Moral spillovers: The effect of moral violations on deviant behavior

Two experiments investigated whether outcomes that violate people’s moral standards increase their deviant behavior (the moral spillover effect). In Study 1, participants with and without a moral mandate (i.e., a strong attitude rooted in moral conviction) read about a legal trial in which the outcome supported, opposed or was unrelated to their moral mandate. Relative to when outcomes supported moral mandates, when outcomes opposed moral mandates people judged the outcome to be less fair, were more angry, were less willing to accept the outcome, and were more likely to take a borrowed pen. In Study 2, participants who recalled another person’s moral violation were more likely to cheat on an experimental task relative to angry or neutral condition participants. Taken together, results provide evidence for moral spillover: outcomes that violate moral standards increase deviant behavior.     

Unable to resist temptation: How self-control depletion promotes unethical behavior

Across four experimental studies, individuals who were depleted of their self-regulatory resources by an initial act of self-control were more likely to “impulsively cheat” than individuals whose self-regulatory resources were intact. Our results demonstrate that individuals depleted of self-control resources were more likely to behave dishonestly (Study 1). Depletion reduced people’s moral awareness when they faced the opportunity to cheat, which, in turn, was responsible for heightened cheating (Study 2). Individuals high in moral identity, however, did not show elevated levels of cheating when they were depleted (Study 3), supporting our hypothesis that self-control depletion increases cheating when it robs people of the executive resources necessary to identify an act as immoral or unethical. Our results also show that resisting unethical behavior both requires and depletes self-control resources (Study 4). Taken together, our findings help to explain how otherwise ethical individuals predictably engage in unethical behavior.     

Purity matters more than harm in moral judgments of suicide: Response to Gray (2014)

Many people judge suicide to be immoral. We have found evidence that these moral judgments are primarily predicted by people’s belief that suicide taints the soul and by independent concerns about purity. This finding is inconsistent with accounts that define morality as fundamentally based upon harm considerations. In this commentary, we respond to a critique of our finding, and we provide further support for our original conclusions. Even when applying new exclusion criteria to our data, an examination of effect sizes demonstrates that concerns about purity robustly and meaningfully explain variance in moral judgments of suicide. While harm concerns sometimes predict moral judgments of suicide alongside purity concerns, they reliably explain a much smaller proportion of the variance than do purity concerns. Therefore, data from six studies continue to suggest that the relevance of harm concerns for moral judgments of suicide is substantially overshadowed by the contribution of purity concerns.     

Too tired to tell the truth: Self-control resource depletion and dishonesty

The opportunity to profit from dishonesty evokes a motivational conflict between the temptation to cheat for selfish gain and the desire to act in a socially appropriate manner. Honesty may depend on self-control given that self-control is the capacity that enables people to override antisocial selfish responses in favor of socially desirable responses. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that dishonesty would increase when people’s self-control resources were depleted by an initial act of self-control. Depleted participants misrepresented their performance for monetary gain to a greater extent than did non-depleted participants (Experiment 1). Perhaps more troubling, depleted participants were more likely than non-depleted participants to expose themselves to the temptation to cheat, thereby aggravating the effects of depletion on cheating (Experiment 2). Results indicate that dishonesty increases when people’s capacity to exert self-control is impaired, and that people may be particularly vulnerable to this effect because they do not predict it.     

Exposure to moral relativism compromises moral behavior

Across two studies we investigated the relationship between moral relativism versus absolutism and moral behavior. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who read a relativist argument for tolerating female genital mutilation were more likely to cheat to win an incentivized raffle than participants who read an absolutist argument against female genital mutilation, or those in a control condition. In Experiment 2, participants who read a definition of morality phrased in absolutist terms expressed less willingness to engage in petty theft than those who read a definition of morality phrased in relativist terms, or those in a control condition. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that effects were not due to absolutist arguments signaling that fewer behaviors are morally permissible, nor to relativist arguments defending more disagreeable moral positions. Rather, the content of the philosophical positions themselves—the fact that relativism describes morality as subjective and culturally-historically contingent, whereas absolutism describes morality as objective and universal—makes individuals more likely to engage in immoral behaviors when exposed to moral relativism compared to moral absolutism.     

Striving for the moral self: the effects of recalling past moral actions on future moral behavior

People's desires to see themselves as moral actors can contribute to their striving for and achievement of a sense of self-completeness. The authors use self-completion theory to predict (and show) that recalling one's own (im)moral behavior leads to compensatory rather than consistent moral action as a way of completing the moral self. In three studies, people who recalled their immoral behavior reported greater participation in moral activities (Study 1), reported stronger prosocial intentions (Study 2), and showed less cheating (Study 3) than people who recalled their moral behavior. These compensatory effects were related to the moral magnitude of the recalled event, but they did not emerge when people recalled their own positive or negative nonmoral behavior (Study 2) or others' (im)moral behavior (Study 3). Thus, the authors extend self-completion theory to the moral domain and use it to integrate the research on moral cleansing (remunerative moral strivings) and moral licensing (relaxed moral strivings).     

When deserving translates into causing: The effect of cognitive load on immanent justice reasoning

In immanent justice reasoning, negative events are attributed to some prior moral failing, even in the absence of a physically plausible causal link between them. Drawing on just-world theory, we examined immanent justice reasoning as an intuitive, deservingness-guided form of causal judgment. Participants were exposed to a story about a man who either did or did not cheat on his wife and who was subsequently injured in a car accident. Under either high or low cognitive load, participants rated the extent to which they believed the accident was the result of the man's prior moral failings. The results showed that participants causally attributed the man's accident to his prior conduct when he was immoral (vs. not immoral) more strongly under high cognitive load. Further, moderated mediation analyses showed that perceived deservingness of the accident mediated the effect of the man's prior immoral behavior on immanent justice attributions more strongly under high cognitive load. These results offer support for the notion that immanent justice attributions reflect an automatic tendency to assume that people get what they deserve.     

Blind ethics: Closing one's eyes polarizes moral judgments and discourages dishonest behavior

Four experiments demonstrate that closing one’s eyes affects ethical judgment and behavior because it induces people to mentally simulate events more extensively. People who considered situations with their eyes closed rather than open judged immoral behaviors as more unethical and moral behaviors as more ethical. In addition, considering potential decisions with closed eyes decreased stated intentions to behave ethically and actual self-interested behavior. This relationship was mediated by the more extensive mental simulation that occurred with eyes closed rather than open, which, in turn, intensified emotional reactions to the ethical situation. We discuss the implications of these findings for moral psychology and ethical decision making.     

Understanding of moral emotions and social exclusion in pre-schoolers and third graders

Abstract

This study examined whether children use information about moral emotions when judging peer exclusion. Japanese pre-schoolers and third graders (N = 110) listened to stories featuring characters who felt happy or sad after engaging in immoral behaviour or avoiding immoral behaviour (pushing a child off a swing and stealing another child’s doughnuts). In study 1, participants judged the extent to which characters who felt happiness, guilt, and pride would be socially excluded. In study 2, participants judged whether characters who felt guilt, no guilt, pride, and no pride would be socially excluded. Participants believed that characters would be socially excluded based on moral emotions. Characters who did not feel guilt or pride were excluded more frequently relative to those who did; however, children found it easier to judge exclusion based on guilt rather than pride, especially in the case of pre-schoolers. Moreover, pre-schoolers had difficulty explaining their reasoning.     

Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment

In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person’s life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they make the opposite judgment. Researchers have identified two general factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level: (1) the agent’s intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the victim in a manner that is relatively “direct” or “personal”. Here we integrate these two classes of findings. Two experiments examine a novel personalness/directness factor that we call personal force, present when the force that directly impacts the victim is generated by the agent’s muscles (e.g., in pushing). Experiments 1a and b demonstrate the influence of personal force on moral judgment, distinguishing it from physical contact and spatial proximity. Experiments 2a and b demonstrate an interaction between personal force and intention, whereby the effect of personal force depends entirely on intention. These studies also introduce a method for controlling for people’s real-world expectations in decisions involving potentially unrealistic hypothetical dilemmas.     

道德自我调节对亲社会行为和违规行为的影响

本文通过两个研究探讨道德自我调节对亲社会行为和违规行为的影响。研究一中,被试随机分为三组,分别抄写“正性特质词语”“负性特质词语”或“中性词语”,并回忆自己所经历的与关键词有关的事情。启动完成后,考察其捐助行为。结果发现,正性特质启动组被试愿意捐助的数目显著高于负性特质和中性词语启动组。研究二用同样的方法改变被试的道德自我知觉,然后对被试的作弊行为进行了考察。结果发现,正性特质启动组的作弊严重程度显著低于中性词语启动组,负性特质启动组的作弊发生率和作弊严重程度显著低于中性词语启动组。本研究表明,道德自我调节过程不一定遵循负反馈机制：虽然“道德净化效应”在本研究中得到了部分验证,但是我们的实验结果不符合“道德许可效应”的预期。     

The paradox of moral focus

When we evaluate moral agents, we consider many factors, including whether the agent acted freely, or under duress or coercion. In turn, moral evaluations have been shown to influence our (non-moral) evaluations of these same factors. For example, when we judge an agent to have acted immorally, we are subsequently more likely to judge the agent to have acted freely, not under force. Here, we investigate the cognitive signatures of this effect in interpersonal situations, in which one agent (“forcer”) forces another agent (“forcee”) to act either immorally or morally. The structure of this relationship allowed us to ask questions about both the “forcer” and the “forcee.” Paradoxically, participants judged that the “forcer” forced the “forcee” to act immorally (i.e. X forced Y), but that the “forcee” was not forced to act immorally (i.e. Y was not forced by X). This pattern obtained only for human agents who acted intentionally. Directly changing participants’ focus from one agent to another (forcer versus forcee) also changed the target of moral evaluation and therefore force attributions. The full pattern of judgments may provide a window into motivated moral reasoning and focusing bias more generally; participants may have been motivated to attribute greater force to the immoral forcer and greater freedom to the immoral forcee.     

Desire for a positive moral self-regard exacerbates escalation of commitment to initiatives with prosocial aims

Across three experiments, people escalated commitment more frequently to a failing prosocial initiative (i.e., an initiative that had the primary aim of improving the outcomes of others in need) than they did to a failing egoistic initiative (i.e., an initiative that had the primary aim of improving the outcomes of the decision-maker). A test of mediation (Study 1b) and a test of moderation (Study 2) each provided evidence that a desire for a positive moral self-regard underlies people’s tendency to escalate commitment more frequently to failing prosocial initiatives than to failing egoistic initiatives. We discuss the implications of these findings for the resource-allocation decisions that people and organizations face when undertaking initiatives with prosocial aims.     

Procedural justice and intragroup status: Knowing where we stand in a group enhances reactions to procedures

The current research investigates the role of relative intragroup status as a moderator of people’s reactions to procedural justice. Based on a review of the procedural justice literature, the authors argue that information about intragroup status influences people’s reactions to variations in procedural justice. In correspondence with predictions, two experiments show that reactions of people who have been informed about their intragroup status position (either low, average, or high) are influenced more strongly by voice as opposed to no-voice procedures than people who are not informed about their intragroup status. It is concluded that knowing where we stand in a group enhances reactions to procedural justice.     

宽以待己，严于律人：道德伪善的双加工机制研究

道德伪善是指个体对同一道德违规行为进行评判时,对自己宽松而对他人严苛的现象。双加工理论认为道德伪善是个体对自身道德违规行为有意识辩护以维护道德自我形象的结果。为此,本研究通过两个行为实验考察直觉思维和分析思维对道德伪善的影响。结果发现,分析性思维可易化道德伪善,直觉性思维无此作用。实验果支持道德伪善的双加工机制模型,道德自利性行为并非自动化的反应,需要认知努力和分析推理的参与。     

The impact of moral theories on cheating

This research series began as a test of an emotion-attribution approach to moral behavior. However, in the early studies, college students who read about morality were subsequently more likely to cheat on a vocabulary test than were control subjects who read materials irrelevant to morality. We hypothesized that resentment toward the test constructors interacted with the moral schemas activated by the reading task. To reduce resentment, in Study III the vocabulary test was presented as the experimenter's doctoral research. As predicted, compared to controls, those subjects who read about morality cheated less. Study IV was a quasi-experiment that confirmed the hypothesized resentment differences between Study III and the earlier studies. In Study V, while two groups read about morality, one group read an internal emotion-attribution passage and the other read an external version; less cheating was observed in the internal condition than in the external or control conditions. The results indicate that even when moral schemas are elicited under conditions favoring moral behavior, those schemas will lead to reduced cheating most effectively under conditions in which subjects attribute their emotional arousal to their own behavior rather than to external causes. Issues of moral schema activation and emotion-attribution in moral behavior are discussed.     

Always looking for a moral identity: The moral licensing effect in men convicted of domestic violence

People who act in accord with moral standards enjoy a strong moral self-concept, but people with a strong moral concept do not always behave morally: sometimes they exhibit consistent behaviors and sometimes compensatory behaviors. Through two studies, this paper shows that people who do wrong enjoy a stronger moral self-concept and regulate their moral behavior accordingly. Specifically, men in court-mandated psychological treatment for having employed violence against their partners manage to preserve a very positive moral self-concept. They also exhibit moral self-regulation: when prompted to consider their high moral self-concepts, they recalled performing significantly more prosocial behaviors in the previous year (consistency effect), and immediately following this, they relaxed their future intentions to act in prosocial manners over the next year (licensing effect). This novel connection between intimate partner violence and moral regulation allows us to observe the dark side of feeling too moral in a sensitive sample.     

道德概念的隐喻表征——从红白颜色、左右位置和正斜字体的维度

随着具身认知的兴起和发展,道德隐喻的研究焕发新活力。在此背景下,本研究从红白颜色、左右位置和正斜字体三个维度考察道德概念的隐喻表征。实验1的结果显示,红白颜色可能并不与道德概念存在隐喻表征。实验2表明,左右位置与道德概念交互作用显著,左边、右边位置分别与不道德概念、道德概念存在一致的隐喻表征。实验3发现,正斜字体对道德概念的判断具有干扰作用,正体字与道德词汇隐喻表征一致,斜体字与不道德词汇隐喻表征一致。研究表明:左右位置、正斜字体与道德概念存在一定的隐喻联结。     

道德失调的自我调节策略

个体因为自己或内群体成员的不道德行为而面临道德失调,为了维持积极的道德自我形象,不得不采取一系列道德自我调节策略以减少道德失调。在道德决策阶段,通过道德许可来缓冲预期的道德失调。在行为评价和责任归因阶段,通过道德规范的动机性遗忘来避免道德觉察,也可以通过道德切换、去道德化、道德推脱等认知策略将不道德行为合理化。在反馈调节阶段,通过道德补偿、道德清洗等行为策略以恢复道德自我形象或通过道德掩饰来避免道德形象损失。最后探讨了道德自我调节过程的系统性、灵活性特点及其不利后果,并提出了未来可能的研究方向。     

Predicting compliance behavior from moral judgment scales

Two experiments with college males examined the relationship between moral judgment and compliance in a modified Asch paradigm. In Experiment 1 moral judgment was assessed with the written form of Kohlberg's dilemmas. Stage of moral judgment interacted with type of compliance, with Stage 4 subjects showing a compromise response between their own perceptions and the responses of others. In Experiment 2 moral judgment was assessed with Rest's Defining Issues Test. Compliance was found to be negatively related to level of moral judgment. The relationship found between moral judgment and compliance in the two experiments was interpreted in terms of a trend away from external standards and toward internal standards with higher levels of moral judgment.