Beyond attitude consensus: The social context of persuasion and resistance

The current research presents a new type of social context effect on attitude certainty. It is proposed that when people receive persuasive messages, they appraise their attitudes not only in terms of whether they are shared or not shared by others, but also in terms of whether they are based on similar or dissimilar assessments of the information presented. In two experiments, participants were presented with persuasive messages. In Experiment 1, they were induced to perceive that they responded favorably (persuasion) or unfavorably (resistance) to the message arguments. In Experiment 2, they were allowed to vary in their actual message responses. In both experiments, message response similarity—the degree to which people perceived that their evaluations of persuasive arguments were shared or unshared by others—moderated the classic effect of attitude similarity on attitude certainty. In particular, attitude similarity only affected attitude certainty under conditions of message response similarity. When message responses were believed to be dissimilar, attitude similarity had no effect on attitude certainty.     

Social network composition and attitude strength: Exploring the dynamics within newly formed social networks

Recent evidence suggests that people who are embedded within attitudinally congruent social networks have stronger attitudes than those embedded in attitudinally diverse networks. The current research examines the causal processes responsible for this relation. Two studies capitalized on naturally occurring experiments whereby college students are quasi-randomly assigned to social contexts containing varying levels of attitudinal diversity. Replicating past research, individuals in attitudinally diverse social networks exhibited less resistance to attitude change and less attitude stability than those in more attitudinally congruent networks. Although there was evidence of attitude projection and selective network construction, neither of these processes could account for the relation between social network composition and attitude strength. These findings corroborate and extend previous results, reinforcing the notion that the social context in which people are embedded has important implications for the durability of their attitudes.     

Exploring the impact of social judgeability concerns on the interplay of associative and deliberative attitude processes

Some recent research applying dual-systems logic suggests that different attitude measures reflect independent modes of evaluation with explicit measures primarily affected by deliberative processes and implicit measures primarily affected by automatic processes. In the current work we hypothesized that explicit attitude measures often do not reflect the outcome of automatic or associative processing because social judgeability concerns prevent people from reporting consciously inexplicable “gut feelings” towards the attitude object. To explore this possibility, we simultaneously presented participants with associative and deliberative information about a target person and manipulated their sensitivity to social judgeability concerns with different sets of task instructions. Although an explicit attitude measure was unaffected by subliminally presented associative information following a standard instruction set, this content did impact explicit judgments when social judgeability concerns were assuaged with a “go with your gut” instruction set.     

Memory-based versus on-line processing: Implications for attitude strength

Three experiments tested whether the manner in which attitudes are created—through on-line or memory-based processing—can impact the resultant strength of those attitudes. In each study, participants were presented with 20 behavioral statements about a person named Marie. Whereas some participants were asked to continually evaluate Marie based upon each sentence and then report their overall evaluation (on-line processing), others were asked to focus on the sentence structure and to evaluate Marie only after they had read all the sentences (memory-based processing). Even when controlling for attitude accessibility, attitudes created through on-line processing were stronger than attitudes created through memory-based processing: Experiment 1 showed that participants in the on-line condition felt more certain of their attitudes, Experiment 2 showed that on-line attitudes were better predictors of participants’ evaluative preferences, while Experiment 3 showed that on-line attitudes manifested stronger attitude-behavioral intention correspondence.     

From repetition to conviction: Attitude accessibility as a determinant of attitude certainty

The present experiment investigated the influence of attitude accessibility on several meta-attitudinal strength measures. It was predicted that certainty and perceived likelihood of change, i.e., commitment-related attributes of attitude strength, are influenced by changes in attitude accessibility, while no effects were expected for importance and perceived centrality to values and the self, i.e., centrality-related attributes. Accessibility was manipulated by having participants express their attitudes either repeatedly or only once. As hypothesized, accessibility and measures of commitment were enhanced after repeated expression compared to single expression. Furthermore, mediation analyses supported the idea that subjective commitment may be inferred from the ease of attitude retrieval. Centrality-related attributes were found to be unaffected by the accessibility manipulation. The results are discussed in the light of a multi-dimensional structure of attitude strength and antecedent processes of meta-cognitive attributes of strength.     

Defensive self-esteem impacts attention, attitude strength, and self-affirmation processes

Individuals with defensive self-esteem score low on implicit measures of self-esteem (ISE) and high on explicit measures of self-esteem (ESE). Although there is some evidence about the consequences of defensive self-esteem, much of it is indirect and open to alternative explanations. Here, we offer direct and novel evidence regarding the implications of defensive self-esteem. Using a standard visual attention paradigm, Study 1 revealed that defensive self-esteem is associated with enhanced attention to defensiveness-related words. Building upon these results, Study 2 found that defensive self-esteem individuals reported particularly strong attitudes, across different operationalizations of attitude strength as well as different attitude objects. Study 3 examined the sensitivity of defensive self-esteem individuals to self-affirmation effects. The results revealed that self-affirmation was particularly effective for defensive self-esteem individuals in reducing actual-ideal self-discrepancies. Overall, the results provide novel and firm evidence that the combination of simultaneously low ISE and high ESE elicits defensiveness.     

The moderating role of attitude strength in selective exposure to information

Individuals prefer to receive information that is consistent with their attitudes. Three experiments examined whether attitude strength moderates this selective exposure effect. Experiments 1A and 1B found that participants preferred attitudinally consistent information but that this effect was more pronounced to the extent that the attitude was strongly held. Experiment 2 replicated these findings and ruled out an alternative interpretation that a general tendency to hold strong attitudes rather than issue-specific attitude strength moderates selective exposure. Discussion concerns the implications of these findings and the possibility that other variables moderate the selective exposure effect.     

Perceiving stability as a means to attitude certainty: The role of implicit theories of attitudes

This research introduces the concept of implicit theories of attitude stability. Across three studies, individuals are shown to vary both naturally and situationally in their lay theories about the stability of attitudes. Furthermore, these general theories are shown to impact people's certainty in their specific attitudes by shaping their perceptions of the stability of the attitude under consideration. By affecting attitude certainty, implicit theories of attitude stability also influence the extent to which people rely on their attitude when committing to future attitude-relevant behavior. Moreover, following exposure to a persuasive attack, implicit theories are shown to interact with situational perceptions of attitude stability to determine attitude certainty. Collectively, these findings suggest that implicit theories of attitude stability have an important influence on people's attitude certainty, subsequent behavioral intentions, and resistance to persuasive messages. Future directions concerning the potential impact of these theories for other attitudinal phenomena are discussed.     

Matching the message source to attitude functions: Implications for biased processing

A study was conducted to examine the hypothesis that matching (vs. mismatching) the source of a persuasive message to the functional basis of recipients’ attitudes may lead to positively biased processing. Under conditions conducive to effortful processing, high and low self-monitors were presented with a persuasive message ascribed to a source that either matched or mismatched the functional basis of their attitudes (i.e., an expert source for low self-monitors and an attractive source for high self-monitors). The message content was either unambiguous strong, unambiguous weak, or ambiguous. As predicted, given an ambiguous message biased processing led to more agreement when the source matched (vs. mismatched) attitude functions. In contrast, an unambiguous strong message led to more agreement than an unambiguous weak message regardless of source matching (unbiased processing). Results are discussed with respect to the role of the activation and use of heuristics in biased processing.     

When linking is stronger than thinking: Associative transfer of valence disrupts the emergence of cognitive balance after attitude change

The present research investigated the role of cognitive balance vs. associative transfer of valence in attitude change. Participants first formed positive or negative attitudes toward several source individuals. Subsequently, participants were shown source–target pairs along with information about the source–target relationship (‘likes’/‘dislikes’). Afterwards, participants’ attitudes toward the sources were changed by means of information that was opposite to the initially induced attitude. In a control condition, initial source attitudes remained unqualified. Results in the control condition showed that initially formed attitudes and available relationship information produced target evaluations that were consistent with the notion of cognitive balance. However, when attitudes toward the sources changed, target evaluations directly matched attitudes toward individually associated sources, irrespective of the relation between source and target. These results suggest that associative transfer of valence can disrupt the emergence of cognitive balance after attitude change.     

The impact of affective and cognitive focus on attitude formation

We examined the effects of unobtrusive affective and cognitive focus on attitude formation. To induce focus, participants worked on a word-search puzzle consisting of either affective (e.g., emotion) or cognitive (e.g., reasoning) words. They then read positive and negative affective and cognitive information about a new attitude object. In the affective focus condition, evaluations were more congruent with the valence of the affective information than they were in the cognitive focus condition, where evaluations were more congruent with the valence of the cognitive information than they were in the affective focus condition. Affective focus also resulted in enhanced recall of affective information. The effects on evaluations remained stable over time, whereas effects on memory disappeared. Finally, affective focus was associated with faster response times, suggesting enhanced accessibility of affect-based attitudes. The present research shows that an affective or cognitive focus leads to the formation of different attitudes.     

Attitudes toward health-messages: The link between perceived attention and subjective strength

IntroductionMany efforts are invested in promoting healthy attitudes and behaviors; nonetheless there is no clear, definitive evidence of sustained effectiveness of those efforts in all cases.ObjectiveThe present study examined the role of perceived attention in changing attitudes toward vegetable consumption as well as the perceived stability and resistance of those changes (attitude strength).MethodParticipants were randomly assigned to read a strong or weak health communication arguing in favor of vegetable consumption. After reading the message, participants reported attitudes toward this health issue, the perceived attention, and the perceived strength associated with their evaluations.ResultsParticipants who reported high (vs. low) perceived attention showed a greater effect of argument quality on persuasion. Furthermore, such participants also reported stronger attitudes compared to those who reported low perceived attention.ConclusionThis study showed that attitudes toward vegetable consumption can be changed after reading a persuasive message, and that the extent of perceived attention moderated the extent to which those changes were perceived as stable and resistant (stronger attitudes).     

Consumer conviction and commitment: An appraisal‐based framework for attitude certainty

This paper explores consumers' commitment to and conviction about their beliefs in the form of attitude certainty. Based on a review of past research, we present a new framework for understanding attitude certainty and how consumers' attitude certainty is shaped by their resisting or yielding to persuasive messages, or even by their reflections on the evidence supporting their attitudes. We propose that attitude certainty is formed and changed largely through an attribution-based reasoning process linked to a finite set of distinct appraisals. Our framework is used to both organize past research and offer guidance for future research endeavors. In addition, we distinguish our framework of appraisal-based attitude certainty from past models in attitudes and persuasion research that have referenced or taken note of the attitude certainty construct. Implications and future directions for the study of consumer behavior are discussed.     

Personality and strength-related attitude dimensions: Between and within-person relationships

Examined personality variables as predictors and moderators of strength-related attitude dimensions (SRAD) using multilevel modeling. Results revealed significant person-level variation in attitude importance, extremity, and ambivalence across attitude objects. Study 1 found the personality variable of need to evaluate (NE) predicted extremity across attitude objects, and finding meaning in life (ML) was predictive of importance across objects. Study 2 revealed that neuroticism and state anxiety were significant predictors of ambivalence across attitude objects. Finally, the NE, the Need for Cognition, and Openness to Experience each moderated the within-person relationship between extremity and ambivalence across objects, with higher values on the individual difference variables being related to stronger within-person relationships. Implications for research on attitude strength and the relationships between personality variables and attitudes are discussed.     

Exploring the Valence‐Framing Effect: Negative Framing Enhances Attitude Strength

In his now‐classic research on inoculation theory, McGuire (1964 ) demonstrated that exposing people to an initial weak counterattitudinal message could lead to enhanced resistance to a subsequent stronger counterattitudinal message. More recently, research on the valence‐framing effect ( Bizer & Petty, 2005 ) demonstrated an alternative way to make attitudes more resistant. Simply framing a person's attitude negatively (i.e., in terms of a rejected position such as anti‐Democrat) led to more resistance to an attack on that attitude than did framing the same attitude positively (i.e., in terms of a preferred position such as pro‐Republican). Using an election context, the current research tested whether valence framing influences attitude resistance specifically or attitude strength more generally, providing insight into the effect's mechanism and generalizability. In two experiments, attitude valence was manipulated by framing a position either negatively or positively. Experiment 1 showed that negatively framed attitudes were held with more certainty than were positively framed attitudes. In Experiment 2, conducted among a representative sample of residents of two U.S. states during political campaigns, negatively framed attitudes demonstrated higher levels of attitude certainty and attitude‐consistent behavioral intentions than did attitudes that were framed positively. Furthermore, the effect of valence framing on behavioral intentions was mediated by attitude certainty. Valence framing thus appears to be a relatively low‐effort way to impact multiple features associated with strong attitudes.     

Exploring the Strength of Association between the Components of Emotion Syndromes: The Case of Surprise

A new experimental paradigm involving a computerised quiz was used to examine, on an intra-individual level, the strength of association between four components of the surprise syndrome: cognitive (degree of prospectively estimated unexpectedness), experiential (the feeling of surprise), behavioural (degree of response delay on a parallel task), and expressive (the facial expression of surprise). It is argued that this paradigm, together with associated methods of data analysis, effectively controls for most method factors that could in previous studies have lowered the correlations among the components of emotion syndromes. It was found that (a) the components of the surprise syndrome were all positively correlated; (b) strong association existed only between the cognitive and the experiential component of surprise; (c) the coherence between syndrome components did not increase with increasing intensity of surprise; and (d) there was also only moderate coherence between the components of the facial expression of surprise (eyebrow raising, eye widening, mouth opening), although in this case, coherence tended to increase with intensity. Taken together, the findings support only a weakly probabilistic version of a behavioural syndrome view of surprise. However, the component correlations seem strong enough to support the existence of strong associations among a subset of the mental or central neurophysiological processes engaged in surprise.     

Contextual contrast and perceived knowledge: Exploring the implications for persuasion

The present research tested the notion that perceived target knowledge can be affected by the amount of information one has about other recently encountered stimuli—whether that information is relevant or not. Furthermore, the present research tested the implications of this effect for persuasion. In 4 experiments, participants were presented with a persuasive message promoting a fictitious department store, but first received another message containing more or less information about something else (e.g., another store, a car, or a person). Regardless of the type or valence of initial information received, the initial message had a contrast effect on perceived target knowledge, which influenced target attitudes. The less information the initial message contained, the more persuasive knowledge participants thought they received from the target message, and the more their attitudes agreed with that message. These findings suggest that the perceived amount of persuasive information one has about a target stimulus can be manipulated to increase persuasion, even when the actual amount of information about the target stimulus does not vary.     

The role of faith in intuition, need for cognition and method of attitude formation in implicit–explicit brand attitude relationship strength

We tested the hypothesis that Faith in Intuition (FI) would moderate implicit–explicit attitude relationship strength for attitudes formed via associative processes, but not propositional processes. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that FI moderated I–E relationship strength for attitudes formed via evaluative conditioning. High FI people had stronger I–E correlations. Experiment 2 showed that FI did not moderate I–E relationship strength for attitudes formed via propositional reasoning. Those low in Need for Cognition (NC), however, showed stronger I–E correlations than those high in NC. The importance of considering trait variables in combination with the method of attitude formation is discussed.     

When credibility attacks: The reverse impact of source credibility on persuasion

Recent research on the self-validation hypothesis suggests that source credibility identified after message processing can influence the confidence people have in their own thoughts generated in response to persuasive messages (Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2004). The present research explored the implications of this effect for the possibility that high credibility sources can be associated with more or less persuasion than low credibility sources. In two experiments, it is demonstrated that when people generate primarily positive thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because the message contains strong arguments) and then learn of the source, high source credibility leads to more favorable attitudes than does low source credibility. When people have primarily negative thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because it contains weak arguments), however, this effect is reversed—that is, high source credibility leads to less favorable attitudes than does low source credibility.