The latent structure of decision styles

Responding to calls for theoretical development in research on decision styles, this article focuses on their structural relationships. A two-component model of decision styles is proposed. One component, pertaining to dual process theories of thinking, is concerned with the processes people use to make decisions, and the other is concerned with processes used to regulate decisions (e.g. whether they should be made immediately or delayed). The results of a first study (N = 629) using items from a comprehensive decision style measure (the Decision Styles Questionnaire), support the two-component model. The results of a second study (N = 305), based on an alternative set of style measures, provide support for an extended version of the model. Implications of the theory and research findings for future work on decision styles are discussed.     

Choosing what I want or keeping what I should: The effect of decision strategy on choice consistency

We examine decision-makers’ consistency vis-à-vis their own priorities in a multi-choice task, using either an inclusion or exclusion strategy to reduce a set of alternatives. Four studies demonstrate that people’s decisions are more consistent with their priorities when using an exclusion vs. an inclusion strategy to screen alternatives. Moreover, this effect was stronger for less knowledgeable than for more knowledgeable decision-makers. We examined two possible mechanisms behind this phenomenon. First, we suggest that the process of thinking about the positive aspects of the alternatives (associated with inclusion) encourages the decision-maker to more favorably evaluate options initially given low marks, resulting in less consistency with preferences. We also show that under exclusion, people tend to select the alternatives that they think they should choose, while under inclusion they tend to choose options that are more in line with what they would like to have but which may be perceived as luxuries.     

The dynamics of deferred decision

Decision makers are often unable to choose between the options that they are offered. In these settings they typically defer their decision, that is, delay the decision to a later point in time or avoid the decision altogether. In this paper, we outline eight behavioral findings regarding the causes and consequences of choice deferral that cognitive theories of decision making should be able to capture. We show that these findings can be accounted for by a deferral-based time limit applied to existing sequential sampling models of preferential choice. Our approach to modeling deferral as a time limit in a sequential sampling model also makes a number of novel predictions regarding the interactions between choice probabilities, deferral probabilities, and decision times, and we confirm these predictions in an experiment. Choice deferral is a key feature of everyday decision making, and our paper illustrates how established theoretical approaches can be used to understand the cognitive underpinnings of this important behavioral phenomenon.     

Binary-choice decision time depends upon cerebral hemisphere and nature of task

Binary-choice paradigms are classificatory problems of basic importance to the understanding of elementary decision processes. Generally when subjects decide if two visual stimuli are identical or differ by as little as one element, the decision of "Different" takes longer. This finding is unexpected as decisions of "Different" should not require an exhaustive matching of elements. Using stimulus presentation to the right and left cerebral hemispheres, the right hemisphere initiated fast selections of "Same" for figural material and alone was responsible for the "Same"/"Different" response differential. Exp. 1 (n = 22) gave no differences for same-different, unilateral-bilateral stimulation, and left-right hemispheres. Exp. 2, using word meaning as the binary-choice task, also showed faster decisions for "Same" but a different left-hemisphere-dependent strategy. The nature of information processing in relation to binary-choice tasks is discussed and the utility of bihemispheric paradigms is demonstrated.     

Response uncertainty and imitation: The interactive effects of age and task options

It was reasoned that younger children would be more susceptible to situational uncertainty and thereby imitate more than older children or peers of the same age tested under more structured conditions. Children 6- through 8- and 12- through 14-years-old observed a model toss a bean bag at a target and were tested for target relevant and incidental imitation under conditions of two task options (high structure) or 10 task options (low structure). On both measures of imitation, preadolescents in the low structure condition imitated significantly more than adolescents. Preadolescents also imitated more incidental behavior in the low than in the high structure condition. Additionally, it was found that personality variables predicted imitative behavior of younger subjects in the low structure condition only.     

The role of working memory in information acquisition and decision making: Lessons from the binary prediction task

The effects of memory constraints upon information acquisition and decision making were examined in two experiments using binary prediction tasks, where participants observe outcomes for two options before deciding which one to bet upon. Our studies extend previous investigations to the case where participants learn the structure of the task through observation, but where information acquisition is separated from the task of prediction. Participants with higher cognitive capacity (larger memory span or higher intelligence) were more likely to adopt the “maximizing” strategy (always selecting the more frequent alternative). This finding conflicts with some recent investigations of similar tasks, a contrast that implies that the presence of feedback on choices may be important in determining the strategic actions of high-capacity individuals. Participants selecting the optimal strategy were in turn more efficient in their data acquisition. The behaviour of participants adopting suboptimal choice strategies was consistent with prediction based upon a “narrow window of experience”—that is, seeking to match the characteristics of small samples of observations.     

The effects of associative and semantic priming in the lexical decision task

Four lexical decision experiments were conducted to examine under which conditions automatic semantic priming effects can be obtained. Experiments 1 and 2 analyzed associative/semantic effects at several very short stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOAs), whereas Experiments 3 and 4 used a single-presentation paradigm at two response-stimulus intervals (RSIs). Experiment 1 tested associatively related pairs from three semantic categories (synonyms, antonyms, and category coordinates). The results showed reliable associative priming effects at all SOAs. In addition, the correlation between associative strength and magnitude of priming was significant only at the shortest SOA (66 ms). When prime-target pairs were semantically but not associatively related (Experiment 2), reliable priming effects were obtained at SOAs of 83 ms and longer. Using the single-presentation paradigm with a short RSI (200 ms, Experiment 3), the priming effect was equal in size for associative + semantic and for semantic-only pairs (a 21-ms effect). When the RSI was set much longer (1,750 ms, Experiment 4), only the associative + semantic pairs showed a reliable priming effect (23 ms). The results are interpreted in the context of models of semantic memory.     

The effects of decision framing on choice of risky vs certain options

Tversky and Kahneman (1981, Science, 211, 453–458) reported that the choice between two decision alternatives of equal expected value, differing only in the degree of risk, was significantly influenced by the “framing” of the alternative decision outcomes. When alternative outcomes were phrased “positively” in terms of lives saved, subjects preferred the risk-averse alternative. When outcomes were phrased “negatively” in terms of lives lost, the risk-seeking option was preferred. Experiment 1 investigated the robustness of the framing effect and its remediation by formal training. Forty-five MBA students responded to a decision problem before and after training in decision theory. Results differed from those published by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) in two respects. First, although results in the positive framing condition were similar to Tversky and Kahneman's results, no preference for the risky option in the negative framing condition was observed. Consequently, no framing effect was found even on the pretest. Second, many students reported being indifferent to the two options. No significant changes occurred after training. Experiment 2 replicated these results on a nonbusiness sample. These findings suggest that (a) unidentified factors affect whether a framing effect is observed, and (b) the bias known as the framing effect may not be as robust as has been believed.     

Repetition and practice effects in a lexical decision task

Ss classified visually presented verbal units into the categories “in your vocabulary” or “not in your vocabulary.” The primary concern of the experiment was to determine if making a prior decision on a given item affects the latency of a subsequent lexical decision for the same item. Words of both high and low frequency showed a systematic reduction in the latency of a lexical decision as a consequence of prior decisions (priming) but did not show any reduction due to nonspecific practice effects. Nonwords showed no priming effect but did show shorter latencies due to nonspecific practice. The results also indicated that many (at least 36) words can be in the primed state simultaneously and that the effect persists for at least 10 min. The general interpretation was that priming produces an alteration in the representation of a word in memory and can facilitate the terminal portion of the memory search process which is assumed to be random.     

Orthographic neighborhood and concreteness effects in the lexical decision task

The experiment reported here investigated the sensitivity of concreteness effects to orthographic neighborhood density and frequency in the visual lexical decision task. The concreteness effect was replicated with a sample of concrete and abstract words that were not matched for orthographic neighborhood features and in which concrete words turned out to have a higher neighborhood density than abstract words. No consistent effect of concreteness was found with a sample of concrete and abstract words matched for orthographic neighborhood density and frequency and having fewer neighbors and higher-frequency neighbors than the words of the first sample. Post hoc analyses of the results showed that orthographic neighborhood density was not a nuisance variable producing a spurious effect of concreteness but, instead, that the existence of higher-frequency neighbors constitutes a necessary condition for concreteness effects to appear in the lexical decision task. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that semantic information is accessed and used to generate the responses in lexical decision when inhibition from orthographic forms delays the target word recognition.     

Termination of information evaluation in auditing

A screening decision is about whether a candidate fails to meet a decision maker's criteria and must be rejected, or whether it meets the criteria and can be accepted. Image theory contends that screening decisions are based on a simple, noncompensatory process that focuses solely upon the candidate's negative attributes. This contention has received empirical support in a job screening context in which students role-played a hypothetical person seeking a job. But how robust is image theory's prediction? The present work was done in the context of professional auditors screening prospective clients. The client screening context is a particularly interesting setting to test the implications of image theory. If auditors reject clients with negative attributes, as predicted by image theory, this will indicate that some clients are being denied access to a socially useful service. Further, auditors can accept prospective clients with negative attributes and simply adjust the audit plan and fees to compensate for the client's riskiness. Thus, it is not clear that the preliminary findings obtained in a job screening context will generalize to the audit context. On the other hand, results consistent with the image theory prediction would suggest a robust theory. Even in the client screening context, where auditors used their own criteria to screen prospective clients, we found overwhelming support for image theory's view of screening. The results indicate the potential payoffs of image theory as a robust framework to address audit and other substantive problems. Implications of a noncompensatory, negative oriented, client screening strategy are discussed.     

The effects of expectations upon task performance as moderated by levels of self-esteem

The study investigated the effects of expectations upon task performance in a simulated work environment. In a 2 × 2 factorial design, individuals of high and low self-esteem responded to either a favorable or unfavorable expectation. It was found that only high self-esteem individuals differed significantly in their response to the expectation manipulation. The results were discussed relative to self-consistency formulations and implications for organizational behavior were suggested.     

Information sampling and group decision making: the effects of an advocacy decision procedure and task experience

Group discussions tend to focus on information that was previously known by all members (shared information) rather than information known by only 1 member (unshared information). If the shared information implies a suboptimal alternative, this sampling bias is associated with inaccurate group decisions. The present study examines the impact of 2 factors on information exchange and decision quality: (a) an advocacy group decision procedure versus unstructured discussion and (b) task experience. Results show that advocacy groups discussed both more shared and unshared information than free-discussion groups. Further, with increasing experience, more unshared information was mentioned in advocacy groups. In contrast, there was no such increase in unstructured discussions. Yet advocacy groups did not significantly improve their decision quality with experience.     

The effect of visual signals on spatial decision making

We examined the effect of an irrelevant visual transient on the decision where to look for a hidden object. Participants also performed a conventional ‘inhibition of return’ localization task. In Experiments 1 and 2 the two tasks were blocked and in Experiments 3 and 4 they were randomly interleaved. In every experiment there was a bias to select the cued location in the spatial decision task. This facilitory effect was greatest when the cue occurred at a strategically unfavored location and even occurred for participants who reported strategically selecting a non-cued location, indicating that the facilitory effect is automatic and independent of other strategic biases. Inhibition of return was observed only when the tasks were blocked and the localization task preceded the decision task. The findings suggests that spatial decisions engage different attentional control settings than those engaged when detecting visual transients; and that this attentional mode affects the processing of visual transients such that they do not inhibit the subsequent speeded detection of onset targets.     

Behavioral contrast in a two-option analogue task of financial decision making

The effects of an alternative course of action on sustained escalation and persistence in the face of failure was investigated using a computerized stock investment task. Subjects invested in "stock" in two "markets" that yielded returns according to two-component multiple variable-interval schedules. Both markets yielded equal but intermittent return rates during the first phase. In the second phase, one market ceased to yield returns, while the return rate for the other market was unchanged. During the second phase, behavioral contrast effects were evident. Investing in the market that ceased to yield returns dropped precipitously, and investing in the unchanged market increased significantly. Although the behavior may be economically "irrational," it is predictable from the matching law and shows that interactions among a history of intermittent returns in a course of action, current return rate, and currently available alternative courses of action are important determinants of persisting in, or withdrawing from, a failing course of action.