Empathy and Its Role in Morality

In this paper, I will argue, contra Prinz, that empathy is a crucial component of our moral lives. In particular, I argue that empathy is sometimes epistemologically necessary for identifying the right action; that empathy is sometimes psychologically necessary for motivating the agent to perform the right action; and that empathy is sometimes necessary for the agent to be most morally praiseworthy for an action. I begin by explaining what I take empathy to be. I then discuss some alleged problems for empathy and explain why some argue that empathy is unnecessary and sometimes even problematic in the moral domain. Next, I criticize a prominent alternative to an empathy‐based morality. Finally, I argue that that empathy is sometimes epistemologically and psychologically necessary for doing the right thing and is sometimes necessary for moral worth. I conclude with a discussion of the important role of empathy in our everyday lives.     

Beyond “Heartless Conservative” and “Bleeding Heart Liberal” Caricatures: How Religiosity Shapes the Relationship Between Political Orientation and Empathy

Is political orientation associated with self‐reported empathy? Popular caricatures frame political orientation in terms of the “heartless conservative” and the “bleeding heart liberal.” Yet, previous research has produced findings that present mixed evidence to support these caricatures. Using data from the 2004 General Social Survey, analyses show that the caricatures of the caring liberal and the cold‐hearted conservative are supported by results for empathy—in which conservatives have lower levels of empathy than liberals—but this pattern holds only when individuals also have low levels of religiosity. In the context of high religiosity, self‐identified conservatives do not have lower empathy than self‐identified liberals, net of a host of sociodemographic characteristics. Our observations demonstrate that patterns in empathy across political orientation are evident only when levels of different forms of religiosity are considered.     

The Social Causes and Political Consequences of Group Empathy

Recent scholarship has discovered significant racial/ethnic group variation in response to political threats such as immigration and terrorism. Surprisingly, minority groups often simultaneously perceive themselves to be at greater risk from such threats and yet still prefer more open immigration policies and civil liberties protections. We suggest a group‐level empathy process may explain this puzzle: Due to their higher levels of empathy for other disadvantaged groups, many minority group members support protections for others even when their own interests are threatened. Little is known, however, about the unique properties of group empathy or its role in policy opinion formation. In this study, we examine the reliability and validity of our new measure of group empathy, the Group Empathy Index (GEI), demonstrating that it is distinct from other social and political predispositions such as ethnocentrism, social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, ideology, and partisanship. We then propose a theory about the development of group empathy in reaction to life experiences based on one's race/ethnicity, gender, age, and education. Finally, we examine the power of group empathy to predict policy attitudes and political behavior.     

Democracy begins at home: Democratic parenting and adolescents' support for democratic values

Although it is generally assumed that support for democratic values and beliefs develops as a result of social learning, the concrete socializing circumstances through which this occurs are less obvious. This study investigated the relationship between democratic family functioning and democratic values of adolescents. Adolescents' (N = 1,341, 16- to 17-year-olds) reports on their parents' psychological control, autonomy granting, warmth, and behavioural control were considered predictors of adolescents' democratic orientation. The results demonstrated that the democratic functioning of families was positively related to adolescents' support for democratic values when controlling for the effects of gender, political experience, authoritarianism, empathy, and political activism. Additionally, this study examined the possible role of empathy as a mediator in the relation between democratic family functioning and adolescent's democratic values. The results show that empathy was a partial mediator of a family's contribution to adolescents' democratic orientation.     

Empathy for Non-Kin,the Faraway,the Unfamiliar,and the Abstract––An Interdisciplinary Study on Mencian Moral Cultivation and a Response to Prinz

This article challenges the pessimistic view that empathy and other fellow feelings are biased and erratic motivation for morality. By discussing Mencius’ account on how to develop empathy from its biased and erratic beginnings, I argue that empathy can be extended to less common objects, such as non-kin, the faraway, the unfamiliar, and the abstract. The extension facilitated by empathy in turn enhances one’s moral cognition toward the sufferings of less common objects; the extension also helps to include less common objects into one’s circle of care. I respond to critics of empathy such as Prinz by highlighting the dynamic cultivational process of empathy that they overlook, and further point out that empathy can be cultivated so as to provide a remedy for the biases that no emotion is immune to. This article contributes to the ongoing discussion on moral cultivation in the Chinese philosophy community and the dispute over empathy’s role in morality in contemporary ethics.     

The Contribution of Empathy to Ethics

ABSTRACT

Empathy has been taken to play a crucial role in ethics at least since the Scottish Enlightenment. More recently, a revival of moral sentimentalism and empirical research on moral behavior has prompted a renewed interest in empathy and related concepts and on their contribution to moral reasoning and to moral behavior. Furthermore, empathy has recently entered our public discourse as having the power to ameliorate our social and political interactions with others.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the extent to which such a role can be actually granted. Before focusing on a positive assessment, I will delve into a few problems our ordinary concept of empathy and our commonsensical way of conceiving its connection to ethics will need to face. Specifically, I will show how an exaggerated reliance on the ordinary concept of empathy could lead to an underestimation of its biases and potential limitations (§ 2), how a naïve conception of its connection to morality can overlook relevant counterexamples (§ 3) and lead to forms of reductionism (§ 4). Overcoming this possible shortsightedness would pave the way for arguing in favor of an important – though not sufficient and possible neither necessary – role for empathy in ethics (§ 5).     

Empathy on trial: A response to its critics

Despite being held in something approaching universal esteem for its capacity to promote prosocial behavior and inhibit antisocial behavior, empathy has recently become the recipient of strong criticism from some of today’s leading academics. Two of the more high-profile criticisms of empathy have come from philosopher Jesse Prinz and psychologist Paul Bloom, each of whom challenges the view that empathy has an overall beneficial influence on human behavior. In this essay, I discuss the basis of their criticisms as well as why I am not compelled by their arguments to believe that empathy does more harm than good. In the process of responding to empathy’s critics, I discuss the important role that empathy plays in our moral lives. I argue that, rather than employing rational considerations to minimize the role that empathy plays in our moral and political judgments, such considerations are put to better use by expanding empathy when conducive to the common good and suppressing it when it opposes the common good.     

Self versus other oriented social motivation,not lack of empathic or moral ability,explains behavioral outcomes in children with high theory of mind abilities

Although traditionally it was believed that having advanced Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities led to social competence and prosocial behaviors in children, it has also been shown that some children use their high ToM abilities to strategically manipulate others instead of acting prosocially towards them. It is an important developmental task to understand the factors contributing to this behavioral divergence for children with advanced ToM understanding, which also has significant practical implications for bullying interventions. We contend that this divergence cannot be explained by a lack of moral competence or empathy, but that the existing evidence lends itself better to a motivational explanation. We propose that the direction of social motivation varies across children and the self versus other oriented social motivation determines if children will use their developed morality and empathy competencies in social interactions to act prosocially or instead cognitively divert moral and empathic emotions to avoid negative feelings about manipulating others. We show how self versus other orientation has been used as a legitimate distinction to inform other domains of psychology and conclude by discussing possible correlates and precursors of this difference in the direction of social orientation in children.     

Agency,human nature and character in Kantian theory

Conclusion In order for the duty of friendship to be practically possible, and for gratitude and beneficence to be unencumbered virtues, Kant need not have held that human beings are basically good. He need only have understood that they are social beings, with desires for both independence and connection, autonomy and affiliation, and purposes that are not always merely their own. I have argued that because he did not, his moral theory is flawed in three important respects.In Kant's theory, morality is only possible because humans are rational, and necessary because (absent morality) they are self-interested individuals, egoistically motivated, distrustful and isolated. When this view is applied to particular questions of friendship and the virtues, it becomes a distorting medium. It is my contention that a more adequate theory of character would result from the application of Kantian moral principles to a sounder, more social conception of human nature.In conclusion, I wish to make it clear that I am not arguing that human beings are basically good, only that they are essentially social. In his political writings Kant has emphasized the social dimension of reason itself, and I believe he would agree with Thomas Nagel's recent claim about human nature and morality: To say that altruism and morality are possible in virtue of something basic to human nature is not to say that men are basically good. Men are basically complicated; how good they are depends on whether certain conceptions and ways of thinking have achieved dominance, a dominance which is precarious in any case.

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The Benefits of Transcending Self-Interest: Examining the Role of Self-Transcendence on Expressive Suppression and Well-Being

Research has taken a dim view of regulating emotions via expressive suppression. However, the impact of suppression may vary according to individuals’ interpersonal orientation. In two studies, we examined the effects of suppression under self-transcendent and self-interest orientations. Results revealed that (1) in everyday life, although dispositional suppression was related to lower psychological well-being, the costs associated with suppression were buffered among individuals with a self-transcendence orientation (Study 1); and (2) among individuals primed with a self-transcendence orientation, suppression of negative emotions in an interpersonal conflict situation led to lower levels of anger-related emotions and higher levels of perceived relational quality compared to emotional expression; however, among individuals primed with a self-interest orientation, suppression led to higher levels of anger-related emotions and lower levels of perceived relational quality compared to expression (Study 2). Together, results from the present study highlight the role of interpersonal orientation in moderating the effects of suppression on well-being.     

The Role of Moral Emotions in Predicting Support for Political Actions in Post-War Iraq

A web-based study of 393 undergraduates at a public university in the United States was conducted to examine the relationship between moral emotions (i.e., emotions that motivate prosocial tendencies) and support for political actions to assist Iraqi citizens after the Second Gulf War (2003–2004). Previous work on emotions and prosocial tendencies has focused on empathy. In the context of post-war Iraq, we found that while empathy predicted support for a number of different political actions that have the potential to advance the welfare of the Iraqi people (humanitarian action in particular), guilt over the U.S. invasion was an important predictor of support for reparative actions (i.e., restoring damage created by the U.S. military), and moral outrage toward Saddam Hussein and his regime was the best predictor of support for political actions to prevent future harm to the Iraqi people and to punish the perpetrators. Our findings demonstrate the utility of an emotion-specific framework for understanding why and what type of political actions individuals will support. And in contrast to the traditional view that emotions are an impediment to rationality, our findings suggest that they can serve as a potentially powerful vehicle for motivating political engagement among the citizenry.     

共情的性别差异

共情指的是个体在与人交往的过程中共享并理解他人的情绪状态的倾向, 包括认知共情和情绪共情两种成分。共情在学前阶段没有性别差异。进入中小学阶段以后, 共情出现了性别差异。一方面, 共情的性别差异与个体自身的生理成熟有关。随着年龄增长, 两性逐渐趋向生理成熟, 荷尔蒙分泌增加并出现差异, 其中催产素有助于情绪共情, 睾丸酮则与认知共情有负相关, 两性的共情水平也因此有了显著差异。另一方面, 共情的性别差异与社会性别角色倾向有关。女性的性别角色以关注他人为导向, 与共情有直接相关, 男性的性别角色以关注公平公正为导向, 与共情没有相关。当两性习得各自的性别角色以后, 他们的共情表现就出现了差异, 这一差异在情绪共情方面较为突出。有关共情性别差异的研究虽然取得了丰富的成果, 但仍然有进一步深入挖掘的空间, 未来的研究需要在视角上注重从年龄、性别和文化交互作用的角度进行考察, 在理论上考虑从能力和倾向性的维度区分共情, 在内容上丰富对影响性别差异的各项因素的研究。     

The Normative Underpinnings of Democracy and the Balance between Morality and Legitimacy

ABSTRACT

Jürgen Habermas’s political philosophy incorporates the view that legitimacy is immanent to law, even though it makes morality a central component of democratic legitimacy. Taking this as a starting point, the article examines one criticism that applies to Habermas’s political theory, insofar as he puts morality at the centre of his reconstruction of the concept of legitimacy. Habermas claims that the moral point of view justifies only those norms that embody universalizable interests and rules out those that embody particular interests. Therefore, the objection is that particular citizens will have no reason to endorse these norms and act according to them because these norms do not incorporate their interests. The article goes on to show that Habermas can successfully answer this objection by means of the principle of discourse. The principle performs this function, inasmuch as it has a post-Kantian nature. On the one hand, it incorporates Kantian autonomy. And on the other, the Hegelian insight that autonomy has to be actualized through modern institutions and practices.     

先秦礼文化凸显的道德生活

先秦礼文化是中国传统文化的重要组成部分,它以制度化的形式存在于先秦社会的方方面面,包括先秦礼俗、礼制、礼学和礼教等主要内容。先秦礼文化的核心是伦理道德,它通过一定的仪式来确立协调天(神)人关系、家庭关系、政治关系以及社会交往等伦理关系的道德规范,以此维护现存社会的稳定和秩序。具体而言,包括以敬神为核心的宗教伦理、以人与自然和谐为主要内容的环境伦理、以孝亲为核心的家庭伦理、以忠君为核心的政治伦理、以尚德尚齿为核心的社会伦理等内容。     

Paternalism and the Criminal Law

ABSTRACT If it could be shown that law is, in some sense, a moral system the apparent contradiction between (moral) autonomy and (legal) heteronomy might be challenged. In order to prepare for such a challenge this paper questions the prevailing view that law is not in the business of enforcing morals. That is done primarily by using decisions of the criminal courts to show that the law does not always criminalise conduct merely to prevent harm to others. Paternalism is distinguished from the harm principle in order to show that the law (rightly or wrongly) sometimes seeks to secure that which is (thought to be) morally good, irrespective of the prevention of harm, at least overall harm.
If such an insight is well founded there are consequences for legal theory in that neither of the ruling paradigms (naturalism and positivism) seems able adequately to accommodate the view of law which emerges. Consequently, an attempt is made in the essay to develop a middle theory of law, between naturalism and positivism, which is referred to as 'normative positivism'. The theory presented has, in turn, consequences for political practice. If law can be seen as community morality rather than as merely the morality of officials, then everyone has a stake in the moral content of law and there may be good moral reasons for disobeying official laws. Civil disobedience is the citizen's ultimate resort against the official morality that has appropriated to itself the eulogistic name of 'law'. That law may be seen as community morality also calls into question some ruling paradigms as to the nature of morality but, if the claim can be sustained, then the legal system may be seen as applied moral philosophy in action.     

WHAT KIND OF PERSON COULD BE A TORTURER?

What kind of persons could engage in political torture? Not only the morally impaired who lack empathy or compassion, or even the merely obedient, but also the righteous who struggle with conscience, and the realists who set morality aside.     

Introduction: Meaning,measurement, and correlates of moral development

Morality has again become an important focus of research in different scientific disciplines: from biology (ethology), neuropsychology and evolutionary psychology to social psychology, business ethics, and political philosophy. One of the reasons for this renewed interest, no doubt, stems from the tragedies that human beings, individually or in groups, inflict upon the lives of one another and the world at large, e.g., (civil) war, the extinction of species and ecological destruction, climate change, and last but not least – the financial crisis. Moral destitution and collapse, a lack of respect for human dignity and worth, deficits in proper moral functioning at all levels of the world community often discounted or masked by transparent excuses and vacuous rationalizations, are viewed as a principal cause of the social, societal and ecological crises with which we are confronted today. The key to solving these crises must lie, at least partly, in a better understanding and active deployment of morality. However, morality is not only an important topic of study for its potential relationship with antisocial behaviour, but also for its relationship with prosocial behaviour (helping, sharing, etc.). Relationships of morality with both types of negative and positive conduct shed important insight on moral (dis)functioning. Developmental psychology is charged with the specific task of illuminating the growth and evolution of moral functioning in human beings.     

Moral reasoning,moral decision-making,and empathy in Korsakoff’s syndrome

Korsakoff’s syndrome (KS) is a neuropsychiatric disorder, caused by a vitamin B1 deficiency. Although it is known that patients with KS display diminished theory of mind functioning and frequently exhibit marked antisocial interactions little attention has so far focused on the integrity of moral decision-making abilities, moral reasoning, and empathy. In an experimental cross-sectional design, 20 patients diagnosed with KS, and twenty age-, education-, and gender-equivalent healthy participants performed tests assessing moral decision-making, moral reasoning maturity, empathy, and executive functioning. Participants were administered the Moral Behaviour Inventory (MBI) for everyday moral dilemmas, and ten cartoons of abstract moral dilemmas. Responses were scored according to the Kohlberg stages of moral reasoning. Empathy and executive functioning were assessed with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) and the Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB). In contrast to frontal traumatic brain injury patients, KS patients did not display a utilitarian bias, suggesting preserved moral decision-making abilities. Of interest, KS patients had significantly lower levels of moral reasoning maturity on everyday moral dilemmas, and abstract moral dilemmas. In patients, empathy was moderately related to the level of moral maturity on both tasks, while executive functioning was not. In conclusion, KS patients have preserved moral decision-making abilities, but their moral reasoning abilities are poorer in everyday and abstract situations. Lower moral reasoning abilities and lower levels of empathy together may be responsible for adverse social functioning in KS.     

Victims' Stories and the Postcolonial Politics of Empathy

This paper discusses Diana Meyers's book in light of postcolonial feminist insights. It argues that though Meyers's defense of empathy is admirably sensitive to the ways philosophical concepts and popular discourses can undermine our empathetic capacities, building a human rights culture requires attention to the relational and distributional dimensions of empathy. Meyers's criticism of the expectation of moral purity from victims attests to the richness of her work on agency and helps dismantle unduly narrow conceptions of who counts as a victim of a human rights violation. Meyers's argument for empathy over sympathy is especially useful for understanding culturally encoded forms of degradation. However, human rights violations are caused not only by empathy deficits; they are caused also by empathy excesses toward some people and savior mentalities that can coexist with empathy. Empathy should be supplemented by a political analysis that helps us identify the causes of global injustice.