共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Daniel Whiting 《Philosophical Investigations》2005,28(4):369-375
Books reviewed:
Michael Luntley, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement , Blackwell Publishers, 2003, ix + 187, price £16.99 p.b. Reviewed by Daniel Whiting, University of Reading Department of Philosophy University of Reading Whiteknights, Reading RG6 6AA danieljwhiting@hotmail.com 相似文献
Michael Luntley, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement , Blackwell Publishers, 2003, ix + 187, price £16.99 p.b. Reviewed by Daniel Whiting, University of Reading Department of Philosophy University of Reading Whiteknights, Reading RG6 6AA danieljwhiting@hotmail.com 相似文献
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David Kishik 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):111-128
This is a paper about the way language meshes with life. It focuses on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work, and compares it with
Leo Tolstoy and Saint Augustine’s confessions. My aim is to better understand in this way what it means to have meaning in
language, as well as meaning in life.
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David KishikEmail: |
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Steven Gross 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(4):518-538
AbstractJim Hopkins (2012) defends a ‘straight’ (non-skeptical) response to Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, a response he ascribes to Wittgenstein himself. According to this response, what makes it the case that A means that P is that it is possible for another to (correctly) interpret A as meaning that P. Hopkins thus advances a form of interpretivist judgment-dependence about meaning. I argue that this response, as well as a variant, does not succeed. 相似文献
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Gilead Bar‐Elli 《Philosophical Investigations》2006,29(3):217-249
On the basis of some ideas of Wittgenstein’s, an argument is presented to the effect that the ability to feel or to experience meaning conditions the ability to mean, and is thus essential to our notion of meaning. The experience of meaning, as manifested in the “fine shades” of use and behaviour, is central to Wittgenstein’s late conception of meaning. In explicating the basic elements involved here, I first try to clarify the notion of feeling and its relationship to meaning, emphasising its central role in music as explanatory of its use in language. The feeling of words, in this sense, is an objective feature of their meaning and use, and should be distinguished from feelings as psychological processes or experiences that may accompany the use of words. I then explain its philosophical significance by arguing that word‐feeling, and the “experience of meaning,” are basically instances of Wittgenstein’s general conception of aspect and aspect‐perception, which are important elements in his later conception of meaning and of thought. The nature of this experience is explicated in terms of grasping internal relations and relevant comparisons, which is manifested in a “mastery of a technique,” or “feeling at home” in a certain practice. In this sense, I argue, the ability to experience the meaning of a word is essential to the very intentionality of our thought and language. The ability to experience meaning is also a precondition for using words in a “secondary sense,” which is of great significance in itself. I conclude by pointing to the application of these notions of understanding, feeling and experience, as well as their explication in terms of comparisons, internal relations and mastery of technique, to music, where they are so apt and natural. 相似文献
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Alexander Miller 《The Philosophical quarterly》2000,50(199):161-174
Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical challenge. 相似文献
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Caleb Thompson 《Philosophical Investigations》1997,20(2):96-116
Tolstoy's writings were clearly important to Wittgenstein. He carried Tolstoy's The Gospel in Brief with him during the war, and he said that it 'virtually kept [him] alive'. But commentators have hesitated to extend Tolstoy's influence to Wittgenstein's philosophy. This essay argues that there are important parallels in structure and content between Tolstoy's A Confession and Wittgenstein's Tractatus which suggest Tolstoy's influence and which help us to see how we should understand the Tractatus. By comparing these two works we can see more clearly in the Tractatus the idea that the solution to philosophical problems lies in their disappearance and that the structure and content of the Tractatus are expressions of that conception. 相似文献
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Silver Bronzo 《European Journal of Philosophy》2017,25(4):1340-1363
This paper argues that Wittgenstein opposed theories of meaning, and did so for good reasons. Theories of meaning, in the sense discussed here, are attempts to explain what makes it the case that certain sounds, shapes, or movements are meaningful linguistic expressions. It is widely believed that Wittgenstein made fundamental contributions to this explanatory project. I argue, by contrast, that in both his early and later works, Wittgenstein endorsed a disjunctivist conception of language which rejects the assumption underlying the question that such theories seek to answer—namely, the assumption that the notion of a meaningful linguistic expression admits of non‐circular analysis. Moreover, I give two arguments in favor of the view I ascribe to Wittgenstein: one based on later Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning skepticism and one based on considerations concerning the identity of linguistic expressions. 相似文献
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William H. Brenner 《Philosophical Investigations》2005,28(4):375-380
Books reviewed:
Wittgenstein and Scepticism , Denis McManus (ed.). London & New York: Routledge, 2004. xi, 305 pp. $50 hb. Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS , Erich Ammereller and Eugen Fischer (eds.). London & New York: Routledge, 2004. xxix, 263 pp. $50 hb. Reviewed by William H. Brenner, Old Dominion University Philosophy Department Old Dominion University Norfolk, VA 23529-0083, USA wbrenner@odu.edu 相似文献
Wittgenstein and Scepticism , Denis McManus (ed.). London & New York: Routledge, 2004. xi, 305 pp. $50 hb. Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS , Erich Ammereller and Eugen Fischer (eds.). London & New York: Routledge, 2004. xxix, 263 pp. $50 hb. Reviewed by William H. Brenner, Old Dominion University Philosophy Department Old Dominion University Norfolk, VA 23529-0083, USA wbrenner@odu.edu 相似文献
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WARREN GOLDFARB 《Midwest Studies In Philosophy》1992,17(1):109-122