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1.
How to Define a Number? A General Epistemological Account of Simon Stevin’s Art of Defining 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jurgen Naets 《Topoi》2010,29(1):77-86
This paper explores Simon Stevin’s l’Arithmétique of 1585, where we find a novel understanding of the concept of number. I will discuss the dynamics between his practice and
philosophy of mathematics, and put it in the context of his general epistemological attitude. Subsequently, I will take a
close look at his justificational concerns, and at how these are reflected in his inductive, a postiori and structuralist
approach to investigating the numerical field. I will argue that Stevin’s renewed conceptualisation of the notion of number
is a sort of “existential closure” of the numerical domain, founded upon the practice of his predecessors and contemporaries.
Accordingly, I want to make clear that l’Aritmetique have to be read not as an ontological analysis or exploration of the numerical field, but as an explication of a mathematical
ethos. In this sense, this article also intends to make a specific contribution to the broader issue of the “ethics of geometry.” 相似文献
2.
In this paper I argue that there are in fact external relations in Russell’s sense. The level at which we are forced to acknowledge
them is, however, not the level of relations between concrete individual objects. All relations of this kind, which I will
call “inter-individual” relations, can be construed as supervenient on the monadic properties of their terms. But if we pursue
our ontological analysis a little bit deeper and consider the internal structure of a concrete individual, then we will inevitably
find irreducible external relations. I mean for example the relation of instantiation (in the frame of a realist’s theory)
or that of concurrence (in the frame of a trope theory). I will show that such “intra-individual” relations – the relations
that make up the internal structure of a concrete individual out of more primitive metaphysical “building blocks” like universals
or tropes – could not (even in principle) be construed as supervenient.
I should like to thank David Frost for brushing up my English and the Austrian Foundation for the Promotion of Scientific Research (FWF) for the financial support. 相似文献
3.
Daniel Halliday 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(2):381-393
4.
Fernando Birman 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2009,40(2):207-225
The literature on physicalism often fails to elucidate, I think, what the word physical in physicalism precisely means. Philosophers speak at times of an ideal set of fundamental physical facts, or they stipulate that physical means non-mental, such that all fundamental physical facts are fundamental facts pertaining to the non-mental. In this article, I will probe
physicalism in the very much tangible framework of quantum mechanics. Although this theory, unlike “ideal physics” or some
“final theory of non-mentality”, is an incomplete theory of the world, I believe this analysis will be of value, if for nothing
else, at least for bringing some taste of physical reality, as it were, back to the debate. First, I will introduce a broad
characterization of the physicalist credo. In Sect. 2, I will provide a rather quick review of quantum mechanics and some of its current interpretations. In Sect. 3, the notion of quantum non-separability will be analyzed, which will facilitate a discussion of the wave function ontology
in Sect. 4. In Sects. 5 and 6, I will explore competing views on the implications of this ontology. In Sect. 7, I will argue that the prior results, based on a thoroughly realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, support only a weak
version of non-reductive physicalism. 相似文献
5.
Igor Primoratz 《The Journal of Ethics》2011,15(4):371-386
Any plausible position in the ethics of war and political violence in general will include the requirement of protection of
civilians (non-combatants, common citizens) against lethal violence. This requirement is particularly prominent, and particularly
strong, in just war theory. Some adherents of the theory see civilian immunity as absolute, not to be overridden in any circumstances
whatsoever. Others allow that it may be overridden, but only in extremis. The latter position has been advanced by Michael
Walzer under the heading of “supreme emergency.” In this paper, I look into some of the issues of interpretation and application
of Walzer’s “supreme emergency” view and some of the criticisms that have been levelled against it. I argue that Walzer’s
view is vague and unacceptable as it stands, but that the alternatives proposed by critics such as Brian Orend, C.A.J. Coady,
and Stephen Nathanson are also unattractive. I go on to construct a position that is structurally similar to Walzer’s, but
more specific and much less permissive, which I term the “moral disaster” view. According to this view, deliberate killing
of civilians is almost absolutely wrong. 相似文献
6.
Wolfgang Fasching 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(2):131-148
In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic
and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization.
Finally I suggest that the self, though irreducible to inter-experiential relations, is not a “separately existing entity”,
but should be conceived of as a dimension, namely the dimension of first-personal manifestation of the experiences.
相似文献
Wolfgang FaschingEmail: |
7.
Richard Tieszen 《Axiomathes》2012,22(1):31-52
In 1928 Edmund Husserl wrote that “The ideal of the future is essentially that of phenomenologically based (“philosophical”)
sciences, in unitary relation to an absolute theory of monads” (“Phenomenology”, Encyclopedia Britannica draft) There are references to phenomenological monadology in various writings of Husserl. Kurt G?del began to study Husserl’s
work in 1959. On the basis of his later discussions with G?del, Hao Wang tells us that “G?del’s own main aim in philosophy
was to develop metaphysics—specifically, something like the monadology of Leibniz transformed into exact theory—with the help
of phenomenology.” (A Logical Journey: From G?del to Philosophy, p. 166) In the Cartesian Meditations and other works Husserl identifies ‘monads’ (in his sense) with ‘transcendental egos in their full concreteness’. In this
paper I explore some prospects for a G?delian monadology that result from this identification, with reference to texts of
G?del and to aspects of Leibniz’s original monadology. 相似文献
8.
Aaron Rizzieri 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,70(3):217-229
It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument
against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of
epistemic support that is required for knowledge. Finally, I generalize my results to include other religiously significant
propositions such as “God exists” and “God does not exist.” 相似文献
9.
Joshua Gert 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(1):1-23
Although it goes against a widespread significant misunderstanding of his view, Michael Smith is one of the very few moral
philosophers who explicitly wants to allow for the commonsense claim that, while morally required action is always favored
by some reason, selfish and immoral action can also be rationally permissible. One point of this paper is to make it clear
that this is indeed Smith’s view. It is a further point to show that his way of accommodating this claim is inconsistent with
his well-known “practicality requirement” on moral judgments: the thesis that any rational person will always have at least
some motivation to do what she judges to be right. The general conclusion is that no view that, like Smith’s, associates the
normative strength of a reason with the motivational strength of an ideal desire will allow for the wide range of rational
permissibility that Smith wants to capture.
Many thanks to Michael Smith for his friendly and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and for permission to
make a very strong and explicit claim on his behalf. 相似文献
10.
Pär Sundström 《Synthese》2008,163(2):133-143
A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or
functional properties and that (ii) we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion
generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential
version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness
produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts can’t co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin
with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn’t be. Further,
and worse, the account predicts that an “intuition of distinctness” will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion,
I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and (physicalist) alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim
(ii). 相似文献
11.
Dale Jamieson 《Science and engineering ethics》2010,16(3):431-445
In this paper I make the following claims. In order to see anthropogenic climate change as clearly involving moral wrongs
and global injustices, we will have to revise some central concepts in these domains. Moreover, climate change threatens another
value (“respect for nature”) that cannot easily be taken up by concerns of global justice or moral responsibility. 相似文献
12.
Geoffrey Cantor 《Jewish History》2009,23(4):363-388
In recovering the life and work of Ellis Abraham Davidson (1828–1878), this paper draws attention to a Victorian who expands
our understanding of Anglo-Jewry as he does not fit the occupational stereotypes. Unusually, he contributed to education,
more specifically to the socially-important but frequently neglected topic of technical education. He taught the “lowly” arts,
generally known in the nineteenth century as “arts and manufactures”, or the “useful arts”, or “art and design”. Thus although
he did not become an artisan or tradesman himself, through his teaching others acquired the requisite skills to become artisans
and tradesmen. Moreover, drawing on his experience teaching practical subjects he lectured to Jewish artisans and advised
the Board of Guardians on the best way to support apprentices. Finally, and most importantly, this study of Davidson sheds
new light on the relations between science, technology, and Judaism in the mid-Victorian period. Thus the final two sections
of this paper will examine his commitment to a form of natural theology that set him against Darwin’s theory of evolution
and also informed his only book directed specifically at the Anglo-Jewish community. 相似文献
13.
James Mensch 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,42(4):449-463
In his last work, The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty explored the fact that we believe that perception occurs in our heads (“in the recesses of a body”) and, hence,
assert that the perceptual world is “in” us, while also believing that we are “in” the world we perceive. In this article,
I examine how this intertwining of self and world justifies the faith we have in perception. I shall do so by considering
a number of examples. In each case, the object “in itself” will turn out to be neither within us nor outside of us, but rather
at the intersection set by the intertwining. I will then turn to what this disclosure of this object reveals about human temporality
and, indeed, about human being as a place (or “clearing”) that permits disclosure. 相似文献
14.
Stephen John 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2010,13(1):3-18
In the first part of the paper, three objections to the precautionary principle are outlined: the principle requires some
account of how to balance risks of significant harms; the principle focuses on action and ignores the costs of inaction; and
the principle threatens epistemic anarchy. I argue that these objections may overlook two distinctive features of precautionary
thought: a suspicion of the value of “full scientific certainty”; and a desire to distinguish environmental doings from allowings.
In Section 2, I argue that any simple distinction between environmental doings and allowings is untenable. However, I argue
that the appeal of such a distinction can be captured within a relational account of environmental equity. In Section 3 I
show how the proposed account of environmental justice can generate a justification for distinctively “precautionary” policy-making. 相似文献
15.
Matthew C. Haug 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(3):313-330
Several philosophers (e.g., Ehring (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 30:461–480, 1996); Funkhouser (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 40:548–569, 2006); Walter (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37:217–244, 2007) have argued that there are metaphysical differences between the determinable-determinate relation and the realization relation
between mental and physical properties. Others have challenged this claim (e.g., Wilson (Philosophical Studies, 2009). In this paper, I argue that there are indeed such differences and propose a “mechanistic” account of realization that elucidates
why these differences hold. This account of realization incorporates two distinct roles that mechanisms play in the realization
of mental (and other special science) properties which are implicit, but undeveloped, in the literature—what I call “constitutive”
and “integrative” mechanisms. I then use these two notions of mechanism to clarify some debates about the relations between
realization, multiple realizability, and irreducibility. 相似文献
16.
John Hadley 《Nanoethics》2012,6(1):41-46
Drawing upon evolutionary theory and the work of Daniel Dennett and Nicholas Agar, I offer an argument for broadening discussion
of the ethics of disenhancement beyond animal welfare concerns to a consideration of animal “biopreferences”. Short of rendering
animals completely unconscious or decerebrate, it is reasonable to suggest that disenhanced animals will continue to have
some preferences. To the extent that these preferences can be understood as what Agar refers to as “plausible naturalizations”
for familiar moral concepts like beliefs and desires, then they can make moral claims on us and provide support for intuitive
opposition to disenhancement. 相似文献
17.
Moser A 《Science and engineering ethics》2000,6(3):365-382
This paper deals with an approach to the integration of science (with technology and economics), ethics (with religion and
mysticism), the arts (aesthetics) and Nature, in order to establish a world-view based on holistic, evolutionary ethics that
could help with problem solving. The author suggests that this integration is possible with the aid of “Nature’s wisdom” which
is mirrored in the macroscopic pattern of the ecosphere. The corresponding eco-principles represent the basis for unifying
soft and hard sciences resulting in “deep sciences”. Deduction and induction will remain the methodology for deep sciences
and will include conventional experiments and aesthetic and sentient experiences. Perception becomes the decisive factor with
the senses as operators for the building of consciousness through the subconscious. In this paper, an attempt at integrating
the concepts of the “true”, the “right” and the “beautiful” with the aid of Nature’s wisdom is explained in more detail along
with consequences.
The author is a bioprocess engineer with a research interest in environmental issues. 相似文献
18.
Joel W. Krueger 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(1):1-22
This paper is an exploration of how we do things with music—that is, the way that we use music as an “esthetic technology”
to enact micro-practices of emotion regulation, communicative expression, identity construction, and interpersonal coordination
that drive core aspects of our emotional and social existence. The main thesis is: from birth, music is directly perceived
as an affordance-laden structure. Music, I argue, affords a sonic world, an exploratory space or “nested acoustic environment”
that further affords possibilities for, among other things, (1) emotion regulation and (2) social coordination. When we do
things with music, we are engaged in the work of creating and cultivating the self, as well as creating and cultivating a
shared world that we inhabit with others. I develop this thesis by first introducing the notion of a “musical affordance”.
Next, I look at how “emotional affordances” in music are exploited to construct and regulate emotions. I summon empirical
research on neonate music therapy to argue that this is something we emerge from the womb knowing how to do. I then look at
“social affordances” in music, arguing that joint attention to social affordances in music alters how music is both perceived
and appropriated by joint attenders within social listening contexts. In support, I describe the experience of listening to
and engaging with music in a live concert setting. Thinking of music as an affordance-laden structure thus reaffirms the crucial
role that music plays in constructing and regulating emotional and social experiences in everyday life. 相似文献
19.
Jonathan Aldred 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(4):377-403
This paper is concerned with intransitivity in normative rational choice. It focuses on a class of intransitivities which
have received little attention, those involving vague preferences. “Vague preferences” are defined in terms of vague predicates
such as “red” or “bald.” Such preferences appear common, and intransitive indifference is argued to be an unavoidable feature
of them. Such preferences are argued to undermine intransitive strict preference also. Various formal theories of vagueness
are applied to an example of vague preferences, but none of them provide a justification for the transitivity axiom.
For helpful comments on earlier drafts and discussions of this material, I am very grateful to John Broome, Rosanna Keefe,
Matthew Kramer, Stuart Rachels, Jochen Runde and Adrian Walsh. I owe a large debt to John O’Neill, who suggested an earlier
version of the “Tragedy of the Disappearing Commons” example. 相似文献
20.
Burleigh T. Wilkins 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(2):147-159
This paper explores some of the problems which arise from Immanuel Kant’s commitment to both human rights and the rights of
states. Michael Doyle believed it was contradictory for Kant to defend both human rights and non-intervention by states in
the affairs of other states, but I argue that for Kant there was no such contradiction, and I explore Kant’s claim that the
state is “a moral personality.” I also discuss Kant’s belief that “Nature guarantees” that perpetual peace will obtain, and
I consider Kant as a teleologist. 相似文献