After MacIntyre

In his influential book After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre identifies Kierkegaard's view of ethics with that of Kant. Both Kant and Kierkegaard, according to MacIntyre, accept the modern paradigm of moral activity for which freedom of the will is the ultimate basis. Ronald M. Green, in Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt, accepts and deepens this alignment between the two thinkers. Green argues that Kierkegaard deliberately obscured his debt to Kant by a systematic “misattribution” of his ideas to other thinkers, and to classical philosophy in particular. This essay argues that MacIntyre and Green are mistaken in identifying Kierkegaard with the Kantian tradition of moral autonomy and that they overlook his debt to the classical conception of virtue. In casting Kierkegaard in the role of the quintessential exponent of a modern conception of freedom, they have perhaps overlooked one of the greatest critics of moral autonomy who has ever lived.     

麦金太尔论给予和接受的德性

在人类共同的社会实践中 ,我们总是处在一种给予和接受的关系之中 ,因此 ,也就需要一种给予和接受的德性。亚里士多德和阿奎那考察了这类德性。包容着具体的公正慷慨的接受和给予的德性实践是我们自己共同体的基本实践 ,对于共同体的共同生活起了它所起的作用。     

MacIntyre on Tradition,Rationality, and Relativism

MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism relies crucially on a distinctive moral particularism, for which morality and rationality are fundamentally tradition-constituted. In light of this, some have detected in his work a moral relativism, radically in tension with his endorsement of a Thomist universalism. I dispute this reading, arguing instead that MacIntyre is a consistent universalist who pays due attention to the moral-epistemic importance of traditions. Analysing his teleological understanding of rational enquiry, I argue that this approach shows how it is possible, dialectically, to reconcile the particularity of our starting-points with the assertion of universal truths. What MacIntyre offers, I contend, is a moral universalism that avoids the pitfalls of its liberal counterpart, and invites an important meta-theoretical shift with respect to the scope for toleration and social critique and toleration in contemporary pluralist society.     

MacIntyre and the Idea of an Educated Public

Some years ago, 1985, Alasdair MacIntyre wrote a paper onThe Idea of an Educated Public in which he argued that the only route open for educators for the future, in order to emerge out of the current moral crisis created by the emotivist modernist culture is to bring back the idea of an educated public from the Scottish Enlightenment and to regard education as education into such a public. The notion of an educated public, in effect, reappears also in all his later books on moral philosophy, particular his latest,Three Rival Theories of Moral Enquiry, where he takes up his original proposal that educated publics should grow around universities and canvasses the new idea that under contemporary conditions what we may need is not one universal university but three kinds contextualized within the three rival kinds of cultural and moral programmes he identifies, and, correspondingly, three kinds of educated public. This paper tries to trace the evolution of MacIntyre's idea of an educated public throughout his work, (1) arguing that there is one particular perspective on the idea which he strangely omits, that represented by Dewey/Habermas, and (2) critiquing his final solution on the basis of its possibility and political desirability.     

Pellegrino,MacIntyre, and the internal morality of clinical medicine

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - There has been significant debate about whether the moral norms of medical practice arise from some feature or set of features internal to the discipline of...     

麦金太尔论社会关系、共同利益与个人利益

我们从出生到死亡都处在一种接受与给予的关系中 ,我们从谁那里接受和给予谁往往是不对称的。这是我们参与到这个网络中不得不懂得的。在这个接受与给予的关系中 ,有我们的共同利益和我们个人的利益。同时 ,处在这样一种关系中 ,也需要我们遵守相应的德性规则。     

Comments on Guyer

Paul Guyer's paper “Naturalistic and Transcendental Moments in Kant's Moral Philosophy” raises a set of issues about how Kantian ethics should be understood in relation to present day “philosophical naturalism” that are very much in need of discussion. The paper itself is challenging, even in some respects iconoclastic, and provides a highly welcome provocation to raise in new ways some basic questions about what Kantian ethics is and what it ought to be. Guyer offers us an admirably informed and complex argument, both historical and philosophical, that tangles with some of the most difficult problems in Kant's moral philosophy. It begins with some ambitious and controversial claims about Kant's moral philosophy prior to the Groundwork of 1785. It then offers an interpretation, and also a fundamental criticism, of the Groundwork's attempt to establish the moral law based on the idea of freedom of the will. And finally, it raises – and expresses some opinions on – the large and vexed questions of the relationship between transcendental philosophy and philosophical naturalism, and whether Kantian ethics can be made consistent with a naturalistic philosophical outlook. In these comments I will have something to say on each of these three topics, without pretending (any more than Guyer does) to have exhausted what might be said about them.