Moral dilemmas and moral rules

Recent work shows an important asymmetry in lay intuitions about moral dilemmas. Most people think it is permissible to divert a train so that it will kill one innocent person instead of five, but most people think that it is not permissible to push a stranger in front of a train to save five innocents. We argue that recent emotion-based explanations of this asymmetry have neglected the contribution that rules make to reasoning about moral dilemmas. In two experiments, we find that participants show a parallel asymmetry about versions of the dilemmas that have minimized emotional force. In a third experiment, we find that people distinguish between whether an action violates a moral rule and whether it is, all things considered, wrong. We propose that judgments of whether an action is wrong, all things considered, implicate a complex set of psychological processes, including representations of rules, emotional responses, and assessments of costs and benefits.     

Moral dilemmas and nonmonotonic logic

Conclusion From a philosophical standpoint, the work presented here is based on van Fraassen [26]. The bulk of that paper is organized around a series of arguments against the assumption, built into standard deontic logic, that moral dilemmas are impossible; and van Fraassen only briefly sketches his alternative approach. His paper ends with the conclusion that the problem of possibly irresolvable moral conflict reveals serious flaws in the philosophical and semantic foundations of orthodox deontic logic, but also suggests a rich set of new problems and methods for such logic. My goal has been to suggest that some of these methods might be found in current research on nonmonotonic reasoning, and that some of the problems may have been confronted there as well.I have shown that nonmonotonic logics provide a natural framework for reasoning about moral dilemmas, perhaps even more useful than the ordinary modal framework, and that the issues surrounding the treatment of exceptional information within these logics run parallel to some of the problems posed by conditional oughts. However, there is also another way in which deontic logic might benefit from a connection to nonmonotonic reasoning. A familiar criticism among ethicists of work in deontic logic is that it is too abstract, and too far removed from the kind of problems confronted by real agents in moral deliberation. It must be said that similar criticisms of abstraction and irrelevance are often lodged against work in nonmonotonic reasoning by more practically minded researchers in artificial intelligence; but here, at least, the criticisms are taken seriously. Nonmonotonic logic aims at a qualitative account of commonsense reasoning, which can be used to relate planning and action to defeasible goals and beliefs; and at least some of the theories developed in this area have been tested in realistic situations. By linking the subject of deontic logic to this research, it may be possible also to relate the idealized study of moral reasoning typical of the field to a more robust treatment of practical deliberation.     

When and how communicated guilt affects contributions in public good dilemmas

Two laboratory studies investigated how groups may deal with the strong emotions that social dilemmas often elicit. A first study showed that a new group member evaluated guilt communicated by a fellow group member as more instrumental than neutral emotion feedback when the amount of required resources to obtain the public good (i.e., provision point) was perceived as difficult to obtain. A second study revealed that participants use communicated guilt to draw inferences about both past and future contributions from all fellow group members. Participants also contributed more themselves and adhered to equality more often when guilt versus no emotion was communicated, but only when the provision point was high. Expected contributions from fellow group members mediated this effect.     

Moral sentiments and cooperation: Differential influences of shame and guilt

For centuries economists and psychologists (Frank, 1988 Frank , R. H. (1988) . Passions within reason: The strategic role of the emotions . New York : Norton . (Originally published 1988)  [Google Scholar]; Ketelaar, 2004 Ketelaar, T. 2004. “Ancestral emotions, current decisions: Using evolutionary game theory to explore the role of emotions in decision-making”. In Evolutionary psychology, public policy and personal decisions, Edited by: Crawford, C. and Salmon, C. 145–163. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.  [Google Scholar]; Smith, 1759) have argued that moral emotions motivate cooperation. Ketelaar and Au (2003 Ketelaar, T. and Au, W. T. 2003. The effects of guilt on the behaviour of uncooperative individuals in repeated social bargaining games: An affect-as-information interpretation of the role of emotion in social interaction. Cognition and Emotion, 17: 429–453. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) recently found first evidence that guilt increases cooperation for proselfs in social bargaining games. We investigated whether this effect would also occur for shame, another moral emotion. Using a dyadic social dilemma game in Experiment 1 and an everyday cooperation measure in Experiment 2 as measures for short-term cooperation, we replicated Ketelaar and Au's findings for guilt. However, as predicted on the basis of previous emotion research, we found no such effect for shame. These results clearly indicate that the effects of moral emotions on cooperative behaviour can only be understood if the specific moral emotion is known.     

Moral error theory,explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt

Philosophical Studies - Recently, companions in guilt strategies have garnered significant philosophical attention as a response to arguments for moral error theory, the view that there are no...     

Moral pickles,moral dilemmas,and the obligation preface paradox

Philosophical Studies - This paper introduces and defends a new position regarding the question of whether it is possible to have conflicting moral obligations. In doing so, it focuses on what I...     

Moral affect and cognitive processes: Differentiating shame from guilt among men and women

Men (n = 103) and women (n = 183) completed measures of shame, guilt, self-critical cognitions, and perfectionism in order to explore gender differences in cognitive processes associated with moral affect. Women reported significantly higher rates of shame and guilt than men. Separate factor analyses for gender indicated that for men, shame loaded with self-critical cognitions while guilt loaded with dimensions of perfectionism. For women, both shame and guilt loaded with self-critical cognitions, but only socially-prescribed perfectionism. Results suggest that a person's gender may need to be considered in evaluations of shame and guilt.     

More than enough guilt to go around: oedipal guilt, survival guilt, separation guilt

The concepts of oedipal guilt, survivor guilt, and separation guilt are examined using clinical material from a child case to demonstrate the intermingling of these constructs. A brief review of their evolution in the psychoanalytic literature reveals a frequent conflation of the terms guilt and fear, the former at times standing in for both meanings. The fear/guilt distinction and the subsequent differentiation of guilt into oedipal, survivor, and separation guilt have implications for how analysts understand and interpret particular kinds of clinical material. Two sets of adult clinical data are next presented: the first illustrates a shift from interpreting a patient's fear of retribution for forbidden desires to interpreting guilt over pursuing those desires. The second vignette illustrates a common dynamic in which a patient's fear/anxiety regarding the ability to lead an independent life defends against deeper feelings of guilt over this same desire. This latter dynamic can play an important role in negative therapeutic reactions and interminable analyses. Developmental research suggests that toward the end of the first year of life, infants' capacity to attribute independent mental states and intentionality to self and others allows for the rudimentary experience of guilt.     

Moral foundations tell us why guilt induces unfair allocation in multi‐party interactions

Previous studies have demonstrated that a sense of guilt promotes and maintains social fairness in two‐party interactions (Psychological Bulletin, 115, 1994 and 243). However, the situation is much more complex in three‐party or multi‐party interactions. De Hooge et al. (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 2011 and 462) found that guilt could not only induce pro‐social behaviour towards the victim, but also have a disadvantageous impact on a third party. In the present study, we attempt to explain how guilt promotes unfair allocations from a moral foundations perspective. We conducted two experiments using a ‘three‐party dictator game’ paradigm. Firstly, it was repeatedly verified that guilt could induce unfair allocations in three‐party interactions. Secondly, five moral foundations (harm, fairness, ingroup, hierarchy and purity) were measured. Then the moderating and main effects of these five indices on how guilt affects the fair allocation of resources were explored using regression analysis. The results show that competition between harm and fairness in individual traits can explain the disadvantageous effect of guilt on fair allocations: the fairness foundation promoted equality in allocation, while the harm foundation promoted victim compensation.     

Maternal guilt

The recent emphasis on humans as cooperative breeders invites new research on human family dynamics. In this paper we look at maternal guilt as a consequence of conditional maternal investment. Solicited texts written by Finnish mothers with under school-aged children in 2007 (n = 63) described maternal emotions perceived as difficult and forbidden. Content analysis of guilt-inducing situations showed that guilt arose from diverging interest and negotiations between the mother and child (i.e., classic parent- offspring conflict). Also cultural expectations of extensive and perpetual high-quality maternal investment or the "motherhood myth" induced guilt in mothers. We argue that guilt plays an important role in maternal-investment regulation. Maternal guilt is predicted to vary with social and cultural context but also to show universal characteristics due to parent-offspring conflict and allomaternal manipulation. Results are preliminary and intended to stimulate research into the mechanisms, gender differences and cultural variations of guilt and other social emotions in human parenting.