Asymmetries Between Positives and Negatives

How people react to negatives (what they dislike) is not always symmetric to how they react to positives (what they like). We propose a theoretical framework that links three potentially general types of positive–negative asymmetries: asymmetry in prediction errors (people err more when predicting others' attitudes about positives than about negatives), asymmetry in consensus (people agree more among themselves about negatives than about positives), and asymmetry in base rates (there are more negatives than positives). Our theory further explores a moderator for these asymmetries – importance of the stimulus to the self: greater importance engenders greater positive–negative asymmetries. We provide empirical evidence for our theory and discuss the boundaries and implications of our propositions and findings.     

"How long will I suffer?" versus "How long will you suffer?" A self-other effect in affective forecasting

This research presents evidence that people predict longer durations of negative affect for others than for themselves. It is argued that this self-other effect is based on the asymmetric availability of knowledge about psychological strategies that reduce negative affective experiences. Specifically, because people have available knowledge about their own coping strategies, they use this information when making predictions about their affect. The lack of information about others' coping strategies leads to longer predictions of affect duration for others, creating the self-other effect. A series of studies demonstrated this self-other effect, its source, and its boundary conditions. Specifically, the self-other effect occurred for negative but not for positive events, it was stronger when participants predicted affect duration for unfamiliar others than when participants predicted affect duration for familiar others, and the impact of the self versus other focus on affective forecasts was mediated by the availability of knowledge about coping strategies. In addition, alternative explanations for the self-other effect were ruled out. The implications for biases in affective forecasting are discussed.     

The effect of comparative context on evaluative conditioning

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is a change in the evaluation of a stimulus after the stimulus co-occurred with affective stimuli. The present research examined whether EC of one stimulus depends also on the co-occurrence of another stimulus with positive or negative stimuli. We paired two target people with affective stimuli. We found that a person who appeared eight times with positive stimuli and eight times with negative stimuli was liked more when the other person appeared always (16 times) with negative stimuli than when the other person appeared always with positive stimuli. The manipulation did not change the US evaluation or the general standard on the value dimension of what a positive or negative stimulus is. We suggest that like other evaluative traits (e.g., evil, pretty) co-occurrence with affective stimuli is sensitive to temporary standards. The manipulation changed the standard of what co-occurrence with affective stimuli is considered positive versus negative.     

Age-related changes in deterministic learning from positive versus negative performance feedback

Feedback-based learning declines with age. Because older adults are generally biased toward positive information (“positivity effect”), learning from positive feedback may be less impaired than learning from negative outcomes. The literature documents mixed results, due possibly to variability between studies in task design. In the current series of studies, we investigated the influence of feedback valence on reinforcement learning in young and older adults. We used nonprobabilistic learning tasks, to more systematically study the effects of feedback magnitude, learning of stimulus–response (S–R) versus stimulus–outcome (S–O) associations, and working-memory capacity. In most experiments, older adults benefitted more from positive than negative feedback, but only with large feedback magnitudes. Positivity effects were pronounced for S–O learning, whereas S–R learning correlated with working-memory capacity in both age groups. These results underline the context dependence of positivity effects in learning and suggest that older adults focus on high gains when these are informative for behavior.     

Motivated prediction of future feelings: effects of negative mood and mood orientation on affective forecasts

This article examines the role of motivational factors in affective forecasting. The primary hypothesis was that people predict positive emotional reactions to future events when they are motivated to enhance their current feelings. Three experiments manipulated participants' moods (negative vs. neutral) and orientation toward their moods (reflective vs. ruminative) and then assessed the positivity of their affective predictions for future events. As hypothesized, when participants adopted a reflective orientation, and thus should have been motivated to engage in mood-regulation processes, they predicted more positive feelings in the negative than in the neutral mood condition. This pattern of mood-incongruent affective prediction was not exhibited when participants adopted a ruminative orientation. Additionally, within the negative mood condition, generating affective forecasts had a more positive emotional impact on reflectors than on ruminators. The findings suggest that affective predictions are sometimes driven by mood-regulatory motives.     

Mood and the perception of unusual people: Affective asymmetry in memory and social judgments

Does good and bad mood have a different influence on our perceptions of typical and atypical people? In this experiment, people in happy, sad or neutral moods recalled, and formed impressions of high- or low-prototypical characters. We expected an asymmetric mood effect on memory, with better recall of typical targets that require simplified, schematic processing in positive mood, but greater negative mood effects on atypical targets that require more detailed and inferential processing. Subjects (N = 66) an audio-visual mood induction in an allegedly separate experiment, before recalling, and forming impressions about people who were consistent or inconsistent with familiar prototypes within their social milieu. We found the predicted mood-congruent bias in judgments, that was significantly greater for non-typical than for typical people. We also found evidence for positive-negative mood asymmetry in memory, with better recall of typical people in positive mood, and atypical people in negative mood. The findings are discussed in terms of contemporary multi-process models of affect and cognition (Forgas, 1992), and the implications for everyday affective influences on social judgments and stereotyping are considered.     

Looking at the sunny side of life: age-related change in an event-related potential measure of the negativity bias

Studies of the negativity bias have demonstrated that negative information has a stronger influence than positive information in a wide range of cognitive domains. At odds with this literature is extensive work now documenting emotional and motivational shifts that result in a positivity effect in older adults. It remains unclear, however, whether this age-related positivity effect results from increases in processing of positive information or from decreases in processing of negative information. Also unknown is the specific time course of development from a negative bias to an apparently positive one. The present study was designed to investigate the negativity bias across the life span using an event-related potential measure of responding to emotionally valenced images. The results suggest that neural reactivity to negative images declines linearly with age, but responding to positive images is surprisingly age invariant across most of the adult life span.     

Strength of affective reaction as a signal to think carefully

Analytic processes reduce biases, but it is not known how or when these processes will be deployed. Based on an affective signal hypothesis, relatively strong affective reactions were expected to result in increased analytic processing and reduced bias in judgement. The valence and strength of affective reactions were manipulated through varying outcomes in a game or evaluative conditioning of a stimulus. Relatively strong positive or negative affective reactions resulted in less desirability bias. Bias reduction only occurred if participants had time to deploy analytic processes and indicators of the degree of analytic processing (in the form of attentional control) predicted less bias. Affective processes have long been acknowledged as a source of bias, but these findings suggest affective processes are also integral to bias reduction.     

分析思维降低情感预测影响偏差

人们在决策前需要对决策可能带来的结果进行预测。人们往往会高估未来事件对情感的影响, 这被称为影响偏差。本研究从双系统理论出发, 考察了分析思维是否会降低情感预测影响偏差。实验1(采用图片启动)和实验2(采用语言流畅性任务)考察了分析思维对影响偏差的影响, 并分析了情感预测程度的中介作用。实验3在现场中以真实的决策(生育二孩)为例, 考察了分析思维启动对情感预测的影响。结果发现:分析思维会降低情感预测强度, 进而降低影响偏差。     

Evidence of fast and automatic gender bias in affective priming

Previous studies have revealed a gender bias in ratings of the valence and intensity of supraliminally presented facial expressions of emotion such that positive emotions receive higher ratings when expressed by females and negative emotions receive higher ratings when expressed by males. However, surprisingly, this gender bias has not been investigated for suboptimal presentation of emotional expressions. Our first experiment aimed at investigating the existence of such a bias for very fast presentation of the stimulus (20 ms onset) on the basis of a classic priming procedure commonly used in affective priming studies that involved the use of a single prime. Our second experiment aimed at proposing a new method involving four fast, repeated presentations of the prime-target pairs (based on the innovative design proposed by Höschel and Irle), that could be used to reduce the gender bias in future studies in affective sciences. Results show that the classic procedure for subliminal affective priming seems, indeed, sensitive to gender bias, but that it is possible to maximise the affective effect and decrease the impact of the gender bias using repeated presentations of the prime.     

心理账户的认知标签与情绪标签对消费决策行为的影响

Mental accounting is the set of cognitive operations used by individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep track of financial activities. Mental accounting proposes that people utilize a set of cognitive labels to evaluate their financial activities, each of which is associated with different preferences to consume (Levav & McGraw, 2009; Kahneman & Tversky 1984; Thaler 1985, 1990). Mental accounting researchers have shown that windfall gains are spent more readily and frivolously than ordinary income. Consumers prefer to spend their windfall gains on hedonic consumptions but spend their ordinary incomes on utilitarian consumptions. Levav and McGraw (2009) suggested that emotional accounting, including people’s feelings about money, also influences consumer choices. When people have negative feelings toward windfall, they opt to make utilitarian expenditures. However, the process of how cognitive (windfall or ordinary income) and affective (positive or negative emotion) tags interact in consumer behavior was not explored. This study proposes that both cognitive tag and affective tags in mental accounting affect consumer decision making. The objective of this study is to explore the interactive effect of cognitive and affective tags in mental accounting on consumer decision through four studies. In studies 1a and 1b, the effect of cognitive and affective tags in mental accounting on consumer decision making behavior was measured. Study 1a showed that the positive tag of windfall income is preferred for hedonic consumption, whereas the negative tag of windfall income is preferred for utilitarian consumption. Both positive and negative tags of ordinary income are preferred for utilitarian consumption. Study1b utilized a field study to examine actual consumption behavior. The results showed that when people received 15 Yuan RMB as ordinary income, they prefer to spend it on utilitarian consumption regardless of the positive or negative emotion they feel. However, they receive 15 Yuan RMB as windfall income, they prefer to use it for hedonic consumption in the positive emotion and for utilitarian consumption in the negative emotion. Studies 2a and 2b attempted to explore the reason of negative emotion can make windfall income turn from hedonic to utilitarian consumption. Study2a found that when people expect to feel guilty about spending windfall income on hedonic consumption, they would avoid hedonic consumption. Study2b found that when people felt guilty about windfall income, they tend to avoid hedonic consumption. Compared with the low guilt level group, the high guilt level group prefers to use windfall income for utilitarian consumption. These results suggest that cognitive and affective tags influence consumer behavior. The influence of cognitive tag on consumer decision presents the “cognition match effect”, whereas the influence of affective tag on consumer decision presents the “affect match effect”. Both tags also have an interaction effect on consumer decision. Guilt may be a mechanism that results in the negative tag of windfall being preferred for utilitarian consumption.     

Automatic optimism: Biased use of base rate information for positive and negative events

People generally judge that positive events will occur in their lives and negative events will not, even when both events have the same objective likelihood to occur. In four studies, we examined the possibility that this optimistic bias is the result of people’s automatic affective reactions to future events. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate, in two different contexts, that people are consistently optimistic in their predictions, despite identical base rates for positive and negative events. In Study 2, optimistic bias was not influenced by incentives for motivated reasoning or rewards for accuracy, suggesting that bias was the result of automatic processes. Studies 3 and 4 showed that optimistic bias was more pronounced when predictions were speeded and when participants made predictions after exposure to affectively valenced words. Together, these findings suggest that people optimistically interpret base rates and that this optimism is due to an effortless affective process.     

It's a wonderful life: mentally subtracting positive events improves people's affective states, contrary to their affective forecasts

The authors hypothesized that thinking about the absence of a positive event from one's life would improve affective states more than thinking about the presence of a positive event but that people would not predict this when making affective forecasts. In Studies 1 and 2, college students wrote about the ways in which a positive event might never have happened and was surprising or how it became part of their life and was unsurprising. As predicted, people in the former condition reported more positive affective states. In Study 3, college student forecasters failed to anticipate this effect. In Study 4, Internet respondents and university staff members who wrote about how they might never have met their romantic partner were more satisfied with their relationship than were those who wrote about how they did meet their partner. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for the literatures on gratitude induction and counterfactual reasoning.     

Caution: fragile! Regulating the interpersonal security of chronically insecure partners

The authors present and test a model of interpersonal insecurity compensation. According to this model, perceivers detect targets' chronic insecurities about interpersonal acceptance, become vigilant about upsetting targets, and respond with affective exaggeration, which involves cautiously inflating positive thoughts and feelings about targets and concealing negative sentiments. Results of 3 studies support this model across a variety of relationship types. Perceivers who detected targets' chronic insecurities concealed negative sentiments when they believed their sentiments would be observed by targets (Study 1), converged with other perceivers in their self-reported affective exaggeration to insecure targets (Study 2), and reported vigilance about upsetting targets, which predicted perceivers' enhanced cognitive processing of targets' daily insecurity and intensified their tendencies to exaggerate affections in response to that insecurity (Study 3). Perceivers' affective exaggeration appeared to enhance chronically insecure targets' perceptions of being valued by perceivers, but it also predicted perceivers' reduced relationship satisfaction (Studies 2 and 3). Results underscore the active, but perhaps dissatisfying, regulation of relationships with chronically insecure relationship partners.     

Influences on current mood of eliciting life-satisfaction judgments

Subjective well-being (SWB) has attracted a plethora of cross-disciplinary research in recent years. As measured in this research, SWB includes a cognitive and an affective component. We hypothesize that eliciting the cognitive component by means of life-satisfaction judgments activates thoughts about positive and negative life circumstances that influence the affective component (current mood or memory of the frequency of past positive and negative affects). Experiment 1 demonstrates an expected asymmetrical carryover effect in that current mood correlates higher with life-satisfaction judgments performed before than after the measurements of current mood. In Experiment 2, it is found that inducing current mood by means of rewarding performance does not influence the life-satisfaction judgments. In contrast and consistent with Experiment 1, Experiment 3 shows such an influence when current mood is induced by thinking about positive and negative life circumstances.     

Asymmetries in the processing of emotionally valenced words

Earlier research has shown a valence dependent encoding asymmetry of emotional words (e.g., Pratto & John, 1991; White, 1996; Stenberg, Wiking & Dahl, 1998). To further study this asymmetry, two word detection experiments were performed based on the following hypothesis: when there is a more thoroughly processing of the valence, in this case a valence categorisation, there will be, in a subsequent task, prolonged latencies for negative words, compared to positive words. The result gave significantly prolonged response latencies for negative words compared to positive ones in the subsequent detection task when using an affective orienting task, something not found using a non-affective orienting task. The results support the Mobilization-Minimization hypothesis (Taylor, 1991), according to which negative events and stimuli occupy more cognitive resources, but with some limitation: the affective asymmetry, with prolonged latencies for negative words, occurs only when there is a deepened encoding of the affective component of the words.     

The positivity proportion effect: A list context effect in masked affective priming

In the evaluative decision task, participants decide whether target words denote something positive or negative. Positive and negative prime words are known to engender so-called affective priming effects in this task. Primes were sandwich masked, and the proportion of positive to negative target words was manipulated. In Experiment 1, prime valence and positivity proportion interacted, so that primes of the less frequently presented target valence caused larger priming effects. Experiment 2 rendered an explanation of this interaction in terms of response bias unlikely, Experiment 3 ruled out a peripheral locus of the effect, and Experiment 4 ruled out an account in terms of stimulus repetition. The effect is explained by means of an attentional bias favoring the rare kind of valence.     

Aging and motivated cognition: the positivity effect in attention and memory

As people get older, they experience fewer negative emotions. Strategic processes in older adults' emotional attention and memory might play a role in this variation with age. Older adults show more emotionally gratifying memory distortion for past choices and autobiographical information than younger adults do. In addition, when shown stimuli that vary in affective valence, positive items account for a larger proportion of older adults' subsequent memories than those of younger adults. This positivity effect in older adults' memories seems to be due to their greater focus on emotion regulation and to be implemented by cognitive control mechanisms that enhance positive and diminish negative information. These findings suggest that both cognitive abilities and motivation contribute to older adults' improved emotion regulation.     

Bias in proportion judgments: the cyclical power model

When participants make part-whole proportion judgments, systematic bias is commonly observed. In some studies, small proportions are overestimated and large proportions underestimated; in other studies, the reverse pattern occurs. Sometimes the bias pattern repeats cyclically with a higher frequency (e.g., overestimation of proportions less than .25 and between .5 and .75; underestimation otherwise). To account for the various bias patterns, a cyclical power model was derived from Stevens' power law. The model proposes that the amplitude of the bias pattern is determined by the Stevens exponent, beta (i.e., the stimulus continuum being judged), and that the frequency of the pattern is determined by a choice of intermediate reference points in the stimulus. When beta < 1, an over-then-under pattern is predicted; when beta > 1, the under-then-over pattern is predicted. Two experiments confirming the model's assumptions are described. A mixed-cycle version of the model is also proposed that predicts observed asymmetries in bias patterns when the set of reference points varies across trials.