The psychology of hate: Moral concerns differentiate hate from dislike

We investigated whether any differences in the psychological conceptualization of hate and dislike were simply a matter of degree of negativity (i.e., hate falls on the end of the continuum of dislike) or also morality (i.e., hate is imbued with distinct moral components that distinguish it from dislike). In three lab studies in Canada and the United States, participants reported disliked and hated attitude objects and rated each on dimensions including valence, attitude strength, morality, and emotional content. Quantitative and qualitative measures revealed that hated attitude objects were more negative than disliked attitude objects and associated with moral beliefs and emotions, even after adjusting for differences in negativity. In Study 4, we analysed the rhetoric on real hate sites and complaint forums and found that the language used on prominent hate websites contained more words related to morality, but not negativity, relative to complaint forums.     

Some reflections on the origin of hate between man and woman

There is no love without hate and no hate without love; their opposite is indifference. According to Winnicott, human being’s deepest guilt evolves when his hate is stronger than his love. This paper will explore how the origin of hate may lie in early helplessness, in the difference between sexes and disturbances of developmental phases. Finally, it will be illustrated how hate can protect love in a relationship between man and woman.     

The other side of Oedipus

The Oedipus complex has been understood as a series of conflicts between feelings of love and hate (sexuality and aggression) in the relationship between the child and his/her parents. This article presents a different view, defining oedipal struggles as conflicts between love and care, sexual desires and self- and object-preservative needs. The crucial conflict the child has to deal with is: to love the one and nevertheless to preserve the other (the rival). Further, the author distinguishes between monolithic conflicts, which are conflicts between different objects of one drive's strivings, and binary conflicts, which involve the objects of both basic drives. In three illustrative examples, she shows that monolithic conflicts can indicate a regressive movement, while binary conflicts tend to foster a progression in the analytic work.     

Let me count the ways: An integrative theory of love and hate

We propose an integrative theory of love and hate intended to help resolve problems and inconsistencies that have emerged from previous conceptualizations. We suggest that love is a motive based on the valuing of the other and is associated with the goal of preserving or promoting the other's well‐being. Likewise, hate is a motive based on devaluing the other and is associated with the goal of diminishing or destroying the other's well‐being. We further suggest that intense, powerful emotions may serve as eliciting experiences for different types of love and hate, and we discuss how benefiting or harming the other can be either an instrumental or an ultimate goal for the various forms of love and hate. Finally, we discuss some ways in which our theory can promote new directions in the future study of love and hate.     

Hatred,hostility, and faith: A theological perspective

This essay proffers a theological-ethical analysis of hate and hostility. More specifically the dynamics of protracted hate and hostility are explored utilizing Niebuhr's concept of evil imagination and his notion of the dialectical structures of human faith. There are two major claims in this article. First, evil imagination, which includes diverse forms of violence, hatred and hostility, is a response to the anxiety and fear associated with powerlessness and absolute dependence; it may be viewed as an attempt to secure one's personal and intersubjective identity and continuity against coming destruction and loss. Second, the protracted hate and hostility of evil imagination manifests a particular type of faith involving particular conscious and unconscious beliefs as well as objects of trust and distrust and loyalty and disloyalty.     

A NEW READING OF THE ORIGINS OF OBJECT-RELATIONS THEORY

The author presents a reading of Freud's 'Mourning and melancholia' in which he examines not only the ideas Freud was introducing, but, as important, the way he was thinking/writing in this watershed paper. The author demonstrates how Freud made use of his exploration of the unconscious work of mourning and of melancholia to propose and explore some of the major tenets of a revised model of the mind (which later would be termed 'object-relations theory'). The principal tenets of the revised model presented in this 1917 paper include: (1) the idea that the unconscious is organised to a significant degree around stable internal object relations between paired split-off parts of the ego; (2) the notion that psychic pain may be defended against by means of the replacement of an external object relationship by an unconscious, fantasied internal object relationship; (3) the idea that pathological bonds of love mixed with hate are among the strongest ties that bind internal objects to one another in a state of mutual captivity; (4) the notion that the psychopathology of internal object relations often involves the use of omnipotent thinking to a degree that cuts off the dialogue between the unconscious internal object world and the world of actual experience with real external objects; and (5) the idea that ambivalence in relations between unconscious internal objects involves not only the conflict of love and hate, but also the conflict between the wish to continue to be alive in one's object relationships and the wish to be at one with one's dead internal objects.     

Hating the One You Love

Many testimonies, as well as fictional works, describe situations in which people find themselves hating the person that they love. This might initially appear to be contradiction, as how can one love and hate the same person at the same time? A discussion of this problem requires making a distinction between logical consistency and psychologically compatibility. Hating the one you love may be a consistent experience, but it raises difficulties concerning its psychological compatibility.     

Three strands of narcissism.

The development of narcissism is usually studied from the standpoint of the drives, or more specifically of the libido. This paper considers narcissism from the standpoint of the ego and seeks to delineate separate developmental lines. From this point of view, a variety of forms may be distinguished which are ordinarily structured during the oedipal period. It is postulated that narcissism cannot be considered as truly separable from the vicissitudes of the love and hate of objects. This formulation makes possible consideration of recent observations concerning the 'narcissistic personality' without requiring major new economic, structural, or dynamic metapsychological constructs.     

Love preferences and ideals: A comparison of homosexual,bisexual, and heterosexual groups

Homosexuals, bisexuals, and heterosexuals were compared on self-reported love preferences and ideals. In general, the three groups tended to agree on ideal characteristics of love objects, love relationships, and love related beliefs. Nevertheless, the groups differed significantly on preferences and beliefs related to love-object sex, residential proximity, ethnic background, physical intimacy, freedom from feelings of jealousy, sexual fidelity, emotional intimacy, and the importance of religious or legal acknowledgment.An early version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the National Council on Family Relations, in San Francisco, October 1984, Journal Series No. 2973 of the Hawaii Institute of Tropical Agriculture and Human Resources.     

Hate (its vicissitudes and its relations) revisited: Part I – Individual

Abstract

The present paper is an expansion of the author’s discussion of Harold Blum’s seminal presentation “Hate and its vicissitudes” in Prague in 2017. It aims at an elaboration of various aspects of hate and hatred as a complex dynamic intrapsychic and relational affective-cognitive state, alloyed, in different ways, with aggression and love. In this context, various theoretical perspectives concerning the multifaceted relation between hate, love, and sexuality, and hate and destructive aggression, and transformations between them, including the first study of neurobiological correlates of hate, will be raised and explored. Implication on destruction as well as psychic structuring, adaptation and creativity are also considered. The clinical vignettes illustrates the relevance of multiple theoretical conceptualizations in contemporary psychoanalytic practice.     

Developmental and dynamic dimensions of hate,rage, and violence

Abstract

Hate may be regarded as a complex affective-cognitive emotion and attitude alloyed with aggression. Hate and aggression have both neurobiological and environmental determinants. Hate may be overt or covert, externalized or internalized, and/or somatized. Persistent recurrent painful and traumatic experiences generate and exacerbate hate and aggression. An amalgam of hate and love is evident in the ambivalence of all self and object relationships and in conscious and unconscious fantasy. In the mature personality, there is a preponderance of love over hate. There may be justified hatred of sociopathic individuals and groups.     

Beliefs as signals: A new function for belief

Beliefs serve at least two broad functions. First, they help us navigate the world. Second, they serve as signals to manipulate others. Philosophers and psychologists have focused on the first function while largely overlooking the second. This article advances a conception of signals and makes a prima facie case for a social signaling function for at least some beliefs. Truth and rational support are often irrelevant to the signaling function. If some beliefs evolved for a signaling function, then we should expect various biases that aid in the manipulation of others.     

Understanding Beliefs

Beliefs are central to political psychology, but in many ways remain undertheorized. A good starting place for further thought is the typology of Smith, Bruner, and White that separates reality testing from the social and psychological functions of beliefs. The concept of beliefs has several connotations, some of which involve faith and emotions. It is often difficult to grasp others' beliefs, especially when they are foreign to us or morally repugnant. It is even more difficult to determine whether beliefs are powerful in the sense of determining behavior and autonomous in the sense of not being directly derivable from other factors. The Smith, Bruner, and White typology is useful here, helps us understand the operation of biases, and points to the multiple roles that beliefs play in people's lives, including managing trade-offs and generating what looks to others like hypocrisy.     

Some Implications of Beliefs in Altruism,Free Will,and Nonreductionism

ABSTRACT

In this research, we explored correlates of individuals’ beliefs in altruism, free will, and nonreductionism, as opposed to contrasting beliefs in psychological egoism, determinism, and biological reductionism. Beliefs in altruism, free will, and nonreductionism were associated with heightened a) senses of meaning in life, b) levels of life satisfaction, c) beliefs in morality as a legitimate and important dimension of life, and d) standards of personal moral conduct; they were not associated with levels of social isolation. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Beyond-personal love – Experiencing love beyond the person

ABSTRACT

Love is seen as interpersonal phenomenon in western society. The love of things that are non-interpersonal or ‘beyond-personal’ is less understood. A sample of 208 adults responded to a questionnaire asking what they loved, and how much they loved 61 common objects, activities, experiences and ideas. An exploratory factor analysis yielded five distinct categories of beyond-personal love including spiritual ideology, physical activity, material objects, hedonic experiences and social experiences. Loving physical activities predicted life satisfaction, happiness, and presence of meaning. Loving social experiences predicted happiness and presence of meaning. Loving hedonic experiences, spiritual ideas or material objects did not predict any of the outcome variables when all factors were considered, but material love was correlated with search for meaning. Results show that beyond-personal love can be considered adaptive, yet the target of beyond-personal love can predict whether one feels life satisfaction, feels subjectively happy or has meaning in one’s life.     

WHEN DEDUCTION LEADS TO BELIEF

The paper questions the common assumption that rational individuals believe all propositions which they know to be logical consequences of their other beliefs: although we must acknowledge the truth of a proposition which is a deductive consequence of our beliefs, we may not genuinely believe it. This conclusion is defended by arguing that some familiar counterexamples to the claim that knowledge is justified true belief fail because they involve propositions which are not really believed. Beliefs guide conduct or issue in assertion by answering questions which arise in the course of deliberation and conversation, but the troublesome cases present propositions which do not present the agent's answer to any question. The paper concludes by sketching the conditions under which the deductive consequences of our beliefs can be believed.¹     

Art alone endures.

Sigmund Freud, a passionate collector of antiquities, often treated these objects as animate beings. He described such blurring of boundaries between persons and things in the protagonist of W. Jensen's novella, Gradiva. Freud began collecting when his father died, but his unusual attitude toward artefacts was established much earlier, presumably as a consequence of repeated early disappointments in human caretakers. It is postulated that this adaptive maneuver was not simply a displacement of love and hate, but a turning away from vulnerability in relationships, toward attachments over which he might retain effective control. The Freud Collection is largely focused on Greco-Roman and Egyptian objects. Freud's profound interest in classical civilization was established in childhood; he was particularly concerned with the struggle between Aryan Rome and Semitic Carthage, a conflict in which he identified with both sides. This ambivalence reflected growing up within a marginal Jewish family in a Germanic environment. Commitment to classical ideals represented an optimal manner of bridging these contrasting worlds. Egyptian artefacts were, for Freud, links to the prehistory of the Jewish people; they also represent an era when maternal deities found their proper place in man's pantheon--an echo of Freud's prehistoric past.     

Culture and beliefs about time: comparisons among black Americans, black Africans, and white Americans

The authors investigated the extent to which racial factors, cultural factors, or both influence a person's beliefs about physical time, personal time, and experienced and remembered duration. A total of 750 Black American, Black African, and White American students responded to a questionnaire on these beliefs about time. Factor analysis was used to compare belief structures. Pairwise comparisons, performed separately for each statement, tested the direction and strength of the reported beliefs. The groups showed many similarities, but they also showed some differences. All 3 groups differed in beliefs about physical and personal time, but they did not differ in beliefs about duration experiences. This evidence does not support simplistic views of racial or cultural influences. Culture may differentially influence beliefs about physical time and personal time. Beliefs about duration experiences may represent an ethnic factor that transcends cultures.     

Believe in yourself: Manipulating beliefs about memory causes checking

One of the most common compulsions in obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) is repeated checking. Although individuals often report that they check to become more certain, checking has been shown to have the opposite effect – increased checking causes increased uncertainty. However, checking may also be thought of as beginning because of memory uncertainty. Beliefs about responsibility, over-estimation of threat, intolerance of uncertainty, perfectionism, and importance of and control of thoughts are already known to affect different aspects of OCD symptomatology. Beliefs about memory, however, are not currently considered to influence compulsive behaviour. In the current study, beliefs about memory were manipulated to test whether or not they affected urges to check. Ninety-one undergraduate participants received (positive or negative) false feedback about their performance on aspects of a standardized memory test, and then completed two additional memory tasks. Their urges to check following these tasks were assessed. Consistent with our hypotheses, individuals in the low memory confidence condition had greater urges to check following the memory tasks than those in the high memory confidence condition, demonstrating that manipulations of beliefs about memory can influence checking. Results and implications are discussed in terms of cognitive-behavioural models of and treatments for OCD.     

Grounded spatial belief revision

Beliefs frequently undergo revisions, especially when new pieces of information are true but inconsistent with current beliefs. In previous studies, we showed that linguistic asymmetries provided by relational statements, play a crucial role in spatial belief revision. Located objects (LO) are preferably revised compared to reference objects (RO), known as the LO-principle. Here we establish a connection between spatial belief revision and grounded cognition. In three experiments, we explored whether imagined physical object properties influence which object is relocated and which remains at its initial position. Participants mentally revised beliefs about the arrangements of objects which could be envisaged as light and heavy (Experiment 1), small and large (Experiment 2), or movable and immovable (Experiment 3). The results show that intrinsic object properties are differently taken into account during spatial belief revision. Object weight did not alter the LO-principle (Experiment 1), whereas object size was found to influence which object was preferably relocated (Experiment 2). Object movability did not affect relocation preferences but had an effect on relocation durations (Experiment 3). The findings support the simulation hypothesis within the grounded cognition approach and create new connections between the spatial mental model theory of reasoning and the idea of grounded cognition.