Mereological nihilism: quantum atomism and the impossibility of material constitution

Mereological nihilism is the philosophical position that there are no items that have parts. If there are no items with parts then the only items that exist are partless fundamental particles, such as the true atoms (also called philosophical atoms) theorized to exist by some ancient philosophers, some contemporary physicists, and some contemporary philosophers. With several novel arguments I show that mereological nihilism is the correct theory of reality. I will also discuss strong similarities that mereological nihilism has with empirical results in quantum physics. And I will discuss how mereological nihilism vindicates a few other theories, such as a very specific theory of philosophical atomism, which I will call quantum abstract atomism. I will show that mereological nihilism also is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that avoids the problems of other interpretations, such as the widely known, metaphysically generated, quantum paradoxes of quantum physics, which ironically are typically accepted as facts about reality. I will also show why it is very surprising that mereological nihilism is not a widely held theory, and not the premier theory in philosophy.     

Infants' On-line Segmentation of Dynamic Human Action

Identifying the developmental origins of scientific thinking, as well as its endpoint, provides an essential framework for understanding its development. The origins of scientific thinking are claimed here to lie in attainments in epistemological understanding, beginning with the understanding achieved at about 4 years of age that assertions generated by human minds are distinguishable from an external reality against which they can be compared. Despite this achievement, children between 4 and 6 years of age exhibit an epistemological category mistake regarding the source of knowledge. They confuse a theory making it plausible that an event occurred and evidence indicating that the event did occur, as the source of their knowing that the event occurred. Appreciation of this distinction develops rapidly during this age range and reflects increasing mastery of an epistemological understanding we argue to be of foundational status for the development of scientific thinking, defined here as the consciously controlled coordination of theory and evidence.     

The Practice of Wisdom: A Contribution to Clinical Philosophy

A general theory of treatment and cure of persons is proposed that might be called clinical philosophy, in contrast to clinical medicine, which concerns the treatment and cure of bodies.

Freud was more a philosopher than is apparent at first glance. He recognized that dreams were not the opposite of reality but transcended the distinction between reality and nonreality. In doing so, he discarded the distinction between truth and fiction and created a new reality that he called psychic reality. Thus the relationship between a psychoanalyst and an analysand can be regarded as a virtual one, it being really metaphorical and existing only within the context and in the service of the treatment.

Remembering is a repetition. Something happening in the present. If the memory is a thought, the thought remembered refers to something in the past that is not present, but when one remembers in the form of an emotion, one actually reexperiences that emotion in the present. These are so-called emotional memories. In the context of the psychoanalytic encounter, they are interpreted as transferences.     

What is General Philosophy of Science?

The very idea of a general philosophy of science relies on the assumption that there is this thing called science??as opposed to the various individual sciences. In this programmatic piece I make a case for the claim that general philosophy of science is the philosophy of science in general or science as such. Part of my narrative makes use of history, for two reasons. First, general philosophy of science is itself characterised by an intellectual tradition which aimed to develop a coherent philosophical view of science, qua a part of culture with distinctive epistemic features and a distinctive relation to reality. But, second, this tradition went through some important conceptual shifts which re-oriented it and made it more sensitive to the actual development of science itself. The historical narrative focuses on three such moments: the defining moment, associated with Aristotle, and two major conceptual turns, related to Kant and Duhem. The pressures on the very idea of a general philosophy of science that followed the collapse of the macro-models of science that became popular in the 1960s, the pressures that lay all of the emphasis on fragmentation and not on integration, can be dealt with by a new synthesis within general philosophy of science of the constitutive and the historical, in light of the intellectual tradition that has defined it.     

QUANTUM AND CONSCIOUSNESS: IN SEARCH OF A NEW PARADIGM

Abstract. Two fundamental issues raised by Lothar Schäfer are considered: (1) the question of a suitable paradigm within which the findings of quantum physics can be optimally interpreted and (2) the question of the assessment of the presence and importance of mind and consciousness in the universe. In regard to the former, I contend that the ideal of science is to interpret its findings in an optimally consistent and minimally speculative framework. In this context Schäfer's assertion that certain findings in quantum physics (those that relate to virtual states) indicate the presence of mind at the quantum level implies a dualistic and hence unnecessarily speculative assumption. In regard to the assessment of mind and consciousness, a consistent and parsimonious paradigm suggests that mind and consciousness are not part of a chain of events consisting of an admixture of physical and mental events but that physical events form a single, coherent set of events, and mental events another set, with the two sets related, as Teilhard (and a number of other philosophers, including White head) affirmed, as the “within” and the “without” (or the “mental pole” and the “physical pole”) of one and the same fundamental reality. This panpsychist as contrasted with Schäfer's dualist paradigm provides a single self‐consistent framework for the interpretation of quantum (and all natural) events while recognizing the presence of mind in the universe as the least speculative realist implication of our immediate experience of consciousness.     

Schrödinger's Cat and Divine Action: Some Comments on the Use of Quantum Uncertainty to Allow for God's Action in the World

I present results of recent work in the field of quantum optics and relate this work to discussions about the theory of quantum mechanics and God's divine action in the world. Experiments involving atomic decay, relevant to event uncertainty in quantum mechanics, as well as experiments aimed at elucidating the so–called Schrödinger's–cat paradox, help clarify apparent ambiguities or paradoxes that I believe are at the heart of renewed attempts to locate God within our constructed physical theories and tend to narrow the gaps proposed as an opening for divine action. Some problems arise because of imprecise use of nonmathematical language to force quantum mechanics into an intuitive "classical" framework.     

Holism in Cartesianism and in Today's Philosophy of Physics

The aim of this paper is to contribute to a more balanced judgement than the widespread impression that the changes which are called for in today's philosophy of physics and which centre around the concept of holism amount to a rupture with the framework of Cartesian philosophy of physics. I argue that this framework includes a sort of holism: As a result of the identification of matter with space, any physical property can be instantiated only if there is the whole of matter. Relating this holism to general relativity, I maintain that this holism cannot be directly applied to today's philosophy of physics consequent upon the failure of geometrodynamics. I show in what respect precisely the holism in quantum physics amounts to a revision of the holism within Cartesianism. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Ordering the components of autobiographical events

Memory for the temporal order of the components of autobiographical events was examined in two experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 examined the relationship between reaction times to recognise photographs of the components of events and ordering of these photographs. Reaction times were not related to true event position, nor to assigned temporal position, in a manner consistent with an activation strength model of temporal ordering. In contrast, ordering performance was found to be related to event vividness ratings, ability to classify a photograph as one the participant had taken, and retention interval. These findings are all consistent with the hypothesis that the order of an autobiographical event's components is determined by the associative structure that links each component to its general event memory. Overall, memory for the order of the components of autobiographical events may be initially based on associations between the event components and their general event memory representation. These associations appear to decay rapidly leaving only reconstructive ability as the determinant of event component order.     

Self-Recording of Everyday Life Events: Origins, Types, and Uses

ABSTRACT In this article we review the history of the scientific use of self-recording and conclude that there are three basic methods: ( a ) interval-contingent, in which respondents report on their experiences at regular intervals, ( b ) signal-contingent, in which respondents report when signaled, and ( c ) event-contingent, in which respondents report whenever a defined event occurs. We then discuss the relative merits of these techniques for answering different questions. Finally, we note that self-recording of small events is a departure from the science of psychology as typically practiced, requiring an acceptance of reality as defined by respondents.     

Towards a general theory of representation

Summary The models of science are representations of a part of reality. Every science has its own specific rules of constructing models, but there are many common rules that must be followed. These rules are to be part of what may be called a general theory of representation. This paper discusses some general aspects of representation that must be considered before such a general theory can be created. There are five sections: (1) an introduction to the topic of representation in general; (2) an overview of some general types of representation, such as goal-directed and self-organizational representations; (3) a short discussion of representation in some specific disciplines; (4) some formal aspects of representations; and (5) a discussion of epistemological aspects of representation, especially scientific reduction and mental causation.This paper was written during participation in the Research Project Mind and Brain, at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research, University of Bielefeld, BRD.     

Luck as Risk and the Lack of Control Account of Luck

This essay explains the notion of luck in terms of risk. It starts by distinguishing two senses of risk, the risk that an event has of occurring and the risk at which an agent is with respect to an event. It cashes out the former in modal terms (rather than probabilistic) and the latter in terms of lack of control. It then argues that the presence or absence of event‐relative risk marks a distinction between two types of luck or fortune commonly overlooked in ordinary usage of the terms “luck” and “fortune.” After offering a detailed account of the notion of control, the essay advances a new version of the so‐called lack of control account of luck: lucky events are events with respect to which one is at risk and hence events over which one lacks control in the specified way. Finally, it argues that its account steers clear of counterexamples to the lack of control account of luck.     

NEW PHENOMENOLOGY IN FRANCE

Phenomenology is a basic philosophical movement belonging to what is called “continental philosophy.” Recently, a new phenomenology has emerged in France. In the period from Levinas and Henry to Marion and Richir, it has become evident that the phenomenon as such cannot be reduced to a mere constitution by intentional consciousness; rather, it must be considered as an event of appearing that establishes itself by itself. This fundamental insight entails important consequences: on the one hand, a new concept of the subject has been elaborated; on the other hand, a new approach to effective reality and objectivity has been developed. Idealism is overcome, transcendentalism is revised and reinterpreted. These changes will certainly have an impact on the destiny of continental philosophy.     

Quantum logical calculi and lattice structures

In a preceding paper [1] it was shown that quantum logic, given by the tableaux-calculus T _eff, is complete and consistent with respect to the dialogic foundation of logics. Since in formal dialogs the special property of the value-definiteness of propositions is not postulated, the calculus T _eff represents a calculus of effective (intuitionistic) quantum logic.Beginning with the tableaux-calculus the equivalence of T _eff to calculi which use more familiar figures such as sequents and implications can be investigated. In this paper we present a sequents-calculus of Gentzen-type and a propositional calculus of Brouwer-type which are shown to be equivalent to T _eff. The effective propositional calculus provides an interpretation for a lattice structure, called quasi-implicative lattice. If, in addition, the value-definiteness of quantum mechanical propositions is postulated, a propositional calculus is obtained which provides an interpretation for a quasi-modular orthocomplemented lattice which, as is well-known, has as a model the lattice of subspaces of a Hilbert space.     

Making sense of surprise: an investigation of the factors influencing surprise judgments

Surprise is often defined in terms of disconfirmed expectations, whereby the surprisingness of an event is thought to be dependent on the degree to which it contrasts with a more likely, or expected, outcome. The authors investigated the alternative hypothesis that surprise is more accurately modeled as a manifestation of an ongoing sense-making process. In a series of experiments, participants were given a number of scenarios and rated surprise and probability for various hypothetical outcomes that either confirmed or disconfirmed an expectation. Experiment 1 demonstrated that representational specificity influences the relationship that holds between surprise and probability ratings. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the inclusion of an enabling event lowers surprise ratings for disconfirming outcomes. Experiment 3 explored the reason for this effect, revealing that enabling events lower surprise by reducing uncertainty, thus enhancing ease of integration. Experiment 4 evaluated the contrast hypothesis directly, showing that differences in contrast are not correlated with differences in surprise. These results provide converging support for the view that the level of surprise experienced for an event is related to the difficulty of integrating that event with an existing representation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved).     

Realism and Objectivism in Quantum Mechanics

The present study attempts to provide a consistent and coherent account of what the world could be like, given the conceptual framework and results of contemporary quantum theory. It is suggested that standard quantum mechanics can, and indeed should, be understood as a realist theory within its domain of application. It is pointed out, however, that a viable realist interpretation of quantum theory requires the abandonment or radical revision of the classical conception of physical reality and its traditional philosophical presuppositions. It is argued, in this direction, that the conceptualization of the nature of reality, as arising out of our most basic physical theory, calls for a kind of contextual realism. Within the domain of quantum mechanics, knowledge of ??reality in itself??, ??the real such as it truly is?? independent of the way it is contextualized, is impossible in principle. In this connection, the meaning of objectivity in quantum mechanics is analyzed, whilst the important question concerning the nature of quantum objects is explored.     

On Order Invariant Aggregation Functionals

This paper deals with aggregation functionals defined on arbitrary sets of ordinal numerical values in the framework of representational measurement theory. Our basic assumption is that such a functional represents a meaningful relation between variables; i.e., it is invariant under actions from an appropriate automorphism group. We prove that an aggregation functional is continuous, idempotent, and invariant if and only if it can be represented in the form of the Choquet integral with respect to a monotonic {0, 1}- valued set function. We also establish a polynomial representation for these functionals.     

三值量子逻辑进路探析

量子测量实验显示部分经典逻辑规则在量子世界中失效。标准量子逻辑进路通过特有的希尔伯特空间的格运算揭示出一种内在于微观物理学理论的概念框架结构,也即量子力学测量命题的正交补模或弱模格,解释了经典分配律的失效,它在形式化方面十分完美,但在解释方面产生了一些概念混乱。在标准量子逻辑进路之外,赖欣巴赫通过引入"不确定"的第三真值独立地提出一种不同的量子逻辑模型来解释量子实在的特征,不是分配律而是排中律失效,但是他的三值量子逻辑由于缺乏标准量子逻辑的上述优点而被认为与量子力学的概率空间所要求的潜在逻辑有很少联系。本文尝试引入一种新的三值逻辑模型来说明量子实在,它有以下优点:(1)满足卢卡西维茨创立三值逻辑的最初语义学假定;(2)克服赖欣巴赫三值量子逻辑的缺陷;(3)澄清标准量子逻辑遭遇的概念混乱;(4)充分地保留经典逻辑规则,特别是标准量子逻辑主张放弃的分配律。     

Using a Values‐Based Taxonomy in Counselor Education

Values such as respect for the client's privacy and respect for diversity are integral to training new counselors. This requires learning in the affective domain, defined as the internalization of values ( Krathwohl, Bloom, & Masia, 1964 ). The affective taxonomy of Krathwohl et al. (1964) is presented as a means of teaching values and measuring the internalization of values. An example from a multicultural counseling course is offered as a template for implications in counselor education.     

Subjectivist – observing and objective – participant perspectives on the world: Kant,aquinas and quantum mechanics

Theological thinking is influenced by perspectives on the relation of scientific knowledge to reality. Two paradigms for understanding the nature of human knowledge are considered in relation to quantum mechanics: the subjective-observing perspective of Kant, and the objective-participant perspective of Thomas Aquinas. I discuss whether quantum mechanics necessarily implies a subject centered perspective on reality, and argue, with reference to d'Espagnat's notion of veiled reality, that quantum non-separability challenges this view. I then explore whether the objective-participant perspective of Thomas Aquinas provides a more fruitful context for understanding quantum mechanics. I discuss quantum measurement in terms of the transition from potentiality to actuality, and knowledge as the latent intelligibility of the world realized. However, the negative nature of our knowledge of quantum non-separability also challenges this perspective. Our theological thinking in response to quantum knowledge must therefore proceed tentatively, balancing a via positiva, with a via negativa.     

Changing environmental context does not reliably affect memory

Most current theories of human memory propose that context, defined here as the time and place at which an event was experienced, forms an integral feature of the mnemonic representation of events. One way of investigating context is by manipulating the environmental context (which typically means the room in which the experiment takes place). The predominant result of this manipulation reported in the literature has been consistent with theory: Memory performance is better when the learning and testing environments are the same than when they differ. This article reports eight experiments that in aggregate challenge the reliability of this same-context advantage. Experiment 1 reported a failure to obtain a same-context advantage. Experiments 2–7 investigated various features of the design that might have reduced the effect. None of these experiments produced a reliable same-context advantage. Experiment 8 repeated the methodology of a published report of a same-context advantage with more than double the number of subjects, but failed to replicate the effect. An analysis of features of the experiments led to two suggestions for future investigations of the effects of changes in environmental context on memory.