控制幻觉与人格、动机关系研究

目的本研究考察了人格、动机强弱分别与心理控制幻觉之间的关系。方法采用被试内实验设计的方法,用艾森克人格问卷进行测量。结果与结论动机水平的高低与控制幻觉的形成之间存在明确的关系,即前后动机水平的发生变化,信心分差异显著(t=-3.1,p=0.006<0.05),动机越强则产生控制幻觉的倾向性越大;人格中的外倾性,精神质与心理控制幻觉的产生存在显著的正相关(r=0.766,P<0.01;r=0.827,P<0.01);外倾性这一心理特质对控制幻觉的产生有较强的预测作用。     

The reduction of sensory pleasure to desire

One of the leading approaches to the nature of sensory pleasure reduces it to desire: roughly, a sensation qualifies as a sensation of pleasure just in case its subject wants to be feeling it. This approach is, in my view, correct, but it has never been formulated quite right; and it needs to defended against some compelling arguments. Thus the purpose of this paper is to discover the most defensible formulation of this rough idea, and to defend it against the most interesting objections.     

Special random numbers: Beyond the illusion of control

Previous research has shown that gamblers prefer numbers they choose themselves because this choice allows them to feel more in control of the (random) outcome. We identify other conditions under which people find numbers “special” (i.e., worthy of betting more on than other numbers). By manipulating gambling task type and assigning participants a number by an endogenous system outside their own control (as is done in numerology, astrology, and other paranormal systems), we find that indeed people prefer to bet on numbers derived from particular special systems. The mechanism underlying this preference is enjoyment with the task—not control. Further, the enjoyment associated with this “specialness” is related to the prevalence of certain types of numbers (i.e., numbers based on dates and names) in the fortune-telling world and not to other factors such as individuality or even belief in the associated system. We replicate these findings using actual money and show that this prevalence-to-enjoyment link already exists in memory for dates and names and is activated and strengthened by priming the fortune-telling systems relevant to those special random numbers. Finally, we present a model of special random numbers that integrates our findings with other determinants of valuation such as regret and subjective probability. Our results expand the realm of special random numbers beyond control. Our enjoyment model has implications not only for understanding gambling, but also for understanding how reasoning under uncertainty is influenced by little-understood phenomena (such as fortune-telling systems) without affecting subjective probability or actual beliefs.     

Shattering the illusion of control: Multi-shot versus single-shot gambles

The illusion of control refers to a phenomenon whereby people believe their chances of success at a task are greater than would be warranted by objective analysis. This article raises two questions. First, how robust is the illusion of control? Second, how might the illusion be ‘shattered?’ Previous experimental demonstrations involved situations that can be likened to unique or single-shot gambles. If, however, the phenomenon is robust, it should occur in repeated or multi-shot gambles in which the outcome depends on a series of gambles involving the same underlying random process. It should also appear in single-shot gambles that are framed so as to superficially resemble multi-shot gambles. We label this the strong illusion of control hypothesis. On the other hand, because people have a better appreciation of probabilistic concepts in tasks they are able to represent as relative frequencies, the introduction of a multi-shot or ‘pseudo-multi-shot’ context might cue people to the random nature of the task, thereby shattering the illusion. The weak illusion of control hypothesis holds that the illusion of control will occur in single-shot but not in multi-shot or pseudo-multi-shot gambles. Two studies are reported that support the weak hypothesis. Alternative explanations are considered and implications are discussed.     

Keeping the illusion of control under control: Ceilings, floors, and imperfect calibration

Prior research has claimed that people exaggerate probabilities of success by overestimating personal control in situations that are heavily or completely chance-determined. We examine whether such overestimation of control persists in situations where people do have control. Our results suggest a simple model that accounts for prior findings on illusory control as well as for situations where actual control is high: People make imperfect estimates of their level of control. By focusing on situations marked by low control, prior research has created the illusion that people generally overestimate their level of control. Across three studies, we show that when they have a great deal of control, people under-estimate it. Implications for research on perceived control and co-variation assessment are discussed.     

Surrendering personal control to automation: Appalling or appealing?

There has been a growing interest in Autonomous Vehicle (AV) technology worldwide over the last decade. Nevertheless, various studies have noted some potential socio-psychological challenges to AV use and ownership. These challenges can be mitigated by designing AV that accounts for users’ personalities, such as their perceived control and power. The complex relationship between personal control and automation, two concepts that intuitively sound contradictory to each other, is less explored. In this study, two dimensions of personal control, the desire for control and the driver locus of control, were hypothesized to influence the attitude toward AV. The relationships were moderated by power distance, a cultural factor related to one’s sense of control. The hypotheses were tested using Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) approach via the Analysis of Moment Structures (AMOS) software. As many as 457 respondents from two sample groups, Hungarian and Indonesian drivers were gathered via an online questionnaire and compared. The results reveal that 1) the higher the desire for control, the more negative the attitude toward AV 2) the higher the external driver locus of control, the more positive the attitude toward AV 3) the more positive the attitude toward AV, the higher the intention to use AV and 4) power distance moderates the relationship between the desire for control and the attitude toward AV, such that the negative effect of the desire for control is strengthened in high power distance orientation. This study also provides theoretical contributions and managerial implications, especially to AV designers.     

Illusory control as a function of the motivation to avoid randomly determined aversive outcomes

Previous research has provided evidence that the need to attain appetitive outcomes positively affects the certainty of winning that outcome in purely chance-based games. Three experiments were conducted to test the notion that the need to avoid an aversive outcome affects winning confidence in the same fashion. In Experiment 1, participants were given the opportunity to avoid having to give an introductory remark (low need) or an impromptu speech (high need) to a group of peers by winning a chance-based card-drawing game. As predicted, confidence-in-winning ratings were found to be a positive function of outcome need. In Experiment 2, participants faced a similar card-drawing procedure but this time could avoid ostensibly having their arms submersed in either room temperature water (low need) or cold water (high need) need. Again as expected, results showed that participants in the high need condition not only displayed greater winning confidence but also believed more skill was involved in playing the purely chance-based game. In Experiment 3, the methodology of Experiment 1 was replicated incorporating a skill measure. The results of this experiment mirrored those of Experiment 2. Results of these investigations are discussed in terms of control theory.

Unconscious modulation of the conscious experience of voluntary control

How does the brain generate our experience of being in control over our actions and their effects? Here, we argue that the perception of events as self-caused emerges from a comparison between anticipated and actual action-effects: if the representation of an event that follows an action is activated before the action, the event is experienced as caused by one's own action, whereas in the case of a mismatch it will be attributed to an external cause rather than to the self. In a subliminal priming paradigm we show that participants overestimated how much control they had over objectively uncontrollable stimuli, which appeared after free- or forced-choice actions, when a masked prime activated a representation of the stimuli immediately before each action. This prime-induced control-illusion was independent from whether primes were consciously perceived. Results indicate that the conscious experience of control is modulated by unconscious anticipations of action-effects.     

Emotional and motivational reactions to failure: the role of illusions of control and explicitness of feedback

Previous research has found that illusions of control (IOC) can buffer against the emotional consequences of failure and may increase persistence in the face of failure. Theoretical analyses suggest that IOC are most closely related to a better mood and higher motivation if failure feedback is open to reinterpretation. Two experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that explicitness (vs. ambiguousness) of failure feedback moderates the consequences of IOC following a failure experience. In accord with predictions, it was found that IOC were subsequently related to a better mood (Study 1) and higher persistence (Study 2) if individuals received ambiguous task-inherent failure feedback. In contrast, explicit failure feedback seemed to neutralize the beneficial effects of IOC. These results are discussed with respect to the adaptiveness of IOC.

The influence of type A behaviour and locus of control upon job satisfaction and occupational health

Results from this study show that in a sample of 332 German managers a Type A personality and an External locus of control are associated with greater perceived levels of stress (particularly in terms of inter-personal relationships), lower job satisfaction and a poorer physical and mental health than that of managers with a type B personality and an Internal locus of control. The magnitude of main effect size is substantially larger than the interaction terms (Type A×Locus of Control). There is no evidence to support a significant effect of a Type A×Locus of Control interaction on either of the health outcome measures (physical and psychological health), but there is some evidence of an interaction with work satisfaction outcomes (job satisfaction and organizational satisfaction). Those with an External locus showed significantly lower levels of work satisfaction, especially when this characteristic was combined with a Type A personality. It appears that negative health consequences may outweigh the superficial attractiveness of the type A personality in a managerial position, particularly when this trait is coupled with a more external locus of control.     

Let me take the wheel: Illusory control and sense of agency

Illusory control refers to an effect in games of chance where features associated with skilful situations increase expectancies of success. Past work has operationalized illusory control in terms of subjective ratings or behaviour, with limited consideration of the relationship between these definitions, or the broader construct of agency. This study used a novel card-guessing task in 78 participants to investigate the relationship between subjective and behavioural illusory control. We compared trials in which participants (a) had no opportunity to exercise illusory control, (b) could exercise illusory control for free, or (c) could pay to exercise illusory control. Contingency Judgment and Intentional Binding tasks assessed explicit and implicit sense of agency, respectively. On the card-guessing task, confidence was higher when participants exerted control than in the baseline condition. In a complementary model, participants were more likely to exercise control when their confidence was high, and this effect was accentuated in the pay condition relative to the free condition. Decisions to pay were positively correlated with control ratings on the Contingency Judgment task, but were not significantly related to Intentional Binding. These results establish an association between subjective and behavioural illusory control and locate the construct within the cognitive literature on agency.     

The desire to win: The effects of competitive arousal on motivation and behavior

The paper theoretically elaborates and empirically investigates the “competitive arousal” model of decision making, which argues that elements of the strategic environment (e.g., head-to-head rivalry and time pressure) can fuel competitive motivations and behavior. Study 1 measures real-time motivations of online auction bidders and finds that the “desire to win” (even when winning is costly and will provide no strategic upside) is heightened when rivalry and time pressure coincide. Study 2 is a field experiment which alters the text of email alerts sent to bidders who have been outbid; the text makes competitive (vs. non-competitive) motivations salient. Making the desire to win salient triggers additional bidding, but only when rivalry and time pressure coincide. Study 3, a laboratory study, demonstrates that the desire to win mediates the effect of rivalry and time pressure on over-bidding.     

The effects of desire for control and extrinsic rewards on the illusion of control and gambling

The role of individual differences in the desire to control events in an illusion of control situation was examined. Subjects high and low in the desire for control played several trials of a gambling game under conditions either facilitating or not facilitating the perception that the subject had control over the outcome of the game. Half of the subjects were allowed to trade their winnings in on prizes at the end of the experiment. The other half played the game without extrinsic incentives. It was found that high desire-for-control subjects were more susceptible to the illusion of control, but only when the winnings could be traded in on prizes. Desire for control level and illusion of control manipulations did not appear to affect betting behavior in the absence of extrinsic rewards.     

Making the uncontrollable seem controllable: The role of action in the illusion of control

It is well known that certain variables can bias judgements about the perceived contingency between an action and an outcome, making them depart from the normative predictions. For instance, previous studies have proven that the activity level or probability of responding, P(R), is a crucial variable that can affect these judgements in objectively noncontingent situations. A possible account for the P(R) effect is based on the differential exposure to actual contingencies during the training phase, which is in turn presumably produced by individual differences in participants' P(R). The current two experiments replicate the P(R) effect in a free-response paradigm, and show that participants' judgements are better predicted by P(R) than by the actual contingency to which they expose themselves. Besides, both experiments converge with previous empirical data, showing a persistent bias that does not vanish as training proceeds. These findings contrast with the preasymptotic and transitory effect predicted by several theoretical models.     

The psychology and philosophy of luck

There has been a great deal of interest in the concept of luck in the recent psychological and philosophical literature. In philosophy, this interest has tended to focus not upon luck simpliciter but rather upon the role that luck plays in ethical and epistemological debates concerning (respectively) moral and epistemic luck. In psychology, in contrast, a number of studies have explicitly examined our everyday conceptions of luck and the manner in which these conceptions influence our lives. This article surveys both the recent psychological and philosophical literature on this topic and argues that (to different degrees) the work of both disciplines in this area has been hampered by a failure to be clearer about what luck involves. Accordingly, this article offers a specification of what is core to the notion of luck and highlights how this analysis can aid further research in this area by both psychologists and philosophers.     

The effects of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards in a risk-taking situation

This study varied both the intrinsic and extrinsic rewards associated with performing a task in a risk taking situation. When the task performed to win a prize provided little if any intrinsic reward, subjects liked and tried for prizes that were easy to obtain. In contrast, when the task was intrinsically rewarding, subjects liked and tried for those prizes that were somewhat more difficult to obtain. In addition, subjects were more likely to like and try for prizes easier to obtain when the extrinsic reward was high.     

The influence of quiet eye training and pressure on attention and visuo-motor control

The aim of this study was to examine the efficacy of an intervention designed to train effective visual attentional control (quiet eye-training) for a far aiming skill, and determine whether such training protected against attentional disruptions associated with performing under pressure. Sixteen novice participants wore a mobile eye-tracker to assess their visual attentional control (quiet eye) during the completion of 520 basketball free throws carried out over 8 days. They first performed 40 pre-test free throws and were randomly allocated into a quiet eye (QE) training or Control group (technical instruction only). Participants then performed 360 free throws during a training period and a further 120 test free throws under conditions designed to manipulate the level of anxiety experienced. The QE trained group maintained more effective visual attentional control and performed significantly better in the pressure test compared to the Control group, providing support for the efficacy of attentional training for visuo-motor skills.     

The effect of decision risk and project stage on escalation of commitment

We investigate the joint effects of decision risk and the stage of project completion on escalation of commitment. In two experiments, we demonstrate that the effect of decision risk is moderated by project stage such that the decision risk has the strongest effect on escalation of commitment at the intermediate stage of project completion. This is due to the dynamic influences underlying escalation of commitment. Whereas the need for project information influences resource commitment at the initial stage of a project, the need for project completion affects resource allocation at the terminal stage. In contrast, motivation to commit resources is disproportionately low at the intermediate stage since both the need for project information and the need for project completion are relatively weak. As such, the decision to commit resources is most sensitive to the moderating effect of decision risk when the project is about half complete.     

The influence of various types of control on psychophysiological stress reactions

The influence of personal control on reactions to shock was found to differ not only as a function of the type of control, but also as a function of the combination of control conditions. For example, behavioral control in the presence of information (cognitive control) reduced stress, whereas behavioral control in the absence of information augmented stress. These results are discussed with regard to the appropriateness of two different models, a “substitutive” versus an “interactive” model, for understanding the effects of personal control.     

The influence of object identity on obstacle avoidance reaching behaviour

When reaching for target objects, we hardly ever collide with other objects located in our working environment. Behavioural studies have demonstrated that the introduction of non-target objects into the workspace alters both spatial and temporal parameters of reaching trajectories. Previous studies have shown the influence of spatial object features (e.g. size and position) on obstacle avoidance movements. However, obstacle identity may also play a role in the preparation of avoidance responses as this allows prediction of possible negative consequences of collision based on recognition of the obstacle. In this study we test this hypothesis by asking participants to reach towards a target as quickly as possible, in the presence of an empty or full glass of water placed about half way between the target and the starting position, at 8 cm either left or right of the virtual midline. While the spatial features of full and empty glasses of water are the same, the consequences of collision are clearly different. Indeed, when there was a high chance of collision, reaching trajectories veered away more from filled than from empty glasses. This shows that the identity of potential obstacles, which allows for estimating the predicted consequences of collision, is taken into account during obstacle avoidance.