The role of meaning in contextual cueing: Evidence from chess expertise

In contextual cueing, the position of a search target is learned over repeated exposures to a visual display. The strength of this effect varies across stimulus types. For example, real-world scene contexts give rise to larger search benefits than contexts composed of letters or shapes. We investigated whether such differences in learning can be at least partially explained by the degree of semantic meaning associated with a context independently of the nature of the visual information available (which also varies across stimulus types). Chess boards served as the learning context as their meaningfulness depends on the observer's knowledge of the game. In Experiment 1, boards depicted actual game play, and search benefits for repeated boards were 4 times greater for experts than for novices. In Experiment 2, search benefits among experts were halved when less meaningful randomly generated boards were used. Thus, stimulus meaningfulness independently contributes to learning context–target associations.     

Discrimination of faces and houses by rhesus monkeys: the role of stimulus expertise and rotation angle

The face inversion effect, or impaired recognition of upside down compared to upright faces, is used as a marker for the configural processing of faces in primates. The inversion effect in humans and chimpanzees is strongest for categories of stimuli for which subjects have considerable expertise, primarily conspecifics’ faces. Moreover, discrimination performance decreases linearly as faces are incrementally rotated from upright to inverted. This suggests that rotated faces must be transformed, or normalized back into their most typical viewpoint before configural processing can ensue, and the greater the required normalization, the greater the likelihood of errors resulting. Previous studies in our lab have demonstrated a general face inversion effect in rhesus monkeys that was not influenced by expertise. Therefore, the present study examined the influence of rotation angle on the visual perception of face and nonface stimuli that varied in their level of expertise to further delineate the processes underlying the inversion effect in rhesus monkeys. Five subjects discriminated images in five orientation angles. Results showed significant linear impairments for all stimulus categories, including houses. However, compared to the upright images, only rhesus faces resulted in worse performance at rotation angles greater than 45°, suggesting stronger configural processing for stimuli for which subjects had the greatest expertise.     

The evidence rejects the expertise hypothesis: reply to Gauthier & Bukach

In Robbins, R. & McKone, E. (2006). No face-like processing for object-of-expertise in three behavioural tasks. Cognition this issue, we showed face-like holistic/configural processing does not occur for objects-of-expertise on standard paradigms including inversion, part-whole, part-in-configurally-transformed-whole, and the standard composite task. In this reply to the discussion by Gauthier, I., & Bukach, C. (2006). Should we reject the expertise hypothesis? Cognition, this issue, we focus on several issues: the fact that they do not dispute our review of previous data; the strength of null effects obtained from multiple studies and paradigms; the evidence for domain-specificity of the neural substrate supporting face processing; the difference between the expertise hypothesis (as a theory about the origin of face processing) and studies of how experience affects object processing in general; and the problems with G&B's proposed alteration to the standard composite paradigm. We argue that overwhelming evidence suggests the expertise hypothesis should be put to rest so that researchers can focus on what the origin of "special" processing for faces actually is, and investigate the many interesting changes to object recognition that do occur with experience.     

The role of discourse context in developing word form representations: a paradoxical relation between reading and learning

To acquire representations of printed words, children must attend to the written form of a word and link this form with the word's pronunciation. When words are read in context, they may be read with less attention to these features, and this can lead to poorer word form retention. Two experiments with young children (ages 5-8 years) confirmed this hypothesis. In our experiments, children attempted to read words they could not previously read, during a self-teaching period, either in context or in isolation. Later they were tested on how well they learned the words as a function of self-teaching condition (isolation or context). Consistent with previous research, children read more words accurately in context than in isolation during self-teaching; however, children had better retention for words learned in isolation. Furthermore, this benefit from learning in isolation was larger for less skilled readers. This effect of poorer word retention when words are learned in context is paradoxical because context has been shown to facilitate word identification. We discuss factors that may influence this effect of context, especially the role of children's skill level and the demands of learning new word representations at the beginning of reading instruction.     

The role of representations in age differences in analogical reasoning

Age-related declines in the efficiency of a number of cognitive tasks have been postulated to be attributable to decreases with age in the quality of internal representations used to mediate performance on those tasks. This proposal was investigated in a geometric analogies task by manipulating variables (i.e., the number of elements per term and the temporal delay between presentation of pairs of terms) assumed to affect the quality or stability of internal representations. As expected, the performance of older adults was impaired more than that of young adults by these manipulations. Further analyses revealed that these representational deficits may be due to a reduction of approximately 40% in the quantity of some type of processing resource between, approximately, 20 and 70 years of age.     

Knowledge restructuring in expertise development: Evidence from pathophysiological representations of clinical cases by students and physicians

The present study was conducted to investigate qualitative changes that occur in the structure of knowledge in acquiring medical expertise. Therefore, the representation of pathophysiological knowledge was compared in subjects at four different levels of expertise. Subjects studied four clinical cases under three different time constraints, and provided a diagnosis and a pathophysiological explanation for the signs and symptoms in each case. Both diagnostic accuracy and quality of explanations increased with level of expertise. The explanations of experts, however, were less elaborate and less detailed than those of students. Constraining processing time affected the quality of explanations of advanced students, but not that of experts; conversely, the elaborateness and level of detail of explanations was affected in experts but not in students. The findings are explained by a network model integrating the two-world hypothesis in which biomedical and clinical knowledge are organised as two worlds apart (Patel, Evans, & Groen, 1989a, b) and the hypothesis of knowledge encapsulation in which biomedical knowledge becomes encapsulated into clinical knowledge (Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1992).     

Choosing an optimal motor-task difficulty is not trivial: The influence of age and expertise

An accurate estimate of one’s performance is an important prerequisite for success, and prevents people from taking excessive risks. Based on the selection-margins paradigm (Riediger et al., 2006), the current paper assessed maximum speed rope-skipping (study 1), soccer dribbling (study 2), and the fine motor task of tracing (study 3) in 5- to 37-year-olds. Participants predicted their performances for the upcoming trial. The better the predicted performance, the more points were gained in case of success. To discourage overestimations, participants received no points for unsuccessful trials. In rope skipping, older and more experienced athletes outperformed the beginners, and had fewer trials with 0 points. In soccer dribbling and tracing, older individuals again showed less overestimation, as reflected by a smaller deviation of predicted and actual performance (selection margins) and fewer 0 point trials. Athletes and coaches should be aware that younger and less-experienced athletes tend to overestimate their motor performances.     

Individual and gender differences in mindful parenting: The role of attachment and caregiving representations

The current study aimed to investigate the mediating role of caregiving representations in the association between attachment representations and mindful parenting. Additionally, this study explored differences between mothers and fathers in attachment and caregiving representations and in mindful parenting and tested whether the proposed model was invariant across genders. A sample of 439 parents (67% mothers) of school-aged children completed measures of attachment-related anxiety and avoidance, caregiving representations, and mindful parenting. Path analyses showed that attachment anxiety was associated with lower levels of mindful parenting through a lower perceived ability to recognize others' needs and more egoistic motivations to provide help. In turn, attachment avoidance was associated with lower levels of mindful parenting through a lower perceived ability to provide help and to evaluate others as worthy of help. The path model was invariant across genders, although fathers presented higher levels of avoidance, more egoistic motivations to provide help, lower perceived ability to recognize others' needs, and lower levels of mindful parenting than mothers. This study demonstrates that attachment representations play a critical role in parents' ability to be mindful in their relationship with their children, although through different caregiving pathways.     

Cross-cultural differences in mental representations of time: evidence from an implicit nonlinguistic task

Across cultures people construct spatial representations of time. However, the particular spatial layouts created to represent time may differ across cultures. This paper examines whether people automatically access and use culturally specific spatial representations when reasoning about time. In Experiment 1, we asked Hebrew and English speakers to arrange pictures depicting temporal sequences of natural events, and to point to the hypothesized location of events relative to a reference point. In both tasks, English speakers (who read left to right) arranged temporal sequences to progress from left to right, whereas Hebrew speakers (who read right to left) arranged them from right to left, replicating previous work. In Experiments 2 and 3, we asked the participants to make rapid temporal order judgments about pairs of pictures presented one after the other (i.e., to decide whether the second picture showed a conceptually earlier or later time-point of an event than the first picture). Participants made responses using two adjacent keyboard keys. English speakers were faster to make "earlier" judgments when the "earlier" response needed to be made with the left response key than with the right response key. Hebrew speakers showed exactly the reverse pattern. Asking participants to use a space-time mapping inconsistent with the one suggested by writing direction in their language created interference, suggesting that participants were automatically creating writing-direction consistent spatial representations in the course of their normal temporal reasoning. It appears that people automatically access culturally specific spatial representations when making temporal judgments even in nonlinguistic tasks.     

How structured and unstructured sport activities aid the development of expertise in volleyball players

This study sought to analyse self-reported perceptions of how the nature of sport activities undertaken by volleyball players aided their development. Thirty highly skilled and thirty less skilled players participated in retrospective interviews to identify the nature of activities undertaken in their developmental pathways. All players reported having an early-diversified sport involvement with participation in both structured and unstructured activities. Highly skilled players differed from less skilled players by having accumulated more hours of structured sport activities, some of which were undertaken with older peers. Furthermore, highly skilled players specifically highlighted the value of their involvement in particular unstructured activities with older peers and recognized their importance for expertise achievement. These findings illustrate the importance of considering the role of unstructured (in addition to structured) sport activities in the development of expertise in volleyball. Further work is needed to verify the generality of the findings to other sports.     

The role of self-attribution differences in the utilization of social comparison information

A study is reported that investigated the effects of receiving social comparison information which implied individual's behavior was inconsistent with his/her self-ascribed trait. The effects of this information on subsequent self-labeling and behavior involving a similar task were found to be mediated by the attributional style of the subject. The social comparison information caused subjects to reevaluate their relevant self-labels regardless of their attributional style. However, only self-attributors also changed their behavior on a later task as a result of exposure to the comparison information. These findings and their implications were discussed with regard to self-attribution and the maintenance of traitbehavior consistency.     

The impact of interpersonal affective relationships and awareness on expertise seeking: A multilevel network investigation

Transactive memory theory suggests that general awareness of expertise location in a group is sufficient to predict expertise seeking. Yet expertise seeking is, at least in part, a social phenomenon between two individuals embedded in a network of social relationships. Taking a multilevel, network perspective, we examined the interplay of affective relationships and awareness on expertise seeking in groups. Hypotheses were tested using network data collected from 693 employees in 53 sales groups. HLM analysis results indicated that awareness of expertise distribution positively influenced the decision to seek expertise at all levels of analysis examined. In addition, both positive and negative affective relationships influenced expertise seeking, although their pattern of influence differed across different levels of analysis. More specifically, having either a positive or a negative affective relationship with another group member affected the decision to seek expertise from that person. Although having many positive relationships had a positive effect on expertise seeking, having many negative affective relationships had no effect. Moreover, having both an awareness and a positive affective relationship with another group member amplified their positive effect on expertise seeking. Last, individuals who had more negative affective ties were less likely to leverage the positive impact of each awareness relationship on expertise seeking.     

How different spatial representations interact in virtual environments: the role of mental frame syncing

This experiment is aimed at understanding how egocentric experiences, allocentric viewpoint-dependent representations, and allocentric viewpoint-independent representations interact when encoding and retrieving a spatial environment. Although several cognitive theories have highlighted the interaction between reference frames, it is less clear about the role of a real-time presentation of allocentric viewpoint-dependent representation on the spatial organization of information. Sixty participants were asked to navigate in two virtual cities to memorize the position of one hidden object. Half of the participants had the possibility to visualize the virtual city with an interactive aerial view. Then, they were required to find the position of the object in three different experimental conditions (“retrieval with an interactive aerial view” vs. “retrieval on a map” vs. “retrieval without an interactive aerial view”). Results revealed that participants were significantly more precise in retrieving the position of the object when immersed in an egocentric experience with the interactive aerial view. The retrieval of spatial information is facilitated by the presence of the interactive aerial view of the city, since it provides a real-time allocentric viewpoint-dependent representation. More participants with high preference for using cardinal points tend to be more accurate when they were asked to retrieve the position of the object on the map. As suggested by the mental frame syncing hypothesis, the presence of an allocentric viewpoint-dependent representation during the retrieval seems to ease the imposition on a specific viewpoint on the stored abstract allocentric viewpoint-independent representation. Our findings represent another significant step toward the comprehension of the organization of spatial representations of our environment.     

The role of representation in computation

Reformers urge that representation no longer earns its explanatory keep in cognitive science, and that it is time to discard this troublesome concept. In contrast, we hold that without representation cognitive science is utterly bereft of tools for explaining natural intelligence. In order to defend the latter position, we focus on the explanatory role of representation in computation. We examine how the methods of digital and analog computation are used to model a relatively simple target system, and show that representation plays an in-eliminable explanatory role in both cases. We conclude that, to the extent that biologic systems engage in computation, representation is destined to play an explanatory role in cognitive science.

Functions and mental representation: the theoretical role of representations and its real nature

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history (Swampman). In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation.     

The role of short-term working memory in mental arithmetic

A series of experiments explored the role of information storage in working memory in performing mental arithmetic. Experiment 1 assessed the strategies people report for solving auditorily presented multidigit problems such as 325 + 46. As expected, all subjects reported breaking down the problems into a series of elementary stages, though there were considerable individual differences with regard to the order of their execution. Strategies of this type necessitate both the temporary storage of information and the mobilization of long-term knowledge. Experiments 2 and 3 examined the effects of delaying the output of individual partial results on calculation accuracy and showed that interim information is forgotten if it is not utilized immediately. Experiment 4 showed that forgetting the initial information is also a source of error and suggested that forgetting increases as a function of the number of calculation stages intervening between initial presentation and subsequent utilization of information. Two simple quantitative models were derived from a general task analysis, one of which assumed a decay process in working storage and the other no decay. The decay model gave a reasonable fit to data from Experiments 2–4, and in doing so it coped appreciably well with the effects of a large variety of task variables (e.g., carrying, the provision of written notes, calculation strategy, output order). The decay model is a tractable analysis of a complex task, and it is suggested that similar analyses may prove fruitful for other problem-solving activities which involve the use of working memory.     

The effect of exemplar activation on mental representations of the ingroup: the moderating role of relative ingroup size

The current research explores the effects of exemplars on the stereotype representation of one's ingroup. Previous research demonstrated that exposure to an ingroup exemplar affects the stereotype one holds of one's ingroup (Coats & Smith, 1999). The primary purpose of the present study was to examine whether this effect is moderated by relative ingroup size. Participants were placed into either a minority or majority group situation and exposed to 1 of 2 dissimilar exemplars of their ingroup. Later, they rated their ingroup. Ratings of the ingroup differed between exemplar conditions in unexpected ways, indicating that the exemplar affected participants' stereotype of their ingroup. Furthermore, exemplars had a stronger effect on participants in the minority group than those in the majority group. Finally, relative ingroup size and, to a marginal extent, exemplars were found to affect ratings of ingroup variability.     

Thinking about representations: the case of opaque contexts

To address the question of whether young children are differentially sensitive to referential opacity, an advanced Theory of Mind skill, we assessed 4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds on three types of opaque contexts: epistemic, quotational, and intentional. Children’s performance improved as a function of age and varied significantly by opacity type. Performance was best for epistemic opacity (using the verb “know”) and poorest for intentional opacity (using “mean to”), with quotational opacity (using “said”) falling in-between. Importantly, the current results suggest that children’s sensitivity to referential opacity is not an all-or-nothing competence but rather one that varies across the contexts examined. Possible reasons for this variability are discussed.     

Normativity is the mother of intention: Wittgenstein, normative practices and neurological representations

To many philosophers, a scientific explanation of our contentful intentional states requires us to identify neurological representations that implement intentional states, and requires a reductive explanation of such representations' contents in terms of objective physical properties. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, however, contentful intentional states are normatively constituted within linguistic, social practices. These cannot be completely accounted for in purely physical terms. I outline this normative thesis, defending it from four objections: that it is not naturalistic, that social norms depend on optional desires to conform, that it over-intellectualizes having intentional states (so excludes animals and infants), and that it cannot account for the causal role of content. I explain the ramifications for scientific psychology and neuroscience, and for interpreting the results of such empirical research. Nothing is objectively a contentful representation, yet some brain states or processes can be normatively constituted as representations with content.