuates Racial Discrimination in Societies that Ostensibly Promote Equal Opportunity

It is shown here that injustices due to racial discrimination are best identified in light of the deleterious effects they have upon their victims, rather than the beliefs and attitudes of their perpetrators. For among participants who cooperate clandestinely to bring about racial injustice there may be broad disagreement about what it is they are doing collectively, and why; or they may disagree in principle about whether what they are doing is morally right. I employ the notion of ‘nomotropic’ behaviour to replace the oversimplified notion of ‘rule-following’ in order to explain how duplicity and hypocrisy fall shy of being regarded as irrational in social climates where implicit norms reinforce racial privileging while explicit norms denounce it. Further, examining the ‘collective utility’ of dogmatic beliefs and norms comprising part of the social architecture that covertly reinforces racial injustice (while ostensibly deriding it) may help to explain why it often seems to make so little difference whether members of an unfairly advantaged elite, whose collaborative behaviour perpetuates a social injustice, individually approve of doing so or not.     

Belief in a just world and well-being of bullies,victims and defenders: a study with Portuguese and Indian students

Abstract

Previous findings characterize the belief in a just world (BJW) as a valuable resource for maintaining positive well-being and assimilating injustice. The present cross-sectional study applies just world research to school bullying and tested the hypotheses that the personal BJW is positively correlated with subjective well-being, here particularly school distress. In this paper the generalizability of this association is tested in victims, bullies, and defenders, and across gender and also two countries with different cultures, Portugal and India. We will test if BJW can best be interpreted as a personal resource (main effect) or a buffer (moderator) for the distress of victims, bullies and defenders of the victims. The participants were 465 school students (Portuguese sample: 187 students aged between 12 and 18 years; Indian sample: 278 Indian students aged between 14 and 17 years). Overall, the results of the study supported the personal resource hypothesis. The stronger the adolescents’ endorsements of the BJW the less they felt distressed at school, and this was true independent of their bullying behavior and within both sexes and across both samples, although boys, bullies, and Portuguese adolescents experienced more distress and defenders experienced less distress at school.     

The Benefits,Costs, and Paradox of Revenge

In this article, we examine the psychology of revenge. We begin by discussing challenges associated with defining revenge. We then review the relative costs and benefits associated with taking revenge. Although revenge can deter future harm, promote cooperation, and restore avengers’ self-worth and power, it can also contribute to conflict escalation and adverse psychological outcomes for avengers, such as depression and reduced life satisfaction. Next, we examine the prevalence of revenge. In distinguishing between the desire for revenge and act of revenge, we challenge the notion that the act of revenge is an automatic or pervasive response to injustice. We highlight four factors that influence whether victims of injustice choose to take revenge: the persistence of anger, perceptions of the costs of revenge, cultural and religious values regarding revenge, and the presence of external systems that can restore justice on behalf of victims.     

Why pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms don’t work

Abstract

Pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms tell us to observe these norms as the best means to attaining the things we value. I argue that such justifications do not work, because they harbour an irresolvable tension: their non-alethic character intrinsically conflicts with the truth-aiming character of the epistemic norms they are justifying. We should abandon, then, either epistemic norms or pragmatic justifications of these norms. I therefore argue that we should abandon pragmatic justifications.     

Black Lives Matter: We are in the Same Storm but we are not in the Same Boat

Black Lives Matter is a clarion call for racial equality and racial justice. With the arrival of Africans as slaves in 1619, a racial hierarchy was formed in the United States. However, slavery is commonly dismissed as that less than noble aspect of the United States’ history without really confronting the legacies of racial inequality and racial injustice left in its wake. White supremacy, based on the myths of white superiority and Black inferiority, have obscured racial inequality and racial injustice, resulting in blaming the victims. Using Black Lives Matter as a platform, we focus on some key considerations for theory, research, education, training, and practice in clinical, community, and larger systems contexts. Broadly, we focus on Black Lives Matter, literally; Black dehumanization; historical oppression; healing; and implications for the field of family therapy. More specifically, we draw attention to health disparities, mass incarceration and aggressive policing, intergenerational racial trauma, restorative justice, and antiracist work.     

公正世界信念——重建公正的双刃剑

公正世界信念即相信所处的世界是公正的,人们得其所应得,所得即应得.然而在现实生活中这一信念常常受到各种不公正事件的威胁,公正世界信念可以帮助人们应对威胁、重建公正.这种重建可能是行动上的也可能是认知上的,认知公正重建往往导致对不公正现状的合理化以及对受害者的贬损责怪.同时对于各种不公正的受害者或见证者,公正世界信念充当着重要的个人资源或是心理缓冲,帮助个体应对不公正事件,维护心理健康,并遵循公正原则追求其长远目标.公正世界信念的多维结构是解释其双重功能的基础.     

On Respecting Animals,or Can Animals be Wronged Without Being Harmed?

Res Publica - There is broad agreement that humans can be wronged independently of their incurring any harm, that is, when their welfare is not affected. Examples include unnoticed infringements of...     

Justifications for bullying among Japanese schoolchildren

The present research investigated the justifications for bullying as a function of the various roles that children assume in bullying. Contrary to expectations, most children judged bullying to be right or at least permitted regardless of their role in the episode. However, children with different types of involvement in bullying showed different justification strategies. In particular, bullies were more likely to blame the victims than were children assuming other roles. Gender differences were found in the justifications provided. Boys were more likely to blame the victims, whereas girls were more likely to engage in denial of injury. These results support the notion that justifications for bullying function to sustain bullying.