UNDERSTANDING THROUGH APPROPRIATION IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE ON ETHICS

In today's globalized world, we need to communicate values clearly and constructively across cultures and religions to avoid misunderstanding and conflict and to find shared solutions to the issues affecting human communities across the world. This communication is not easy to implement and requires a considerable amount of commitment and empathy. To be effective, intercultural and interreligious dialogues on ethics demand, first of all, an accommodation of different epistemologies coupled with a sincere respect for their richness and internal coherence. Furthermore, our values are so closely rooted in our identity that expressing them becomes a cultural act—even an act of faith in the case of interreligious dialogue. In this paper, I argue that we need to reiterate or embrace this act of faith in the other's values if we are to properly understand them. How is this possible? The answer calls for a theoretical discussion of the hermeneutics of interreligious dialogue. When applied to intercultural and interreligious dialogues, I contend that the theory of hermeneutics needs a specific epistemological dimension—namely that of “appropriation”—that entails that we borrow the other's epistemological outlook, adopt the other's ad hoc modes of communication or transmission of values, and integrate the other's values into the constellation of our sources of meaning.     

AIDS and confidentiality

ABSTRACT AIDS raises the moral problem of confidentiality because those in sexual contact with the patient may contract a life-threatening and incurable disease. Medicine has a tradition in which a patient's condition is regarded as confidential information held by the doctor alone. In this case there is a clear moral inclination to inform those at risk from the disease. In most cases no problem will arise but when it does the moral justification for a violation of confidentiality comes into question. Confidentiality is important because of our respect for certain human values and their importance to our patient. Where that patient acts so as to disregard the welfare of others with whom they are in close relationship, those values are lacking. This lack warrants a departure from our normal canons and provokes a suspension of normal moral privileges. The contention that any transgression, however slight, could be held to justify such a response posits a slope down which we, in fact, have no tendency to slide.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Justice for Hedgehogs</Emphasis>, Conceptual Authenticity for Foxes: Ronald Dworkin on Value Conflicts

In his 2011 book Justice for Hedgehogs, Ronald Dworkin makes a case for the view that genuine values cannot conflict and, moreover, that they are necessarily mutually supportive. I argue that by prioritizing coherence over the conceptual authenticity of values, Dworkin’s ‘interpretivist’ view risks neglecting what we care about in these values. I first determine Dworkin’s position on the monism/pluralism debate and identify the scope of his argument, arguing that despite his self-declared monism, he is in fact a pluralist, but unusual in denying conflict between plural values. I then set out the structure of his interpretive theory of value relations and present a case of value conflict which I think interpretivism cannot deal with. Following this I argue that there are structural reasons why cases like this are liable to occur and suggest that interpretivism will frequently fail to properly reflect people’s moral commitments because reinterpretation of values has the side effect of excluding important moral commitments from our conceptions of values. While, as Dworkin argues, there are no brute moral facts concerning values, moral psychology constrains the range of acceptable conceptions of values. Given the shortcomings of interpretivism I conclude that we should acknowledge that values may conflict.     

Invited Review—Survey of Value‐Focused Thinking: Applications,Research Developments and Areas for Future Research

Criteria are the central focus of multi‐criteria decision analysis. Many authors have suggested using our values (or preferences) to define the criteria we use to evaluate alternatives. Value‐focused thinking (VFT) is an important philosophy that advocates a more fundamental view of values in our decision making in our private and professional lives. VFT proponents advocate starting first with our values and then using our values to create decision opportunities, evaluate alternatives and finally develop improved alternatives. It has been 20 years since VFT was first introduced by Ralph Keeney. This paper surveys the VFT literature to provide a comprehensive summary of the significant applications, describe the main research developments and identify areas for future research. We review the scope and magnitude of VFT applications and the key developments in theory since VFT was introduced in 1992 and found 89 papers written in 29 journals from 1992 to 2010. We develop about 20 research questions that include the type of article (application, theory, case study, etc.), the size of the decision space (which, when given, ranged from $200K to billions of dollars), the contribution documented in the article (application benefits) and the research contributions (categorized by preferences, uncertainties and alternatives). After summarizing the answers to these questions, we conclude the paper with suggestions for improving VFT applications and potential future research. We found a large number of significant VFT applications and several useful research contributions. We also found an increasing number of VFT papers written by international authors. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Several programming models with unascertained parameters and their applications

Several programming models are introduced with the consideration of available unascertained information. In this case, the so‐called unascertained information is some numerical values whose ranges are known but their exact values are not. These models resolve several vital weaknesses of the traditional programming methods to a certain degree. Our study includes considerations of linear and non‐linear programming models with grey parameters, grey 0–1 programming, and satisfactory and quasi‐optimal solutions of grey linear programmings. Finally, some practical applications are given in order to test the applicability of our theory. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intersectionality: A Model for Addressing the Complexity of Oppression and Privilege

This essay proposes that adopting an intersectional theoretical approach amenable to the values and commitments of our field will enhance our efforts as pastoral theologians seeking to analyze, engage, and resist oppression and privilege in response to forms of difference. Intersectionality is a model that effectively addresses complex individual, relational, structural, and ideological aspects of domination and privilege arising from forms of difference treated oppressively. Methodologically, intersectionality pursues emancipatory praxis toward its telos of social justice. This essay introduces key themes in intersectional theory and draws on them to analyze a case. The essay also briefly explores both points of convergence in the literatures of intersectionality and pastoral and practical theology and points to which pastoral and practical literature may add value to intersectional theory.     

The Stories We Tell: Introduction to the Special Issue on Ethical Challenges in Community Psychology Research and Practice

This Special Issue examines ethical challenges in community psychology research and practice. The literature on ethics in community psychology has remained largely abstract and aspirational, with few concrete examples and case studies, so the goal of this Special Issue was to expand our written discourse about ethical dilemmas in our field. In these articles, researchers and practitioners share stories of specific ethical challenges they faced and how they sought to resolve them. These first‐person narratives examine how ethical challenges come about, how community psychology values inform ethical decision making, and how lessons learned from these experiences can inform an ethical framework for community psychology.     

Surreal decisions

Although expected utility theory has proven a fruitful and elegant theory in the finite realm, attempts to generalize it to infinite values have resulted in many paradoxes. In this paper, we argue that the use of John Conway's surreal numbers shall provide a firm mathematical foundation for transfinite decision theory. To that end, we prove a surreal representation theorem and show that our surreal decision theory respects dominance reasoning even in the case of infinite values. We then bring our theory to bear on one of the more venerable decision problems in the literature: Pascal's Wager. Analyzing the wager showcases our theory's virtues and advantages. To that end, we analyze two objections against the wager: Mixed Strategies and Many Gods. After formulating the two objections in the framework of surreal utilities and probabilities, our theory correctly predicts that (1) the pure Pascalian strategy beats all mixed strategies, and (2) what one should do in a Pascalian decision problem depends on what one's credence function is like. Our analysis therefore suggests that although Pascal's Wager is mathematically coherent, it does not deliver what it purports to, a rationally compelling argument that people should lead a religious life regardless of how confident they are in theism and its alternatives.     

Intrinsic Ethics Regarding Integrated Assessment Models for Climate Management

In this essay we develop and argue for the adoption of a more comprehensive model of research ethics than is included within current conceptions of responsible conduct of research (RCR). We argue that our model, which we label the ethical dimensions of scientific research (EDSR), is a more comprehensive approach to encouraging ethically responsible scientific research compared to the currently typically adopted approach in RCR training. This essay focuses on developing a pedagogical approach that enables scientists to better understand and appreciate one important component of this model, what we call intrinsic ethics. Intrinsic ethical issues arise when values and ethical assumptions are embedded within scientific findings and analytical methods. Through a close examination of a case study and its application in teaching, namely, evaluation of climate change integrated assessment models, this paper develops a method and case for including intrinsic ethics within research ethics training to provide scientists with a comprehensive understanding and appreciation of the critical role of values and ethical choices in the production of research outcomes.     

A note on modulation of gait in man: Effects of constraining stride length and frequency

In this study, our aim was to investigate the effect of an imposed stride-length on walking speed and stride-frequency, and the effect of an imposed stride-frequency on walking speed and stride-length. These variations were determined in relation to the values obtained by analysing the subject's preferred pace. In the first case, the subject had to step on transversal stripes on the floor; in the second case, he had to synchronize his stride with a regular auditory signal. The results obtained with 8 subjects show that speed was the most variable factor. Variations in speed were correlated with variations in the imposed parameter: whenever the subject lengthened his stride or increased his stride-frequency, his walking speed increased proportionally. These results point to a relative independence between stride-length and stride-frequency, and a strong correlation between each of these parameters and speed.     

Personalistic concepts in action: The case of Adolf Hitler

Grounded in his personalistic worldview, William Stern regarded persons as inherently valuable beings who use values to conduct their lives. One might wonder if such a value-laden and idealistic approach can be applied to the case of Adolf Hitler, who clearly was a very destructive and disharmonious figure. In order to deal with this challenging question we will refer to three personalistic principles, namely convergence, introception, and unitas multiplex. As our analysis shows, all three principles can be exemplified in the case of Hitler if a neutralized version of each principle is used. By the demonstration of “iron will” he strived for coherence and unity, and was tremendously successful in managing that his followers introcepted the Nazi ideals. The convergence principle also applies to Hitler since there was unique conjunction of his traits with influences of his era.     

On the Importance of Being (Earnestly) Hybrid—Or,Qualms of a Quasi-Postmodernist: Commentary on Paper by Susan Fairfield

Dr. Fairfield makes a strong case that contemporary analytic theorists fail to live up to their apparent aspiration to present a thoroughgoingly postmodern conceptualization of the self. She argues instead in favor of a “hybrid” model—one that includes a dollop of modernism in the postmodernist brew. In this commentary, I critique the theorizing process inherent in psychoanalytic postmodernism, and then comment on and give a clinical example involving the self's “configurality.” I argue that we need to embrace the challenges of postmodernism without so privileging this position that we let it loosen our grasp of the realities of everyday clinical experience that might cause us to question postmodernism's tenets or values. Moreover, we must not assume that we can gauge the full impact of our “model of subjectivity” on the therapeutic process by knowing what we think we think.     

Prejudice Against Muslim Australians: The Role of Values,Gender and Consensus

Data from an Australian community survey (n = 189) examining the predictors of prejudice against Muslim Australians were analysed. Using thematic analysis, we investigated the specific values our participants reported regarding their perceptions of Muslim Australians and Islam. We then investigated the relationship between prejudice against Muslim Australians, the most important value priorities given by our participants, and other prejudice‐related variables. After entry into a regression analysis, the participants high in prejudice were found to be significantly more likely to have lower educational levels and more right‐wing views. They were also significantly more likely to report high levels of national attitudes (i.e. stronger identification with Australian identity), concern about gender equality within the Muslim community, less concern about equality generally and report that Muslims were not conforming to Australian values. High prejudiced participants also scored higher in the reporting of negative media‐related beliefs, were more likely to perceive higher support in the community for their views than was the case and were more negative towards Muslim men than Muslim women. The implications for anti‐prejudice interventions are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What's really wrong with Laudan's normative naturalism

The article presents a critical discussion of Larry Laudan's naturalistic metamethodological theory known as normative naturalism (NN). I examine the strongest extant objection to NN, and, with reference to ideas in Freedman ( Philosophy of Science , 66 (Proceedings), pp. S526-S537, 1999), show how NN survives it. I then go on to outline two problems that really do compromise NN. The first revolves around Laudan's conception of the relationship between scientific values and the history of science. Laudan argues we can make sense of progress in science without seeing great scientists in the past as having held the cognitive values and methodological rules we hold today as important for science. I argue this is extremely implausible, and moreover that Laudan must see our values today as justified by reference to the values of past scientists if he is to avoid a pernicious form of relativism. The second problem with NN is that its conception of methodological rules--as hypothetical imperatives linking cognitive means to ends--is untenable. Such rules would not be needed in a scientific community; moreover it is doubtful whether they should class as rules at all. I conclude by suggesting that the distinction between cognitive means and ends which undergirds Laudan's view is intuitively not well founded, and in any case does not provide sufficient materials for a viable normative naturalized epistemology.     

A new direction for science and values

The controversy over the old ideal of “value-free science” has cooled significantly over the past decade. Many philosophers of science now agree that even ethical and political values may play a substantial role in all aspects of scientific inquiry. Consequently, in the last few years, work in science and values has become more specific: Which values may influence science, and in which ways? Or, how do we distinguish illegitimate from illegitimate kinds of influence? In this paper, I argue that this problem requires philosophers of science to take a new direction. I present two case studies in the influence of values on scientific inquiry: feminist values in archaeology and commercial values in pharmaceutical research. I offer a preliminary assessment of these cases, that the influence of values was legitimate in the feminist case, but not in the pharmaceutical case. I then turn to three major approaches to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate influences of values, including the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values and Heather Douglas’ distinction between direct and indirect roles for values. I argue that none of these three approaches gives an adequate analysis of the two cases. In the concluding section, I briefly sketch my own approach, which draws more heavily on ethics than the others, and is more promising as a solution to the current problem. This is the new direction in which I think science and values should move.     

The wisdom of hindsight and the limits of Humean constructivism

Ordinary normative discourse includes talk about the reasons for action we had in the past but only came to discover in hindsight. In some cases, we come to discover these reasons not because new information has come to light, but because our values have changed. Contemporary metaethical views, namely Street's Humean constructivism and Blackburn's and Gibbard's quasi-realism, have some difficulty accounting for these reasons and the claims we make about them. This difficulty hinges on the diachronic complexity of these reasons and claims. It cannot be the case that these reasons were constructed by the perspective we had in the past before our values changed. If there were no extant reasons in the past, then it would seem that our claims about them in the present cannot be true. Quasi-realists can account for the way in which reason claims purport to be true by appealing to a deflationary sense of truth and so can remain agnostic on the actual existence of these reasons. Nevertheless, Street argues that this agnosticism is inconsistent with the quasi-realists' naturalism that should have them reject the existence of such reasons. I argue that Street would suffer from an even more acute form of this inconsistency were she to account for reasons only discovered in hindsight. At best her view does no better than the view of her chosen rivals. At worst, it discounts reasons that are so central to our moral development that it fails to be plausible.     

An Examination of the “Greening of Christianity” Thesis Among Americans, 1993–2010

Some environmental and religious scholars, religious leaders, and media figures have claimed there has been a “greening of Christianity” in the United States since the mid‐1990s. Such a trend would be socially significant, as the integration of Christian values and environmental values may invigorate both domains. Using nationally representative data from the 1993 and 2010 General Social Surveys, we analyze how green self‐identified Christians in the U.S. general public are in their pro‐environmental attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. Using structural equation modeling, we find no clear evidence of a greening of Christianity among rank‐and‐file Christians in the general public between 1993 and 2010. Indeed, the patterns of our results are quite similar to those from earlier decades, which documented that self‐identified Christians reported lower levels of environmental concern than did non‐Christians and nonreligious individuals. We did find evidence of some greening among evangelical Protestants, especially relative to mainline Protestants, between 1993 and 2010. We close by suggesting a few fruitful avenues for further research in this area via variable‐oriented, case‐oriented, and experimental studies and discussing some theoretical implications of our findings.     

Confronting Our Own Hypocrisy: Being a Model for Our Students and Clients

Counselor educators, supervisors, and practitioners sometimes act in ways that contradict the most significant beliefs and values that they espouse. Despite communicating to students and trainees the importance of being caring, respectful, warm, flexible, honest, and personally competent, we are sometimes found to be operating quite differently. Issues related to the counselor educator, supervisor, and practitioner's narcissism, self-indulgence, abuses of power, illusions of omnipotence, prejudices, and unresolved issues are discussed. A case is strongly presented that we would all be a lot more effective if we worked to confront our hypocrisies and practice more what we preach.     

Doing Ontology and Doing Justice: What Feminist Philosophy Can Teach Us About Meta-Metaphysics

Abstract

Feminist philosophy has recently become recognised as a self-standing philosophical sub-discipline. Still, metaphysics has remained largely dismissive of feminist insights. Here I make the case for the value of feminist insights in metaphysics: taking them seriously makes a difference to our ontological theory choice and feminist philosophy can provide helpful methodological tools to regiment ontological theories. My examination goes as follows. Contemporary ontology is not done via conceptual analysis, but via quasi-scientific means. This takes different ontological positions to be competing hypotheses about reality’s fundamental structure that are then assessed with a loose battery of criteria for theory choice. Such criteria make up the constitutive values of ontology (e.g. providing a unified, coherent, non-circular, simple, parsimonious total theory). These values are distinguished from contextual values of a practice: the political and moral values embedded in the social context of inquiry. Although we may be frank about some meta-metaphysical value commitments, bringing in feminist contextual values is viewed as an unacceptable move when thinking about ontological theory choice. This paper then asks: is this move unacceptable? I think not and I aim to motivate this methodological insight here by examining recent work on grounding.