Science and community psychology: social norms for pluralistic inquiry

The concept of science linked to the concept of community psychology requires adaptation. In the case of community psychology, science is public to citizens as well as to the scientist. The community psychologist, as scientist, works from the expectation that choices of topics, methods, and interpretation of findings are done in concert with representatives of the community. The following remarks offer 7 ways to keep vital the research of the community psychologist while contributing to robust and useful knowledge.     

Pastoral theology in a pluralistic age

The article presents a theological and normative response to the question, “What is Pastoral Theology?”. The primary task is to bring together theological ethics and the social sciences to provide a normative vision of the human life cycle for a pluralistic setting with diverse religio-cultural assumptions. Introduces a clinical case to suggest the range of questions with which Pastoral Theology should be concerned and presents four propositions informed by a theological ethic and a dynamic perspective.     

Towards a pluralistic neurobiological understanding of consciousness

Theories of consciousness are often based on the assumption that a single, unified neurobiological account will explain different types of conscious awareness. However, recent findings show that, even within a single modality such as conscious visual perception, the anatomical location, timing, and information flow of neural activity related to conscious awareness vary depending on both external and internal factors. This suggests that the search for generic neural correlates of consciousness may not be fruitful. I argue that consciousness science requires a more pluralistic approach and propose a new framework: joint determinant theory (JDT). This theory may be capable of accommodating different brain circuit mechanisms for conscious contents as varied as percepts, wills, memories, emotions, and thoughts, as well as their integrated experience.     

Physicians and patients: Moral agency in a pluralistic world

This paper examines the role of the physician in a pluralistic community. A personal and communal sense of identity must resolve a vast array of often conflicting backgrounds and contexts in order to function smoothly. Physicians are neither entitled to impose their own moral views on their patients nor expected to surrender their own moral agency. Several illustrative cases are given. The solution of inevitable conflicts is embodied within the context of the situation, but since irreconcilable differences remain, a resolution is not always possible. Tolerance for such differences and ways of dealing with them allows the integrity of both parties to remain intact.     

On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance

Pluralistic ignorance is a socio-psychological phenomenon that involves a systematic discrepancy between people’s private beliefs and public behavior in certain social contexts. Recently, pluralistic ignorance has gained increased attention in formal and social epistemology. But to get clear on what precisely a formal and social epistemological account of pluralistic ignorance should look like, we need answers to at least the following two questions: What exactly is the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance? And can the phenomenon arise among perfectly rational agents? In this paper, we propose answers to both these questions. First, we characterize different versions of pluralistic ignorance and define the version that we claim most adequately captures the examples cited as paradigmatic cases of pluralistic ignorance in the literature. In doing so, we will stress certain key epistemic and social interactive aspects of the phenomenon. Second, given our characterization of pluralistic ignorance, we argue that the phenomenon can indeed arise in groups of perfectly rational agents. This, in turn, ensures that the tools of formal epistemology can be fully utilized to reason about pluralistic ignorance.     

Accountability in a computerized society

This essay warns of eroding accountability in computerized societies. It argues that assumptions about computing and features of situations in which computers are produced create barriers to accountability. Drawing on philosophical analyses of moral blame and responsibility, four barriers are identified: 1) the problem of many hands, 2) the problem of bugs, 3) blaming the computer, and 4) software ownership without liability. The paper concludes with ideas on how to reverse this trend. Several people have contributed generously to this work. Michael Davis, Deborah G. Johnson, Arthur Kuflik, Pamela Samuelson, Debra Satz, Richard De George, Larry May, and Dennis Thompson read drafts and made invaluable suggestions. Reviewers forScience and Engineering Ethics offered thorough and challenging commentary. An earlier version of the paper was presented at The American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division Meeting, December 1993, where audience comments and questions led to clarification of several key issues.