Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning

It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. However, it is not entirely clear what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. In this paper, I try to answer the question what this difference is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that this answer can help to resolve some disagreements in which the difference between inferential and non-inferential reasoning plays a role.     

On Quantitative and Qualitative Parsimony

The distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony is supposed to allow David Lewis to dismiss one of the charges against his modal realism: that is, the charge of bloated ontology. The aim of this paper is to undermine Lewis's response to this objection. In order to do this, a distinction between multipliable and nonmultipliable objects is introduced. Based on this it is argued that the acceptance of Lewis's response requires one to believe in modal realism in the first place—that is, one has to believe in the view that the existence of nonactual spatiotemporal worlds does not affect the quality of the ontological commitment. Although the paper focuses on the problem of the metaphysics of possible worlds, this should be regarded merely as a case study. Accordingly, the results of this analysis should find applications in other metaphysical debates as well.     

Grounding agency in depth: The implications of Merleau-Ponty's thought for the politics of feminism

While poststructuralist feminist theorists have clarified our understanding of the gendered subject as produced through a matrix of language, culture, and psycho-sexual affects, they have found agency difficult to ground. I argue that this is because in these theories the body has served primarily as an inscribed surface. In response to this surface body, particular to this age, I have turned to Merleau-Ponty's concept of depth which allows us to theorize the agency crucial to feminist politics. While the poststructuralists' rejection of depth is largely due to its roots in Cartesian rationality, depth is much more than this. Rather than allowing for the impossibility of political action, depth means that as bodily moving and acting subjects we are part of Being, and thus part of the questions raised in this age, even if it is a mark of this age that this tends to be forgotten.     

Theoretical functions in physical science

The aim of this paper is to give an account of theoreticity which captures the preanalytic conception of a theoretical function, which is precise and yet which expresses what is significant about theoretical functions. The point of departure for this account is a recent discussion of the topic by Balzer and Moulines. On the basis of criticism of this discussion and on the basis of an examination of laboratory measurement, an account of theoreticity is proposed.I am grateful to the members of the philosophy seminar at the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University, to Barbara Davidson and particularly to Wolfgang Balzer and this journal's referee for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.     

Least squares estimation in finite Markov processes

The usual least squares estimate of the transitional probability matrix of a finite Markov process is given for the case in which, for each point in time, only the proportions of the sample in each state are known. The purpose of this paper is to give another estimate of this matrix and to investigate the properties of this estimate. It is shown that this estimate is consistent and asymptotically more efficient than the previously considered estimate in a sense defined in this paper.     

Reasons and Impossibility

Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then give three arguments for the truth of the latter claim, which are also arguments for the truth of the former claim as I interpret it.     

Neuropsychological Assessment of Mental Capacity

The assessment of mental capacity to assist legal determinations of competency is potentially a growth area for neuropsychology, although to date neuropsychologists have published relatively little in this area. In this paper a systematic review of methods used to assess capacity is presented, including coverage of specialized tests and interviews used for this purpose. A neuropsychological model for conducting capacity assessments is proposed. This model involves comprehensive assessment of a wide range of cognitive abilities as well as assessment of specific skills and knowledge related to the type of capacity being assessed. The purpose of proposing this model is to stimulate further discussion and debate about the contribution neuropsychologists might make in this area.     

Single-Assumption Systems in Proof-Theoretic Semantics

Proof-theoretic semantics is an inferentialist theory of meaning, usually developed in a multiple-assumption and single-conclusion framework. In that framework, this theory seems unable to justify classical logic, so some authors have proposed a multiple-conclusion reformulation to accomplish this goal. In the first part of this paper, the debate originated by this proposal is briefly exposed and used to defend the diverging opinion that proof-theoretic semantics should always endorse a single-assumption and single-conclusion framework. In order to adopt this approach some of its criteria of validity, especially separability, need to be weakened. This choice is evaluated and defended. The main argument in this direction is based on the circular dependences of meaning between multiple assumptions and conjunctions, and between multiple conclusions and disjunctions. In the second part of this paper, some systems that suit the new requirements are proposed for both intuitionistic and classical logic. A proof that they are valid, according to the weakened criteria, is sketched.

     

Demarcating depression

How to draw the line between depression‐as‐disorder and non‐pathological depressive symptoms continues to be a contested issue in psychiatry. Relatively few philosophers have waded into this debate, but the tools of philosophical analysis are quite relevant to it. In this paper, I defend a particular answer to this question, the Contextual approach. On this view, depression is a disorder if and only if it is a disproportionate response to a justifying cause or else is unconnected to any justifying cause. I present four objections to this approach and then defend it from them. Along the way, I explain why it matters whether we get this question right.     

The paradox of decrease and dependent parts

This paper is concerned with the paradox of decrease. Its aim is to defend the answer to this puzzle that was propounded by its originator, namely, the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus. The main trouble with this answer to the paradox is that it has the seemingly problematic implication that a material thing could perish due merely to extrinsic change. (For, intuitively, it is not possible for a mere extrinsic change to cause a material thing to cease to be.) It follows that in order to defend Chrysippus’ answer to the paradox, one has to explain how it could be that Theon is destroyed by the amputation without changing intrinsically. In this paper, I shall answer this challenge by appealing to the broadly Aristotelian idea that at least some of the proper parts of a material substance are ontologically dependent on that substance. I will also appeal to this idea in order to offer a new solution to the structurally similar paradox of increase. In this way, we will end up with a unified solution to two structurally similar paradoxes.     

The Model of Human Occupation

The Model of Human Occupation is used as a theoretical framework to review literature on the diagnosis of conduct disorder in adolescence. Specific occupational dysfunctions typical of this population are highlighted. A Newspaper Treatment Group based on this model is described focusing on three levels of treatmcnt: exploratory, competence and achievement. The purpose of this group is to facilitate healthy adaptation in this population.     

Personal need for structure and creative performance: the moderating influence of fear of invalidity

Previous research has suggested that personal need for structure (PNS) is negatively related to creative performance. In this article, it is argued that this relation, in fact, depends on another personality variable: personal fear of invalidity (PFI). When PFI is high, PNS should indeed be negatively associated with creativity. However, PNS should be positively associated with creativity when PFI is low, because this combination enables people to take a structured approach to creative tasks and this can be helpful to overcome their reliance on conventional and accessible task strategies. In four studies, this hypothesis is tested using different measures of creative performance. The expected interaction effect is found for measures of ideational fluency and measures of originality but not for measures of flexibility. Moreover, it is shown that the interaction effect between PNS and PFI is mediated by perseverance within thought categories.     

Informed Consent and the Requirement to Ensure Understanding

It is generally held that doctors and researchers have an obligation to obtain informed consent. Over time there has been a move in relation to this obligation from a requirement to disclose information to a requirement to ensure that that information is understood. Whilst this change has been resisted, in this article I argue that both sides on this matter are mistaken. When investigating what information is needed for consent to be informed we might be trying to determine what information a person would need in order to consent at all, or we might be trying to determine what information a person needs in order to make an informed choice about whether or not to consent. I argue that the obligation to ensure understanding only applies to information generated by the first type of enquiry; but that much of the information generally thought necessary in order for consent to be informed is only required if our concern is with the second type of enquiry. For this reason it is neither the case that doctors and researchers should ensure all the information they provide is understood, nor is it the case that their only obligation is to disclose it.     

What Happens to the Person With Dementia?

Answering this question depends on how the person without dementia is understood. Consequently, this research project has two main steps. The first is to assess competing understandings of the human person to see if there is a preferred understanding. If this is successful, the second step is to see whether this preferred understanding helps develop our understanding of what happens to the person with dementia. This article makes a start on the first step by presenting two requirements by which to assess contenders for the preferred understanding of the human person. The criteria are philosophical coherence and empirical adequacy. As an example of the kind of work involved in making this assessment I evaluate Tom Kitwood’s understanding of the human person, which was central to his person-centered care of people with dementia.     

Visually Controlled Locomotion and Visual Orientation in Animals

A general theory of locomotor behavior in relation to physical objects is presented. Since the controlling stimulation for such behavior is mainly optical, this involves novel assumptions about object perception and about what is called visual kinaesthesis. Evidence for these assumptions is cited. On the basis of this theory it is possible to suppose that animals are visually oriented to the surfaces of their environment, not merely to light as such. In short, it is possible to explain why they seem to have space perception. Implications of this approach for maze-learning are pointed out.     

Coerced Consent with an Unknown Future*

It is hard enough giving an account of how coercion undermines the consent of someone who knows full well the consequences of her choices. But in the wild, coerced consent is even more ethically complex because people are often unsure or misled about what will happen if they refuse to consent. In this essay, I discuss how coercion can invalidate consent under conditions of imperfect information. To explain how consent is invalidated in this way, I argue for the “Subjective Principle.” According to this principle, a sufficient condition for the invalidity of consent is that the consent-giver either believes or has a credence that they would suffer a penalty for refusing to consent, this penalty is illegitimate, and this belief or credence causes them to consent.     

Likeness: A Hidden Ingredient in Family Therapy

The purpose of this paper is to show how one can progress from a validated theoretical model to its practical application in family therapy. The model applied in this case is the Likeness Continuum consisting of six degrees of Likeness: symbiosis, sameness, similarity, differentness, oppositeness, and alienation. A formal Task to evaluate this model in family therapy is attached to provide a basis for the evaluation of this model in the laboratory and in the therapy office.     

Reasons-responsiveness and degrees of responsibility

Ordinarily, we take moral responsibility to come in degrees. Despite this commonplace, theories of moral responsibility have focused on the minimum threshold conditions under which agents are morally responsible. But this cannot account for our practices of holding agents to be more or less responsible. In this paper we remedy this omission. More specifically, we extend an account of reasons-responsiveness due to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza according to which an agent is morally responsible only if she is appropriately receptive to and reactive to reasons for action. Building on this, we claim that the degree to which an agent is responsible will depend on the degree to which she is able to recognize and react to reasons. To analyze this, we appeal to relations of comparative similarity between possible worlds, arguing that the degree to which an agent is reasons-reactive depends on the nearest possible world in which given sufficient reason to do otherwise, she does so. Similarly, we argue that the degree to which an agent is reasons-receptive will depend on the intelligibility of her patterned recognition of reasons. By extending an account of reasons-responsiveness in these ways, we are able to rationalize our practice of judging people to be more or less responsible.     

When seeing is not believing: A critique of priest's argument from perception

In this paper I critically examine an argument proposed by Graham Priest in support of the claim that the observable world is consistent. According to this argument we have good reason to think that the observable world is consistent, specifically we perceive it to be consistent. I critique this argument on two fronts. First, Priest appears to reason from the claim ‘we know what it is to have a contradictory perception’ to the claim ‘we know what it is to perceive a contradiction’. I argue that this inference fails to be valid. Secondly, I give reasons for thinking that if an observable state of affairs were to be contradictory, we would perceive it to be consistent. As such that the world we observe appears consistent does not constitute evidence that it is in fact consistent. That we see a consistent world is no reason to believe that the world is consistent. I conclude the paper with some reflections on the implications of this analysis for the plausibility of trivialism.     

Healing the physical/spiritual divide through a holistic and hermeneutic approach to education

In this special edition of the journal, attention is being given to the two dimensions of spirituality and physicality. In this particular paper I argue that there is an unhelpful divide that is often assumed to exist between these two dimensions and that this divide can be transcended or ‘healed’ through a holistic and hermeneutic approach to education. Rather than give our focus to narrower concerns such as spiritual education and physical education, we ought instead to pursue education in such a way that it is understood to necessarily be inclusive of both the physical and the spiritual simultaneously. That is, our spirituality is necessarily embodied in the physical. In order to make this argument, references to holistic education shall mainly draw upon the works of Dewey and Gadamer.