The revelation effect for item and associative recognition: Familiarity versus recollection

The revelation effect occurs when items on a recognition test are more likely to be judged as being old if they are preceded by a cognitive task that involves the processing of similar types of stimuli. This effect was examined for item (single-word) and associative (word-pair) recognition. We found, in Experiments 1 and 2, a revelation effect for item, but not for associative recognition under normal study conditions. A revelation effect for both item and associative recognition was observed in Experiments 3 and 4 when study time was extremely brief, thus limiting the encoding of information that would support recall or recollection. In Experiment 5, we demonstrated that the revelation effect for item recognition is eliminated when item recognition decisions are made in the context of a study item. The results show that the revelation task influenced recognition decisions based on familiarity, but not decisions that involved recall or recollection.     

Utilization of base-rate information during feeling-of-knowing judgments.

We examined whether subjects use base-rate information about item difficulty when making feeling-of-knowing judgments for items they failed to recall. First, the subjects attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions. Then, for those items they recalled incorrectly, half of the subjects received information about the normative probability of recall of each item while judging their feeling of knowing. The other subjects made their feeling-of-knowing judgments without receiving any base-rate information. Finally, all subjects had a forced-choice recognition test on those items to validate the accuracy of their feeling-of-knowing judgments. Relative to the no-base-rate information group, the base-rate group had lower feelings of knowing for normatively difficult items and higher feelings of knowing for normatively easier items. Subjects who had received base-rate information during the judgment state had greater feeling-of-knowing accuracy than subjects who did not receive base-rate information. However, even the predictions from subjects who received base-rate information were not significantly more accurate for predicting subsequent recognition than were the predictions derived from normative information alone.     

Destination and source memory in Huntington's disease

Destination memory refers to the recall of the destination of previously relayed information, and source memory refers to the recollection of the origin of received information. We compared both memory systems in Huntington's disease (HD) participants. For this, HD participants and healthy adults had to put 12 items in a black or a white box (destination task), and to extract another 12 items from a blue or a red box (source task). Afterwards, they had to decide in which box each item had previously been deposited (destination memory), and from which box each item had previously been extracted (source memory). HD participants showed poorer source as well as destination recall performance than healthy adults in the proposed tasks. Correlation analysis showed that destination recall was significantly correlated with episodic recall in HD participants. Destination memory impairment in HD participants seems to be considerably influenced by their episodic memory performance.     

Automatic processing influences free recall: converging evidence from the process dissociation procedure and remember-know judgments

Dual-process theories of retrieval suggest that controlled and automatic processing contribute to memory performance. Free recall tests are often considered pure measures of recollection, assessing only the controlled process. We report two experiments demonstrating that automatic processes also influence free recall. Experiment 1 used inclusion and exclusion tasks to estimate recollection and automaticity in free recall, adopting a new variant of the process dissociation procedure. Dividing attention during study selectively reduced the recollection estimate but did not affect the automatic component. In Experiment 2, we replicated the results of Experiment 1, and subjects additionally reported remember–know–guess judgments during recall in the inclusion condition. In the latter task, dividing attention during study reduced remember judgments for studied items, but know responses were unaffected. Results from both methods indicated that free recall is partly driven by automatic processes. Thus, we conclude that retrieval in free recall tests is not driven solely by conscious recollection (or remembering) but also by automatic influences of the same sort believed to drive priming on implicit memory tests. Sometimes items come to mind without volition in free recall.     

On the origin of functional differences in recollective experience

Abstract

Subjects studied target words that were repeated either immediately (lag0) or after six intervening items (lag6). At retention testing, subjects were required to discriminate targets from distractors and, contingent on a ‘yes' response, to classify each identified item as one that evoked either a ‘remember’ (R) response or a ‘know’ (K) response. An R response indicated recognition based on conscious recollection, and K, recognition without conscious recollection. R responses were significantly greater in lag6 than lag0 whereas the reverse was found for K responses. The data are interpreted as showing that R responses depend on the probability of a target stimulus engaging conscious effortful processing, whereas K responses are increased in the absence of conscious involvement at learning.     

Remembrance of remembrance past

Arnold and Lindsay (2002) found that individuals more often failed to remember they had previously recalled an item if that item had been cued in a qualitatively different way on two recall occasions: the “forgot-it-all-along” (FIA) effect. Experiment 1 was designed to determine if the FIA effect arises because participants incorrectly believe they have not been previously tested for an item, or because they incorrectly believe they have failed to recall the item when previously tested. Experiment 2 measured participants' confidence in their incorrect prior-recall judgements, and Experiment 3 tested participants' ability to “recover” their previous recollection when the prior-recall context was restored. Results indicated that participants usually believed they had not previously been cued for the items they failed to remember previously recalling; they were often confident in their incorrect judgements of prior non-remembering; and re-introducing the context of prior remembering sometimes enabled them to recapture their memories of previous recall.     

Remembrance of remembrance past

Arnold and Lindsay (2002) found that individuals more often failed to remember they had previously recalled an item if that item had been cued in a qualitatively different way on two recall occasions: the "forgot-it-all-along" (FIA) effect. Experiment 1 was designed to determine if the FIA effect arises because participants incorrectly believe they have not been previously tested for an item, or because they incorrectly believe they have failed to recall the item when previously tested. Experiment 2 measured participants' confidence in their incorrect prior-recall judgements, and Experiment 3 tested participants' ability to "recover" their previous recollection when the prior-recall context was restored. Results indicated that participants usually believed they had not previously been cued for the items they failed to remember previously recalling; they were often confident in their incorrect judgements of prior non-remembering; and re-introducing the context of prior remembering sometimes enabled them to recapture their memories of previous recall.     

Conscious recollection in autobiographical memory: an investigation in schizophrenia

Whether or not conscious recollection in autobiographical memory is affected in schizophrenia is unknown. The aim of this study was to address this issue using an experiential approach. An autobiographical memory enquiry was used in combination with the Remember/Know procedure. Twenty-two patients with schizophrenia and 22 normal subjects were asked to recall specific autobiographical memories from four lifetime periods and to indicate the subjective states of awareness associated with the recall of what happened, when and where. They gave Remember, Know or Guess responses according to whether they recalled these aspects of the event on the basis of conscious recollection, simply knowing, or guessing. Results showed that the frequency and consistency of Remember responses was significantly lower in patients than in comparison subjects. In contrast, the frequency of Know responses was not significantly different, whereas the frequency of patients' Guess responses was significantly enhanced. It is concluded that the frequency and consistency of conscious recollection in autobiographical memory is reduced in patients with schizophrenia.     

In what sense is implicit memory "episodic"? The effect of reinstating environmental context

We consider three aspects of the term episodic. Previous literature shows implicit memory does not make conscious autobiographical reference but does code an item's intrinsic context (e.g., perceptual detail). Here, we consider extrinsic context--namely, that not directly processed as part of item identification and not overtly relevant to the task. Study-test mismatch in environmental context (outdoors vs. indoors) reduced memory in an explicit stem-cued recall task but had no effect on repetition priming in an implicit stem completion task. This was true even for very low frequency words. We support the view that implicit memory reflects traces within perceptual (or semantic) knowledge-based systems that are instance specific but do not code the full spatiotemporal context information necessary to support conscious recollection. We also interpret our results as consistent with differences in environmental context specificity between free recall and recognition.     

The role of phantom recollection in false recall

Although high levels of phantom recollection (illusory vivid experience of the prior "presentation" of unpresented items) have been found for false recognition, little is known about phantom recollection in recall. We examined this issue with Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists using two paradigms: repeated recall and conjoint recall. High levels of phantom recollection were observed with both standard behavioral measures and the parameters of fuzzy-trace theory's dual-recall model. In addition, phantom recollection and the true recollection that accompanies presented items appear to involve different retrieval processes, because they were dissociated by manipulations such as number of recall tests and list strength.     

Recollective experience in word and nonword recognition

The functional relationship between memory and consciousness was investigated in two experiments in which subjects indicated when recognizing an item whether they could consciously recollect its prior occurrence in the study list or recognized it on some other basis, in the absence of conscious recollection. Low-frequency words, relative to high-frequency words, enhanced recognition accompanied by conscious recollection but did not influence recognition in the absence of conscious recollection. By contrast, nonwords compared with words enhanced recognition in the absence of conscious recollection and reduced recognition accompanied by conscious recollection. A third experiment showed that confidence judgments in recognizing nonword targets corresponded with recognition performance, not with recollective experience. These measures of conscious awareness therefore tap qualitatively different components of memory, not some unitary dimension such as "trace strength." The findings are interpreted as providing further support for the distinction between episodic memory and other memory systems, and also as providing more qualified support for theories that assume that recognition memory entails two components, one of which may also give rise to priming effects in implicit memory.     

Recollective experience in the revelation effect: Separating the contributions of recollection and familiarity

The revelation effect is a phenomenon of recognition memory in which words presented for a recognition decision are more likely to be identified as previously studied if they are initially disguised and are then somehow revealed to the subject. The goal of the present experiments was to determine whether the revelation effect has similar or different influences on the conscious recollection of a previous encounter with a test item and on the feeling of familiarity evoked by a test item. The process-dissociation procedure (Experiment 1) and the remember/know procedure (Experiment 2) were used to achieve this goal. The main findings of these experiments were that revealing an item at test (1) increased the feeling of familiarity associated with that item, especially if it was not previously studied, and (2) decreased conscious recollection of previously studied items. These data narrow the range of potential explanations of the revelation effect.     

Word frequency effects in immediate serial recall: item familiarity and item co-occurrence have the same effect

In immediate serial recall, high-frequency words are better recalled than low-frequency words. A prevalent interpretation of this effect suggests that, at the point of recall, degraded representations undergo a reconstruction process calling upon long-term knowledge of the to-be-remembered items. Recently, Stuart and Hulme (2000) following Deese (1960), suggested that high-frequency items are better recalled due to their better long-term associative links. Their results revealed that a familiarisation procedure involving repeated presentations of the to-be-remembered items in pairs abolished the usual frequency effect. In the experiment reported here, an alternative interpretation of this result is examined. Prior to the memory task, subjects received either no familiarisation, item familiarisation, or pair familiarisation. Both item and pair familiarisation improved the item recall of low-frequency items to the same extent, suggesting that increased familiarity can account for the co-occurrence effect.     

Cognitive effort and recollective experience in recognition memory

The difficulty of the cognitive operations required to process study items was manipulated in two experiments investigating recollective experience. In subsequent recognition tests, subjects indicated whether their recognition judgements for items processed in these tasks were based on recollection ("remember" responses) or on familiarity ("know" responses). In Experiment 1 target items were presented in the context of a category decision task. It was found that remember responses increased with the difficulty of the category decision. For positive instances, remember responses were greater for items of low instance frequency than for items of high instance frequency, while for negative instances remember responses were greater for items from similar categories than for items from dissimilar categories. These effects were not present in know responses. In Experiment 2, remember responses were more frequent when study items had been presented in the form of anagrams to be solved than when they had been presented in the form of words to be read aloud. The incidence of know responses was not affected by the format in which study items were presented. Source judgements were also more accurate when recognition was based on recollection. It is argued that the type of conscious awareness experienced during recognition is determined by the knowledge activated by items presented in the recognition test, which in turn is determined by the nature of the operations engaged at encoding.     

Background Data and Autobiographical Memory: Effects of Item Types and Task Characteristics

Background data, or life history measures, ask people to recall and report prior behavior and experiences. Although these measures have been found to be effective predictors of performance, little is known about the characteristics of items contributing to accurate reporting and good recall. Accordingly, 153 undergraduates were asked to work on a complex, computer-based ‘in-basket’ task. In working through this task, objective indices of their activities were obtained. After completing this task, subjects were asked to answer a set of background data items describing their behavior and experiences during task performance. Additionally, they were asked to return one week later and, again, answer the background data questions. Indices of accuracy and recall consistency were obtained for various item types. In accordance with the literature of autobiographical memory, it was found that people could consistency recall and accurately report general summaries of activities and their reactions to the task. More specific actions or behaviors that were not linked to goals were not accurately and consistently recalled. The implications of these findings for the development and application of background data measures are discussed.     

Is the picture bizarreness effect a generation effect?

Bizarre stimuli usually facilitate recall compared to common stimuli. This investigation explored the so-called bizarreness effect in free recall by using 80 simple line drawings of common objects (common vs bizarre). 64 subjects participated with 16 subjects in each group. Half of the subjects received learning instructions and the other half rated the bizarreness of each drawing. Moreover, drawings were presented either alone or with the name of the object under mixed-list encoding conditions. After the free recall task, subjects had to make metamemory judgments about how many items of each format they had seen and recalled. The key result was that a superiority of bizarre pictures over common ones was found in all conditions although performance was better when the pictures were presented alone than with their corresponding label. Subsequent metamemory judgments, however, showed that subjects underestimated the number of bizarre items actually recalled.     

Word frequency effects in immediate serial recall: Item familiarity and item co‐occurrence have the same effect

In immediate serial recall, high‐frequency words are better recalled than low‐frequency words. A prevalent interpretation of this effect suggests that, at the point of recall, degraded representations undergo a reconstruction process calling upon long‐term knowledge of the to‐be‐remembered items. Recently, Stuart and Hulme () following Deese (), suggested that high‐frequency items are better recalled due to their better long‐term associative links. Their results revealed that a familiarisation procedure involving repeated presentations of the to‐be‐remembered items in pairs abolished the usual frequency effect. In the experiment reported here, an alternative interpretation of this result is examined. Prior to the memory task, subjects received either no familiarisation, item familiarisation, or pair familiarisation. Both item and pair familiarisation improved the item recall of low‐frequency items to the same extent, suggesting that increased familiarity can account for the co‐occurrence effect.     

Isolation of massed- and distributed-practice items

In four experiments, massed-practice (MP) or distributed-practice (DP) items were isolated from other items in a list presented either visually or auditorially for free recall. For three independent groups, the first, second, or both presentations of an item were isolated. Locus of isolation had a marginal influence on recall. When MP items were isolated, they were recalled better than DP items. Isolating the DP items enhanced the MP-DP effect. The results are congruent with the idea that the MP-DP effect in free recall results, in part, from differential rehearsal.     

Age differences in collaborative memory: the role of retrieval manipulations

In two experiments, we examined age differences in collaborative inhibition (reduced recall in pairs of people, relative to pooled individuals) across repeated retrieval attempts. Younger and older adults studied categorized word lists and were then given two consecutive recall tests and a recognition test. On the first recall test, the subjects were given free-report cued recall or forced-report cued recall instructions (Experiment 1) or free recall instructions (Experiment 2) and recalled the lists either alone or in collaboration with another subject of the same age group. Free-report cued recall and free recall instructions warned the subjects not to guess, whereas forcedreport cued recall instructions required them to guess. Collaborative inhibition was obtained for both younger and older adults on initial tests of free-report cued recall, forced-report cued recall, and free recall, showing that the effect generalizes across several tests for both younger and older adults. Collaborative inhibition did not persist on subsequent individual recall or recognition tests for list items. Older adults consistently falsely recalled and recognized items more than did younger adults, as had been found in previous studies. In addition, prior collaboration may exaggerate older adults’ tendency toward higher false alarms on a subsequent recognition test, but only after a free recall test. The results provide generality to the phenomenon of collaborative inhibition and can be explained by invoking concepts of strategy disruption and source monitoring.     

The picture-superiority effect in category-association tests

In two experiments we examined the picture-superiority effect in the framework of the transfer-appropriate processing approach recently advocated by Roediger, Weldon, and Challis (1989). For the first time conceptual implicit-memory task is used, i.e., category association. In Experiment 1, subjects study a mixed list of pictures and words and then receive either a category-association test or a category-cued recall test, followed by a recognition test. The results show that performance on category-cued recall, recognition, and category-association tests are better when the material is studied in picture format. In Experiment 2, we show that producing a sentence with the material studied (picture or word) eliminates the picture-superiority effect in the implicit test, but does not eliminate picture superiority in the category-cued recall test. These results suggest that conceptually driven processing plays a critical role in category association and explicit tests of memory. The results are discussed in the framework of the transfer-appropriate processing approach to memory.