Jealousy in Relation to Envy

The conceptions of jealousy used by philosophical writers are various, and, this paper suggests, largely inadequate. In particular, the difference between jealousy and envy has not yet been plausibly specified. This paper surveys some past analyses of this distinction and addresses problems with them, before proposing its own positive account of jealousy, developed from an idea of Leila Tov-Ruach(a.k.a. A. O. Rorty). Three conditions for being jealous are proposed and it is shownhow each of them helps to tell the emotion apart from some distinct species of envy.It is acknowledged that the referents of the two terms are, to some extent, overlapping,but shown how this overlap is justified by the psychologies of the respective emotions.     

Negative Emotion in the Workplace: Employee Jealousy and Envy

Nine hypotheses were developed from the emerging literature on negative emotion in the workplace. In order to test these hypotheses, the responses of 167 employed master's students to measures of individual differences (self-esteem and Machiavellianism), work unit attributes (autonomy, competitive reward, and supervisory considerateness) and personal response variables (sense of control, organization-based self-esteem, and propensity to quit) were analyzed with bivariate and hierarchical regression analyses. Results of these analyses were generally supportive of the predicted relationships. Findings are interpreted as indicating the utility of the constructs of employee jealousy and envy for understanding individual experiences of interpersonal stress.     

Social Emotions in Children's Human Figure Drawings: Drawing Shame,Pride and Jealousy

The study examines children's ability to convey social – as opposed to basic – emotions in their human figure drawings. One hundred children aged 4‐, 6‐ and 8‐years were asked to draw a person experiencing shame, pride, jealousy, happiness, sadness and fear as well as a baseline figure ‘feeling nothing’. Drawings were rated in terms of (i) overall emotional expressiveness and (ii) variety and types (face, body/posture and context) of graphic cues used to convey emotion. The effect of age on overall expressiveness and use of these graphic cues was also investigated. The results showed that drawings depicting social emotions were rated as less expressive and presented fewer graphic cues than those conveying basic emotions. Children's developing ability to depict pride, shame and jealousy was largely driven by an increased use of contextual cues in their human figure drawings. As regards the effect of age, it was found that 6‐ and 8‐years old produced more expressive drawings containing a larger range of graphic cues than the 4‐year olds. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Envy and difference

This paper explores five examples of envy, examining the similarities and differences between the clinical situations. The theory relating to envy is extensively reviewed and a critique of the Kleinian position is offered, suggesting that the aversion to separation and difference is not only prior to, but also has explanatory precedence over, the functioning of envy. Kleinian examples are explored in this light. The experience of separateness and difference is understood to lead to a number of outcomes: envy, admiration, competitiveness, a sense of low self-esteem and inadequacy, or a fear of being envied. It is argued that the individual's particular personality organization and their associated relational pattern will determine their experience of envy. Examples of schizoid, borderline, narcissistic and hysteric functioning in relation to envy are examined in some depth. The link between these phenomena and the death instinct is touched on.     

Envy: Further thoughts

Urges toward the good may be hidden in bad acts. A case in point is envy, which is often motivated by desire for the good. Its ill effects can be counteracted by this realization.Ann Belford Ulanov, M.Div., Ph.D., is Christiane Brooks Johnson Professor of Psychiatry and Religion at Union Theological Seminary in New York, a psychoanalyst in private practice, and Co-Editor of theJournal of Religion and Health.     

Vices of Inattention

abstract Why do we routinely betray moral commitments that, in some sense, we authentically embrace? One explanation involves inattention: failure to attend to morally important aspects of our lives. Inattention ranges from an unmotivated lack of focus, or “simple” inattention, to more purposeful and wilful self‐deception. Self‐deception has received exhaustive and insightful treatment by philosophers and psychologists; what remains unexamined is the less complex, but more pervasive phenomenon of simple inattention. Since inattention is at least equally important in accounting for our routine moral failures, this gap is an important one to fill. In this essay I examine moral dimensions of inattention: what makes it problematic, what vices it reflects, what duties we have to overcome it, and how we might try to do that. I argue that inattention obscures responsibilities to prevent harm, erodes autonomy, manifests a lack of virtue, and undermines integrity. For these reasons, we have obligations of attentiveness. I propose that we should attend (at least) to apparent violations of our moral values in which we are personally implicated, which we have power to affect, and to which we have been directed by clues that something is amiss. I end with practical suggestions for enhancing our attentiveness.     

Jealousy

A slightly revised version of a paper presented at the Conference on Archetypal Psychology in Dallas, Texas, in 1977.     

Envy and us

Within emotion theory, envy is generally portrayed as an antisocial emotion because the relation between the envier and the rival is thought to be purely antagonistic. This paper resists this view by arguing that envy presupposes a sense of us. First, we claim that hostile envy is triggered by the envier's sense of impotence combined with her perception that an equality principle has been violated. Second, we introduce the notion of “hetero‐induced self‐conscious emotions” by focusing on the paradigmatic cases of being ashamed or proud of somebody else. We describe envy as a hetero‐induced self‐conscious emotion by arguing (a) that the impotence felt by the subject grounds the emotion's self‐reflexivity and (b) that the rival impacts the subject's self‐assessment because the rival is framed by the subject as an in‐group member. Finally, we elaborate on the asset at stake in envy. We contend that this is esteem recognition: The envier covets the esteem that her reference group accords to the rival. Because, in envy, the subject conceives of herself as member of a group to which the other is also understood to belong, we conclude that envy is a social emotion insofar as it presupposes a sense of us.     

Virtues and Vices of Relativism

comment ? Subject: “Judging Others: History, Ethics, and the Purposes of Comparison” Aaron Stalnaker Journal of Religious Ethics 36.3 (September 2008) ? From: Jonathan Wyn Schofer Harvard Divinity School 45 Francis Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138     

Pathophobia,Vices, and Illness

ABSTRACT

I introduce the concept of pathophobia to capture the range of morally objectionable forms of treatment to which somatically ill persons are subjected. After distinguishing this concept from sanism and ableism, I argue that the moral wrongs of pathophobia are best analysed using a framework of vice ethics. To that end I describe five clusters of pathophobic vices and failings, illustrating each with examples from three influential illness narratives.     

Episodic Envy

Episodic envy, the unpleasant emotion resulting from a specific negative social comparison, is discussed. A new measure designed to assess it is developed, validated, and cross-validated in 3 studies. The implications of episodic envy are also examined. Results show that episodic envy is composed of a feeling component and a comparison component; and is different from unfairness, admiration, and competition. The feeling component is strongly correlated with negative emotional reactions (anxiety, depression, negative mood, hostility) and behavioral reactions (e.g., harming the other, creating a negative work atmosphere) to envy. The comparison component is correlated with behaviors intended to improve one's position in the organization. Episodic envy predicts reactions to envy above and beyond dispositional envy.     

Tolerance & Forgiveness: Virtues or Vices?

This paper explores the relationship between tolerance, forgiveness, and justice. Contrary to prevailing wisdom, it argues that tolerance and forgiveness are not independent virtues vying with justice for our allegiance, but that they fall under justice's imperative to judge other people objectively and treat them as they deserve. Misguided extensions of tolerance and forgiveness imperil the very values that ethics is designed to promote. Thus tolerance and forgiveness are neither virtues nor vices; they are appropriate only when authorised by justice. The paper clarifies the common confusion of tolerance with respect for individuals' rights, and argues that forgiveness is not a supererogatory act of generosity, but is sometimes morally required.     

Economic Envy

Envy of others' material possessions is a potent motivator of consumerism. This makes it a prudentially and morally hazardous emotional response. After outlining these hazards, I present an analysis of the emotion of envy. Envy, I argue, presents things in the following way: the envier lacks some good that her rival possesses; this difference between them is bad for the envier; this difference reflects poorly on the envier's worth; and this difference is undeserved. I then discuss the conditions under which these presentations can be satisfied by differences in material possessions. My conclusion is that no difference in material possessions can simultaneously be all the ways envy presents it as being. Consequently, economic envy is systematically irrational: it is never a warranted response to the distribution of material wealth. Recognising this bolsters the prudential and moral case for reducing the degree to which we feel it and for resisting the inclinations it gives rise to when we do.     

Envy and Its Consequences: Why It Is Useful to Distinguish between Benign and Malicious Envy

Envy is the pain that arises from the good fortune of others. Recent research identified two subtypes of envy, benign and malicious envy. Malicious envy is the envy subtype with action tendencies aimed to pull down the envied person from their superior position. Benign envy is also a frustrating experience, but activates action tendencies aimed at improving oneself. This article provides an overview of the empirical support for making this distinction in envy subtypes. It then discusses the benefits of a subtype approach to envy, with the main advantages of distinguishing benign and malicious envy being that it (a) provides researchers with the language to be clear in how they conceptualize envy and (b) allows novel predictions. A next section provides a response to some criticism on making this distinction. Finally, I conclude with a section on how envy in general, and benign and malicious envy in particular, could be measured.