Ideology as instrument

Comments on the article by J. T. Jost, which argued that the end-of-ideology claims that emerged in the aftermath of World War II were both incorrect and detrimental to the field of political psychology. M. Glassman and D. Karno make three critical points. First, Jost objectified ideology as a grand strategy implemented at the individual level, rather than as an instrument used for a specific purpose in activity. In doing so, he set ideology up as an "object" that guides human behavior rather than as a rational part of human experience. Second, they take issue with the idea that, because somebody acts in a manner that can be categorized as ideological, there actually is such a thing as ideology separate from that event and/or political experience and that psychologists ought to understand the meaning of ideology in order to understand future human activities as outside observers. Third, Jost seems to see this objective ideology as a unidirectional, causal mechanism for activity, a mechanism that assumes individuals act according to ideology, which eclipses the possibility that immediate ideological positions are the residue of purposeful activity. Glassman and Karno suggest that it may be better to take a pluralistic view of ideology in human action. Where ideology does exist, it is as a purposeful instrument--part of a logically based action to meet some ends-in-view--a mixture of immediate goals tied to secondary belief systems (which have been integrated to serve the material purposes of the purveyors of these ideologies). So if we are to understand ideology, we can only understand it through its use in human activity.     

The Unmaking of Prejudice: How Christian Beliefs Relate to Attitudes Toward Homosexuals

We propose that the internalization of orthodox Christian beliefs serves as a basis for a personal moral standard that discourages prejudice against others as well as for self-critical emotions that follow upon behaving in a discriminatory manner. Two correlational studies tested hypotheses derived from our theory. Study 1 demonstrated that to the extent people endorse orthodox Christian beliefs, they report an internal motivation to respond without prejudice toward homosexuals. Study 2 demonstrated that, when controlling for the effects of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), endorsement of orthodox Christian beliefs was related to positive attitudes toward homosexuals as individuals or as a group, but not toward homosexuality as a behavior or lifestyle.     

Intentional and unintentional contributions to nonspecific preparation during reaction time foreperiods

The nonspecific preparation that follows a warning stimulus (WS) to speed responding to an impending imperative stimulus (IS) is generally viewed as a strategic, intentional process. An alternative view holds that WS acts as a conditioned stimulus that unintentionally elicits a tendency to respond at the moment of IS presentation as a result of a process of trace conditioning. These views were contrasted as explanatory frameworks for classical effects on reaction time of the duration and intertrial variability of the foreperiod, the interval between WS and IS. It is shown that the conditioning view accounts for the available data at least as well as the strategic view. In addition, the results of 3 experiments provide support for the conditioning view by showing that unintentional contributions to nonspecific preparation can be dissociated from intentional contributions.     

Varieties of Objectivity: Reply to De Mesel

In a previous paper, I argued that the later Wittgenstein did not endorse a realist account of ethics, where a realist account is understood to involve a claim to truth as well as objectivity. In this paper, I respond to a number of critical questions that Benjamin De Mesel raises about that interpretation. I agree with him that just as there are uses for expressions such as “truth”, “fact” and “reality” in ethics, there are uses for expressions such as “objectivity” that do not involve a deeper realist commitment. But I uphold and reinforce my claim that objectivity in ethics as the realist conceives it is ruled out by Wittgenstein, who describes the correspondence between ethical expressions and reality in an entirely different way.     

Self as verb and the metaphor of dance: An explanation of the self discovery experience within a constructivist framework

The concept of self discovery within a constructivist framework is difficult to explain given the central assumption of constructivism that self is a created construct rather than an entity to be discovered. Two problems are identified as impediments to constructivist accounts of the self discovery experience: first, their failure to adequately account for the embodied experience of self, and second, the difficulties inherent in using self as a noun to express a process.
It is proposed that if self is considered as a verb, as the action of a body-subject, the verbal contortionism of referring to self as a process in a language that places self as an entity may be overcome. The notion of self as verb places the individual firmly in the role of active embodied participant in the experience of self. The metaphor of "self'" as "dance" is explored to emphasize the materiality of the human animal that is argued to be central to the experience of self discovery.     

The impetus theory in judgments about object motion: A new perspective

Several tendencies found in explicit judgments about object motion have been interpreted as evidence that people possess a naive theory of impetus. The theory states that objects that are caused to move by other objects acquire force that determines the kind of motion exhibited by the object, and that this force gradually dissipates over time. I argue that the findings can better be understood as manifestations of a general understanding of externally caused motion based on experiences of acting on objects. Experiences of acting on objects yield the idea that properties of the cause of motion are transmitted to the effect object. This idea functions as a heuristic for explicit predictions of object motion under conditions of uncertainty. This accounts not only for the findings taken as evidence for the impetus theory, but also for several findings that fall outside the scope of the impetus theory. It has also been claimed that judgments about the location at which a moving object disappeared are influenced by the impetus theory. I argue that these judgments are better explained in a different way, as best-guess extrapolations made by the visual system as a practical guide to interactions with the object, such as interception.     

Toward a critical relational theory of gender

This article analyzes and critiques the construct of gender as a psychoanalytic and cultural category. Without succumbing to a nonpsychoanalytic notion of androgyny, the argument developed here challenges the assumption that an internally consistent gender identity is possible or even desirable. Beginning with the idea that, from an analytic perspective, the construct of “identity”; is problematic and implausible, because it denotes and privileges a unified psychic world, the author develops a deconstructionist critique of our dominant gender‐identity paradigm. It is argued that gender coherence, consistency, conformity, and identity are culturally mandated normative ideals that psychoanalysis has absorbed uncritically. These ideals, moreover, are said to create a universal pathogenic situation, insofar as the attempt to conform to their dictates requires the activation of a false‐self system.

An alternative, “decentered”; gender paradigm is then proposed, which conceives of gender as a “necessary fiction”; that is used for magical ends in the psyche, the family, and the culture. From this perspective, gender identity is seen as a problem as well as a solution, a defensive inhibition as well as an accomplishment. It is suggested that as a goal for analytic treatment, the ability to tolerate the ambiguity and instability of gender categories is more appropriate than the goal of “achieving”; a single, pure, sex‐appropriate view of oneself.     

Are Proper Names Rigid Designators?

A widely accepted thesis in the philosophy of language is that natural language proper names are rigid designators, and that they are so de jure, or as a matter of the “semantic rules of the language.” This paper questions this claim, arguing that rigidity cannot be plausibly construed as a property of name types and that the alternative, rigidity construed as a property of tokens, means that they cannot be considered rigid de jure; rigidity in this case must be viewed as a pragmatic and not a semantic property.     

Defending Double Effect

According to the doctrine of double effect(DDE), there is a morally significantdifference between harm that is intended andharm that is merely foreseen and not intended.It is not difficult to explain why it is bad tointend harm as an end (you have a ``badattitude' toward that harm) but it is hard toexplain why it is bad to intend harm as a meansto some good end. If you intend harm as a meansto some good end, you need not have a ``badattitude' toward it. I distinguish two ways inwhich you can treat something that is yourchosen means to your ends. You can pursue yourends directly, and treat X as a mere means thatyou pursue for the sake of your end. Or you canpursue your ends indirectly, and treat X as a``plan-relative end' that you pursue for its ownsake. I argue that much of the time we pursueour ends indirectly, and treat our means asplan-relative ends. There are significantanalogies between intending harm as an end, andintending harm as a plan-relative end. So,under certain circumstances, it is morallyworse to intend harm as a means or an end thanto foresee bringing about the same amount of harm.     

Difficult Terminations in Group Therapy: A Self Psychologically Informed Perspective

In group therapy, terminations that are neither planned nor anticipated are sometimes referred to as difficult. This complex issue of difficult terminations is used as a vehicle to challenge the prevailing, though often unspoken, assumption that the goal of the group therapist is to keep the members in the group. The author presents the notion that the leader needs to maintain a balance between the group as a treatment context, and the goal of that context. The goal of group-as-treatment context is to provide for the therapeutic needs of each individual patient in the group. Self psychology provides a basis for redefining the therapy group as a treatment context. A specific rationale, goal, and process of that redefinition is presented along with illustrative case material. With this understanding, unanticipated terminations can be as readily accepted and understood as ones that are planned. All terminations are viewed as further opportunities to understand how a patient defines his or her sense of self, sense of other, and sense of self with other.     

Repression and substitutive formation: the relationship between Freud's concepts reconsidered

This paper examines Freud's concept of repression and the relationship between repression and substitutive formation as it presents itself in Freud's writings. The author shows that Freud gives at least four different meanings to the term "repression": Freud uses it interchangeably with defense, as a consciously intended forgetting, as a specific unconscious mechanism of defense, and to describe the consequence of defense mechanisms leading to substitutive formations. The inconsistencies in this relationship are discussed and clarified, and Freud's economic and linguistic attempts at founding repression are subjected to critique; the need of a primal repression as a necessary condition for repression proper is pointed out. In developing Freud's linguistic foundation of repression further, the author presents defense as a semantic displacement. Ideas are excluded from the realm of the concepts that belong to them historically. These presentations become unconscious, that is, repressed, in that they can no longer be identified as "cases" of these conceptual internal contents. At the same time they are displaced into the extensions of concepts whose internal contents do not belong to them originally. It is by virtue of the internal contents of these concepts that the displaced elements as substitutive formations once again attain consciousness, albeit a false one. The author suggests dismissing repression as a specific defense mechanism of its own; to reversing Freud's thesis that repression, as a rule, creates a substitutive formation into its opposite; and recognizing that the mechanisms used to build substitutes, as a rule, create repression.     

A single-element impact in global/local processing: the roles of element centrality and diagnosticity

A modification of the compound stimuli paradigm has been used to measure the impact of a certain single element on the local-to-global effect and to compare the measured impacts of central and non-central elements matched on diagnosticity. In addition to global letters made of identical response-associated elements, some global letters comprised of only one response-associated element at a specific location (with all other ones being response-neutral), and in some other global letters that critical element was rather response-neutral (with all other ones being response-associated). Experiment 1 showed that the contribution of a central element that served as a distinctive feature was as large as the joint contribution of all other elements. Experiment 2 (as well as Experiment 4) showed that, in contrast, a non-central element that served as a distinctive feature did not contribute at all to the effect. Experiment 3 showed that the contribution of a central element was still as large as the joint contribution of all other elements even when it was completely irrelevant for selecting the response.     

CONSEQUENTIALISM AND RATIONAL CHOICE: LESSONS FROM THE ALLAIS PARADOX

Abstract: This paper investigates the relation between consequentialism, as conceived of in moral theory, and standard expected utility theory. I argue that there is a close connection between the two. I show furthermore that consequentialism is not neutral with regard to the values of the agent. Consequentialism, as well as standard expected utility theory, is incompatible with the recognition of considerations that depend on what could have been the case, such as regret and disappointment. I conclude that consequentialism should be rejected as a principle of rational choice and that there are reasons to doubt its plausibility in the realm of moral theory. Moreover, this is a reason to doubt whether standard expected utility theory is a plausible theory of rational choice.     

Judging Another's Spirituality: Comment on Sundararajan and Kim's (2014) Claim that Müntzer was a False Mystic

Sundararajan and Kim (2014) claimed that Thomas Müntzer was a false mystic based on criteria that they believed characterize authentic mystics, such as preferring transcendence over immanence. They selected Müntzer as a false mystic, compared to so-called authentic mystics, due to his not, at least in their evaluation, meeting their criteria, as well as based on their historical interpretation of his life. Their rejection of Müntzer's authenticity as a mystic is challenged by contradictory historical evidence and concerns about the validity of the criteria they used to classify mystics as either false or authentic. It is not claimed that Müntzer is either authentic or false as a mystic, but only that classifying him as false is unconvincing, based on available evidence.     

Abwehr, Verdrängung und Ersatzbildung

The author investigates the relationship of defence, repression and substitutive formation as it presents itself in Freud’s writings. He shows that Freud gives at least four different meanings to the term “repression”: Freud uses it interchangeably with defence, as a consciously intended forgetting, as a specific unconscious mechanism of defence and to describe the consequence of defence mechanisms leading to substitutive formations. The inconsistencies in this relationship are discussed and clarified and Freud’s economic and linguistic attempts to justify repression are subjected to critique as well as the need of a primal repression as a necessary condition for repression proper. In developing Freud’s linguistic justification of repression further, the author presents defence as a semantic displacement. Ideas are excluded from the realm of the concepts which belong to them historically. These presentations become unconscious, i.e. repressed, in that they can no longer be identified as “cases” of these conceptual internal contents. At the same time they are displaced into the extensions of concepts whose internal contents do not belong to them originally. It is by virtue of the internal contents of these concepts that the displaced elements as substitutive formations once again attain consciousness, albeit a false one. It is suggested that repression as a specific defence mechanism of its own should be dismissed, to reverse Freud’s thesis that repression as a rule creates a substitutive formation into its opposite and to understand that the mechanisms used to build substitutes as a rule create repression.     

Resisting the Logic of Ambivalence: Bad Faith as Subversive,Anticolonial Practice

This article critiques Homi Bhabha's proposal that mimicry, as a transgressive performance of ambivalence, disrupts the colonial violence of the stereotype, and as such, generates emancipatory conditions for postcolonial subjects. I am critical of this naming of mimicry as enabling a possible liberation from colonial violence not only because it fails to address the loss of belonging that significantly marks the experience of being so violated, but also because it seems to intensify this loss in the hybridity and fragmentation that it celebrates. Through the work of María Lugones and Mariana Ortega, I propose a reimagined sense of Sartrean bad faith as one that corrects for this failure. This account of bad faith—as subversive, anticolonial practice—legitimizes my longing for a stability made impossible by the violent ambivalence that pervades both the colonial and postcolonial condition. Lugones's accounts of multiplicity and ontological plurality, as well as Ortega's conception of hometactics, help me argue that this reimagined conception of bad faith ought to be considered productive when it comes to existential strategies that pursue the possibility of free black life.     

Safe driving and road-crossing tasks: A particular case of successful transfer of learning

The current study examines whether crucial safe driving skills are associated with safe road-crossing skills as pedestrians. The main research question was whether skills that are acquired from the point of view of a driver are associated with the skills of pedestrians in different platforms or settings. Furthermore, the study examines whether task performance on one platform (driving) primes an operator for task performance on another (road-crossing as a pedestrian) or vice versa. Sixty people took part in this study and completed a demographic questionnaire, a Driving Behavior Questionnaire, a Pedestrian Behavior Scale and two computerized tests – a Hazard Perception Test for Drivers and a Hazard Perception Test for Pedestrians.We found that the better the participants detect hazards on the road as drivers, the better they detect hazards as pedestrians as well, and that most of the participants’ self-reported values regarding their driving and their road-crossing as pedestrians are correlated. The study revealed an association between years of seniority in driving and the number of driving hours per week, and some behavioral variables as pedestrians – meaning that exposure to the road as a driver may be related to safer behavior as a pedestrian.     

The morality of weapons research

I ask whether weapons research is ever justified. Weapons research is identified as the business of the engineer. It is argued that the engineer has responsibility for the uses to which the tools that he designs can be put, and that responsibility extends to the use of weapons. It is maintained that there are no inherently defensive weapons, and hence there is no such thing as ‘defensive’ weapons research. The issue then is what responsibilities as a professional the engineer has in regard to such research. An account is given to ground the injunction not to provide the means to harm as a duty for the engineers. This account is not, however, absolutist, and as such it allows justifiable exceptions. The answer to my question is thus not that weapons research is never justified but there must be a strong assurance that the results will only be used as a just means in a just cause.