Beliefs about factors affecting the Reliability of eyewitness testimony: A Comparison of judges,jurors and the general public

We surveyed 164 members of the juror pool of the Court of Appeal and a representative sample of 1000 adult Norwegians without juror experience, about their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony, and compared their answers to a prior survey of Norwegian judges. Although the judges were somewhat more knowledgeable than jurors and the general public, all groups had limited knowledge of eyewitness testimony. Juror experience, in terms of number of times serving as juror, did not correlate with eyewitness knowledge. Consistent with this finding, the knowledge scores of the jurors were similar to the scores of the general public, tested with an abridged seven‐item version of the questionnaire. Comparisons with the results of surveys conducted in the US, indicate similar levels of knowledge among law professionals and jurors in the two countries. Increasing the knowledge of eyewitness testimony among the principal participants in the judiciary system may be an important component of the solution to eyewitness error. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Eyewitness memory is still not common sense: comparing jurors,judges and law enforcement to eyewitness experts

Knowledge of factors affecting eyewitness accuracy was examined in a sample of jurors, judges and law enforcement professionals. Participants completed a survey in which they were asked to agree or disagree with 30 statements about eyewitness issues, and their responses were compared to a sample of eyewitness experts who completed the same survey. Participant responses differed significantly from responses of eyewitness experts. Jurors disagreed with the experts on 87% of the issues, while judges and law enforcement disagreed with the experts on 60% of the issues. The findings show a large deficiency in knowledge of eyewitness memory amongst jurors, judges and law enforcement personnel, indicating that the legal system may benefit from expert assistance in the evaluation of eyewitness evidence. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Comparison of What U.S. Judges and Students Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony

We compared what 160 U.S. judges, 57 law students, and 121 undergraduates know and believe about factors affecting the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Judges were no more knowledgeable than were undergraduates, and both groups were less knowledgeable than were law students. For all 3 groups, increased knowledge of eyewitness factors was associated with beliefs that might reduce wrongful convictions. Participants in all 3 groups underestimated what potential jurors know about eyewitness testimony. The results suggest that increasing judges' knowledge of eyewitness testimony might help them to reduce wrongful convictions and to more accurately assess when eyewitness experts are needed. The results also suggest that law schools need to do a better job of educating law students about eyewitness testimony.     

Lay people's and police officers' attitudes towards the usefulness of perpetrator voice identification

Expert and lay knowledge of factors that affect the identification of a voice is an area of research that is still relatively unexplored. Much more research has focused on eyewitness identification and eyewitnesses' common knowledge. However, results from ‘eyewitnessing’ studies may not be directly applicable to ‘earwitnessing’. The present study examines how knowledgeable British lay people and police officers were concerning earwitness identification performance. One hundred nine participants (i.e. 49 lay people and 60 police officers) responded to a specially designed questionnaire. Results showed respondents to be more knowledgeable than expected, although police officers were no more knowledgeable than the general population. The existence of meta‐knowledge is discussed in relation to previous studies. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Lay Perspective on the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony1

To understand more about what laypeople think they “know” about eyewitness testimony, 276 jury-eligible university students were asked to indicate what factors they believe affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. In contrast to the large proportion of eyewitness-memory research that concerns system variables, the lay respondents overwhelmingly generated factors related to estimator variables, while system-variable factors such as police questioning and identification procedures were rarely mentioned. Respondents also reported that their own common sense and everyday life experiences were their most important sources of information about the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Not only do these results clarify the need for further research on the lay perspective of eyewitness testimony, but they also provide some insight into the way in which many jurors might approach cases involving eyewitness evidence.     

What US judges know and believe about eyewitness testimony

In a survey, 160 US judges indicated their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony. Although correct on some issues, judges were often wrong on important issues such as whether at trial eyewitness confidence is a good indicator of eyewitness accuracy, and if jurors can distinguish accurate from inaccurate witnesses. Increased knowledge was associated with: a willingness to permit legal safeguards, including expert testimony at trial; a belief that jurors have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors; a reluctance to convict defendants solely from eyewitness testimony; a more accurate estimate of the extent to which wrongful convictions result from eyewitness error; and a belief that judges need more eyewitness training. Additional training about factors and procedures that affect eyewitness accuracy may help judges reduce the number of wrongful convictions. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Judge's Instruction on Eyewitness Testimony: Evaluation and Revision1

Studies of the reliability of eyewitness identification show that such testimony may frequently be inaccurate; because of this inherent unreliability, the law has established certain safeguards to the use of eyewitness evidence. One safeguard has been the development of an instruction that a judge may use to focus jurors' attention on the eyewitness issue. The effectiveness of this instruction has never been assessed, although other studies confirm that jurors frequently misunderstand or incorrectly use instructions they get from the judge. The purpose of these studies was to evaluate comprehension of this instruction in the context of a videotaped trial and to develop a simplified instruction that would be easier for jurors to understand. Compared to jurors who heard the existing instruction, those with the revised version were more knowledgeable of the factors to consider when listening to eyewitness testimony and were less likely to convict the defendant. A sample of superior court judges in the U.S. thought the simplified instruction was more effective than the existing version at conveying the intended legal concepts to the jury, but also rated it as more strongly biased toward the defense.     

Expert testimony and jury decision making: An empirical analysis

This experiment examines the influence of expert psychological testimony on juror decision making in eyewitness identification cases. Experienced jurors and undergraduate mock jurors viewed versions of a videotaped trial, rated the credibility of the eyewitness and the strength of the prosecution's and defense's cases, and rendered verdicts. In the absence of expert testimony jurors were insensitive to eyewitness evidence. Expert testimony improved juror sensitivity to eyewitness evidence without making them more skeptical about the accuracy of the eyewitness identification. Few differences emerged between the experienced jurors and undergraduate mock jurors.     

Information Integration in Juror Decision Making

Research applying information integration theory to jury decision making has long assumed that people average informational scale values when making legal judgments. Although often consistent with research results, this hypothesis has never been tested in a legal context against a more general additive rule. The present paper describes two studies conducted as a critical test between these two models. Incriminating evidence and eyewitness confidence were varied in a full-factorial, within-subjects design involving a total of 131 subjects acting as mock jurors. Subject responses included eyewitness accuracy and defendant-guilt probability estimates, as well as final verdict decisions. Results strongly support an averaging model of legal decision making. Additional results concerning the influence of initial attitudes and the interrelationships between the variables considered are reported and their implications are discussed.     

Polygraph Testimony and Juror Judgments: A Comparison of the Guilty Knowledge Test and the Control Question Test1

The present experiment investigated the impact of the Control Question Test (CQT) and the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT) on the verdicts of mock jurors. Although studies have indicated that polygraph evidence has little influence on jurors' verdicts (Cavoukian & Heselgrave, 1980; Spanos, Myers, Dubreuil, & Pawlak, 1992–1993), no research has previously distinguished between the different types of polygraph tests and their impact on juror verdicts. In the present study, jurors were shown a videotape of a simulated rape-murder trial that contained either CQT polygraph evidence, GKT polygraph evidence, or no polygraph evidence. No differences were found among the 3 conditions for either jury verdicts or individual juror verdicts, and jurors tended to rate both forms of polygraph testimony below other forms of equally suspect evidence, such as eyewitness testimony, in its influence on their decision-making process.     

The Junior Eysenck Personality Questionnaire: An American sample

A sample of 1838 students enrolled in public schools in Merced, CA, responded to the Junior Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (JEPQ). The students ranged in age from 7 to 15 yr and included 938 boys and 900 girls. Means and SDs for each age and sex were computed and compared to the corresponding values for the British sample presented in the manual. Differences between the two samples were small. In addition, a factor analysis of the item responses was conducted for the American sample. This analysis produced four factors closely corresponding to the scales on the JEPQ. This study along with previous literature indicate that the JEPQ is appropriate for use in the United States.     

Beliefs About Overcoming Psychological Problems Among British and Japanese Students

Abstract

This study was part of a series investigating lay attributions for the cure of psychological problems. Three groups of students–Japanese students in Japan, Japanese students studying in England, and British students–completed a questionnaire and rated the perceived efficacy of 24 different strategies for overcoming each of 5 psychological problems: agoraphobia, depression, smoking cessation, lack of confidence, and obesity. Factor analysis of the curative strategies revealed 5 interpretable factors, the first 3 of which were Professional Help, Inner Control, and Understanding. There were numerous cultural differences between the British group and both Japanese groups in their written ratings of strategies, particularly professional help, for each psychological problem.     

Cheating among University of Transkei students

The purpose of this study was to investigate the extent to which cheating in academic work occurs at this university. 58 participants registered for a postgraduate diploma in education responded to a questionnaire on cheating. Some students admitted engaging in every behaviour; however, the percentage of students so engaged was much lower than those reported among British and American institutions of higher learning. This may partly be attributed to respondents being reluctant to divulge their dishonesty.     

The role of self‐rated ability in the accuracy of confidence judgements in eyewitness memory and general knowledge

It is argued that confidence stems in part from self‐rated ability in a domain of knowledge and that in eyewitness memory such perceptions are erroneous. Two experiments tested these hypotheses. In both experiments participants rated their relative ability in the domains of eyewitness memory and general knowledge and subsequently took tests of each, giving confidence ratings for each item attempted. In both studies, self‐rated ability predicted performance for general knowledge, but not eyewitness memory. Across participants confidence ratings were significant predictors of accuracy for general knowledge, but not for eyewitness memory. In Experiment 1 self‐rated ability was predictive of confidence ratings for both domains, although this effect was weaker in Experiment 2. The argument that the accuracy of confidence judgements in eyewitness memory is undermined by a lack of insight into relative expertise is therefore supported. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Caste attitudes of college students in India

Data from college students in North and South India tend to support our earlier findings of a positive relationship between the educational level and the degree of liberalism (Anant, 1972). With few exceptions a higher percentage of students than respondents from the general population gave liberal responses to most of the items in our questionnaire. A higher percentage of North and South Indian students gave liberal responses to items dealing with general attitudes toward caste-system and toward interaction with Harijans (former ‘untouchables’), but the differences were reversed in the responses to items dealing with special privileges for the depressed castes.     

The Discrediting Effect in Eyewitness Testimony1

Loftus (1974) had subjects read summaries of criminal trials that contained the testimony of either credible or discredited prosecution eyewitnesses, and found no effect of discrediting an eyewitness. Instead, almost as many subjects voted guilty with a discredited eyewitness as with a credible eyewitness; this led Loftus to the conclusion that jurors tend to overbelieve eyewitness testimony. Loftus's conclusion was subsequently challenged by others who reported a strong discrediting effect. A series of three experiments using college students was conducted to explore the characteristics of trial summaries that might account for the discrepancy in results, such as inclusion of judicial instructions concerning proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or an eyewitness's reaffirmation of his testimony following discrediting. In all cases, a strong discrediting effect was found. Apparently the discrediting effect appears regardless of wide variation in content of trial summaries. The present data do not support the overbelief claim.     

Lay knowledge of eyewitness issues: A Canadian evaluation

Lay opinions concerning eyewitness topics were surveyed in three community samples of juror‐eligible participants in Canada. The scientific reliability of these topics had been previously evaluated by eyewitness experts. The first survey assessed participant responses to the identically worded expert items. Participants responded to many statements with greater accuracy than anticipated. Two subsequent surveys assessed the consistency of lay knowledge across variations in the directionality and wording of items and the provision of additional contextual information. Taken together, jury‐eligible participants frequently responded to survey items in ways that closely resembled the responses of experts and suggested awareness and understanding of these topics at levels beyond those previously obtained. Further, the provision of contextual information increased response accuracy and reduced the frequencies of ‘Don't Know’ responses. Deficiencies in knowledge for 50% of the topics were also apparent; however, these topics were frequently those for which the experts themselves had not reached consensus. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Perspectives on the role of the eyewitness expert

Extensive controversy over the appropriate application of expert knowledge regarding issues of eyewitness accuracy led to a conference and a special issue of taw and Human Behavior in 1986. Arguments were presented both in support of and against the eyewitness researcher as expert testifier. The current research explored the views of the general public (N = 50), defense attorneys (N = 14), and prosecutors (N = 10) with regard to the use of eyewitness expertise in each of four roles (court-appointed expert, consultant, researcher, expert tesdfier for the defense). Extensive differences of opinion were found across both samples and expert roles. In general, prosecutors held significantly more negative views of the usefulness of expert witnesses for the defense than did the public or defense attorneys. The role of court-appointed expert was viewed positively by all three groups and may present a useful alternative to the battles of experts that may result from current practices.