Neither ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’ nor ‘Better’ in Terms of ‘Good’

In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms of the other. According to definitions of ‘good’ in terms of ‘better’, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of ‘better’ without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining ‘better’ in terms of ‘good’, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of intrinsic goodness or it breaks down in cases where both of the relata of ‘better’ are bad.     

A Lesson in ‘Psycholese,’ or How to ‘Get a Feel For’ Where Your ‘Helper’ Is ‘Coming From’

Oftentimes/frequently the consumers/clients/patients of community/private mental health agencies/facilities experience/encounter difficulty communicating with the mental health professionals/paraprofessionals. Presented is a glossary that should aid novice clients to better communicate with their helpers/therapists/counselors/ caregivers. On the other hand (at the same time), it might just confuse the clients further. This is clearly a risk with counseling.     

Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as ‘good’, in terms of dyadic value relations, such as ‘better’. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.     

‘Fundamentalism’ Christian and Islamic

This article seeks to answer the question whether the term ‘fundamentalism’ is an appropriate label for certain Islamic movements by undertaking a detailed comparison with Protestant Christian fundamentalism, for which the term was originally coined. After an effort to identify and characterize the two phenomena, a number of similarities and differences are discussed. Among the differences is the fact that the most obvious defining characteristics in each case (Biblical inerrancy for Protestants and politicalsocial involvement for Muslims) are of little relevance to the other case. Among the similarities is a common opposition to ‘modernism’ and a tendency to stress what has been distinctive to the Protestant and Islamic traditions, respectively. The conclusion is that, while the two phenomena do have much in common, ‘fundamentalism’ is not an appropriate common label. The author prefers ‘Islamic radicalism’ for the Muslim case and tentatively suggests ‘radical neotraditionalism’ as a common label.     

Counseling the ‘disadvantaged’

In this article, Henrietta Tolson looks at the obstacles to a sharing relationship with clients which counselors set up by stereotyping people and seeking to enhance their own status. With the vision of someone who has worked for many years with people in Seattle's central area, she discusses the subtleties of racial and economic prejudice among well meaning, middle class counselors and case workers.     

DESCARTES' ‘PROVISIONAL MORALITY’

Discourse on Method part 3 offers une morale par provision, usually translated as ‘a provisional moral code’. Occasionally it has been questioned that this code is temporary and restricted to those engaged in pure inquiry. We argue that Descartes intends the moral code to be his final ethical position universally applicable. Since the moral code is ‘derived from’ the rules of method, it should have their permanence, holding for the time pure inquiry commences and when it completes the sciences. Moreover, the four moral maxims replace the classical cardinal virtues. Thus they are meant to govern the lives of all persons.