Games of luck and games of chance: the effect of luck- versus chance-orientation on gambling decisions

Chance and luck are conceived as two distinct causal agents that effect different results. The present study examined the proposition that persons who habitually attribute the outcome of random events to chance (chance-oriented persons) and those who prefer to attribute such outcomes to luck (luck-oriented persons) cope differently with decision making under uncertainty. Chance-oriented persons decide according to given or estimated odds that define the decision problem. Luck-oriented persons, on the other hand, rely on self-attributions of personal luck, and ignore the probabilities of decision outcomes. The hypothesized qualitative difference between the approaches of chance- and luck-oriented persons to decision making under uncertainty was supported substantially by the findings. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cance and luck are not the same

In the mind of many people chance and luck act as real but different causes of events. Even in strictly defined situations as casino gambling, people may perceive influences of luck that help to overcome the negative expectancy defined by the rules of chance. Interviews with gamblers in casinos confirmed this idea. In two experiments it was established that the distinction between chance and luck are also made by ordinary subjects in everyday situations. The results revealed that chance is perceived to operate when an event is surprising, an unexpected coincidence. Luck is perceived when an event implies the escape from negative consequences, or the achievement of something that is important and difficult. The distinction between chance and luck can explain why people are trapped by the illusion of control, even when it is clear that they have no influence on the physical causation determining the outcomes of events. They cannot change the outcome of the roulette wheel, but they can employ their luck, which helps them to place their bets on the winning number.     

Effects of belief in luck on the attractiveness of loyalty programmes

The aim of this article is to demonstrate that the perception of belief in luck affects loyalty programmes, causing people making cognitive (affective) choices to feel more (less) attracted. To validate our hypotheses, we conducted 3 related experiments (2 laboratory tests and 1 in the field). We found that the perception of belief in luck (bad or good) affects the relationship between loyalty programmes and attractiveness (Study 1). We study this effect considering the mechanisms of points‐pressure and rewarded behaviour. Thereafter, we established that cognitive (affective) decisions promoted an increase (decrease) in attractiveness when consumers were exposed to continuous loyalty programmes because their belief in luck was lower (Studies 2 and 3). We believe that these changes occur because the consumer's belief in luck masks the uncertainty in the decision‐making process.     

Beliefs in moral luck: When and why blame hinges on luck

Belief in moral luck is represented in judgements that offenders should be held accountable for intent to cause harm as well as whether or not harm occurred. Scores on a measure of moral luck beliefs predicted judgements of offenders who varied in intent and the outcomes of their actions, although judgements overall were not consistent with abstract beliefs in moral luck. Prompting participants to consider alternative outcomes, particularly worse outcomes, reduced moral luck beliefs. Findings suggest that some people believe that offenders should be punished based on the outcome of their actions. Furthermore, prompting counterfactuals decreased judgements consistent with moral luck beliefs. The results have implications for theories of moral judgement as well as legal decision making.     

Good luck and bad luck: how to tell the difference

Good luck implies comparison with a worse counterfactual outcome, whereas bad luck implies upward comparisons. People will accordingly describe themselves as particularly lucky after recollecting situations where they avoided something negative, and as particularly unlucky after recollecting episodes in which they missed something positive (Study 1). Upward and downward comparisons can be created by the way a situation develops, and are accentuated by the way a story is told. Good luck stories typically change for the better only in the last stage, whereas bad luck stories show a more steady downward progression (Study 2). This is also reflected in phrases believed to be characteristic of good luck versus bad luck stories, with good luck stories involving surprise and reference to close counterfactuals, whereas bad luck stories focus on initial normal events (Study 3). Good and bad luck imply different orders of events (negative–positive versus positive–negative), so by rearranging the narrative sequence, the same set of outcomes can form the basis for a good luck story as well as a bad luck story (Study 4). The final experiment (Study 5) shows that negative outcome expectations are typical for chance‐determined and uncontrolled situations. Under such circumstances, factual outcomes do not have to be exceptionally good to be considered as lucky. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bad Luck Once Again

In a recent article in this journal, Storrs McCall and E.J. Lowe sketch an account of indeterminist free will designed to avoid the luck objection that has been wielded to such effect against event‐causal libertarianism. They argue that if decision‐making is an indeterministic process and not an event or series of events, the luck objection will fail. I argue that they are wrong: the luck objection is equally successful against their account as against existing event‐causal libertarianisms. Like the event‐causal libertarianism their account is meant to supplant, the process view cannot offer a reasons explanation of the agent’s choice itself; that choice is explained by nothing except chance. The agent therefore fails to exercise freedom‐level control over it.     

Holistic Versus Analytic Thinking Explains Collective Culpability Attribution

Classical attribution theories of behavioral responsibility attribution emphasize that individuals should not be blamed for their mere association with a wrongdoer. Nonetheless, perceivers sometimes blame the wrongdoer's associates for the wrongdoer's misdeed even when those associates are not causally connected to the wrongdoing. In an experiment conducted in Singapore, we found that collective culpability attributions result from holistic thinking—the tendency to attribute causal connectedness between discrete entities or events. Activating holistic thinking enhanced perceptions of causal impacts of distal events and facilitated collective culpability attributions. We discuss these results in terms of their implications for understanding the nature of collective culpability and research on holistic thinking.     

奖赏结构与结果效价对男女儿童成就归因的影响

本研究的目的是考察奖赏结构和结果效价对男女儿童归因风格的影响.被试为小学五年级学生(n=74,男生36人,女生38人),实验通过解决一系列迷津测验来创设成功和失败情境.研究结果表明,能力、运气归因存在性别差异,在竞争奖赏结构条件下,女生对成就状况倾向于做运气归因,而男生倾向于做运气以外其他因素的归因(如能力);在非竞争奖赏结构条件下,男生对成就状况倾向于做运气归因,而女生倾向于做运气以外其他因素的归因.此外,还发现了一些其他的显著效应.     

Getting Luck Properly Under Control

This article proposes a new account of luck and how luck impacts attributions of credit for agents' actions. It proposes an analogy with the expected value of a series of wagers and argues that luck is the difference between actual outcomes and expected value. The upshot of the argument is that when considering the interplay of intention, chance, outcomes, skill, and actions, we ought to be more parsimonious in our attributions of credit when exercising a skill and obtaining successful outcomes, and more generous in our attributions of credit when exercising a skill but obtaining unsuccessful outcomes. Furthermore, the article argues that when agents skillfully perform an action, they deserve the same amount of credit whether their action is successful or unsuccessful in achieving the goal.     

Dispositional optimism and luck attributions: Implications for philosophical theories of luck

We conducted two studies to determine whether there is a relationship between dispositional optimism and the attribution of good or bad luck to ambiguous luck scenarios. Study 1 presented five scenarios that contained both a lucky and an unlucky component, thereby making them ambiguous in regard to being an overall case of good or bad luck. Participants rated each scenario in toto on a four-point Likert scale and then completed an optimism questionnaire. The results showed a significant correlation between optimism and assignments of luck: more optimistic people rated the characters in the ambiguous scenarios as more lucky while more pessimistic people rated the same characters in the same scenarios as more unlucky. Study 2 separated the good and bad luck components of the study 1 scenarios and presented the components individually to a new group of participants. Participants rated the luckiness of each component on the same four-point scale and then completed the optimism questionnaire. We found that the luckiness of the bad luck component could be significantly predicted by their level of optimism. We discuss how these findings pose problems for philosophical accounts that treat luck as an objective property.     

Studies in subjective probability IV: probabilities, confidence, and luck

Probably because of formal advantages, probabilities are often regarded as more basic than other dimensions of attitudes towards uncertain events (beliefs, confidences, doubts, statements of hope and fear, good and bad luck etc.). In a series of experiments, some of these concepts were empirically compared by asking students to give their views on a variety of uncertain events, ranging from future examinations to lotteries. Confidence turned out to be closely related to perceived chance, but very imperfectly to the subjective probability of the event in question, except when all outcomes are judged equally due to chance. Judgments of good and bad luck were still more independent of the probabilities involved, even in a chance situation, It is concluded that subjective probability plays a secondary role in assessments of confidence as well as of luck, and is poorly suited as a common measure of the varieties of subjective uncertainty. A final experiment suggests the subjective and statistical conceptions of uncertainty to have partially opposing connotations. "An uncertain future" seems to be subjectively interpreted as an open future, restricted possibilities of prediction.     

Authoritarianism,Anger, and Hostile Attribution Bias: A Test of Affect Displacement

Past research has supported the hypothesis that the relationship between harsh childhood punishment and adult political attitudes is due to the displacement of negative emotions that arise onto punitive public policies, e.g., support for the death penalty (Milburn, Conrad, Sala, & Carberry, 1995). Cognitions associated with childhood punishment may also impact adult political attitudes, yet their effects have not yet been examined, despite research that shows that punitive childhood experiences increase the tendency to attribute hostility to others. Thus, we investigated whether the tendency to make hostile attributions about others' behavior influences a person's authoritarianism, controlling for their parents' political orientation. Respondents completed an online survey concerning their childhood punishment experiences, their parents' political orientation, their trait anger, their level of hostile attribution bias (HAB), and their authoritarianism. Multiple regression analyses and structural equation modeling (SEM) found that higher childhood punishment has a significant direct effect on higher levels of authoritarianism, even after controlling for parents' political orientation, and that trait anger and HAB appear to mediate the effects of childhood punishment experiences on authoritarianism,. These results support the process of affect displacement as an important influence on adult punitiveness and political orientation.     

Reactions to Others' Selfish Actions in the Absence of Tangible Consequences

This research assessed the role of perceived selfishness in people's reactions to events without tangible consequences. In Experiment 1, participants were assigned to complete a boring task by another person who gave a selfish, legitimizing, or exculpatory explanation for the decision. However, half of the participants knew that the other's decision was irrelevant and that they would complete the task regardless of the person's decision. In a second experiment, participants were told that the decision was irrelevant either before or after learning that the other person assigned them to do the boring task. Both studies showed that participants who received a selfish explanation responded strongly to the other person whether or not the person's decision had tangible consequences for them.     

Moral Taint: On the Transfer of the Implications of Moral Culpability

Suppose two people are about to drown. We are in a position to save only one, so the other will have to die. One of the two has just culpably killed an innocent person, but has no intention of killing anybody else and there is no reason to expect that he will. Everything else being equal, should we give them an equal chance of being saved by flipping a coin? In this paper I argue that we should not. I argue that the implications of a person's moral culpability for (recent or prospective) harm to a particular victim should transfer to other conflict situations in which the wrongdoer might find him or herself. This requires establishing the extent to which a person's contributing to harming another person — and his moral culpability for that harm — impinges on our decision making in situations where it is possible only to assist either the wrongdoer or some other person that is not his victim.     

运气特质:将机遇转化为一种可利用的力量

运气在各种文化中都非常普遍,但在心理学界对运气的定义一直存在争议。本文在分析以往三种主要的运气观后,基于中国传统文化的视角将运气定义为“个体在一定时间或期限内由定数和变数组合而成的发展轨迹或发展趋势,其中变数主要是指机遇,定数主要是指运气特质”。运气特质能决定个体幸运与否,并通过产生控制幻觉或者改变个体的自我概念将运气转化为个体可利用的内部力量。未来研究可进一步探讨运气特质的结构及其与幸运感、感恩、幸福感、亲社会行为、赌博行为、腐败行为等变量的关系。     

Planned Happenstance: Constructing Unexpected Career Opportunities

Chance plays an important role in everyone's career, but career counseling is still perceived as a process designed to eliminate chance from career decision making. Traditional career counseling interventions are no longer sufficient to prepare clients to respond to career uncertainties. Work world shifts challenge career counselors to adopt a counseling intervention that views unplanned events as both inevitable and desirable. Counselors need to teach clients to engage in exploratory activities to increase the probability that the clients will discover unexpected career opportunities. Unplanned events can become opportunities for learning.     

Blameworthiness,desert, and luck

Philosophers disagree about whether outcome luck can affect an agent's “moral responsibility.” Focusing on responsibility's “negative side,” some maintain, and others deny, that an action's results bear constitutively on how “blameworthy” the actor is, and on how much blame or punishment they “deserve.” Crucially, both sides to the debate assume that an actor's blameworthiness and negative desert are equally affected—or unaffected—by an action's results. This article challenges that previously overlooked assumption, arguing that blameworthiness and desert are distinct moral notions that serve distinct normative functions: blameworthiness serves a liability function (removing a bar to otherwise impermissible treatments), whereas desert serves a favoring function (contributing new value to states of affairs, or providing new reasons for responsive treatments). Having distinguished (negative) desert from blameworthiness, the article proposes a novel resolution to the outcome-luck debate: that results do not affect an agent's liability to blame, but do affect the amount and severity of blame to which the agent is justly liable, including by affecting the severity of blame that the agent deserves.     

How good is good luck? The role of counterfactual thinking in the perception of lucky and unlucky events

Spontaneous references to ‘luck’ (e.g. in the mass media) frequently occur in connection with narrow escapes from accidents. The hypothesis that lucky events are not always positive, to the same degree as unlucky events are negative, was tested by asking Norwegian and Polish students to describe incidents of good and bad luck from their own lives, These stories were subsequently evaluated by the narrators and by a group of judges. Ratings showed unlucky events to be uniformly negative whereas lucky events varied widely in attractiveness. Both were characterized by the idea that the outcome could easily have been a dramatically different one. In a parallel set of studies, pleasant and unpleasant experiences from students' everyday life were collected (without specific reference to luck) and evaluated along the same dimensions. The results confirm that unlucky and unpleasant events have more in common than lucky and pleasant ones. Pleasant and unpleasant events can be imagined to have opposite alternative outcomes, but these are felt with less immediacy than in the case of luck. It is concluded that luck attributions typically occur in situations that could easily have taken a worse turn. How lucky depends upon how easily and how much worse.     

Retracted: BEING LUCKY AND BEING DESERVING,AND DISTRIBUTION

This paper examines the concepts of desert and luck, familiar in political theory but neglected by sociologists. I argue that the idea of desert is composed of both personal performance and the degree of responsibility a person has over that performance. Distribution ought to be in accordance with the indebtedness created by the person's performance. This can be compromised by luck; that is, personal desert is undermined where lack of performance scuttles the applicability of the contributory model. This paper examines recent work, focusing on establishing desert criteria for each person's ends and life‐plans, and a formula for distribution according to personal welfare.