Preference-based escalation: A new interpretation for the responsibility effect in escalating commitment and entrapment

A prominent finding in escalating commitment and entrapment research is the “responsibility effect”: people invest more in a losing course of action or persist with it for longer if they themselves initiated this action (responsibility) as opposed to if it was assigned to them. We argue that this effect is driven by participants’ preferences. Responsible participants usually prefer the chosen alternative since they have chosen it themselves. Non-responsible participants, in contrast, represent a mix of persons who either favor or disfavor the chosen alternative. In two experiments, we demonstrate that responsible participants favor the chosen course of action more strongly than non-responsible participants do, that these preferences facilitate reinvestment in and persistence with the chosen course of action, and that responsibility has no effect over and above this effect of preferences. Non-responsible participants preferring the chosen course of action made similar reinvestments and exhibited similar persistence as responsible participants.     

Learning to de-escalate: The effects of regret in escalation of commitment

The current research investigates whether and how individuals are able to learn from one escalation situation to another, hypothesizing that post-escalation regret will reduce subsequent escalation. In Experiment 1, individuals participated in an escalation task after escalating their commitments in a first escalation situation. In Experiment 2, participants’ regret was manipulated by asking them to imagine engaging in an escalation situation. The experiments expand our theoretical and practical understanding of how to prevent escalation of commitment by demonstrating that escalation-specific regret—either experienced from an earlier escalation or primed through imagining an escalation scenario—reduced subsequent escalation in a different context. The discussion focuses on the theoretical and practical impact of regret and emotions in general in escalation of commitment.     

Group decision process and incrementalism in organizational decision making

In two studies examining resource allocation, support is found for the notion that group decisions are affected in systematic ways depending on whether or not there was individual consideration of the problem before meeting as a group. Specifically, compared to no prior consideration groups, prior consideration groups (1) escalate their commitment more in progress (i.e., ongoing) decisions, and (2) are less willing to concentrate resources on a single project in adoption (i.e., resource utilization) decisions. The findings challenge the blanket assertion that promoting divergent views in a group decision context is always related to better decisions.     

Desire for a positive moral self-regard exacerbates escalation of commitment to initiatives with prosocial aims

Across three experiments, people escalated commitment more frequently to a failing prosocial initiative (i.e., an initiative that had the primary aim of improving the outcomes of others in need) than they did to a failing egoistic initiative (i.e., an initiative that had the primary aim of improving the outcomes of the decision-maker). A test of mediation (Study 1b) and a test of moderation (Study 2) each provided evidence that a desire for a positive moral self-regard underlies people’s tendency to escalate commitment more frequently to failing prosocial initiatives than to failing egoistic initiatives. We discuss the implications of these findings for the resource-allocation decisions that people and organizations face when undertaking initiatives with prosocial aims.     

Escalate shamefully,de‐escalate angrily or gratefully: The influence of discrete emotions on escalation of commitment

Decision makers often tend to escalate their commitment when faced with a dilemma of whether to continue a losing course of action. Researchers recently began to investigate the influence of discrete emotions on this decision tendency. However, this work has mainly focused on negative emotions and rarely considered positive emotions, to say nothing of comparing the effects of both of them simultaneously. The current study addresses this need by presenting the results of three experiments that examined the effects of four emotions of both positive and negative valences in escalation situations. Experiment 1 investigated the relationships of three trait emotions (hope, shame, and anger) and escalation of commitment. Experiments 2 and 3 examined the effects of three induced emotions (anger, shame, and gratitude) on escalation of commitment in a student sample and an employee sample, respectively. The results revealed that the effects of discrete emotions in escalation situations are mainly due to their associated differences on the appraisal dimension of responsibility that is related to escalation situations rather than their valence. The theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

The promise and peril of self-affirmation in de-escalation of commitment

Drawing on the motivated cognition literature, we examine how self-affirmation processes influence self-justification needs and escalation decisions. Study 1 found that individuals with a larger pool of affirmational resources (high self-esteem) reduced their escalation compared to those with fewer affirmational resources (low self-esteem). Study 2 extended these findings by demonstrating that individuals also de-escalated their commitments when they were provided an opportunity to affirm on an important value. Finally, Study 3 found that affirming on traits that were of low relevance (e.g., creativity) to an initial decision reduced escalation, but affirming on decision-relevant traits (e.g., decision-making ability) ironically increased escalation. Across three studies, using three instantiations of self-affirmations and two measures of escalation, the results highlight the potential benefits and costs of using self-affirmation as a vehicle to de-escalate commitment.     

Alexithymia and risk preferences: Predicting risk behaviour across decision domains

Risk‐taking is a critical health factor as it plays a key role in several diseases and is related to a number of health risk factors. The aim of the present study is to investigate the role of alexithymia in predicting risk preferences across decision domains. One hundred and thirteen participants filled out an alexithymia scale (Toronto Alexithymia Scale—TAS‐20), impulsivity and venturesomeness measures (I7 scale), and—1 month later—the Cognitive Appraisal of Risky Events (CARE questionnaire). The hierarchical regression analyses showed that alexithymia positively predicted risk preferences in two domains: aggressive/illegal behaviour and irresponsible academic/work behaviour. The results also highlighted a significant association of the alexithymia facet, externally oriented thinking (EOT), with risky sexual activities. EOT also significantly predicted aggressive/illegal behaviour and irresponsible academic/work behaviour. The alexithymia facet, Difficulty Identifying Feelings, significantly predicted irresponsible academic/work behaviour. The results of the present study provide interesting insights into the connection between alexithymia and risk preferences across different decision domains. Implications for future studies and applied interventions are discussed.     

The effects of mortality salience on escalation of commitment

Based on propositions derived from terror management theory (TMT), the current study proposes that people who are reminded of their mortality exhibit a higher degree of self-justification behavior to maintain their self-esteem. For this reason, they could be expected to stick with their previous decisions and invest an increasing amount of resources in those decisions, despite the fact that negative feedback has clearly indicated that they might be on a course toward failure (i.e., "escalation of commitment"). Our experiment showed that people who were reminded of their mortality were more likely to escalate their level of commitment by maintaining their current course of action. Two imaginary scenarios were tested. One of the scenarios involved deciding whether to send additional troops into the battlefield when previous attempts had failed; the other involved deciding whether to continue developing an anti-radar fighter plane when the enemy had already developed a device to detect it. The results supported our hypothesis that mortality salience increases the tendency to escalate one's level of commitment.     

The effect of imperfect memory recall on risk preferences

People often take on different levels of risk when deciding on future actions compared with when they take actions with immediate consequences. The presently reported research investigated how imperfect recall of previously chosen options influences temporal fluctuations in risk preferences. In two incentivized studies with a waiting time before decision resolution (a 4-week waiting period from an initial decision), we observed that errors in the recall of previous choices played a substantial role in constructing risk preferences for choices that are usually resolved after a delay. More specifically, in a first study, we found that after a waiting period (i.e., after participants waited for their risky choices to be resolved), participants perceived that they took less risk during their initial choices than they actually did. Importantly, when asked about whether they would change their initial choices, participants declared that they would take riskier choices. In a second study, we tested directly whether such a shift in initial choices could also be demonstrated behaviorally. Results revealed that after beliefs about past choices were induced, participants changed their risk preferences in line with the information presented during belief induction.     

Pricing risk and ambiguity: The effect of perspective taking

In the valuation of uncertain prospects, a difference is often observed between selling and buying perspectives. This paper distinguishes between risk (known probabilities) and ambiguity (unknown probabilities) in decisions under uncertainty and shows that the valuation disparity increases under ambiguity compared to risk. It is found that both the comparative versus noncomparative evaluation of risky and ambiguous prospects and the uniqueness of the valuation perspective (either seller or buyer) moderate this increase in the disparity under ambiguity. The finding is consistent with recent theoretical accounts of pricing under uncertainty. We discuss implications for market behaviour and for the ambiguity paradigm as a research tool.     

The effects of authentic and contrived dissent on escalation of commitment in group decision making

Escalation of commitment refers to the tendency to persist with or even intensify losing courses of action. In this study, we examined whether authentic and contrived dissent reduces escalation in group decision making. Participants first individually indicated their preference on how to allocate money between two alternatives. Based on these individual preferences, homogeneous and heterogeneous three‐person groups were formed. In addition, group discussion was either structured by assigning one group member to play the role of a devil's advocate or was not structured. Results revealed that escalation tendencies over multiple decisions were reduced in heterogeneous groups that used the devil's advocacy procedure. The rationality of this behavior is discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inaction inertia, the sunk cost effect, and handedness: Avoiding the losses of past decisions

Strength of handedness, or the degree to which an individual prefers to use a single hand to perform various tasks, is a neurological marker for brain organization and has been shown to be linked to episodic memory, attribute framing, and anchoring, as well as other domains and tasks. The present work explores the relationship of handedness to both inaction inertia (the inclination to resist an action after previously bypassing a similar action) as well as to the sunk cost effect (the tendency to continue to engage in a behavior after an initial investment of time or money has been made). In Experiment 1, mixed-handers displayed a larger inaction inertia effect than strong-handers. In Experiment 2, they displayed a larger sunk cost effect than strong-handers. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the sunk cost finding into a different domain and explored how mixed- and strong-handers react to additional information designed to increase the comparative advantage of terminating, rather than continuing, a failed project. Overall, we found that mixed-handers were more likely to show inertia effects because of an increased aversion to losses. The results of Experiment 4 suggest that, when provided with additional information that made it clear that continuing a project would be a greater loss than terminating it, mixed-handers no longer showed a larger sunk cost effect than strong-handers, highlighting the importance of carefully considering exactly how sunk cost scenarios are worded and providing additional information on how mixed- and strong-handers differ in belief updating.     

Commitment profiles: The configural effect of the forms and foci of commitment on work outcomes

This study is based upon the conceptual linking of the multidimensional and multi-focal nature of work-related commitment. The main aims of our study were to create, through K-means cluster analysis, commitment profiles based on the three components of organizational and occupational commitment, and to examine their joint effect on key work outcomes. One hundred and fifty seven working adults completed questionnaires measuring the three components of organizational and occupational commitment, and work outcomes. Our findings show (a) the incremental validity of occupational commitment in the prediction of work-related variables, (b) the compatibility of occupational and organizational commitment as reflected in the four form-oriented commitment profiles that emerged (highly committed, affective–normative dominant, continuance dominant, and non-committed), and (c) the positive effect of the highly committed profile (dually foci-committed employees with high AC, CC, and NC) on focal and discretionary behaviors. On a practical level, our results can foster the practice of management concerning control of withdrawal behaviors and development of desirable discretionary behaviors.     

急性应激与风险倾向：兴奋易感性的调节作用

为探索应激对决策的作用机理及其个体差异,减少工程作业中因应激导致的决策失误,本研究采用特里尔社会应激测试和气球模拟风险任务考察应激反应与应激下风险倾向的关系,并探索兴奋易感性在其中的调节作用。研究结果表明,应激下个体的皮质醇反应越大,行为越冒险。且这一作用受到兴奋易感性的调节：兴奋易感性较高的个体,应激下皮质醇反应越大,行为越冒险;而兴奋易感性较低的个体,其皮质醇变化不能预测风险倾向。该发现提示了兴奋易感性在应激影响中的重要作用,也为高压岗位的人员选拔提供了科学启示。     

The effects of labelling,expert testimony,and information processing mode on juror decisions in SVP civil commitment trials

Expert witnesses offering testimony in sexually violent predator civil commitment trials may use diagnostic labels that are either familiar (e.g. ‘psychopath’) or unfamiliar (e.g. ‘paraphilia’) to jurors. Using predictions based on cognitive experiential self-theory, we explored the influence of testimony type (clinical versus actuarial) and diagnostic label (psychopath versus paraphilia) on jurors motivated to adopt either an experiential processing mode (PM; in which heuristic cues may be strongly relied upon) or an analytic rational PM. Consistent with previous research, our results indicated that when given a psychopathic diagnostic label, mock jurors motivated to process information experientially were more influenced by clinical testimony, whereas mock jurors induced into a rational mode were more influenced by actuarial testimony. However, experientially oriented jurors given a paraphilia diagnostic label did not show the expected influence of clinical expert testimony, and instead were more persuaded by actuarial testimony. These findings are discussed from a judgement and heuristics cues framework. The implications of several procedural suggestions are examined. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Developmental changes in decision making under risk: The role of executive functions and reasoning abilities in 8- to 19-year-old decision makers

Previous studies have shown that children and adolescents often tend toward risky decisions despite explicit knowledge about the potential negative consequences. This phenomenon has been suggested to be associated with the immaturity of brain areas involved in cognitive control functions. Particularly, “frontal lobe functions,” such as executive functions and reasoning, mature until young adulthood and are thought to be involved in age-related changes in decision making under explicit risk conditions. We investigated 112 participants, aged 8–19 years, with a frequently used task assessing decisions under risk, the Game of Dice Task (GDT). Additionally, we administered the Modified Card Sorting Test assessing executive functioning (categorization, cognitive flexibility, and strategy maintenance) as well as the Ravens Progressive Matrices assessing reasoning. The results showed that risk taking in the GDT decreased with increasing age and this effect was not moderated by reasoning but by executive functions: Particularly, young persons with weak executive functioning showed very risky decision making. Thus, the individual maturation of executive functions, associated with areas in the prefrontal cortex, seems to be an important factor in young peoples’ behavior in risky decision-making situations.     

Sunk cost of local elected representatives in situation of fiscal competition: An example of escalating commitment

Introduction

Competition between French local communities to build infrastructures to attract enterprises and residents could sometimes result in irrational public spending.