AUGUSTINE ON MORAL CONSCIENCE

There are widely differing accounts of Augustine's place in the early history of the notion of conscience. While some regard his contribution as groundbreaking, others consider that he only stressed interiority more than earlier authors. Starting with a contrast with Jerome, the present article aims at clarifying Augustine's specific contribution and the place of conscience in his moral thought.     

GRADES OF FREEDOM: AUGUSTINE AND DESCARTES

Abstract: While Augustine distinguishes free choice from true liberty, his account of human freedom implies further distinctions which Augustine himself does not make explicit. More importantly, Augustine regards these distinct types of freedom as qualitatively different; some are clearly superior to others. Descartes also distinguishes qualitatively different types of freedom, and does so in a way that parallels Augustine's view. I here argue that Augustine divides freedom into four qualitatively distinct grades, and then demonstrate that Descartes’ account of freedom is a rationalist adaptation of the theory of free choice found in Augustine.     

AUGUSTINE AND THE LIMITS OF PREEMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE WAR

While Michael Walzer's distinction between preemptive and preventive wars offers important categories for current reflection upon the Bush Doctrine and the invasion of Iraq, it is often treated as a modern distinction without antecedent in the classical Christian just war tradition. This paper argues to the contrary that within Augustine's corpus there are passages in which he speaks about the use of violence in situations that we would classify today as preemptive and preventive military action. While I do not claim that Augustine makes an explicit distinction between the two types of war (such would be anachronistic), I will argue that based on examinations of De libero arbitrio I.v.11–12 and De civitate Dei I.30 Augustine's discussions of hypothetical cases or actual wars in history provide insights helpful for contemporary reflection on preemptive and preventive wars.     

THE CASTRATION OF SIGNS: CONVERSING WITH AUGUSTINE ON CREATION, LANGUAGE AND TRUTH

This article takes as its starting point Nicholas Lash's use of the Buberian distinction between the basic words “I‐It” and “I‐You” to address the question of how the difference between God and creation is “displayed” within the world. Drawing on a rather different discourse—the semiotics developed by Augustine in the distinctions he makes between sign and thing, use and enjoyment—it seeks to explore the concrete shape that might be taken by practices that foster the speaking of the basic word “I‐You”, and which thereby manifest God's redemptive activity within the world, focusing specifically on practices of debate and argument. “What might a redeemed practice of debate look like?” is the question that this article seeks to answer.     

CHRISTIAN AND BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVES ON NEURO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HUMAN PERSON: PNEUMA AND PRATITYASAMUTPADA

Abstract. Recent discussions of the mind‐brain and the soul‐body problems have been both advanced and complexified by the cognitive sciences. I focus explicitly here on emergence, supervenience, and nonreductive physicalist theories of human personhood in light of recent advances in the Christian‐Buddhist dialogue. While traditional self and no‐self views pitted Christianity versus Buddhism versus science, I show how the nonreductive physicalist proposal regarding human personhood emerging from the neuroscientific enterprise both contributes to and is enriched by the Christian concept of pneuma (spirit) and the Buddhist concept of pratityasamutpada (codependent origination).     

SIMULTANEOUS AND RETROSPECTIVE PERSON PERCEPTION

The subjects were shown a silent motion picture and asked to describe simultaneously what they saw. They were then requested to give a retrospective account of the same film. Comparisons of these reports indicated that the simultaneous verbalizations yielded more information about the subjects' perception of other persons' feelings and momentary states. It is proposed that clinical diagnostics should include data on immediate person perception as well as retrospective accounts.     

AUGUSTINE,ROUSSEAU, AND THE IDEA OF CHILDHOOD1

The social history of childhood usually identifies Rousseau as the origin of our contemporary understanding of the topic. The literature describes how Rousseau's notion of childhood as a time of natural innocence became embedded in key social forms such as the family and universal education. Scholars working in the history of political thought, however, have uncovered a fundamental relationship between Rousseau and Augustine. Analysis shows that Rousseau's philosophy of childhood recapitulates many Augustinian elements, and was not therefore an ex nihilo creation.     

SOME DETERMINANTS OF THE REINFORCING AND PUNISHING EFFECTS OF TIMEOUT1

Some determinants of the reinforcing and punishing properties of timeout were investigated in two experiments. Experiment I began as an attempt to reduce the frequency of tantrums in a 6-yr-old autistic girl by using timeout. Unexpectedly, the result was a substantial increase in the frequency of tantrums. Using a reversal design, subsequent manipulations showed that the opportunity to engage in self-stimulatory behavior during the timeout period was largely responsible for the increase in tantrums. Experiment II was initiated following the failure of timeout to reduce the spitting and self-injurious behavior of a 16-yr-old retarded boy. Using a multiple-baseline design, the nature of the timein environment was shown to be an important determinant of the effects of timeout. When the timein environment was “enriched”, timeout was effective as a punisher. A conception of timeout in terms of the relative reinforcing properties of timein and timeout and their clinical implications are discussed.     

SELF-DEFENSE, INNOCENT AGGRESSORS, AND THE DUTY OF MARTYRDOM

On the traditional doctrine of self-defense, defensive force is permissible not only against Culpable Aggressors but against Innocent Aggressors as well (for example, psychotic aggressors). Some moral philosophers have recently challenged this view, arguing that one may not harm innocent attackers because morality requires culpability as an essential condition of being liable to defensive force. This essay examines and rejects this challenge as both a violation of common sense and as insufficiently grounded in convincing reasons from moral theory.