共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 8 毫秒
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John Wright 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):129-142
One problem that has formed the focus of much recent discussion on personal identity is the Fission Problem. The aim of this paper is to offer a novel solution to this problem.
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John WrightEmail: Phone: +61-2-4921-5182Fax: +61-2-4921-6940 |
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JONATHAN ICHIKAWA 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2011,82(2):287-313
Many of the motivations in favor of contextualism about knowledge apply also to a contextualist approach to counterfactuals. I motivate and articulate such an approach, in terms of the context‐sensitive ‘all cases’, in the spirit of David Lewis’s contextualist view about knowledge. The resulting view explains intuitive data, resolves a puzzle parallel to the skeptical paradox, and renders safety and sensitivity, construed as counterfactuals, necessary conditions on knowledge. 相似文献
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David Mandel 《Cognition & emotion》2013,27(1):139-159
Participants recalled either a negative academic or interpersonal experience, and the relations among counterfactual thinking, negative emotions, and attributions of blame and control were examined. Situational context effects on attribution, counterfactual thinking, and emotion were observed, indicating a greater tendency toward self-focused cognition and emotion in the academic context than in the interpersonal context. Consistent with recent theorising, upward counterfactual thinking was associated with negative emotions of guilt, shame, regret, disappointment, and sadness. However, there was no indication that downward counterfactual thinking regulated emotion as previous literature suggests. Implications for functional and process theories of counterfactual thinking are discussed. 相似文献
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Sören Häggqvist 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2015,58(7-8):741-754
AbstractIn The Philosophy of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), Tim Williamson has offered a sophisticated account of thought experiments and of modal epistemology. More recently, he has also engaged in a variant of the so-called ‘expertise defence’ of traditional philosophical methodology. In this paper I argue that if Williamson’s account of thought experiments and of modal epistemology is right, this seriously undermines his version of the expertise defence. 相似文献
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Mathias Frisch 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(4):655-672
In order to motivate the thesis that there is no single concept of causation that can do justice to all of our core intuitions concerning that concept, Ned Hall has argued that there is a conflict between a counterfactual criterion of causation and the condition of causal locality. In this paper I critically examine Hall's argument within the context of a more general discussion of the role of locality constraints in a causal conception of the world. I present two strategies that defenders of counterfactual accounts of causation can pursue to respond to Hall's challenge—including the adoption of a counterfactual condition that is sufficient for causal action-at-a-distance in place of Hall's ‘process’ condition—and conclude that Hall's argument against counterfactual accounts of causation is unsuccessful. 相似文献
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Tomasz Bigaj 《Axiomathes》2005,15(4):599-619
The article deals with one particular problem created by the counterfactual analysis of causality à la Lewis, namely the context-sensitivity problem or, as I prefer to call it, the background condition problem. It appears that
Lewis’ counterfactual definition of causality cannot distinguish between proper causes and mere causal conditions – i.e. factors
necessary for the effect to occur, but commonly not seen as causally efficacious. The proposal is put forward to amend the
Lewis definition with a condition, based on the notion of cotenability, which would eliminate the problem. It is shown that
the corrected definition of causality leads to the transitivity of the causal relation. Possible objections to the proposed
solution, involving the assumption of indeterminism and the preemption cases, are given a thorough consideration. 相似文献
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Nikk Effingham 《Erkenntnis》2011,74(2):225-240
This paper argues that, in light of certain scenarios involving time travel, Sider’s definition of ‘instantaneous temporal
part’ cannot be accepted in conjunction with a semantic thesis that perdurantists often assume. I examine a rejoinder from
Sider, as well as Thomson’s alternative definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’, and show how neither helps. Given this,
we should give up on the perdurantist semantic thesis. I end by recommending that, once we no longer accept such semantics,
we should accept a new set of definitions, which are superior in certain respects to Sider’s original set. 相似文献
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Nikk Effingham 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(2):333-345
I have previously argued in a paper with Robson that a particular time travel scenario favours perdurantism over endurantism on the grounds that endurantists must give up on the Weak Supplementation Principle. Smith has responded, arguing that the reasons we provided are insufficient to warrant this conclusion. This paper agrees with that conclusion (for slightly different reasons: that even the perdurantist has to give up on the Weak Supplementation Principle) but argues that the old argument can be supplanted with a new one. 相似文献
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Counterfactuals, probabilistic counterfactuals and causation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
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Igal Kvart 《Erkenntnis》1992,36(2):139-179
In this article I offer an approach to counterfactuals based on a notion of objective probability. It is in the spirit of, though it does not fall squarely under, the metalinguistic model. Thus, it is not developed in terms of possible worlds, or notions parasitic on them (e.g., similarity). Its dominant features are rooted in objective probability and causal relevance (analyzed probabilistically), and thus it is not close in spirit to a maximal similarity or a minimal change approach. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - 相似文献
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SU Ching Hui 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2015,10(4):668
It is commonly agreed that when evaluating the validity of an argument involving context-sensitive expressions, the context should be held fixed. In their 2008 essay “Counterfactuals and Context,” Brogaard and Salerno argue further that context should be held fixed when evaluating an argument involving counterfactuals for validity, since, as many will agree, counterfactuals are context-sensitive. In the present paper, it will however be argued that Brogaard and Salerno fail to distinguish between two different roles that context plays in determining the meaning of a given counterfactual. If they were fully aware of the distinction between these two roles played by context, they might propose a contextualist approach to counterfactuals, as has been developed by Ichikawa in his 2011 paper “Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals.” 相似文献
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Journal of Philosophical Logic - In this paper, we investigate the semantics and logic of choice-driven counterfactuals, that is, of counterfactuals whose evaluation relies on auxiliary premises... 相似文献