宗教与知识

认为2 0 0 1年9月发生的那次袭击标志着当代历史的一个重大转折点,这也许是夸大其词的。但这个事件无疑已令我们感到必须对诸多问题重新加以思考。其中的一个问题尤其与这组探讨知识社会的论文有着高度的相关性。它提出了下述问题:在这样一个社会中,宗教可能扮演着什么角色?人们首先会认为这种角色几乎为零,这在很大程度上是因为囿于私人生活领域的宗教已被改造成无害的古语。其次,就其本质而言,宗教同任何形式的理性知识皆不相容。这次袭击颠覆了上述两种假设。起初,它令某种人们怀疑已久的事情在转瞬间成为关注的焦点。自从原教旨主义现象…     

CONTEXTUALISM, SUBJECT-SENSITIVE INVARIANTISM AND KNOWLEDGE OF KNOWLEDGE

§I schematizes the evidence for an understanding of 'know' and of other terms of epistemic appraisal that embodies contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism, and distinguishes between those two approaches. §II argues that although the cases for contextualism and sensitive invariantism rely on a principle of charity in the interpretation of epistemic claims, neither approach satisfies charity fully, since both attribute meta-linguistic errors to speakers. §III provides an equally charitable anti-sceptical insensitive invariantist explanation of much of the same evidence as the result of psychological bias caused by salience effects. §IV suggests that the explanation appears to have implausible consequences about practical reasoning, but also that applications of contextualism or sensitive invariantism to the problem of scepticism have such consequences. §V argues that the inevitable difference between appropriateness and knowledge of appropriateness in practical reasoning, closely related to the difference between knowledge and knowledge of knowledge, explains the apparent implausibility.     

CONCEIVABILITY AND MODAL KNOWLEDGE

Abstract: This article is a discussion of Hume's maxim Nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. First I explain this maxim and distinguish it from the principle Whatever cannot be imagined (conceived), is impossible. Next I argue that Thomas Reid's criticism of the maxim fails and that the arguments by Tamar Szábo Gendler and John Hawthorne for the claim that “it is uncontroversial that there are cases where we are misled” by the maxim are unconvincing. Finally I state the limited but real value of the maxim: it does help us, in certain cases, reliably to make up our minds. Along the way I show that Reid, his criticism of the maxim notwithstanding, actually employs it, and I furthermore argue that the principle What is inconceivable, is impossible is spurious.     

LOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND GETTIER CASES

Knowledge of the basic rules of logic is often thought to be distinctive, for it seems to be a case of non-inferential a priori knowledge. Many philosophers take its source to be different from those of other types of knowledge, such as knowledge of empirical facts. The most prominent account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic takes this source to be the understanding of logical expressions or concepts. On this account, what explains why such knowledge is distinctive is that it is grounded in semantic or conceptual understanding. However, I show that this cannot be the correct account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic, because it is open to Gettier-style counter-examples.     

KNOWLEDGE, SPEAKER AND SUBJECT

I contrast two solutions to the lottery paradox concerning knowledge: contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism. I defend contextualism against an objection that it cannot explain how 'knows' and its cognates function inside propositional attitude reports. I then argue that subject-sensitive invariantism fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the paradox.     

ALTERNATIVE QUESTIONS AND KNOWLEDGE ATTRIBUTIONS

We discuss the 'problem of convergent knowledge', an argument presented by J. Schaffer in favour of contextualism about knowledge attributions, and against the idea that knowledge- wh can be simply reduced to knowledge of the proposition answering the question. Schaffer's argument centrally involves alternative questions of the form 'whether A or B'. We propose an analysis of these on which the problem of convergent knowledge does not arise. While alternative questions can contextually restrict the possibilities relevant for knowledge attributions, what Schaffer's puzzle reveals is a pragmatic ambiguity in what 'knowing the answer' means: in his problematic cases, the subject knows only a partial answer to the question. This partial knowledge can be counted as adequate only on externalist grounds.     

知识创新与心理学的发展

在知识经济时代,创新能力决定国家的前途命运,建设国家创新体系是提高国家创新能力的重要举措。知识创新是国家创新体系的一个重要组成部分,是提高我国整体创新能力的关键所在。心理学是一门横跨自然科学和社会科学的交叉科学,其成果在人类生活的许多方面有重要影响。根据当前国家需求和心理学的发展前沿,我们认为,在知识创新活动中,应当将心理健康与创新能力、认知与复杂信息环境、社会经济与心理行为作为重要研究方向。     

KNOWLEDGE AND IMAGINATION IN FICTION AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY

Abstract: Autobiographies are particularly interesting in the context of moral philosophy because they offer us rare and extended examples of how other people think, feel and reflect, which is of crucial importance in the development of phronesis (practical wisdom). In this article, Martha Nussbaum's use of fictional literature is shown to be of limited interest, and her arguments in Poetic Justice against the use of personal narratives in moral philosophy are shown to be unfounded. An analysis of Aristotle's concept of mimesis shows that Nussbaum's claims for fictional literature also apply to personal narratives. A case is then made for the importance of personal narratives in developing practical wisdom, and three sub‐genres of autobiography are discussed: (1) the confession, (2) the apology and (3) the testimonial. These sub‐genres exemplify some of the unique features of personal narratives.     

THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT AND HIGHER-ORDER PROPERTIES

The paper argues that Jackson's knowledge argument fails to undermine physicalist ontology. First, it is argued that, as this argument stands, it begs the question. Second, it is suggested that, by supplementing the argument (and taking one of its premises for granted), this flaw can be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against type‐physicalism; however, this flaw cannot be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against token‐physicalism. The argument cannot be supplemented so as to show that experiences have properties which are illegitimate from a physicalist perspective.     

EXPERIENCE AND CONCEPTUALIZATION IN MYSTICAL KNOWLEDGE

Abstract. The purpose of this article is to explore certain parallels and divergencies between contemporary philosophy of science and the comparative study of mysticism. Two types of mystical experiences, "depth-mystical" and "nature-mystical," are first differentiated. Next, the role of both experience and doctrine in the development and justification of mystical knowledge is defended. Finally, the issue of whether one mystical system can be established as superior to others is discussed.     

GAME THEORY AND KNOWLEDGE BY SIMULATION

This paper makes a connection between some developments in game theory and issues about everyday psychological knowledge. I argue that there are two-person situations in which agents will do badly if they use a particular simple theory of rationality to predict one another's actions. If we assume that our everyday techniques for anticipating one another's actions will get better results than this, it follows that these techniques do not consist in applying a theory like this one. One alternative is that when we anticipate actions we supplement whatever theories we have with a capacity to imagine the other person's motivation. I sketch a way of modelling this capacity. ¹ 1 This paper went through many drafts. Martin Davies was very patient with several of them. Remarks by Susan Hurley and Alex Cacelnik at a crucial moment helped me see what I was trying to say. I should like to dedicate the paper to Stephan Körner, former editor of Ratio, who recently celebrated his eightieth birthday.
     

NEUROMEDIA,EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING

Imagine you had the functions of your smartphone miniaturized to a cellular level and accessible by your neural network. Reflection on this possibility suggests that we should not just concern ourselves with whether our knowledge is extending “out” to our devices; our devices are extending in, and with them, possibly the information that they bring. If so, then the question of whether knowledge is “extended” becomes wrapped up with the question of whether knowing is something we do, or something we can share with, or outsource to, instruments. And that in turn raises the two questions of this paper: First, to what extent does such technology put pressure on the idea that we might have more than one conception of knowledge (or types of knowledge)? And second, what is the value of states that fit these conceptions (or types) of knowledge?