Leibniz,creation and the best of all possible worlds

Leibniz argued that God would not create a world unless it was the best possible world. I defend Leibniz’s argument. I then consider whether God could refrain from creating if there were no best possible world. I argue that God, on pain of contradiction, could not refrain from creating in such a situation. I conclude that either this is the best possible world or God is not our creator.     

Why Only Perfection Is Good Enough

Abstract

I argue that the traditional problem of evil mislocates the problem which confronts the theist. The real problem arises not from the evil in the world, but from the non-perfection of the world. Given that a perfect God could create only a perfect world, and given that the world is not in fact perfect, I construct an argument for atheism. I show that the argument is not open to the objections which theists standardly bring against the traditional objection from evil.     

Buddhist Thought and Several Problems in the World Today

Buddhism has not only produced an influence upon the ancient world culture but is also playing an important role in world affairs today. This article analyzes several important problems in the world today: world peace, disarmament, economic justice, human rights, environmental protection, and universal cooperation in world problem solving. The writer holds that, to solve these problems, we should study Buddhist theory and get some helpful ideas from it. Translated from Beida Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 5, Special Issue, April 2004     

A Common Earth Religion: World Religions from an Ecological Perspective

On the basis of a critical analysis of the place of world religions in an era of globalization, and drawing on the Gaia hypothesis of James Lovelock, this paper argues for the need for a shift in perspective from a world economy to an earth economy, and for world religions to become earth religions. Here the anthropocentrism of the modern world is overcome and humanity is viewed as an integrated element in planet earth as a whole. This view implies that the world religions need to give back to the earth the virtues they have projected onto the world beyond, and abandon their denial of life and their capacity for violence. In secular terms, this means that world religions need to engage with the ecological perspective and start by applying it to themselves. For if the earth can no longer support life, that means the end of the human world, and the end of world religions.     

Language knowledge and event knowledge in language use

This paper examines how semantic knowledge is used in language comprehension and in making judgments about events in the world. We contrast knowledge gleaned from prior language experience (“language knowledge”) and knowledge coming from prior experience with the world (“world knowledge”). In two corpus analyses, we show that previous research linking verb aspect and event representations have confounded language and world knowledge. Then, using carefully chosen stimuli that remove this confound, we performed four experiments that manipulated the degree to which language knowledge or world knowledge should be salient and relevant to performing a task, finding in each case that participants use the type of knowledge most appropriate to the task. These results provide evidence for a highly context-sensitive and interactionist perspective on how semantic knowledge is represented and used during language processing.     

Evil in the Fine‐Tuned World

If the world has been fine‐tuned for human life, why does that life encompass such calamity and suffering? It seems that in so far as we are impressed by the fine‐tuning intuition that the world has been designed for human life, the problem of natural evil gains in urgency. I propose that observing the world from the anthropic point of view is the source of theists’ challenge which arises from this tension. Dealing with this challenge I suggest perhaps the world is fine‐tuned for God’s telos, which may be His manifestation of love through sentient beings’ pains and emotions.     

论《周易》的"象"世界和"理"世界--象数和义理关系刍议

由“理”和“象”所昭示的两种不同思维形式出发,形成了解读《周易》文本的两大阵营——义理易学和象数易学。义理易学阵营中的王弼、程颐易学凸现了《周易》“理”世界的超越性,象数易学揭示了《周易》“象”世界对于彰明“理”世界的关键性。朱熹基于《易》本为卜筮之书的立场,既强调了“理”世界的超越性,又突出了“象”世界对于彰明《周易》“理”世界的关键性。     

Belief in an unjust world: when beliefs in a just world fail

Belief in a just world, where people get what they deserve, has been hypothesized to underlie a variety of psychological phenomena (Lerner, 1965). Close inspection of individual difference measures of this belief, however, has indicated repeatedly that just world beliefs are not a unidimensional construct. The purpose of this investigation was to elaborate upon the conceptualization of unjust world beliefs as a related but separate construct from just world beliefs. In two studies, the Unjust World Views scale (UJVS) was developed and its reliability and validity examined. The UJVS demonstrated acceptable reliability and validity and accounted for more variability in related outcomes than just world beliefs. Further, belief in an unjust world was related to defensive coping, anger, and perceived future risk. These findings contribute to theory development and suggest that a belief in an unjust world may serve a self-protective function. Clinical implications are discussed as unjust world views also were found to be potentially maladaptive.     

Gödelian time-travel and anthropic cosmology

This paper looks at Kurt Gödel's causally‐pathological cosmological models (derived from general relativity), in the light of anthropic explanations. If a Gödelian world is a possible world, could anthropic reasoning shed any light on whether or not our world is Gödelian? This paper argues that while there are some good anthropic reasons why our world ought to be Gödelian, too many observations suggest that our world can’t possibly be Gödelian in fact. If Gödel's world is a possible one, anthropic teleology alone cannot explain why it isn’t the world we inhabit. Furthermore, if our world were Gödelian, anthropic arguments against the existence of extraterrestrial intelligences would imply a bleak human future. En route, some general objections to relativistic causal pathologies are addressed and some anthropic arguments to the effect that Gödelian worlds couldn’t sustain life are also addressed and dismissed.     

World Government,Social Contract and Legitimacy

Abstract

The notion of world government is anathema to most political theorists. This is the case due to the arguments that a world government is infeasible, undesirable and unnecessary. This threefold argument is partly predicated on the assumption that in world politics the larger a geographical and political entity is, the greater the chance of it becoming unstable, ungovernable and, ultimately, illegitimate. On the one hand, if this assumption is correct, then a world government is likely to be illegitimate. On the other hand, if the assumption is wrong, then it is not far-fetched to consider a world government to be legitimate. Considering a world government that emerges from a global social contract, this paper contends that the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a world government and the extent to which it is legitimate or illegitimate depends on the kind of social contract that produces it and the extent to which it fulfils or fails to fulfil the conditions of the social contract.     

Euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, and Christianity's positive relationship to the world.

This essay addresses the problem of communication between Christianity and the secular world in an area where the latter tends to oppose the moral norms endorsed by the former. How, in the interest of missionary outreach (and with which understandings of what such outreach involves) can the language barriers be bridged? Whereas the Roman Catholic natural law tradition posits a neutral common ground of (traditional or hermeneutical) rationality between Christianity and the world, an Ebeling- and Barth-modified Lutheranism engages in an argument ad hominem by seizing upon an admitted deficiency within that world, and by recommending Christianity for mending that deficiency. Both positions differ from the Evangelical claim that since that which the world politically values is derived from Christianity, it must remain subject to Christianity's moral legislation. An entirely different approach to the communication- and outreach-problem is taken by Orthodox Christianity: The gulf which separates it from the world is acknowledged, and the possibility of trans-gulf-traffic is referred to God's grace. It is only this latter model, however, which preserves Christianity's theological terms (such as "Scripture", "law", and "holiness") from common-ground-securing, deficiency-mending, or authority-imposing secularizing, and thus from compromising that very theological context into which communicative outreach endeavors were to invite.     

Two Kinds of Logical Impossibility

In this paper, we argue that a distinction ought to be drawn between two ways in which a given world might be logically impossible. First, a world w might be impossible because the laws that hold at w are different from those that hold at some other world (say the actual world). Second, a world w might be impossible because the laws of logic that hold in some world (say the actual world) are violated at w. We develop a novel way of modelling logical possibility that makes room for both kinds of logical impossibility. Doing so has interesting implications for the relationship between logical possibility and other kinds of possibility (for example, metaphysical possibility) and implications for the necessity or contingency of the laws of logic.     

公正世界信念对第三方惩罚的影响：来自ERP的证据

采用事件相关电位技术（ERP）考察公正世界信念对第三方惩罚的影响。（1）行为结果显示,高公正世界信念个体的第三方惩罚显著多于低公正世界信念个体,低公正世界信念个体在高不公正提议下的第三方惩罚显著增加;（2）ERP结果显示,高公正世界信念个体比低公正世界信念个体诱发了更大的MFN波幅和更小的P300波幅,且高公正世界信念个体的MFN波幅在高、低不公正提议下没有差异,低公正世界信念个体在高不公正提议下的MFN波幅明显更大。这说明相比低公正世界信念个体,高公正世界信念个体所持有的公正认知强烈且稳定,个体做出第三方惩罚更多基于自身对于公正结果的预期,而非外部条件。     

Representation and self-awareness in intentional agents

Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for conditional and counterfactual thinking. Contextual or indexical representations are necessary in order that the inner world relates to the actual external world and thus can be used as a basis for action. To have full-blown intentionality, the agent should also have a detached self-awareness, that is, be able to entertain self-representations that are independent of the context.     

How Infants Learn About the Visual World

The visual world of adults consists of objects at various distances, partly occluding one another, substantial and stable across space and time. The visual world of young infants, in contrast, is often fragmented and unstable, consisting not of coherent objects but rather surfaces that move in unpredictable ways. Evidence from computational modeling and from experiments with human infants highlights three kinds of learning that contribute to infants' knowledge of the visual world: learning via association, learning via active assembly, and learning via visual-manual exploration. Infants acquire knowledge by observing objects move in and out of sight, forming associations of these different views. In addition, the infant's own self-produced behavior-oculomotor patterns and manual experience, in particular-are important means by which infants discover and construct their visual world.     

Omniscience And Pantheism

This article argues that theism entails a species of pantheism on the grounds that there is simply no discernible difference between the God's knowledge of the world and the world that God knows. The case against this thesis begins with the traditional theory of distinctions. But since God is necessarily omniscient there is not even the possibility that these might be considered apart and thus distinguished in that way. But neither is it possible to do this by means of Leibnitz's law, that is, by finding some feature possessed by the one but not the other. Three potential areas of difference are considered but rejected, first, that knowledge unlike the world is representational, and second, that knowledge unlike the world is phenomenal – there is something that it is like to have. Both of these features, though able to distinguish ordinary knowledge from its objects, cease to provide the difference we require when extended to the case of divine knowledge. A final area of potential difference lies in the transcendent nature of God over the world, especially with respect to time, finitude and possibility. But this, in the end, is found no more able to distinguish God's knowledge from its object than the previous two suggestions.     

Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Education in the Hispanic World: A Response

We concentrate on four questions among the many posed by this special collection of papers on Pragmatism and the Hispanic world. They are, first, what took pragmatism beyond the borders of the United States and into the Hispanic world? Next, what are the ideas of Dewey (or pragmatism) that have had the greatest impact on Hispanic culture? Third, what are the past and present obstacles that has kept the Hispanic world from using pragmatism to deal with many of their educational and social problems? Finally, why does pragmatism still hold great promise and potential for the Hispanic world?     

Believing in a personal just world helps maintain well-being at work by coloring organizational justice perceptions

Justice is a core fundamental theme for individuals in organizations. This study suggests that believing the world is just where one gets what one deserves, and deserves what one gets, is an important personal resource that helps maintain well-being at work. Further, it suggests that personal belief in a just world, but not general belief in a just world, exerts its influence on well-being through increasing overall justice perceptions of the work environment. Using two waves of data drawn from a large random sample of working adults in Switzerland, results showed that personal belief in a just world at time 1 indeed augmented perceptions of overall organizational justice, and this in turn increased job satisfaction at time 2, that is, 1 year later. As expected, this effect was only evident for personal and not general belief in a just world, highlighting personal belief in a just world as an important yet largely overlooked resource for the work context, and suggesting the need to consider individual’s beliefs about justice as drivers of overall organizational justice perceptions.     

Aesthetics and the Containment of Grief

My point of departure is the observation that people ubiquitously turn to aesthetic practices in response to the loss of a loved one. I argue that profound loss catapults the bereaved person into an alternate “world” that differs in marked ways from the world we usually occupy, an alternate world lacking even the basic coherence we need to function. Aesthetic practices facilitate restoration of coherence to our experience, as well as reconnection with the social world and recovery from the breakdown that profound loss involves. While the aesthetic notion of closure is frequently invoked in connection with the needs of the bereaved, I suggest that while containing the emotions experienced in connection with loss is vital if they are to be processed, unrealistic aspirations toward closure can encourage expectations that harm the bereaved. By contrast, I suggest that the aims of aesthetically punctuating experience and communicating through aesthetic gestures are beneficial for helping the bereaved adjust to their new circumstances.