IS THE SELF-CONCEPT A HABITUAL REFERENT IN JUDGMENTS OF SIMILARITY?

Abstract— People typically provide higher similarity ratings in response to the question "How similar is the typical preppie to you?" than to the question "How similar are you to the typical preppie?" Observed asymmetries in comparisons of the self and person prototypes have been offered as evidence that the self-concept acts as a habitual reference point in social judgment However, such a task does not test the habitual placement of a concept in the referent position of a comparison. In this study, participants judged the similarity between the self and person prototypes in response to linguistic (forced directional) queries or to spatial (nonforced) queries in which the self was positioned above or below the person concept Participants also rated pairs of familiar and unfamiliar countries in a similar manner, to replicate and extend the work of Tversky (1977) Expected asymmetries were observed in forced comparisons. The self and the familiar country were seen as more similar to other people and less familiar countries, respectively, when the former concepts served as the referent of a comparison than when they served as the subject Asymmetries were not observed in the nonforced conditions, and mean similarity in these conditions was of the same magnitude as in the forced condition in which the more familiar stimulus was the referent of the comparison. This result provides the first direct evidence that the self serves as a habitual referent in similarity judgments     

WHAT IS EFFECTIVE IN THE THERAPEUTIC PROCESS? A ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION

In her contribution to the Round Table Discussion in 1956, Marianne Horney Eckardt brings into focus the need to respect the unique qualities of the patient as a human being and to be cognizant of the uniqueness of each patient–therapist relationship. In discussing the subtler aspects of technique, Dr. Eckardt reminds us that there is no neutral technique and that what is effective and what brings change in treatment needs to be viewed in the specific context of the dynamic interaction of the patient—therapist dyad. She also appeals for humility in the therapist and reminds clinicians to keep in awareness the one-sidedness of the relationship.     

WHERE IS THE COMPARISON IN COMPARATIVE COGNITION?

Abstract— Contemporary research on comparative cognition reflects two distinct programs. The purpose of the an-thropocentric program is to discover whether nonhuman species process information in the same way as humans do. The ecological program analyzes ecologically significant aspects of cognition and compares them in closely and distantly related species. Research on memory for stored food in birds provides a detailed example of this latter program. Other examples include research on bird song learning and foraging and ecological analyses of human cognition.     

IS THERE A PROBLEM WITH THE LPC SCORE IN LEADER MATCH?

Some problems with the use of the LPC score in the Fiedler, Chemers, and Mahar Leader Match self-teaching book were identified and examined. The cutting scores defining high and low LPC were questioned because of inadequately developed norms and the alteration of the LPC scale from 16 to 18 items. The current procedures were estimated to create a substantial bias toward being inappropriately categorized as a high LPC individual.     

WHAT IS THE SCIENCE OF THE SOUL? A CASE STUDY IN THE EVOLUTION OF LATE MEDIEVAL NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

This paper aims at a partial rehabilitation of E. A. Moody's characterization of the 14th century as an age of rising empiricism, specifically by contrasting the conception of the natural science of psychology found in the writings of a prominent 13th-century philosopher (Thomas Aquinas) with those of two 14th-century philosophers (John Buridan and Nicole Oresme). What emerges is that if the meaning of empiricism can be disengaged from modern and contemporary paradigms, and understood more broadly in terms of a cluster of epistemic doctrines concerned with the methodology of knowing, it characterizes very appropriately some of the differences between the ways in which late-medieval thinkers both understood and practised the science of psychology. In particular, whereas Aquinas thinks psychology is about reasoning demonstratively to the real nature of the soul from its evident operations (thereby assimilating psychology to metaphysics), Buridan and Oresme, both of whom doubt whether real animate natures can be known empirically, focus on giving detailed accounts of those operations themselves (thereby assimilating psychology to physics).     

IS THERE A FUTURE FOR THE DIALOGUE?

The title question was raised by Philip Hefner in an editorial in the March 2007 issue of Zygon, and answered in various ways in sixteen guest editorials in the June, September, and December 2007 issues. In this article, after defining some pertinent concepts, I comment on these essays. I review critical statements made by the guest editorialists and survey their proposals for further dialogue topics. I conclude with my own views on the future of the dialogue and the role of Zygon therein.     

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN THE DIALOGUE PROPOSED BY WILLIAM KLINK?

Abstract. Klink rejects the use of ecological models in environmental decision making because their predictions cannot be tested by rigorous scientific methods. I argue that models that cannot be tested according to the rigorous standards of the physical sciences can still be considered “scientific”; they are useful (and, in practice, used) for assessing the impacts of human actions on the environment and choosing between alternative courses of action. It is, however, important to be aware of the uncertainties and to make corrections as new data and insights become available. The interplay between (1) model-based decisions and action and (2) their consequences and subsequent corrections can be regarded as a dialogue between humans and nature (or God) in the sense proposed by Klink. Klink also claims that future actions should be informed by the larger vision of theology and should not be based on science. I suggest that science has an indispensible role. The larger vision is needed to respond to the fundamental religious question: How should I live—and why? But this question cannot be answered without first addressing the fundamental scientific question: How does the world work? I suggest that responses to the first question can be formulated as visions of a future state of existence that we feel compelled to strive to realize, and that science is necessary to provide “maps of reality” needed to realize visions. I also suggest that Christian traditions can probably provide adequate visions; the crucial need is for improving our “maps of reality.”     

THE ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR WHAT'S IN IT FOR US?

When we publish behavioral research, we are not allowed to communicate the thrill, the poetry, or the exhilaration that are outcomes of the discovery process. Yet, these are among our most potent reinforcers. Explicit recognition of the emotional accompaniments to research could help attract students into the experimental analysis of behavior.     

WHAT IS EFFECTIVE IN PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY? A HISTORICAL REPRISE

While psychoanalysis as a field has moved from the ideal of technical neutrality to a vision of the therapist as more human, real, and empathically engaged, relatively little attention has been paid to the implications of this evolution. For Freud, technical neutrality provided an important protection against bias and suggestion, one problematized by a view of the psychoanalyst’s participation and influence as intrinsic to the therapeutic enterprise. The impact of this change on the evaluation of mechanisms of change is contextualized and discussed by the author.     

At the Point of Death—A Case Study

In 1979 Pastoral Psychology published my first autobiographical case study: the story of a near-fatal automobile accident, collateral damage of a high speed police chase in downtown Chicago. Providence was evident in my survival of that collision, as well as in the present case study: a massive heart attack during a psychotherapy session in 2001. By comparing these two crises, I find that I must call into focus a psychological propensity: if a near-fatal experience occurs from the “outside in” (e.g. automobile accident), guilt may well surface as the emotion of conflict; but if a near-fatal experience occurs from the “inside out” (e.g. heart attack), the emotion of conflict may emerge as shame. In the former the body is assaulted; in the latter it revolts.