Darwin’s solution to the species problem

Biologists and philosophers that debate the existence of the species category fall into two camps. Some believe that the species category does not exist and the term ‘species’ should be eliminated from biology. Others believe that with new biological insights or the application of philosophical ideas, we can be confident that the species category exists. This paper offers a different approach to the species problem. We should be skeptical of the species category, but not skeptical of the existence of those taxa biologists call ‘species.’ And despite skepticism over the species category, there are pragmatic reasons for keeping the word ‘species.’ This approach to the species problem is not new. Darwin employed a similar strategy to the species problem 150 years ago.     

Gandalf’s solution to the Newcomb problem

This article proposes a new theory of rational decision, distinct from both causal decision theory (CDT) and evidential decision theory (EDT). First, some intuitive counterexamples to CDT and EDT are presented. Then the motivation for the new theory is given: the correct theory of rational decision will resemble CDT in that it will not be sensitive to any comparisons of absolute levels of value across different states of nature, but only to comparisons of the differences in value between the available options within states of nature; however, the correct theory will also resemble EDT in that it will rely on conditional probabilities (not unconditional probabilities). The new theory gives a prominent role to the notion of a “benchmark” for each state of nature, by comparison with which the value of the available options in that state of nature are measured, and so it has been called the Benchmark Theory (BT). It is argued that BT gives the right verdict on the cases that seem to be counterexamples to CDT and EDT. Finally, some objections to BT are considered and answered.     

Children’s rights and the non-identity problem

Abstract

Can appealing to children’s rights help to solve the non-identity problem in cases of procreation? A number of philosophers have answered affirmatively, arguing that even if children cannot be harmed by being born into disadvantaged conditions, they may nevertheless be wronged if those conditions fail to meet a minimal standard of decency to which all children are putatively entitled. This paper defends the tenability of this view by outlining and responding to five prominent objections that have been raised against it in the contemporary literature: (1) the identifiability objection; (2) the non-existence objection; (3) the waiving of rights objection, (4) the lack of legitimate complaint objection; and (5) the unfairness objection.     

Does Klein’s infinitism offer a response to Agrippa’s trilemma?

The regress of reasons threatens an epistemic agent’s right to claim that any beliefs are justified. In response, Peter Klein’s infinitism argues that an infinite series of supporting reasons of the right type not only is not vicious but can make for epistemic justification. In order to resist the sceptic, infinitism needs to provide reason to think that there is at least one justified belief in the world. Under an infinitist conception this involves showing that at least one belief is supported by an infinite series of supporting reasons. This paper argues that showing this makes problems for the infinitist. The finite minds problem that prevents completion of an infinite series is well documented. This paper examines alternative attempts to provide evidence of infinity that the infinitist might take, whether by using a notion of justification without infinite reasons or by altering the notion of evidence. It concludes that both of these fail and consequently infinitism is unable to offer a solution to Agrippa’s trilemma.     

Naive misconceptions of Cooke and Breedin’s research: response to Ranney

In this paper, we respond to Ranney's (1994) comment on our paper on naive physics (Cooke & Breedin, 1994). In his comment, Ranney criticizes our methods and analyses, as well as our claims of theoretical inconsistency. In response to Ranney, we show that mast of his criticisms can be traced to several misconceptions. Some of these misconceptions seem to stem from his drawing of inappropriate similarities between his own research and ours. Specifically, ftanney seems to hall faun' misconceptions about our research: (1) the belief that trajectory responses in our study were relevant to our claims about theoretical consistency, (2) tie belief that aggregation of theoretical variations weakens claims of inconsistency, (3) the belief that the method of written reports is inferior to the method of structured interviews, and (4) the belief that our proposal of on-the-fly theorizing is at odds with temporal consistency and nonimpetus beliefs.     

Why the generality problem is everybody’s problem

The generality problem is widely considered to be a devastating objection to reliabilist theories of justification. My goal in this paper is to argue that a version of the generality problem applies to all plausible theories of justification. Assume that any plausible theory must allow for the possibility of reflective justification—S’s belief, B, is justified on the basis of S’s knowledge that she arrived at B as a result of a highly (but not perfectly) reliable way of reasoning, R. The generality problem applies to all cases of reflective justification: Given that B is the product of a process-token that is an instance of indefinitely many belief-forming process-types (or BFPTs), why is the reliability of R, rather than the reliability of one of the indefinitely many other BFPTs, relevant to B’s justificatory status? This form of the generality problem is restricted because it applies only to cases of reflective justification. But unless it is solved, the generality problem haunts all plausible theories of justification, not just reliabilist ones.     

A Contribution to the Author Meets Critics Session: Tyson Lewis’s Walter Benjamin’s Antifascist Education

Studies in Philosophy and Education -     

A response to William Meredith-Owen’s ‘Alchemical dragons: Winnicott’s reaching towards the objective psyche’

This paper was presented as a response to Meredith-Owen’s paper at the inaugural joint conference of The Society of Analytical Psychology and the West Midlands Institute of Psychotherapy in autumn 2020. The author considers the constraints on the personal mother’s capacity to facilitate the integration of both the shadow and the unrepressed unconscious. Such a difficult task requires the involvement of an enabling cultural matrix mediated by socio-political systems and structures. The improvement of this cultural matrix relies on alchemical-like processes which would help understanding develop beyond one’s own point of view.     

Classical conditioning of the rabbit’s nictitating membrane response to a piezoceramic vibrotactile CS

The present paper reports the development of a transducer system for delivery of a noiseless vibrotactile stimulus that was successfully employed as a conditioned stimulus in classical conditioning of the rabbit’s nictitating membrane response (NMR). In addition, the postasymptotic determination of the relationship between the amplitude and frequency of vibrotactile stimulation and the frequency of conditioned NMRs were found to be monotonically increasing functions. Accordingly, the vibrotactile transducer appears to provide a tractable CS that can be used by itself or in conjunction with visual and auditory stimuli to study a range of issues in animal learning.     

Reichenbach’s cubical universe and the problem of the external world

This paper is a sympathetic critique of the argument that Reichenbach develops in Chap. 2 of Experience and Prediction for the thesis that sense experience justifies belief in the existence of an external world. After discussing his attack on the positivist theory of meaning, I describe the probability ideas that Reichenbach presents. I argue that Reichenbach begins with an argument grounded in the Law of Likelihood but that he then endorses a different argument that involves prior probabilities. I try to show how this second step in Reichenbach’s approach can be strengthened by using ideas that have been developed recently for understanding causation in terms of the idea of intervention.     

Newcomb’s problem and its conditional evidence: a common cause of confusion

This paper aims to make three contributions to decision theory. First there is the hope that it will help to re-establish the legitimacy of the problem, pace various recent analyses provided by Maitzen and Wilson, Slezak and Priest. Second, after pointing out that analyses of the problem have generally relied upon evidence that is conditional on the taking of one particular option, this paper argues that certain assumptions implicit in those analyses are subtly flawed. As a third contribution, the piece aims to draw attention to an important similarity between Newcomb’s problem and the toxin puzzle. In short, both problems illustrate the fact that you can have a reason to intend to φ without having a reason to actually φ.     

Logical structuralism and Benacerraf’s problem

There are two general questions which many views in the philosophy of mathematics can be seen as addressing: what are mathematical objects, and how do we have knowledge of them? Naturally, the answers given to these questions are linked, since whatever account we give of how we have knowledge of mathematical objects surely has to take into account what sorts of things we claim they are; conversely, whatever account we give of the nature of mathematical objects must be accompanied by a corresponding account of how it is that we acquire knowledge of those objects. The connection between these problems results in what is often called “Benacerraf’s Problem”, which is a dilemma that many philosophical views about mathematical objects face. It will be my goal here to present a view, attributed to Richard Dedekind, which approaches the initial questions in a different way than many other philosophical views do, and in doing so, avoids the dilemma given by Benacerraf’s problem.     

Ireland’s economic crisis and austerity: the response of the Irish Catholic Bishops

The Irish Roman Catholic Church has been a dominant institution in Irish society for generations but this dominance has declined in recent decades due to modernisation and secularisation. Since the mid-1990s, the Church has been rocked by scandals of clerical and religious sex abuse of children, which has had a negative impact on its moral standing in Irish society. As a result of the economic crash in 2008, a programme of severe austerity was introduced by the Irish government. In this article, the response of the Irish Catholic Bishops to the recession and austerity measures is assessed through the analysis of their public statements which are available through the news archive of the Irish Bishops’ Conference. The findings show that the Bishops did criticise the socio-economic policies of the Irish government but this was limited due to a range of institutional barriers.     

Influence of following vehicle’s tailway and classification on subject driver’s response to the circular yellow indication

Traffic crashes at signalized intersections are frequently linked to driver behavior at the onset of the circular yellow (CY) indication. To better understand behavioral factors that influence a driver’s decision to stop or go at an intersection, this study analyzed the behavior of the driver of a subject vehicle at the onset of the CY indication. Driver performance data from 53 participants were collected in the Oregon State University Driving Simulator, simulating scenarios of driving through high-speed intersections under various conditions. Data included interactions where the driver stopped at the stop line (n = 644) or proceeded through the intersection (n = 628) in response to a CY indication. Data were analyzed as panel data while considering 12 indicator variables related to the driver’s stop/go decision. These indicator variables included time to stop line (TTSL), tailway time, following vehicle type, vehicle speed at the onset of the CY indication, and demographics (age, gender, driving experience, level of education, personal vehicle type, number of times driving per week, number of miles driving last year, participation in previous simulation studies. A random-parameter binary logit model was used to determine contributing factors for driver decision making at the onset of CY indication while accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. Four indicator variables were significantly related to the driver’s stop/go decision, but three factors varied across observations. Findings showed that a driver’s stop/go decision in response to a CY indication was associated with the time to the stop line (TTSL), tailway time to the following vehicle, subject vehicle speed at the onset of the CY indication, and driver’s age (20–36 years), but was not significantly associated with classification of the following vehicle. Also, the findings indicated that a shorter tailway increased a subject driver’s red-light running frequency. These findings provide insights into variables that affect driver decisions in a vehicle-following situation at the onset of the CY indication. This information can help make better decisions in smart traffic control systems such as to extend/decrease the green interval slightly to avoid decisions that are more difficult.     

Hume’s Solution of the Goodman Paradox and the Reliability Riddle (Mill’s problem)

Many solutions of the Goodman paradox have been proposed but so far no agreement has been reached about which is the correct solution. However, I will not contribute here to the discussion with a new solution. Rather, I will argue that a solution has been in front of us for more than two hundred years because a careful reading of Hume’s account of inductive inferences shows that, contrary to Goodman’s opinion, it embodies a correct solution of the paradox. Moreover, the account even includes a correct answer to Mill’s question of why in some cases a single instance is sufficient for a complete induction, since Hume gives a well-supported explanation of this reliability phenomenon. The discussion also suggests that Bayesian theory by itself cannot explain this phenomenon. Finally, we will see that Hume’s explanation of the reliability phenomenon is surprisingly similar to the explanation given lately by a number of naturalistic philosophers in their discussion of the Goodman paradox.     

In defence of a faith-like model of love: a reply to John Lippitt’s “Kierkegaard and the problem of special relationships: Ferreira,Krishek, and the ‘God filter”’

In his major work on love, Works of Love, Kierkegaard clearly and robustly affirms the moral superiority of neighbourly love, and approves preferential love on one condition: that it serve as an instance of neighbourly love. But can an essentially preferential love be an instance of the essentially non-preferential neighbourly love? John Lippitt seems to think it can. In his paper “Kierkegaard and the problem of special relationships: Ferreira, Krishek, and the ‘God filter”’ he defends Kierkegaard’s position in Works of Love against my criticism (as presented in my book Kierkegaard on Faith and Love); specifically, against my claim that in using Kierkegaard’s view of neighbourly love as a framework for understanding preferential love, one fails to account for the latter’s distinctive character. Lippitt claims that I misinterpret Kierkegaard’s position and, using what he calls ‘the God filter’, he attempts to show how adhering to Kierkegaard’s view of neighbourly love allows one to sustain the distinctiveness (and value) of preferential love. In what follows I will defend my interpretation of Kierkegaard’s position and explain why I take the view he presents in Works of Love to be problematic. Furthermore, in my aforementioned book I offer a Kierkegaardian model of love that does precisely what Lippitt seeks his ‘God filter’ model to do: namely, preserve the distinctiveness of preferential love while allowing its possible coexistence with neighbourly love. Thus, against the background of Lippitt’s criticism I will demonstrate this model again, in hope of clarifying the advantages this view offers.     

Exemplarization: a solution to the problem of consciousness?

In recent publications, Keith Lehrer developed the intriguing idea of a special mental process??exemplarization??and applied it in a sophisticated manner to different phenomena such as intentionality, representation of the self, the knowledge of ineffable content (of art works) and the problem of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper I am primarily concerned with the latter issue. The target of this paper is to analyze whether exemplarization, besides explaining epistemic phenomena such as immediate and ineffable knowledge of experiences, can also solve the ontological problem of consciousness. In particular, Lehrer suggests that if we consider exemplarization, zombies cannot provide an argument for anti-physicalism. I argue that exemplarization offers neither a physicalist explanation of the conceivability of zombies nor an elucidating physicalist account of their impossibility. Therefore, exemplarization cannot offer a physicalist solution to the ??hard problem?? of consciousness.