⊃E is Admissible in “true” relevant arithmetic

The system R## of true relevant arithmetic is got by adding the -rule Infer xAx from A0, A1, A2, .... to the system R# of relevant Peano arithmetic. The rule E (or gamma) is admissible for R##. This contrasts with the counterexample to E for R# (Friedman & Meyer, Whither Relevant Arithmetic). There is a Way Up part of the proof, which selects an arbitrary non-theorem C of R## and which builds by generalizing Henkin and Belnap arguments a prime theory T which still lacks C. (The key to the Way Up is a Witness Protection Program, using the -rule.) But T may be TOO BIG, whence there is a Way Down argument that produces a better theory TR, such that R## TR T. (The key to the Way Down is a Metavaluation, on which membership in T is combined with ordinary truth-functional conditions to determine TR.) The result is a theory that is Just Right, whence it never happens that A C and A are theorems of R## but C is a non-theorem.     

Beyond Truth and Falsehood: The Real Value of Knowing That p

Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goalsof believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspirations.On such a view, (call it the TG view) the only evaluationsthat count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluatesomething (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitivetrait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to thesetwo goods. In particular, this view implies that all theepistemic value of knowledge must be derived from thevalue of the two goals cited in TG. I argue thatthis implication is false, and thus that the TG view must be abandoned. I propose a candidate to replacethe TG view that makes better sense of the value ofknowledge.     

Keeping Up with the Cloneses -- Issues in Human Cloning

The advent of cloning animals has created a maelstrom of social concern about the ethical issues associated with the possibility of cloning humans. When the ethical concerns are clearly examined, however, many of them turn out to be less matters of rational ethics than knee-jerk emotion, religious bias, or fear of that which is not understood. Three categories of real and spurious ethical concerns are presented and discussed: 1) that cloning is intrinsically wrong, 2) that cloning must lead to bad consequences, and 3) that cloning harms the organism generated. The need for a rational ethical framework for discussing biotechnological advances is presented and defended.     

Modern to postmodern: Social construction, dissonance, and education

Modernist educational practice operates within an overarching norm of consonance, notions of sameness and agreement that permeate schools and classroom life. This paper posits a needed move to postmodern educational theory and practice through dissonance. Following an intellectual contextualization, two sets of philosophical claims are presented. The first promotes social construction of reality and the second poses dissonance rather than consonance. The paper concludes with a look at education from this postmodern perspective.     

What Is Wrong with External Reasons?

In this paper I argue that only a subset of the reason statementsWilliams defines as external must be rejected as false. `A has areason to ' is necessarily false when the ends and aimsconstitutive of A's good close off the deliberative route from her S to the conclusion she has reason to . But when less important ends are at stake, it seems that a person's needs generally provide reasons for action, contrary to Williams's internalist account. I suspect, however, that there may remain inexorable disagreementover these claims because people value things in two distinct ways. Tosupport my suspicion, I explain how people's valuation can take either an agency-prioritizing or an end-prioritizing form. I then argue thatresolving the disagreement over Williams's internalist account ofreasons depends on whether it can be established that the agency-prioritizingform is the rationally superior form of valuation.     

Diminishing Returns to Income, Companionship – and Happiness

From philosophical and intuitive sources, I find three goods that should serve as ultimate ends in assessing a high quality of life: subjective well-being, human development, and justice. With acknowledged plural ends (we use them whether we acknowledge them or not), each takes its value from its scarcity relative to the other two – a version of diminishing marginal utility. Contrary to economists' belief that income (together with leisure) is the source of all utility, evidence shows that companionship, which does not pass through the market, has higher utility and contributes more to well-being than does income. But if money income has diminishing marginal utility, so does this competing good, companionship. With arguments drawn from the meaning of happiness, I show that happiness, too, may have diminishing marginal utility and that often it must rely for its hedonic and social value on such other goods as human development and justice.     

Educating ethically: Culture,commitment and integrity

In this paper, it is argued that the criticism of the Enlightenment project in education and the disappearance in the philosophy of education discourse of particular educational problems which confront practitioners has resulted in a philosophy of education which — as a kind of Spielerei — begs the question. To revitalize itself, philosophy of education must take up anew its perennial mission, one near to specific educational problems. In explaining how the I of the educator can be conceived after postmodernism, this study elaborates the concepts of integrity and particularity as relevant for education. Education itself is conceived as a personal relation with a real person that aids in developing individuality. It is concluded that this answer is an authoritative and authentic response from one individual to another within a particular situation.     

The teleological/deontological distinction

Conclusion In almost every introductory ethics course the student is taught that there are two basic kinds of moral theories: teleological and deontological. If the conclusions of this paper are correct, this practice must stop. As a minimum, discussion of the teleological/deontological distinction should be replaced by discussions of the axiological/deontological distinction. In addition, the student should be introduced to various of the other fundamental classificatory distinctions. This, I believe, will result in more penetrating theory criticism, and more creative theory construction. The hegemony of the teleological/deontological distinction must end.

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Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology as Non-Conventionally Utopian

This essay takes up the claim made recently by Simon Critchley in The Companion to Continental Philosophy that a feature common to many philosophers in the Continental tradition is the utopian demand that things be otherwise. The general question I pursue has to do with whether or not such a claim includes movements within Continental philosophy that do not self-identify with the utopian (like critical theory). The particular question has to do with whether or not the movement of phenomenology is utopian or does it, because of its other commitments, view the utopian as the antithesis to its orientation, which makes that claim that phenomenology is utopian seem strange. My thesis is that phenomenology can be seen as a utopian tradition but that some account must be given that demonstrates this connection to the utopian. In particular, I argue that Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology provides an understanding of the utopian, which I call a non-conventional view, that is vastly different from the one assumed by most when they see or hear the word utopian, which I label conventional. I show that such a non-conventional understanding can be developed in a way that neither requires us to view the utopian solely as opposed to finitude and contingency, nor a form of thought and action from which we necessarily need to dissociate ourselves. It is this non-conventional view of the utopian that in the end enables us to understand how Continental philosophy in general and phenomenology in particular are important bearers of the utopian demand that things be otherwise.     

In Praise of Objective-Subjectivity: Teaching the Pursuit of Precision

Building upon aspects of Isreal Scheffler's philosophy, this essay takes up the search for forms of education that will lead to increased participation in a universal conversation in the making. In particular, it looks at how the rational passions may either enhance or impede the possibility of intelligible discourse between opponents. On the impediment side, the phenomenon of 'communicative isolation' is investigated, along with the nature of arrogant perception and the problematic role played by negative rational passions. The conclusion reached is one that advocates the cultivation of 'objective-subjectivity' – a practice that combines reflexivity and precise self-awareness with the conscious exercise of positive rational passions.     

Accountability Forces in Performance Appraisal: Effects of Self-Appraisal Information, Normative Information, and Task Performance

This study investigated the effects of self-appraisal information, normative information, and task performance on performance appraisal ratings. Participants rated a fictitious subordinate's performance on a clerical task (which was either very good or moderately poor) subsequent to receiving self-assessment information (high or low) and normative information (present or absent). Self-appraisals affected performance ratings for poor performers but not for good performers, suggesting that judges are more motivated to please ratees than they are merely to adopt the subordinate's view of their own performance. Furthermore, objective normative information had greater influence than self-appraisals on performance ratings, suggesting that information source credibility has more influence than felt accountability on performance appraisals. Implications of the findings for organizations were discussed.     

Can Virtuous Actions be Both Habitual and Rational?

Virtuous actions seem to be both habitual and rational. But if we combine an intuitive understanding of habituality with the currently predominant paradigm of rational action, these two features of virtuous actions are hard to reconcile. Intuitively, acting habitually is acting as one has before in similar contexts, and automatically, that is, without thinking about it. Meanwhile, contemporary philosophers tend to assume the truth of what I call the reasons theory of rational action, which states that all rational actions are actions for reasons. Whilst interpretations of this phrase are disputed, I argue that neither of the two leading views – which I call reasons internalism and reasons externalism – makes room for habitual actions to count as actions for reasons; by the reasons theory, they cannot be rational either. I suggest one way of effecting the reconciliation which, whilst it allows us to keep the reasons theory, requires us to conceive of reasons as even more radically external than current externalists believe them to be.     

Teaching,Reason and Risk

In his writings on teaching, Isreal Scheffler has argued for the close connection between teaching and reason, an argument which can be summarized by, Teaching is. . an initiation into open rational discussion. This essay examines Schefflier's thesis in the light of criticisms drawn from feminist writings on teaching. It is argued that Scheffler's thesis is consistent with a view of teaching in which it can be achieved through kindness, good example and the efficacy of unconscious imitation, characteristics of the private, reproductive processes typical of women. It is then argued that Scheffler's concept of teaching is compatible with views of education that try to do justice to both reason and emotion, mind and feeling.     

Time courses in visual-information processing: Some theoretical considerations

Summary In the literature two different views with regard to the time course of activation of recognition units —hypothetical entities that represent identity information —are proposed. Both views are derived from a restricted set of phenomena in visual perception. The first view gets its intuitions from phenomena such as those summarized by Bloch's law; these phenomena show integration or summation of activation over time. This grow-and-grow view assumes that recognition units accumulate activation gradually over times The second view finds its inspiration in phenomena such as Mach-bands and simultaneous contrast; these phenomena show inhibition or steady-state suppression over time. This grow-and-shrink view assumes that the activation levels increase fast initially and then start to decrease.The perception literature strongly suggests that it may be light intensity that determines whether mainly integration (and phenomena such as Bloch's law) or inhibition (and phenomena such as Mach-bands) is obtained. So it is also likely that both information-processing views apply only to a limited range of intensity conditions; the grow-and-grow view to conditions of low-flight intensities, and the grow-and-shrink view to conditions of intermediate-and high-light intensities.It is argued that, to arrive at a complete view, a visual phenomenon that applies to the complete range of light intensities should be taken as a background for generating hypotheses about time courses in visual-information processing. The Broca-Sulzer effect is such a phenomenon. Starting from this phenomenon a simple, synthesizing, information-processing model is derived that is compatible with both the grow-and-grow view and the grow-andshrink view. It is shown that, besides the relevant temporal properties, this model also produces the appropriate spatial properties.     

Meditation and the unconscious

This paper begins by describing the practice of meditation. It goes on to discuss George Kelly's view of the unconscious and uses meditation to illustrate this view. Some similarities between meditation and psychotherapy are also described within their mainly Kellian perspective. It is concluded, inter alia, that meditation practice sensitizes the world within, which includes subverbal and unconscious material. With increased adeptness its practice may lead to the temporary suspension of our habitual, dualistic, cognitive construing, and thus facilitate the experience of no-thought, tranquility and a sense of oneness or unity. In the long-term, meditation practice may elaborate both subverbal and transverbal construing.     

Stimulus Control with Computer Assisted Learning

Computer Assisted Learning (CAL) has been shown to be an efficient learning-teaching procedure. Although there is an extensive educational software tradition using CAL approaches, few of them have demonstrated a better student performance than standard drill and practice methods. The purpose of this study was (a) to evaluate the effectiveness of the Let's Play With... software program, and (b) to evaluate the effectiveness of a prompt (i.e. a blinking object) used in the program. The educational software Let's Play With... was designed to teach basic concepts involving shapes and body positions to preschool students. The software structure follows a behavioral design and uses a stimulus control procedure. The study was carried out with 64 preschool students in the Cadiz (Spain) School District. Statistically significant differences were found between the experimental group and a control group.     

The Core Emotion Themes of Conjugal Loss

Previous studies have associated emotion and appraisal with long-term bereavement outcome. The present study extended this research by coding conjugal bereavement narratives for core relational themes (CRT) that served as emotional summaries of unique combinations of appraisal features. A range of CRTs was evidenced at 6 months after loss, with positive CRTs, such as love/affection and pride, occurring most frequently. As a way to examine competing models of coping with loss, CRTs were grouped by goal-congruence (positive/negative) and appraisal features (self/interpersonal) into four thematic categories, and they were compared with 6-, 14-, and 25-month outcome. Results contradicted the traditional grief work perspective, but they were consistent with the alternative view that recovery is fostered by identity continuity and a continued emotional bond with the deceased. With initial symptoms and Dyadic Adjustment Scale scores controlled, enhanced self themes (e.g., self-pride) and interpersonal affirmation themes (e.g., pride in the deceased) were each associated with improved functioning over time, whereas interpersonal discord themes (e.g., anger at the deceased) were associated with chronic grief.     

Developmental study of the comprehension and production of the pronoun “it”

Forty-two English-speaking children aged 3,3 to 7,0 were asked to act out instructions of the type There is clay on the table, give it to me, where the pronoun it occurs in object position and refers to a collective noun, or to a count noun, or to a noun (chocolate) which can be either. They were also asked to describe actions performed by the experimenter and to repeat the experimenter's instructions. A hierarchical pattern of behavior emerged and unexpected errors were noted. The results do not appear to be interpretable from the purely linguistic point of view; it is argued that analogous observations have been made in problem-solving tasks and that therefore cognitive development in general must play an important part.     

Humanization,democracy, and political education

Given the current concern in the Soviet Union and East Europe to emancipate public education from its Stalinist past, it is understandable that educators have called for the humanizing of education. Yet humanization is a none too clear idea and must be approached, I propose, through its opposite: dehumanization. Dehumanization, itself, can be understood as the denial of the dignity of the individual — a cardinal principle of the philosophies that comprise classical and contemporary liberal theory. This principle of the dignity of the individual in turn implies duties for the liberal democratic state to treat all citizens (and for all citizens to treat each other) with equal respect as ends in themselves and equally as choosers of ends, as being, at least in principle, capable of choosing and acting on the ultimate ends in their own lives and as potential sayers of great words and doers of great deeds in the common public enterprise.Now in claiming that the principle of the dignity of the individual is central to an understanding of a just and humane society, we do not thereby commit ourselves to those doctrines long associated with liberalism, viz., ontological and moral individualism. The form of political, or united-reformed, liberalism argued for in this paper is clearly compatible with strong forms of community, even authoritarian types of community insofar as they do not transgress the principle of the dignity of the individual as regards informed choice. As decidedly non-perfectionist and agnostic about ultimate goods (tempered by the ban on all public forms of dehumanizing behavior and treatment), this form of political liberalism is neither individualistic nor communitarian, neither capitalist nor socialist (though the state is not indifferent to their fortunes).This rendering of the liberal democratic state sets the requirements for a deep and thorough political education that goes well beyond any familiar example today. In seeking to develop, to humanize individuals for a world of thought and action in the common public enterprise, political education — the premier form of education — in a liberal democratic state seeks to develop individuals who are theoretically informed and practically wise — thus the emphasis on the development of rationality in all of its forms. Moreover, despite the formal agnosticism of the state concerning ultimate human ends, a political education requires deep student exposure to and critical assessment of religion, possible ways of life, and those views of the human good that humans throughout history have found worthy of pursuit. And this even if it means that students will come to reject the principle of the dignity of the individual.Together, Fred Ellett and I have thought through many of these ideas. In no way, however, is he responsible for the, undoubted, weaknesses herein.     

How to be an Anti-Skeptic and a NonContextualist

Contextualists often argue from examples where it seems true to say in one context that a person knows something but not true to say that in another context where skeptical hypotheses have been introduced. The skeptical hypotheses can be moderate, simply mentioning what might be the case or raising questions about what a person is certain of, or radical, where scenarios about demon worlds, brains in vats, The Matrix, etc., are introduced. I argue that the introduction of these skeptical hypotheses leads people to fallaciously infer that it is no longer true to say that the relevant person knows. I believe that that is a better explanation of the so-called intuition that the person does not know than the contextualists who claim that raising these skeptical hypotheses changes the standards that determine when it is true to say S knows that P. At the end I raise the possibility that contextualists might defend their view on pragmatic rather than skeptical grounds by arguing that the standards of evidence rise when more is at stake in a practical sense.