POWER AND INFLUENCE STRATEGIES IN VIOLENT AND NONVIOLENT MARRIAGES

How important is the use of physical violence in determining the balance of power within marriage? Do women in violent marriages make more use of indirect strategies in attempting to persuade their husbands than do women in nonviolent marriages? Is marital satisfaction related to influence styles? These questions are investigated by looking at decision making in couples and how this is related to the forms of influence strategies used by wives and husbands in violent and nonviolent marriages. Data from in-depth structured interviews with 137 self-identified battered wives and 137 comparison wives, some of whom were also found to have experienced violence from their husbands, are used to answer these questions. Results indicated that women with violent husbands used more influence strategies overall, although these women had less overall power in terms of decision making than did women with nonviolent husbands. The relationship of influence strategies to decision making was different for women with violent husbands than for those whose husbands were not violent. As expected, the use of coercive strategies related negatively to marital happiness, whereas positive strategies were positively predictive. Violence and other negative strategies should be included in future research on influence strategies in close relationships, and a positive-negative dimension should be included as a way of categorizing influence strategies.     

A PARTIAL DEFENSE OF EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE

The paper starts out by distinguishing two closely related hypotheses about extended cognition. According to the strong hypothesis, there are no intrinsic representations in the brain. This is a version of the extended‐mind view defended by Andy Clark and Richard Menary. On the weak hypothesis, there are intrinsic representations in the brain but some types of cognition, knowledge or memory are constituted by particular types of external devices or environmental factors that extend beyond the skull and perhaps beyond the skin. This type of view was defended, for example, by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. After drawing this distinction and clarifying the notions of causal influence and constitution, I defend the second weaker hypothesis with respect to procedural knowledge and knowledge of action and show why this sort of view supports what we might call a ‘situationist‐friendly virtue epistemology’.     

MICHAEL POLANYI'S DEFENSE OF SPONTANEOUS ORDER

Michael Polanyi is best known for his work in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Less frequently discussed, but still a significant aspect of his work, is his political theory. He is an advocate of a free society which is based on "spontaneous order." This concept is apparent in an early collection of essays entitled The Logic of Liberty , and is emphasized again in his last book, Meaning. In the latter work, Polanyi's method of argumentation involves citing three objections to the endorsement of spontaneous order, and then offering a rebuttal to each. His discussion in this regard, while brief, provides an excellent opportunity for insight into a pivotal topic in his politics. In what follows here I will offer first a brief summary of Polanyi's position on spontaneous order and certain related concepts. Then I will examine his responses to the three objections he poses, and point out their deficiencies. Involved are a commonplace logical fallacy, the tendency to underestimate the power of economic interests and egoistic motivations, and, ultimately, an overstated and untenable epistemological position which does not adequately support, but instead undermines, his political position.