Whose ideology? A rejoinder to M. Plon

M. Plon commits the same offense that he finds so odious in American social psychology: A confounding of political axioms and scientific reasoning. His desire to demonstrate ideological blindness in Americans leads him to misinterpret some published works on the Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm in bargaining research and to ignore the issue of the most useful balance in emphasis between conflict maintenance and conflict resolution when these topics are studied experimentally. Thus, M. Plon's angry attack is not a clarification of the deep issues that he essays but, rather, another data point that will itself need to be understood.     

Whose forest? Whose land? Whose Ruins? Ethics and conservation

The stakes are very high in many struggles over cultural property, not only because the property is itself valuable, but also because property rights of many kinds hinge on cultural identity. However, the language of property rights and possession, and the standards for establishing cultural rights, is founded in antiquated and essentialized concepts of cultural continuity and cultural purity. As cultural property and culturally-defined rights become increasingly valuable in the global marketplace, disputes over ownership and management are becoming more and more intense. Using the example of a recent lawsuit over logging on Mayan Indian reservations in the Central American country of Belize, this paper argues that cultural essentialist positions are no longer tenable. Assigning exclusive ownership of globally important resources to any group or entity on purely cultural grounds is likely to prolong conflict instead of creating workable management structures. The author instead advocates a concept of “stakeholding” which acknowledges the legitimate interests of diverse individuals and groups. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a symposium entitled “Ethics in Science: Special Problems in Anthropology and Archaeology” held at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Philadelphia, PA, 15 February, 1998.     

Why Fix What Isn't Broken? A Rejoinder to Ridenour,Daley, & Reich*

Ridenour, Daley, & Reich (2000) suggest that the Family Assessment Device should be reorganized. We disagree and provide further reasons why such a reorganization is unwise.     

Whose harm? Which metaphysic?

Douglas Diekema has argued that it is not the best interest standard, but the harm principle that serves as the moral basis for ethicists, clinicians, and the courts to trigger state intervention to limit parental authority in the clinic. Diekema claims the harm principle is especially effective in justifying state intervention in cases of religiously motivated medical neglect in pediatrics involving Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists. I argue that Diekema has not articulated a harm principle that is capable of justifying state intervention in these cases. Where disagreements over appropriate care are tethered to metaphysical disagreements (as they are for Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists), it is moral-metaphysical standards, rather than merely moral standards, that are needed to provide substantive guidance. I provide a discussion of Diekema’s harm principle to the broader end of highlighting an inconsistency between the theory and practice of secular bioethics when overriding religiously based medical decisions. In a secular state, ethicists, clinicians, and the courts are purportedly neutral with respect to moral-metaphysical positions, especially regarding those claims considered to be religious. However, the practice of overriding religiously based parental requests requires doffing the mantle of neutrality. In the search for a meaningful standard by which to override religiously based parental requests in pediatrics, bioethicists cannot avoid some minimal metaphysical commitments. To resolve this inconsistency, bioethicists must either begin permitting religiously based requests, even at the cost of children’s lives, or admit that at least some moral-metaphysical disputes can be rationally adjudicated.

     

Whose Evolution? Which Theology?

The importance of scientific conflicts for theology andphilosophy is difficult to judge. In many disputes of significance, prominent scientists can be found on both sides. Profound philosophical and religious implications are sometimes said to be implied by the new theory as well. This article examines the dispute over natural selection between Richard Dawkins and Stephen Jay Gould as a contemporary instance of such a conflict. While both claim that profound philosophical conclusions flow from their own alternativeaccount of evolution, I suggest that the implication is not as great as is claimed and that the alleged implications have as much to do with their own perceptions of theology as with the actual theories themselves. Nevertheless, evolutionary theory is not irrelevant for theology. Theologians should be aware of the possible implications of evolutionary theory and at the same time theextent and limits of such implications.     

Consenting to Donate Organs: Whose Wishes Carry the Most Weight?

An experimental simulation methodology examined how people weigh the wishes of the donor and the next-of-kin in recommending whether the latter should consent to donate the organs of a deceased loved one. Subjects read several brief stories, each describing a young adult who had died suddenly and whose kin faced the decision of whether to donate their loved one's organs. Each scenario had four versions, identical except for minor wording changes providing information about the organ donation wish of the potential donor and the next-of-kin. Subjects indicated "yes,""no," or "I'm undecided" about whether the kin should donate the organs. Subjects weighted the wishes of the deceased much more heavily than their own or those of the next-of-kin when those wishes were stated directly. When the deceased's wishes had to be inferred indirectly, attitudes of the next-of-kin and the experimental subject affected the decision much more. Implications for organ procurement practice are considered.     

Constantine,Babel, and Yankee Doodling: Whose Indigeneity? Whose Psychology?

This essay addresses the issue of indigeneity in terms of local cultures. The authors do so in conversation with Kim, Yang, and Hwang’s recent book, Indigenous and Cultural Psychology: Understanding People in Context. The life and work of Virgilio Enriquez is reviewed briefly as an exemplary indigenous psychologist. He illustrates the possibility of an indigenous psychology with a local, regulative grammar of cognition, affect, behavior, and relationships. The accounts of the tower of Babel and Constantine point to the irreversible damage of homogenizing culture and imposing it on other cultures. We argue that the imposition of a local, particular Western psychology on a global scale might risk a similar cost. The authors propose that current research in indigenous psychologies might take more seriously the notion that culture is not monolithic but should be understood from the point of view of the analysis of power relationships. Secondly, the authors argue that the role of language has not received sufficient attention in terms of shaping thought and increasing the incommensurability between cultures. Thirdly, it is argued that positivist epistemology has dominated the field and that more hermeneutic approaches must be considered. Fourth, the question must be asked regarding who controls indigenous research. Too often control has been exogenous rather than in the hands of local leaders. Finally, it is suggested that North Americans would do well to examine and recognize the indigeneity of their own psychology.     

Whose Community are You Working for? A Change Agent Case Study

This article explores the role and responsibility of the community psychologist in creating change that could potentially harm the group they are meant to be in solidarity with. Drawing upon a 2‐year project with a Latinx Student Union at a public middle school in the Pacific Northwest, I examine the ethical dilemmas that arose when powerful stakeholders (school administration) changed the goals and intention of the research project without the consent of the low‐power stakeholders (the students). This narrative seeks to shed light on the dilemmas that come with being an ethical community psychologist (Balcazar, Garate‐Serafini, & Keys, 2004; Nelson, Prilleltensky, & MacGillivary, 2001; O'Neill, 1989), how these ethics can be compromised by one's identity, and what it means to work for/with/against one's community when deciding whether to stay with or leave a project.