Philosophy, Polemics, Education

In this paper I wish to comment upon the use of polemical argument in philosophy of education and education. Like Foucault, I believe that a whole morality is at stake because polemical argument obfuscates the search for truth at the expense of truth and the other’s veracity, integrity and dignity. The use of polemics is illustrated by two arguments. The first general argument is taken from an attack upon Albert Camus by the British writer Colin Wilson. The second more particular example is taken from attacks in New Zealand by the State Department of Education upon the educational ideas of the novelist and educator Sylvia Ashton-Warner. Finally I discuss how polemics might be countered in education.

Physiological Reactions to a Suicide Film: Suicide Attempters,Suicide Ideators,and Nonsuicidal Patients

A film about two teenagers who commit suicide was shown to three groups of psychiatric inpatients: 17 who had attempted suicide, 20 who had expressed suicidal thoughts, and 10 who were not suicidal. Anxiety before and after the film was evaluated with psychometric (anxiety rating scale) and physiological tools (heart and respiration rate, blood pressure, electromyogram). Values noted before and after screening, and the degree of change in these values, were compared. In addition, psychomotor agitation was rated at several points during the film. Most results were negative. The suicide attempters had significantly lower postscreening heart rates and a significantly lesser change in heart and respiration rates than the other two groups. The suicide attempters revealed an increase in psychomotor agitation until the discovery of the suicide and a decrease thereafter, whereas the agitation of the nonsuicidal patients continued to increase from the start to the end of the film. The study suggests that on some parameters, suicide attempters reveal less anxiety than nonsuicidal psychiatric patients following exposure to a simulated suicide. The reaction of suicide ideators falls somewhere between the two groups.     

The Opinions of GP's Patients About Suicide,Assisted Suicide,Euthanasia, and Suicide Prevention: An Italian Survey

A survey about opinions on end‐of‐life issues of a population represented by 1,171 people in the waiting room of general practitioners' surgeries was conducted in a province of northern Italy. Most subjects did not consider suicide as a reasonable option even in cases of a serious and incurable disease. Moreover, subjects did not consider euthanasia as a possible option either; however, they did express an opposite attitude when considering euthanasia in a third‐person perspective. People with a personal history of suicidal behavior appear to present as a different population, overall expressing more open attitudes.     

Parallelism, Interactionism, and Causation

One may gather from the arguments of two of the last papers¹ published before his death that J. L. Mackie held the following three theses concerning the mind/body problem:

• (1)

  There is a distinct realm of mental properties, so a dualism of properties at least is true and materialism false.
• (2)

  All bodily movements probably have sufficient causes in physical facts and properties, but mental facts and properties are not causally irrelevant to human action.
• (3)

  At the same time, the view that there are not sufficient causes in the physical realm alone for all bodily movements has no good and adequate empirical or philosophical reasons against it.

In this paper I wish (1) to register my strong agreement with the first thesis by way of simply taking it for granted, (2) to defend the second thesis in greater detail and in a manner somewhat different from Mackie's, and (3) to show the third thesis to be false.     

Skeptical Theism,the Preface Paradox,and Non-Cumulative Inductive Evidence of Pointless Evil

Philosophia - This paper discusses an analogical argument for the compatibility of the evidential argument from evil and skeptical theism. The argument is based on an alleged parallel between the...     

Perception, Causation, and Supervenience

What relation between an experience and a physical object makes the experience a perception of the object?¹ One common answer is that it is a certain kind of causal relation. The idea is that to perceive an object is just to undergo an experience appropriately caused by the object. This answer is incorrect. The reason is that perceiving an object does not supervene on the causal connection the object bears to the perceiver's experience. Whether or not a person perceives an object depends, in part, on conditions that could obtain or fail to obtain without variation in the causal processes (if any) by which the object causes the person's experience. In what follows, I explain and defend these claims.     

Causation, coincidence, and commensuration

What does it take to solve the exclusion problem? An ingenious strategy is Stephen Yablo’s idea that causes must be commensurate with their effects. Commensuration is a relation between events. Roughly, events are commensurate with one another when one contains all that is required for the occurrence of the other, and as little as possible that is not required. According to Yablo, one event is a cause of another only if they are commensurate. I raise three reasons to doubt that this account solves the exclusion problem successfully. First, it leaves a mystery about what determines a particular’s causal capacities. Second, because there are two ways of construing coincidence between particulars, a dilemma arises: either the solution to the exclusion problem is threatened, or the account of coincidence loses an attractive feature concerning ontological economy. Third, even if we assume the commensuration constraint, a plausible principle about overdetermination seems to regenerate the exclusion problem.     

Capturing Shadows: On Photography,Causation, and Absences

Many photographs seem to be images of absences: for instance, a photograph of a shadow seems to be an image of an absence, as shadows are plausibly thought of as being absences of light. Absence photography is puzzling, however, as, first, it is a common idea that photographs can only be images of things that have caused them, and, second, it is unclear whether absences can cause anything. In this paper, I look at various ways to unravel the puzzle. Along the way, I also hope to cast some light on the idea that photography is a causal medium.     

Mental Causation versus Physical Causation: No Contest

Common sense supposes thoughts can cause bodily movements and thereby bring about changes in where the agent is or how his surroundings are. Many philosophers suppose that any such outcome is realized in a complex state of affairs involving only microparticles; that previous microphysical developments were sufficient to cause that state of affairs; hence that, barring overdetermination, causation by the mental is excluded. This paper argues that the microphysical swarm that realizes the outcome is an accident (Aristotle) or a coincidence (David Owens) and has no cause, though each component movement in it has one. Mental causation faces no competition "from below".     

Counterfactual Causation and Mental Causation

Counterfactual conditionals have been appealed to in various ways to show how the mind can be causally efficacious. However, it has often been overestimated what the truth of certain counterfactuals actually indicates about causation. The paper first identifies four approaches that seem to commit precisely this mistake. The arguments discussed involve erroneous assumptions about the connection of counterfactual dependence and genuine causation, as well as a disregard of the requisite evaluation conditions of counterfactuals. In a second step, the paper uses the insights of the foregoing analyses to formulate a set of counterfactuals-based conditions that are characterized as sufficient to establish singular causal claims. The paper concludes that there are ample reasons to believe that some mental events satisfy all these conditions with respect to certain further events and, hence, that mental events sometimes are causes.     

Assisted Suicide,Euthanasia, and Suicide Prevention: The Implications of the Dutch Experience

What impact would legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia have on our ability to treat suicidal patients and to prevent suicide? Information from a study of the Dutch experience illustrates how legal sanction promotes a culture that transforms suicide into assisted suicide and euthanasia and encourages patients and doctors to see choosing death as a preferred way of dealing with serious or terminal illness. The extension of the right to euthanasia to those who are not physically ill further complicates the problem. So too does the tendency of doctors in such a culture to begin to feel that they can make decisions about ending the life of competent terminally ill patients without consulting the patient. “Normalizing” suicide as a medical option lays the groundwork for a society that turns euthanasia into a “cure” for suicidal depression.     

Sparse Causation and Mere Abundant Causation

Philosophical Studies - Setting off from a familiar distinction in the philosophy of properties, this paper introduces a tripartite distinction between sparse causation, abundant causation and mere...