Identity, the Identity Statuses, and Identity Status Development: A Contemporary Statement

The Utrecht Study of Adolescent Development (Meeus et al., this issue) provides new data pertinent to issues of identity formation addressed in earlier reviews of the literature, specifically, (a) the direction and timing of identity status development, (b) the relative stability of the identity statuses, and (c) gender differences in identity formation. Despite numerous differences from earlier studies in the samples studied, the instruments used, and the methodologies employed, the findings of the Utrecht study are generally quite consistent with theoretical expectations and previous research outcomes. Because of the size and scope of the Utrecht study, data on possible age differences in the frequency of specific patterns of intraindividual identity status change could be analyzed. This aspect of identity formation had not been previously investigated. Equivocal results were obtained. Possible explanations for the partial failure to confirm this aspect of developmental theory are discussed.     

The Integration of Personal Identity,Religious Identity,and Moral Identity in Emerging Adulthood

The present study investigated the relative roles of identity structure (i.e., personal identity) and identity contents (i.e., religious identity and moral identity) in predicting emerging adults’ prosocial and antisocial behaviors. The sample included 9,495 college students. A variable-centered analysis (path analysis) used personal identity, religious identity, and moral identity as predictors of prosocial and antisocial behavior and tested interactions of personal identity with religious identity and moral identity. Moral identity was the strongest predictor of both behaviors, and religious identity and moral identity both interacted with personal identity in predicting antisocial behavior. A person-centered analysis (latent profile analysis) found three classes: integrated, moral identity–focused, and religious identity–focused, with integrated being most adaptive on both outcomes.     

Monogamy,Nonmonogamy, and Identity

After a brief discussion of the terms “monogamy” and “nonmonogamy,” I evaluate explanations offered by different theorists for the pain that nonmonogamy can cause to the partner (especially a female partner) of a nonmonogamous person (of either sex). My suggestion is that the self, especially the female self, is convention’ ally defined in terms of sexual partners. I present and reply to a possible objection to this explanation, and then discuss my theory's normative implications.     

Altruism, Grief, and Identity

The divide between oneself and others has made altruism seem irrational to some thinkers, as Sidgwick points out. I use characterizations of grief, especially by St. Augustine, to question the divide, and use a composition-as-identity metaphysics of parts and wholes to make literal sense of those characterizations.     

Grounding,Essence, and Identity

Recent metaphysics has turned its focus to two notions that are—as well as having a common Aristotelian pedigree—widely thought to be intimately related: grounding and essence. Yet how, exactly, the two are related remains opaque. We develop a unified and uniform account of grounding and essence, one which understands them both in terms of a generalized notion of identity examined in recent work by Fabrice Correia, Cian Dorr, Agustín Rayo, and others. We argue that the account comports with antecedently plausible principles governing grounding, essence, and identity taken individually, and illuminates how the three interact. We also argue that the account compares favorably to an alternative unification of grounding and essence recently proposed by Kit Fine.     

Identity,community, and prejudice

A new and urgent developmental task of adulthood is to learn to live with those who differ from oneself along dimensions of race, gender, ethnicity, religion, social class, and nationality. In order to promote discussion aimed toward achieving a better understanding of issues of multiculturalism and diversity, a conceptual framework is proposed. The conceptual framework is based on distinctions in how we define ourselves and our relationship to others and on contrasting perspectives on our intentions with respect to others. The conceptual framework is then used as a tool for setting forth a number of issues of multiculturalism and diversity. The article concludes with a discussion of the dynamics within the conceptual framework, including intraindividual and interindividual variation in adulthood.     

Identity Coping in the First Years of University: Identity Diffusion,Adjustment and Identity Distress

In today’s advanced post-capitalist societies, consolidating identity with a view to acquiring adult roles is more complex than in the past. In Italy, the changes in the educational system are also associated with changes in the labor market characterized by lack of opportunity and instability. Therefore, young people on the threshold of university are discouraged from making long-term decisions and developing a coherent identity. The aim of the study was to explore what modalities Italian students adopt in order to cope with developmental tasks and how they proceed to negotiate and resolve identity-related concerns. The participants were 332 Italian students, balanced by gender, attending the first 2 years of university and aged 18–25. We used six self-report measures: Dimensions of Identity Development Scale; Identity Stage Resolution Index; Identity Distress Scale; Locus of Control Scale; Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; and Depressive Symptom Subscale and Anxiety Symptom Subscale. Participation was voluntary, and anonymity was guaranteed. Findings indicate that identity processes, identity distress and sense of adulthood are related dimensions. We find five different modalities of identity coping (clusters) that identify different subjects. These retained clusters have also an effect on psychosocial correlates. Results advance the literature linking identity, sense of adulthood and coping with developmental tasks in emerging adulthood. Findings also support previous literature suggesting that coping with identity during first years of university is an important target of prevention efforts aimed at improving academic performance and identification of developmental path, particularly for individuals who exhibit identity diffusion and distress.     

Harun al-Rashid and the Terrorists: Identity Concealed, Identity Revealed

The assumption of false identities is a frequent theme in history, fiction, and current events. Spies and criminals are among those who pretend to be other than they are, although the strategy is not restricted to them. Harun al-Rashid, medieval Caliph of Baghdad, was described in the Thousand and One Nights as disguising himself in order to detect and punish evildoers. One distinctive feature of his adventures is that at some point he threw off the disguise and revealed his true identity. This paper recounts similar self-exposures by spies and terrorists (including those of 9/11) in situations where such an act could spell disaster for them. It further explores a number of explanations for the "Harun al-Rashid motive," suggests a way to measure it, and discusses ways in which counterterrorism agencies could build upon it for their own purposes.     

Identity,Culture and Contestation: Social Identity as Cross-Cultural Theory

In this paper we explore the logic and implications of the social identity approach to group processes. The theory argues that the consequences of social identification for behaviour are not simple givens. Rather than making generalisations about the behaviour that flows from social identification, the theory makes the point that behaviour depends upon the way in which identities are defined. This emphasis upon the contents of social identities draws our attention to their construction and we pay particular attention to how group identities are made and remade in and through argument and social practice. We argue that attention to the dynamics of identity construction means that this perspective is respectful of culture and cultural difference and that the social identity approach therefore has considerable value in exploring the politics and practice of identity wherever group behaviour may be found. Moreover, we argue that the ubiquity of identity-related argument across cultures and contexts reflects the fact that group identity is a basis for social power.     

Identity,practice and dialogue

Identities are constructed and contested. This means they may be re‐worked to support more inclusive visions of who belongs and on what basis. However, identity construction does not take place in a vacuum, and social psychological analyses of change need to address the contextual dynamics that shape the processes and outcomes of dialogue. This requires attention to processes of power. Furthermore, we need to consider minority group members' understandings of these processes. From the perspective of the disadvantaged, dialogue may be experienced as disempowering because it is viewed as compromising group members' capacities to organize themselves to pursue strategies of social change. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Identity,Individuation and Substance

The paper takes off from the problem of finding a proper content for the relation of identity as it holds or fails to hold among ordinary things or substances. The necessary conditions of identity are familiar, the sufficient conditions less so. The search is for conditions at once better usable than the Leibnizian Identity of Indiscernibles (independently suspect) and strong enough to underwrite all the formal properties of the relation. It is contended that the key to this problem rests at the level of metaphysics and epistemology alike with a sortalist position. Sortalism is the position which insists that, if the question is whether a and b are the same, it has to be asked what are they? Any sufficiently specific answer to that question will bring with it a principle of activity or functioning and a mode of behaviour characteristic of some particular kind of thing by reference to which questions of persistence or non‐persistence through change can be adjudicated. These contentions are illustrated by reference to familiar examples such as the human zygote, the Ship of Theseus and Shoemaker's Brown‐Brownson. The first example is hostage for a mass of unproblematical cases. The problems presented by the second and third sort of examples arise chiefly (it is claimed) from an incompleteness in our conceptions of the relevant sort—the what the thing in question is. That incompleteness need not prevent us from knowing perfectly well which thing we are referring to. In the concluding section, sortalism is defended against various accusations of anthropocentrism. The paper touches on the interpretation of Heraclitus, Leibniz's theory of clear indistinct ideas, the difficulties of David Lewis's ‘perdurantist’ or stroboscopic view of persistence, four‐dimensionalism, and the relation of personal identity both to experiential memory and to the particular bodily physiognomy of a subject. At some points—as in connection with the so‐called Only a and b rule—the paper corrects, supplements or extends certain theses or formulations proposed in the author's Sameness and Substance Renewed (2001).     

Delusion,Dissociation and Identity

Abstract

Envy and resentment are generally thought to be unpleasant and unethical emotions which ought to be condemned. I argue that both envy and resentment, in some important forms, are moral emotions connected with concern for justice, understood in terms of desert and entitlement. They enable us to recognise injustice, work as a spur to acting against it and connect us to others. Thus, we should accept these emotions as part of the ethical life.     

Entity, Identity and Unity

I propose a fourfold categorisation of entities according to whether or not they possess determinate identity-conditions and whether or not they are determinately countable. Some entities – which I call ‘individual objects’ – have both determinate identity and determinate countability: for example, persons and animals. In the case of entities of a kind K belonging to this category, we are in principle always entitled to expect there to be determinate answers to such questions as ‘Is x the same K as y?’ and ’How many Ks are there satisfying condition C?’, even if we may sometimes be unable in practice to discover what these answers are. But other entities apparently lack either determinate identity, or determinate countability, or both. In these terms I try to explain certain important ontological differences between familiar macroscopic objects and various rather more esoteric entities, such as the ‘particles’ of quantum physics, quantities of material stuff, and tropes or property instances. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.