A Classical Prejudice?

In this paper, I reassess Floridi’s solution to the Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox (the information yield of inconsistent propositions is maximal) by questioning the orthodox view that contradictions cannot be true. The main part of the paper is devoted to showing that the veridicality thesis (semantic information has to be true) is compatible with dialetheism (there are true contradictions) and that, unless we accept the additional non-falsity thesis (information cannot be false), there is no reason to presuppose that there is no such thing like contradictory information.     

Is U.N. Security Council Authorisation for Armed Humanitarian Intervention Morally Necessary?

Relative to the abundance of literature devoted to the legal significance of UN authorisation, little has been written about whether the UN’s failure to sanction an intervention can ever make it immoral. This is the question that I take up here. I argue that UN authorisation (or lack thereof) can have some indirect bearing on the moral status of a humanitarian intervention. That is, it can affect whether an intervention satisfies other widely accepted justifying conditions, such as proportionality, “internal” legitimacy, and likelihood of success. The more interesting question, however, is whether the UN’s failure to provide a mandate can make a humanitarian operation unjust independently of these other familiar considerations. Is a proportional, internally legitimate humanitarian intervention, with a just cause and strong prospect of success, still morally unacceptable if it is not approved by the United Nations Security Council? This is the question that I turn to in the second half of the paper.     

A SCIENTIFIC BUDDHISM?

This essay endorses the argument of Donald Lopez's Buddhism and Science and shows how the general thesis of the book is consonant with other historical work on the “discovery” of Buddhism and on the emergence of Western conceptions of religion. It asks whether one of the key claims of Buddhism and Science—that Buddhism pays a price for its flirtation with the modern sciences—might be applicable to science‐and‐religion discussions more generally.     

The Moscow Council of 1917–1918

Following a period of decline beginning in the early eighteenth century, the Orthodox Church in Russia held a general council in Moscow from August 1917 to September 1918. More than 500 clergy and laity met, prayed and discussed numerous issues relating to the church’s life and witness. The Moscow Council was prompted by various trends of renewal which were growing ever stronger among the clergy and laity. Political circumstances at the time also made the Council possible: a preparatory preconciliar process was initiated in 1905, in parallel with the first revolution against Emperor Nicholas II, and the Council itself was convened in 1917, in parallel with the establishment of a Provisional Government. However, it was precisely such political events which led to the premature interruption of the Council. The main items on the Council’s agenda were linked to the reformation of church structures and the implementation of conciliar provisions at every level of church life: parish, deanery, diocese and autocephalous church. Special attention was given to the renewal of the pastoral ministries of priests and bishops, and to that of committed laity. In a way, the Moscow Council was a kind of ‘first encounter’ of Orthodoxy with contemporary societies, secularised or on the road to secularisation. Its legacy is therefore of great interest to all Christianity today. This article aims to analyse the Council and the main decisions made, in the light of ecclesiology, and to provide a primary bibliography at the end of the text.     

HAS PSYCHOLOGY A FUTURE?

I consider that psychologists have a duty to explore their own field, to create hypotheses about the behavior of animals, especially human, and to test these and look for possible causal relationships at the level of acting, thinking, perceiving humans m their environmental context Our agenda should be at this level, not one that depends on waiting for reductionist theories at some other level, be it neural, genetic, nuclear, or especially artificial To go about this work, a developmental approach, in a systems setting—the organism-environment system—holds great promise and has the dignity of successful precedents in other sciences
All of behavior—perceiving, acting, problem solving, communicating with others—should be our province The hallmarks of human behavior can and should be studied in all of these areas It IS their development that offers a road to understanding We should continue to look for theories of considerable generality, however elegant a model may be in a tiny realm If we tot find universal laws, we may still come up with unifying principles
Not so long ago, in another keynote address, George Miller told us that It was time to "give psychology away" (Miller, 1969) I am afraid that that is exactly what we are doing, though n the sense that Miller intended Let us keep psychology, recapture the old excitement, looking for the causes in behavior itself, and not giving up on the grand unified theory     

A dilemma for internalism?

Internalism about epistemic justification (henceforth, ‘internalism’) says that a belief B is epistemically justified for S only if S is aware of some good-making feature of B, some feature that makes for B’s having positive epistemic status: e.g., evidence for B. Externalists with respect to epistemic justification (‘externalists’) deny this awareness requirement. Michael Bergmann has recently put this dilemma against internalism: awareness admits of a strong and a weak construal; given the strong construal, internalism is subject to debilitating regress troubles; given the weak construal, internalism is unmotivated; either way, internalism is in serious trouble. I argue for two claims in this article. First, Bergmann’s dilemma argument is unmotivated: he’s given no good reason for accepting one of its crucial premises. And second, Bergmann’s dilemma argument is unsound: the crucial premise in question is false.     

A Dao of Technology?

Scholars have detected hostility to technology in Daoist thought. But is this a problem with any machine or only some applications of some machines by some people? I show that the problem is not with machines per se but with the people who introduce them, or more exactly with their knowledge. It is not knowledge as such that causes the disorder Laozi and Zhuangzi associate with machines; it is confused, disordered knowledge—superficial, inadequate, unsubtle, and artless. In other words the problem is not with machines but with the ethics of engineering and the government of technology. The Daoist argument does not devalue machines or knowledge of them; instead, it sets a new goal, defining an alternative ideal—alternative to techniques held hostage to despotic ideas about efficiency and profit.