Traces of the artist: Sensitivity to the role of the artist in children's pictorial reasoning

In three studies we investigated the question of whether children consider the attributes of the artist (sentience, age level, affective style, emotion) when making judgments about the traces (drawings) made by that artist. In Study 1, 2–5‐year‐old children were asked to find pictures drawn by a machine, an adult, an older and a younger child. Results indicated that children younger than 4 years do not consider the artists' attributes when making judgments, but 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds do. Furthermore, whereas the oldest children were adept at both machine‐person (sentience) and person‐person (age) contrasts, 4‐year‐olds succeeded only with person‐person contrasts. In Study 2, videotaped artists displayed differences in degree of agitation (affective style) while drawing, and this attribute was manipulated in the drawing by varying line density, asymmetry, line overlap and line gap, or all four features, across stimuli. Three‐ and five‐year‐old children judged whether a calm or agitated person drew the stimuli. Findings showed that five‐year‐old, but not 3‐year‐old, children easily completed the task. In Study 3, 3‐, 5‐ and 7‐year‐old children judged whether happy or sad artists made paintings of matching emotional tone. Performance on this picture judgment task was contrasted with performance on three theory of mind tasks (false belief, emotion and interpretative). The results indicated that 5‐ and 7‐year‐olds successfully judged the impact of artists' emotions on paintings, but 3‐year‐olds did not. Performance on the picture task was related to that on the false belief task, but not to the emotion or interpretive tasks. Taken together, the results suggest that children's view of visual symbols includes a consideration of the qualities of the artist beginning around 5 years, and there appears to be a common link between judgments of the mind behind the visual symbol in the picture task and judgments of mental state reasoning in the false belief task.     

Eliciting Empathy for Adults in Chronic Pain through Autobiographical Memory Sharing

Two studies (N = 80; N = 91) investigated whether sharing an autobiographical memory increases empathy for a person experiencing chronic pain. Across studies, empathy was assessed after reading a pain‐related narrative of either a 25‐ or 85‐year‐old target and again after assignment to one of two recall conditions. Conditions involved recalling a pain‐related autobiographical memory (Studies 1 and 2), or as comparisons, recalling the target's pain narrative (Study 1) or recalling a character in pain from a movie (Study 2). Looking across both studies, empathy levels appear to increase after sharing an autobiographical memory but not in the comparison conditions. Increases in empathy were related to trait‐level agreeableness. When target‐age differences emerged (Study 2), participants felt greater empathy for the older person. Findings are discussed in terms of the function of autobiographical memory in eliciting pro‐social emotions such as empathy and implications for training empathic responding. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Differential effects of makeup on perceived age

Makeup accentuates three youth‐related visual features – skin homogeneity, facial contrast, and facial feature size. By manipulating these visual features, makeup should make faces appear younger. We tested this hypothesis in an experiment in which participants estimated the age of carefully controlled photographs of faces with and without makeup. We found that 40‐ and especially 50‐year‐old women did appear significantly younger when wearing makeup. Contrary to our hypothesis, 30‐year‐old women looked no different in age with or without makeup, while 20‐year‐old women looked older with makeup. Two further studies replicated these results, finding that makeup made middle‐aged women look younger, but made young women look older. Seeking to better understand why makeup makes young women look older, we ran a final study and found evidence that people associate makeup use with adulthood. By activating associations with adulthood, makeup may provide an upward bias on age estimations of women who are not clearly adult. We propose that makeup affects social perceptions through bottom‐up routes, by modifying visual cues such as facial contrast, facial feature size, and skin homogeneity, and also through top‐down routes, by activating social representations and norms associated with makeup use.     

Working memory abilities and children's performance in laboratory analogues of classroom activities

Laboratory analogues of classroom activities on which children with low working memory skills have been observed to perform very poorly were developed and employed in two studies. In Study 1, 5‐ and 6‐year‐old completed one task involving recalling spoken sentences and counting the numbers of words, and another task involving the identification of rhyming words in spoken poems. Poorer performance of low than average working memory children was obtained on the recall measure of both tasks. In Study 2, 5‐ and 6‐year‐old children heard spoken instructions involving the manipulation of a sequence of objects, and were asked either to perform the instructions or repeat them, in different conditions. The accuracy of performing but not repeating instructions was strongly associated with working memory skills. These results indicate that working memory plays a significant role in typical classroom activities that involve both the storage and mental manipulation of information. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Closing the empathy gap in college students' judgments of end‐of‐life tradeoffs

When considering hypothetical end‐of‐life (EOL) scenarios involving 80‐year‐old intensive‐care unit patients, young adults are more likely than older adults to judge that shorter lifespan would be a fair trade in exchange for a more pleasant death. This result has been interpreted in terms of an empathy gap, in which individuals fail to relate to the affective states of others. If so, the effect should be reduced when young adults consider scenarios involving patients similar to themselves. The present study examined college students' willingness to trade healthy lifespan for better death in EOL scenarios involving 80‐year‐old and 22‐year‐old cancer victims. Results indicated students under 30 were less likely to trade lifespan in the 22‐year‐old scenarios, and were less likely to trade lifespan in either set of scenarios when the 22‐year‐old scenarios were presented first. The findings are consistent with an empathy gap account of judgments concerning EOL care.     

Definitions of bullying: Age differences in understanding of the term,and the role of experience

We report two studies that examine age differences in pupils' and parents' definitions of the term bullying, and possible reasons for these including the role of specific experiences. Study 1 compared definitions of bullying given by participants in four age groups; 4 to 6 years, 8 years, 14 years and adult. Participants were shown/read 17 different cartoon scenarios and were asked if each constituted an episode of bullying or not. Multidimensional scaling indicated that the groups differed in their definition of bullying. 4‐ to 6‐year‐olds and 8‐year‐olds used 1 dimension, a distinction between aggressive and non‐aggressive acts, when differentiating cartoons; 14‐year‐olds and adults gave a 2‐dimensional solution, also distinguishing between physical and non‐physical (social/relational or verbal) acts. Study 2 further investigated definitions of bullying given by 99 children aged 4 to 6 years, and the role of experience. Just over half had some understanding of the term, but tended to be less concerned about power differences and repetition of actions. No significant differences in definitions were found between boys and girls, or between children in involved (aggressor, victim or defender) or not involved (bystander) roles; however, aggressors were more likely than other children to say that 11 of the 13 aggressive behaviours were not bullying. These findings are discussed in relation to age related changes in experiences of bullying and cognitive development. Implications for interventions and research are also raised.     

To be or not to be a galaprock: Preschoolers' intuitions about the importance of knowledge and action for pretending

Can someone pretend to be a galaprock without knowing what a galaprock is? Do children recognize that such knowledge is required for pretending? Three studies focusing on the relations among action, knowledge and pretending suggest that children have this understanding by age 4 years. In Study 1, 4‐year‐olds and adults willingly pretended to be moving and unmoving objects but had trouble pretending to be objects that were difficult to represent physically. In Study 2, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds claimed they could not pretend to be an unknown thing, justifying their refusals with mentalistic language indicating their ignorance of the object or its typical actions. In Study 3, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds predicted that other children who have knowledge of an object unfamiliar to the subjects themselves can nevertheless pretend to be it, whereas those lacking that knowledge cannot. The results add support to the growing literature showing that preschoolers conceptualize pretense as involving mental activity.     

Enhancing the recall of young,young–old and old–old adults with cognitive interviews

Two studies examined whether a Cognitive Interview improves older witnesses' recall. Study 1 compared the quality and quantity of older adults' recall when given a typical UK police interview, the Enhanced Cognitive Interview (ECI), or a modified version of the Cognitive Interview (MCI). The MCI was identical to the ECI except that the change perspective technique was omitted. Old–old (75–95‐years) adults' recall was less complete and less accurate than that of young–old (60–74‐years) adults, which was less complete and accurate than that of young (17–31‐years) adults. The ECI and MCI increased the number of correct Person, Action, Object and Surrounding details reported across every age group, without increasing the number of incorrect or confabulated details recalled. In Study 2, it was found that these effects remained when interviews were re‐scored using a system that reflected police officers' decisions about the investigative relevance of details. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's conceptions of mental illness: A naïve theory approach

This paper reports two studies that investigated children's conceptions of mental illness using a naïve theory approach, drawing upon a conceptual framework for analysing illness representations which distinguishes between the identity, causes, consequences, curability, and timeline of an illness. The studies utilized semi‐structured interviewing and card selection tasks to assess 6‐ to 11‐year‐old children's conceptions of the causes and consequences (Study 1) and the curability and timeline (Study 2) of different mental and physical illnesses/ailments. The studies revealed that, at all ages, the children held coherent causal–explanatory ideas about the causes, consequences, curability, and timeline of both mental and physical illnesses/ailments. However, while younger children tended to rely on their knowledge of common physical illnesses when thinking about mental illnesses, providing contagion and contamination explanations of cause, older children demonstrated differences in their thinking about mental and physical illnesses. No substantial gender differences were found in the children's thinking. It is argued that children hold coherent conceptions of mental illness at all ages, but that mental illness only emerges as an ontologically distinct conceptual domain by the end of middle childhood.     

Developmental changes in the recognition of faces and facial features

The view that, as children get older, there is a decline in the use of feature‐based forms of face processing to more configurational forms of processing was examined by asking 6‐year‐old and 9‐year‐old children to judge which of two photographs matches an identical probe photograph. The probe and test stimuli were either photographs of whole faces or photographs of isolated facial features. Within this standard method, the stimuli also systematically varied in terms of the familiarity of the faces shown and in the orientation of presentation, both factors that have been interpreted as effecting configurational encoding. A number of age‐related effects are observed: (a) older children are better at recognizing whole faces than younger children, (b) older children exhibit a clear face inversion effect with whole faces while the younger children are equally adept at identifying upright and inverted whole faces, and (c) analysis of the recognition rates associated with the individual features reveals that younger children are better than older children when asked to recognize eye regions. It is argued that the data support the view that as children get older there is a change in the forms of piecemeal encoding employed and an increase in configurational processing. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stronger evidence for own-age effects in memory for older as compared to younger adults

Three studies examined whether younger and older adults better recall information associated with their own than information related to another age group. All studies compared young and older adults with respect to incidental memory for previously presented stimuli (Studies 1 and 2: everyday objects; Study 3: vacation advertisements) that had been randomly paired with an age-related cue (e.g., photo of a young or an old person; the word "young" or "old"). All three studies found the expected interaction of participants' age and age-associated information. Studies 1 and 2 showed that the memory bias for information arbitrarily associated with one's own as compared to another age group was significant for older adults only. However, when age-relevance was introduced in a context of equal importance to younger and older adults (information about vacations paired either with pictures of young or older adults), the memory bias for one's own age group was clearly present for both younger and older adults (Study 3).     

Do the Emotional Benefits of Optimism Vary Across Older Adulthood? A Life Span Perspective

This study examined whether the emotional benefits of dispositional optimism for managing stressful encounters decrease across older adulthood. Such an effect might emerge because age‐related declines in opportunities for overcoming stressors could reduce the effectiveness of optimism. This hypothesis was tested in a 6‐year longitudinal study of 171 community‐dwelling older adults (age range = 64–90 years). Hierarchical linear models showed that dispositional optimism protected relatively young participants from exhibiting elevations in depressive symptoms over time, but that these benefits became increasingly reduced among their older counterparts. Moreover, the findings showed that an age‐related association between optimism and depressive symptoms was observed particularly during periods of enhanced, as compared to reduced, stress. These results suggest that dispositional optimism protects emotional well‐being during the early phases of older adulthood, but that its effects are reduced in advanced old age.     

Associations among relational values,support, health,and well‐being across the adult lifespan

Is the link between close relationships and health and well‐being static across the lifespan, or are the benefits most evident in older adulthood, when concerns about physical health are greater? In Study 1, a cross‐sectional survey of 271,053 adults, valuing friendships was related to better functioning, particularly among older adults, whereas valuing familial relationships exerted a static influence on health and well‐being across the lifespan. In Study 2, a longitudinal study of 7,481 older adults, only strain from friendships predicted more chronic illnesses over a 6‐year period; support from spouses, children, and friends predicted higher subjective well‐being over an 8‐year period.     

Stronger evidence for own-age effects in memory for older as compared to younger adults

Three studies examined whether younger and older adults better recall information associated with their own than information related to another age group. All studies compared young and older adults with respect to incidental memory for previously presented stimuli (Studies 1 and 2: everyday objects; Study 3: vacation advertisements) that had been randomly paired with an age-related cue (e.g., photo of a young or an old person; the word “young” or “old”). All three studies found the expected interaction of participants’ age and age-associated information. Studies 1 and 2 showed that the memory bias for information arbitrarily associated with one's own as compared to another age group was significant for older adults only. However, when age-relevance was introduced in a context of equal importance to younger and older adults (information about vacations paired either with pictures of young or older adults), the memory bias for one's own age group was clearly present for both younger and older adults (Study 3).     

Magical thinking in judgments of causation: Can anomalous phenomena affect ontological causal beliefs in children and adults?

In four experiments, 4‐, 5‐, 6‐ and 9‐year‐old children and adults were tested on the entrenchment of their magical beliefs and their beliefs in the universal power of physical causality. In Experiment 1, even 4‐year‐olds showed some understanding of the difference between ordinary and anomalous (magical) causal events, but only 6‐year‐olds and older participants denied that magic could occur in real life. When shown an anomalous causal event (a transformation of a physical object in an apparently empty box after a magic spell was cast on the box), 4‐ and 6‐year‐olds accepted magical explanations of the event, whereas 9‐year‐olds and adults did not. In Experiment 2, the same patterns of behaviour as above were shown by 6‐ and 9‐year‐olds who demonstrated an understanding of the difference between genuine magical events and similarly looking tricks. Testing the entrenchment of magical beliefs in this experiment showed that 5‐year‐olds tended to retain their magical explanations of the anomalous event, even after the mechanism of the trick had been explained to them, whereas 6‐ and 9‐year‐olds did not. In Experiment 3, adult participants refused to accept magical explanations of the anomalous event and interpreted it as a trick or an illusion, even after this event was repeated 4 times. Yet, when in Experiment 4 similar anomalous causal events were demonstrated without reference to magic, most adults acknowledged, both in their verbal judgments and in their actions, that the anomalous effects were not a fiction but had really occurred. The data of this study suggest that in the modern industrialized world, magical beliefs persist but are disguised to fit the dominant scientific paradigm.     

Age differences in emotional reactivity: the sample case of sadness

Past studies have suggested that the intensity of subjective reactions to emotion-arousing stimuli remains stable, whereas the magnitude of autonomic reactions declines with age. The goal of the present studies was to investigate whether this evidence will generalize to newly edited films dealing with age-relevant themes such as the loss of loved ones. In Study 1, greater self-reported sadness was found in older than in younger adults in response to all films. Findings of Study 2, which were based on an independent sample, replicated those of Study 1. In addition, 6 indicators of autonomic nervous system activity were assessed. Young and old adults did not differ in their autonomic reactions to the films. This evidence suggests that when older people are exposed to stimuli featuring themes that are relevant to their age group, they show greater subjective and physiological reactions than would be expected on the basis of past research.     

Contribution of the priming paradigm to the understanding of the conceptual developmental shift from 5 to 9 years of age

We conducted three experiments to study the role of instrumental (e.g. knife–bread) and categorical (e.g. cake–bread) relations in the development of conceptual organization with a priming paradigm, by varying the nature of the task (naming – Experiment 1 – or categorical decision – Experiments 2 and 3). The participants were 5‐, 7‐ and 9‐year‐old children and adults. The results showed that on both types of task, adults and 9‐year‐old children presented instrumental and categorical priming effects, whereas 5‐year‐old children presented mainly instrumental priming effects, with categorical effects remaining marginal. Moreover, the magnitude of the instrumental priming effects decreased with age. Finally, the priming effects observed for 7‐year‐old children depended on the task, especially for the categorical effects. The theoretical implications of these results for our understanding of conceptual reorganization from 5 to 9 years of age are discussed.     

Age-related differences in brain electrical activity during extended continuous face recognition in younger children, older children and adults

To examine the development of recognition memory in primary-school children, 36 healthy younger children (8-9 years old) and 36 healthy older children (11-12 years old) participated in an ERP study with an extended continuous face recognition task (Study 1). Each face of a series of 30 faces was shown randomly six times interspersed with distracter faces. The children were required to make old vs. new decisions. Older children responded faster than younger children, but younger children exhibited a steeper decrease in latencies across the five repetitions. Older children exhibited better accuracy for new faces, but there were no age differences in recognition accuracy for repeated faces. For the N2, N400 and late positive complex (LPC), we analyzed the old/new effects (repetition 1 vs. new presentation) and the extended repetition effects (repetitions 1 through 5). Compared to older children, younger children exhibited larger frontocentral N2 and N400 old/new effects. For extended face repetitions, negativity of the N2 and N400 decreased in a linear fashion in both age groups. For the LPC, an ERP component thought to reflect recollection, no significant old/new or extended repetition effects were found. Employing the same face recognition paradigm in 20 adults (Study 2), we found a significant N400 old/new effect at lateral frontal sites and a significant LPC repetition effect at parietal sites, with LPC amplitudes increasing linearly with the number of repetitions. This study clearly demonstrates differential developmental courses for the N400 and LPC pertaining to recognition memory for faces. It is concluded that face recognition in children is mediated by early and probably more automatic than conscious recognition processes. In adults, the LPC extended repetition effect indicates that adult face recognition memory is related to a conscious and graded recollection process rather than to an automatic recognition process.     

Will to live in older people's medical decisions: immediate and delayed effects of aging stereotypes

This research explores the duration of age stereotype priming effects on individuals' will to live when faced with a medical terminal illness decision. Study 1 established the content of the stereotype of the older age group in Portugal. Study 2 tested the effects of priming positive or negative age stereotypes on older and younger individuals' will to live, immediately after priming or after a delay. Results showed significant effects of stereotype valence on older people's will to live. As expected, immediate and delayed will‐to‐live scores were both lower in the negative than in the positive condition. In contrast, among younger people there were no significant effects of stereotype valence. These findings demonstrate the robustness of these types of unconscious influences on older people's fundamental decisions.