Don’t hate me because I’m beautiful: Self-enhancing biases in threat appraisal

We compare people’s intuitive judgments about how the self and others respond to threat. We propose that people hold a self-enhancing belief in ”threat immunity,” i.e., they see themselves as more secure than other people in the face of threat. In Study 1, people assumed that they threatened others more than others threatened them. In Study 2, people on project teams estimated that both they and their teammates provoked roughly equal levels of threat in others, although they experienced less threat than did other people. Study 3 experimentally manipulated threat perceptions in an interactive context and revealed that when people held self-enhancing threat appraisals, those with whom they interacted experienced lower satisfaction with the outcome and relationship. Finally, Study 4 demonstrated that, as compared to people who affirmed themselves and thus focused on the self, people who affirmed another person displayed lower threat immunity. The self-enhancing nature of these threat appraisals reveals how competition and envy emerge in organizations—or at least, how people imagine they emerge.     

On the counterfactual nature of envy: “It could have been me”

We examined whether counterfactual thinking influences the experience of envy. Counterfactual thinking refers to comparing the situation as it is to what it could have been, and these thought processes have been shown to lead to a variety of emotions. We predicted that for envy the counterfactual thought “it could have been me” would be important. In four studies we found a clear link between such counterfactual thoughts and the intensity of envy. Furthermore, Studies 3 and 4 revealed that a manipulation known to affect the extent of counterfactual thinking (the perception of being close to obtaining the desired outcome oneself), had an effect on the intensity of envy via counterfactual thoughts. This relationship between counterfactual thinking and the experience of envy allows for new predictions concerning situations under which envy is likely be more intense.     

The role of egocentrism and focalism in the emotion intensity bias

People sometimes judge their emotions, preferences, and attitudes to be more intense than those of other people. Two experiments tested whether this emotion intensity bias in direct comparisons results from two non-motivated cognitive processes—egocentrism and focalism. In Study 1, the intensity bias was found even when comparing a friend’s preferences to peers. In Study 2, attention given to own versus other’s preferences, and the referent of the comparison (self or others) were manipulated. Results indicated that attention to others reduced the bias, presumably by reducing egocentrism. Consistent with focalism, the bias also emerged when a friend was the target of comparison, and the bias was eliminated when the self was the referent rather than the target of comparison. In the discussion, we evaluate these accounts in light of some alternative explanations for the intensity bias.     

What will I be? The role of temporal perspective in predictions of affect, traits, and self-narratives

This article examined the effect of temporal perspective on the multifaceted future self (i.e., affect, traits, and self-narratives). Participants imagined themselves in the near versus distant future, and subsequently predicted their affect (Experiment 1), traits (Experiment 2), and naturalistic self-concepts (Experiment 3). Drawing from the Construal Level Theory and self-enhancement literatures, we hypothesized and found across three experiments that predictions of one's self in the distant future are more positive than predictions of one's self in the near future. Furthermore, building upon literature on the existence of normative and culturally sanctioned implicit theories of positive growth throughout the life span, we hypothesized and found that increased temporal distance yielded less variable predictions of affect, traits, and self-narratives (all three experiments) and that higher-level attributions mediated the effect of temporal perspective on the positivity of self-narratives (Experiment 3) and that time distance leads to more positive and less variable future selves.     

Disentangling trait from state components in the assessment of egoistic and moralistic self-enhancement

A latent state-trait model has been used to assess the extent to which egoistic and moralistic self-enhancement represent: (a) stable individual differences and (b) systematic effects of the situation and/or the person-situation interaction. Analyses were conducted on a sample of 187 adults (64% females). Findings revealed that both self-enhancement tendencies mostly capture stable interindividual differences, although significant occasion-specific effects were observed. Egoistic self-enhancement presents a higher proportion of trait variance than moralistic self-enhancement. The egoistic dimension was mostly related with the stable (trait) components of conscientiousness and emotional stability. The moralistic dimension, on the contrary, was mostly related with the transient component of emotional stability. Potential explanations for the observed differences between egoistic and moralistic self-enhancement were discussed and interpreted in terms of their implications for personality assessment.     

Self-enhancement and theory-based correction processes

Two studies examined bias correction by manipulating a perceived chronic judgmental bias (i.e., overestimator/underestimator) using a modified dot estimation task. In Experiment 1, participants corrected for this perceived estimation bias by making adjustments away from the arbitrary feedback about their personal bias tendencies. In Experiment 2, the perceived desirability of the same estimation bias was manipulated. Results indicated that self-enhancement concerns impacted perceivers’ motivation to correct, at a cost to accuracy. These studies expand our current understanding of theory-based correction by including self-enhancement motives as causes of correction, demonstrating that such corrections can decrease rather than increase judgment accuracy, and illustrating the usefulness of a new perceived bias manipulation in theory testing.     

Children’s understanding of depreciation in scenarios of envy and modesty

The aim of this study was to explore children’s understanding of depreciation when being presented with scenarios of envious or modest behavior. 123 Spanish children, six to eight years of age, decided how a character should respond when faced with a situation of envy or modesty. These situations were described in vignettes. The children chose between a response of either depreciation or admiration in the case of envy and between a response of either modesty or immodesty when faced with modest behavior. They were then asked to explain the reasons for their choices. Generally speaking, the results indicated that children rated self-depreciation in scenarios of modesty more highly than they did depreciation of another in situations of envy. An interaction effect showed that eight-year-old chose modest responses more than immodest ones, in contrast to the six-year-old. Conversely, age differences were not observed for the scenarios of envy. We discuss these results in light of the children’s explanations. Furthermore, the acquisition of emotional display rules is discussed, as well as the ability to manage emotions. Also, we discuss the truths and falsehoods of expression within the framework of social pragmatism in the selection of responses in both scenarios.     

Envy,Facts and Justice: A Critique of the Treatment of Envy in Justice as Fairness

A common anti-egalitarian argument is that equality is motivated by envy, or the desire to placate envy. In order to avoid this charge, John Rawls explicitly banishes envy from his original position. This article argues that this is an inconsistent and untenable position for Rawls, as he treats envy as if it were a fact of human psychology and believes that principles of justice should be based on such facts. Therefore envy should be known about in the original position. The consequences for Rawlsian theory—both substantive and methodological—are discussed.

The rational side of egocentrism in social comparisons

Prior work has found that when people compare themselves with others they egocentrically focus on their own strengths and achievements more than on the (equally relevant) strengths and achievements of the comparison group. As a consequence, people tend to overestimate their comparative standing when absolute standing is high and underestimate their comparative standing when absolute standing is low. The present research investigated a rational discounting explanation of this bias—namely, that people weight the target of the comparison (the self) more than the referent of the comparison (others) because they typically have more knowledge about the former than the latter. In three studies, we found that the tendency to focus on the target in social comparisons—and the over and underestimation of relative standing that tendency engenders—was reduced (but not eliminated) as people’s knowledge about the comparison group increased. These results suggest that there may be a rational side to egocentrism in social comparisons.     

Affective evaluations of objects are influenced by observed gaze direction and emotional expression

Gaze direction signals another person's focus of interest. Facial expressions convey information about their mental state. Appropriate responses to these signals should reflect their combined influence, yet current evidence suggests that gaze-cueing effects for objects near an observed face are not modulated by its emotional expression. Here, we extend the investigation of perceived gaze direction and emotional expression by considering their combined influence on affective judgments. While traditional response-time measures revealed equal gaze-cueing effects for happy and disgust faces, affective evaluations critically depended on the combined product of gaze and emotion. Target objects looked at with a happy expression were liked more than objects looked at with a disgust expression. Objects not looked at were rated equally for both expressions. Our results demonstrate that facial expression does modulate the way that observers utilize gaze cues: Objects attended by others are evaluated according to the valence of their facial expression.