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MICHAEL J. SHAFFER 《Metaphilosophy》2007,38(1):44-54
Abstract: In a series of influential articles, George Bealer argues for the autonomy of philosophical knowledge on the basis that philosophically known truths must be necessary truths. The main point of his argument is that the truths investigated by the sciences are contingent truths to be discovered a posteriori by observation, while the truths of philosophy are necessary truths to be discovered a priori by intuition. The project of assimilating philosophy to the sciences is supposed to be rendered illegitimate by the more or less sharp distinction in these characteristic methods and its modal basis. In this article Bealer's particular way of drawing the distinction between philosophy and science is challenged in a novel manner, and thereby philosophical naturalism is further defended. 相似文献
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It is widely accepted in epistemology that knowledge is factive, meaning that only truths can be known. We argue that this theory creates a skeptical challenge: because many of our beliefs are only approximately true and therefore false, they do not count as knowledge. We consider several responses to this challenge and propose a new one. We propose easing the truth requirement on knowledge to allow approximately true, practically adequate representations to count as knowledge. In addition to addressing the skeptical challenge, this view also coheres with several previous theoretical proposals in epistemology. 相似文献
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Philip Hefner 《Zygon》1988,23(3):263-279
Abstract. One of the basic intentions of theology is to extend the explanatory function of the community's faith beyond the community to the realm of wider human experience. In this sense, theology may be called "scientific,'and it will benefit from conforming as much as possible to the characteristics of scientific theory formation. Using the work of Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos as a guide, the following theological theory is proposed: Homo sapiens is God's created co-creator, whose purpose is the stretching/enabling of the systems of nature so that they can participate in Gods purposes in the mode of freedom. It is argued that this research program produces new knowledge in relating the Christian faith to scientific views of human being as comprised of both genes and cultures to a theory of technological civilization; to freedom, determinism, and natural selection; and to credible notions of human purpose. Traditional Christian doctrines are related to this research program. 相似文献
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Robert C. Fuller 《Zygon》1987,22(4):497-510
Abstract. Peter Berger established himself in the sociological profession in large part through his functional interpretations of religion and its ostensible demise in relation to the empirical bent of modern intellectual thought. Yet, in his ef–fort to expand the scope of empiricism such that it might address nontrivial concerns, Berger found himself attempting to understand the "substance" of religiori—that is, the conviction that there exists an "other" which confronts us unconditionally and consequently forms the basis of all issues concerning value and meaning. Berger's writings deserve critical attention in that they disclose both the problems and the promises of utilizing empirical methods for the task of rehabilitating, rather than debunking, humanity's religious propensities. 相似文献
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Jill Gordon 《Journal of social philosophy》1995,26(1):53-85
Many will ask what Harlem finds to honor in the stormy, controversial and bold young captain. And we will smile. And we will answer and say unto them: Did you ever talk to Brother Malcolm? Did he ever touch you? Did you have him smile at you? Did he ever do a mean thing? Was he ever himself associated with violence or any public disturbance? For if you did, you would know him and if you knew him you would know why we must honor him. 相似文献
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PIERRE CRUSE 《Metaphilosophy》2007,38(4):489-508
Abstract: A traditional view is that to be an empiricist is to hold a particular epistemological belief: something to the effect that knowledge must derive from experience. In his recent book The Empirical Stance, and in a number of other publications, Bas van Fraassen has disagreed, arguing that if empiricism is to be defensible it must instead be thought of as a stance: an attitude of mind or methodological orientation rather than a factual belief. In this article I will examine his arguments for this claim in detail. I will argue that they do not succeed and that empiricism is, contrary to van Fraassen's claim, better thought of as a truth‐evaluable doctrine than as a stance. 相似文献