Keeping the “cognitive” in cognitive neuroscience, the “affective” in affective neuroscience, and the “behavioral” in behavioral neuroscience: The CABN mission for the next five years

The fields of cognitive, affective, and behavioral neuroscience have been with us for many years now, and have served to spawn an ever growing body of research that has helped to clarify the mechanisms by which the brain gives rise to the diverse processes that govern our thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. These fields of research have grown exponentially as more and more tools have become available for invasive and noninvasive measures of brain function in both humans and animals, and as information about the human and animal genomes has increased. These advances in neurosciencebased tools have clearly advanced our knowledge and understanding of brain—behavior relationships. However, there is also a danger that lurks in the shadows of these methodological and empirical advances. This danger is that the enticement of understanding neural processes sometimes leads us to forget about the exact phenomena that we ultimately wish to understand and explain—namely, cognitive, affective, and behavioral processes. What do I mean by danger? I mean the concern that we often seem to prioritize the sophistication of our neural and genetic tools and theorizing over our psychological tools and theorizing, and that we may overlook the absence of linkage between neural (e.g., imaging results at a range of levels) or genetic findings and well—grounded psychological theories about specific cognitive, affective, or behavioral mechanisms. In other words, we can be seduced by the “call of the brain mechanism,” without a reminder of the phenomena we wish to explain.     

Conscious Action/Zombie Action

I argue that the neural realizers of experiences of trying (that is, experiences of directing effort towards the satisfaction of an intention) are not distinct from the neural realizers of actual trying (that is, actual effort directed towards the satisfaction of an intention). I then ask how experiences of trying might relate to the perceptual experiences one has while acting. First, I assess recent zombie action arguments regarding conscious visual experience, and I argue that contrary to what some have claimed, conscious visual experience plays a causal role for action control in some circumstances. Second, I propose a multimodal account of the experience of acting. According to this account, the experience of acting is (at the very least) a temporally extended, co‐conscious collection of agentive and perceptual experiences, functionally integrated and structured both by multimodal perceptual processing as well as by what an agent is, at the time, trying to do.     

神经科学偏见效应：可重复性及其心理机制的探索

神经科学的发展对其他学科以及社会产生了重要的影响。虽然神经科学方法与行为研究方法都是探索人类心理与行为的有效手段并各有所长, 但神经科学的研究结果却可能引起人们过度的解读和信任。研究者发现, 当某一结论使用神经科学结果作为证据时, 比使用行为科学结果或者心理生理学指标作为证据时更加让人信服, 即使神经科学结果与该结论之间毫无关系, 这种现象被称为神经科学偏见(neuroscience bias)。通过系统回顾近年来关于神经科学偏见的研究, 我们发现：(1)虽然神经科学偏见存在可重复性的争论, 但该效应确实存在; (2)神经科学偏见的产生可能是因为个体倾向于还原论的解释(即使用低层次、简单的机制来解释更高层次上的现象)及心理本质主义的影响(即人们认为心理与行为的本质是神经活动)。神经科学偏见反映了公众对科学结果解读的偏见, 未来研究需要探讨这种偏见的心理机制, 从而引导科学结果的正确解读和运用。     

宽恕心理的行为测量及认知神经机制

宽恕是一个复杂的心理过程,被认为是对冒犯者的亲社会化转变的过程,包括认知、情绪、动机和行为上的改变。本文回顾了国内外宽恕心理的行为测量范式和认知神经机制研究相关的成果,发现宽恕心理的行为测量范式能够揭示宽恕相关的心理过程;认知神经机制的研究发现宽恕心理过程主要涉及负责社会认知、共情和认知控制等功能的脑区。未来的研究应关注宽恕心理行为测量范式的有效性和揭示内容的一致性、宽恕心理的认知和脑神经基础。     

The multiple realization book

In this review of Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book I look at the positive account, Modest Identity Theory, that Polger and Shapiro advance. In §2 of this review, I outline P&S’s arguments against multiple realization and summarize the view they defend, Modest Identity Theory. In §3, I consider what consequences the adoption of Modest Identity Theory might have on the ontology of psychological or mental kinds. In particular, I highlight the ontological pluralism and anti-reductionism that Polger and Shapiro endorse. Modest Identity Theory tolerates multiple taxonomies of psychological kinds, which represents an important departure from earlier versions of Identity Theory. I conclude in §4 by arguing that the way Modest Identity Theory individuates psychological kinds very closely resembles the way that those kinds are individuated by functionalism. I argue that the causal properties individuative of psychological kinds can be used to group together distinct neuroanatomical characteristics. I illustrate this by describing research into the functional connectivity of the reading network. I conclude by emphasizing the value of using empirical evidence from neuroscience and cognitive science to inform the new pluralistic ontology of psychological and mental kinds with which Modest Identity Theory is compatible.     

On the Thinking Brains and Tinkering with the Scientific Models

The paper aims to provide a detailed assessment of Tim Crane’s recent invocation of the notion of scientific models in the way of dealing with the issue of the brain’s representational states. In this paper, I assess Crane’s proposal under a charitable and a less charitable reading. I argue that Crane’s use of scientific models is at best (i.e. under a charitable reading) compatible with his expression of psychological realism. However, Crane’s use of model-based strategy by no means underlay, support, or strengthen his psychological realism. Rather, traditional reasons from the metaphysics of mind, acting quite separately from empirical scientific reasons, must be used to support this realism, and Crane has merely removed the threat posed to these metaphysical arguments by the existence of the so-called mereological fallacy in empirical neuroscience. Therefore, while he has saved the neuroscientific language from philosophical attack, he has perhaps even strengthened the divide between neuroscience and philosophy. I conclude the paper by outlining the sketch of a broadbrush scientifically informed strategy for defending psychological realism.     

Against Functional Reductionism in Cognitive Science

Functional reductionism concerning mental properties has recently been advocated by Jaegwon Kim in order to solve the problem of the ‘causal exclusion’ of the mental. Adopting a reductionist strategy first proposed by David Lewis, he regards psychological properties as being ‘higher‐order’ properties functionally defined over ‘lower‐order’ properties, which are causally efficacious. Though functional reductionism is compatible with the multiple realizability of psychological properties, it is blocked if psychological properties are subdivided or crosscut by neurophysiological properties. I argue that there is recent evidence from cognitive neuroscience that shows that this is the case for the psychological property of fear. Though this may suggest that some psychological properties should be revised in order to conform to those of neurophysiology, the history of science demonstrates that this is not always the outcome, particularly with properties that play an important role in our folk theories and are central to human concerns.     

高社交焦虑者识别动态情绪面孔的神经机制

近年来, 大量的研究对高社交焦虑者的情绪面孔加工和社交焦虑的干预进行了考察, 取得了丰富成果, 但仍存在以下不足: (1) 在以往的中国动态情绪面孔库存中, 刺激材料的情绪类别、视频维度以及视频持续时间的种类偏少; (2) 高社交焦虑者识别动态情绪面孔的神经机制未被系统探讨; (3) 注意偏向训练的效果存在争议, 即一些研究者发现注意偏向训练对社交焦虑有明显的缓解作用, 而其他研究者却未发现注意偏向训练的效果。针对这些不足, 当前项目建设的中国人动态情绪面孔库拟增加刺激材料的情绪类别、视频维度以及视频持续时间的类型, 此外运用神经科学的技术系统探究高社交焦虑者对动态情绪面孔的识别机制, 最后采用工作记忆训练改善高社交焦虑者对动态生气面孔识别的注意偏向。本研究团队提出了高社交焦虑个体识别动态情绪面孔的神经机制模型, 该模型主要包括机制和干预两个部分。本项目的开展不仅为动态情绪面孔加工和社交焦虑研究提供了新视角, 还突破原有单一的研究方法, 拟从行为、电生理和脑成像三个层次进行研究。研究成果将促进社交焦虑干预工作的开展, 从而缓解社交焦虑个体的心理健康问题, 对于提高他们的幸福感和生命质量有重要价值。     

Two types of debunking arguments

Debunking arguments are arguments that seek to undermine a belief or doctrine by exposing its causal origins. Two prominent proponents of such arguments are the utilitarians Joshua Greene and Peter Singer. They draw on evidence from moral psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary theory in an effort to show that there is something wrong with how deontological judgments are typically formed and with where our deontological intuitions come from. They offer debunking explanations of our emotion-driven deontological intuitions and dismiss complex deontological theories as products of confabulatory post hoc rationalization. Through my discussion of Greene and Singer’s empirically informed debunking of deontology, I introduce the distinction between two different types of debunking arguments. The first type of debunking argument operates through regular undercutting defeat, whereas the second type relies on higher-order evidence. I argue that the latter type of debunking argument, of which the argument from confabulation is an example, is objectionably sloppy and therefore inadmissible in academic discussion.     

The Relation Between Perception and Action: What Should Neuroscience Learn From Psychology?

Research in neuroscience is making progress toward understanding the "dorsal" mechanisms responsible for the fast modulation by optical information of actions such as reaching and grasping. The function of "ventral" visual pathways is not to support perception, as distinct from action. Instead, it is to control extended actions that unfold over longer time scales and draw on optical information over larger spatial scales, than simple, fast limb movements. Perception and sensation should be regarded as particular forms of extended communicative actions and not as alternative end points for the use of environmental information. The neural mechanisms involved in controlling extended actions are not yet understood, and psychological theory has a role to play in framing their investigation by neuroscience.     

认知神经科学的心理学理论价值

从认知神经科学面临的三个挑战--(1)神经科学是“还原” 的,不能完全解释一个人的心理活动过程;（2）认知神经科学无法真正解释人的心理与行为;（3）认知神经科学只能揭示出神经事件与认知活动或行为活动的相关性--入手来讨论其心理学理论价值,阐明认知神经科学在心理学研究中的重要地位及主流趋势。同时指出,认知神经科学只是心理学学科门类中的一种,它能解决的问题也只限于特定的范围,对它要有科学理性的认识和定位。     

Reflective Argumentation: A Cognitive Function of Arguing

Why do we formulate arguments? Usually, things such as persuading opponents, finding consensus, and justifying knowledge are listed as functions of arguments. But arguments can also be used to stimulate reflection on one’s own reasoning. Since this cognitive function of arguments should be important to improve the quality of people’s arguments and reasoning, for learning processes, for coping with “wicked problems,” and for the resolution of conflicts, it deserves to be studied in its own right. This contribution develops first steps towards a theory of reflective argumentation. It provides a definition of reflective argumentation, justifies its importance, delineates it from other cognitive functions of argumentation in a new classification of argument functions, and it discusses how reflection on one’s own reasoning can be stimulated by arguments.     

Defeasibility,Law, and Argumentation: A Critical View from an Interpretative Standpoint

The phenomenon of defeasibility has long been a central theme in legal literature. This essay aims to shed new light on that phenomenon by clarifying some fundamental conceptual issues. First, the most widespread definition of legal defeasibility is examined and criticized. The essay shows that such a definition is poorly constructed, inaccurate and generates many problems. Indeed, the definition hides the close relationship between legal defeasibility and legal interpretation. Second, this essay argues that no new definition is needed. I will show that from an interpretative standpoint, there is nothing special about legal defeasibility. Contrary to what some authors maintain, no unique or privileged source of legal defeasibility exists, nor are there privileged arguments to justify it. Specifically, legal defeasibility refers to interpretative outcomes deriving from interpretative arguments that, on the one hand, are very different from one another, and, on the other, are often employed to justify different interpretative outcomes. In the legal field, the problems related to defeasibility have little in common with the problems that this label covers in other areas—such as logic or epistemology—and they are nothing but the well-known problems related to legal interpretation. In conclusion, this paper argues that as far as legal argumentation is concerned, the notion of legal defeasibility lacks explanatory power, and it should be abandoned.

     

Return of the mental image: are there really pictures in the brain?

In the past decade there has been renewed interest in the study of mental imagery. Emboldened by new findings from neuroscience, many people have revived the idea that mental imagery involves a special format of thought, one that is pictorial in nature. But the evidence and the arguments that exposed deep conceptual and empirical problems in the picture theory over the past 300 years have not gone away. I argue that the new evidence from neural imaging and clinical neuropsychology does little to justify this recidivism because it does not address the format of mental images. I also discuss some reasons why the picture theory is so resistant to counterarguments and suggest ways in which non-pictorial theories might account for the apparent spatial nature of images.     

Contribution de la motricité graphique à la reconnaissance visuelle des lettres

The ability to recognize single letters, an important step in reading, is traditionally assumed to depend only on visual processes. However, as many of the objects surrounding us, letters are learnt through a matching between a visual configuration and movements. We review arguments suggesting that the characteristics of writing movements impact visual recognition of letters, at both a behavioral and neural levels. This impact might be especially strong when the orientation of letters has to be processed.     

ARGUMENTS FROM CONCEIVABILITY1

What can be inferred from the fact that something is, or is not, conceivable? In this paper I argue, contrary to some deflationary remarks in recent literature, that arguments which use such facts as their starting point may have significant philosophical import. I use Strawson's results from the first chapter of Individuals in order to show that Galileo's arguments in favour of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which are based on premises concerning conceivability, should not be dismissed: they are the first step towards recognising an important conceptual truth.     

Should we reject the expertise hypothesis?

On the basis of a review of the literature and the results of three experiments with dog experts, Robbins and McKone [Robbins, R. A., & McKone, E. (2006). No face-like processing for objects-of-expertise in three behavioural tasks, Cognition] argue that there is little or no evidence supporting an expertise account of the differences in configural processing that are typically observed between faces and non-face objects. In the spirit of a debate that has become overly polarized, we believe that R&M often emphasized relatively unimportant controversial issues at the expense of bigger, more important questions. We also feel that some of R&M's arguments are rooted in methodological confusions that should be clarified because they have implications beyond this specific debate. In this commentary, we first clarify issues surrounding the proper statistical analysis of the composite paradigm, a methodology that is commonly used to assess configural and holistic effects in both face and non-face objects. We then discuss several theoretical issues that we feel are central to the debate regarding accounts of face-specificity. We also briefly review positive evidence for the correlation between measures of behavioral expertise and neural markers of face-selectivity. Unlike R&M, we believe the positive evidence for expertise effects, both behavioral and neural, greatly outweighs evidence stemming from null results and that it clearly motivates the importance of future work on the role of experience in the specialization of visual cortex.     

Should Psychology Ignore the Language of the Brain?

ABSTRACT— Claims that neuroscientific data do not contribute to our understanding of psychological functions have been made recently. Here I argue that these criticisms are solely based on an analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies. However, fMRI is only one of the methods in the toolkit of cognitive neuroscience. I provide examples from research on event-related brain potentials (ERPs) that have contributed to our understanding of the cognitive architecture of human language functions. In addition, I provide evidence of (possible) contributions from fMRI measurements to our understanding of the functional architecture of language processing. Finally, I argue that a neurobiology of human language that integrates information about the necessary genetic and neural infrastructures will allow us to answer certain questions that are not answerable if all we have is evidence from behavior.