Children's Eyewitness Identification as Implicit Moral Decision‐Making

Why are young children particularly prone to make false positive errors or false alarms when identifying a wrongdoer? In three studies, the problem was approached using a signal detection analysis, focusing on the moral costs of false alarms, as understood at different points in development. The findings are as follows: (i) decisional criteria became more conservative, indicating fewer false alarms, with age in three studies; (ii) children's beliefs about the seriousness of false alarms and misses changed from (a) a non‐moral concern to (b) a moral concern for misses to (c) a moral concern for false alarms. (iii) These findings were replicated in two demographically different communities. More critically, (iv) framing of the filmed event, for example, as a moral transgression (stealing) or a pro‐social (helping) act (Study 1) and as intentional with little damage or unintentional with major damage (Study 3), interacts with age in influencing decisional criteria. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Goal‐Proximity Decision‐Making

Reinforcement learning (RL) models of decision‐making cannot account for human decisions in the absence of prior reward or punishment. We propose a mechanism for choosing among available options based on goal‐option association strengths, where association strengths between objects represent previously experienced object proximity. The proposed mechanism, Goal‐Proximity Decision‐making (GPD), is implemented within the ACT‐R cognitive framework. GPD is found to be more efficient than RL in three maze‐navigation simulations. GPD advantages over RL seem to grow as task difficulty is increased. An experiment is presented where participants are asked to make choices in the absence of prior reward. GPD captures human performance in this experiment better than RL.     

Career Decision‐Making Intervention With Unemployed Adults: When Good Intentions Are Not Effective

This study adapted existing empirically supported interventions to explore options for serving large numbers of unemployed adults. Participants included 150 unemployed adults (72 experimental group, 78 control group) seeking employment office services to maintain U.S. federal unemployment compensation. A 1‐hour workshop was offered to the 72 experimental group participants. The same career development variables were assessed during data collection for both groups. Results revealed the workshop had no impact on negative career thinking and potentially increased career decision‐making difficulties in the experimental group. Intervention effectiveness issues, implications for future research, and intervention options with unemployed adults are discussed.     

High School Students' Career‐Related Decision‐Making Difficulties

The present study examined the construct of career‐related decision‐making difficulties among 1,843 Israeli adolescents: choosing a high school (9th grade), choosing high school elective courses (10th grade), and deciding on a military job preference (11th grade). Three versions of the Career Decision‐Making Difficulties Questionnaire (CDDQ) were constructed to match the 3 decision situations. The structures of the 10 difficulty categories of the revised CDDQ were found similar to that proposed by I. Gati, M. Krausz, and S. H. Osipow (1996). Boys reported higher difficulties than girls in external conflicts and dysfunctional beliefs. Research and counseling implications are discussed.     

The Problem of Counterfactuals in Substituted Judgement Decision‐Making

The standard by which we apply decision‐making for those unable to do so for themselves is an important practical ethical issue with substantial implications for the treatment and welfare of such individuals. The approach to proxy or surrogate decision‐making based upon substituted judgement is often seen as the ideal standard to aim for but suffers from a need to provide a clear account of how to determine the validity of the proxy's judgements. Proponents have responded to this demand by providing the truth‐conditions for the substituted judgement in terms of counterfactual reasoning using a possible worlds semantics. In this paper, I show how these underpinnings fail to support the substituted judgement approach as a reasonable standard for decision‐making. Firstly, I show how this counterfactual element has been poorly interpreted. I then explain how various accounts have failed to reflect problems and limitations associated with providing an interpretation of their truth‐conditions using counterfactuals. Finally, I argue that, even when we attend to the initial problems of providing a counterfactual analysis, it still deeply problematic as a means of determining the validity of substituted judgements for two main reasons. Firstly, making determinate judgements as to the truth‐value of these judgements will often not be possible and, secondly, there is a strong requirement when interpreting many counterfactual claims to charitably accede to their being true. I conclude that substituted judgements, as interpreted through counterfactual reasoning and possible worlds semantics, do not therefore provide an adequate standard for surrogate decision‐making.     

Relating Decision‐Making Styles to Social Orientation and Time Approach

Research on decision‐making styles has shown that stylistic differences matter for real‐life outcomes, but less research has explored how styles relate to other differences between individuals. Heeding a call for a more systematic and theoretically sound understanding of decision‐making styles, we investigated the relation between decision‐making styles and specific aspects of social orientation and approach to time in two samples (students, n = 118, and police investigators, n = 90). The results of regression analyses showed that decision‐making styles are related to specific differences in social orientation and time approach. Furthermore, results of structural equation model analyses suggested possible adjustments to the proposed two‐factor model for decision‐making styles (Dewberry, Juanchich, & Narendran, 2013a ). © 2017 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

For the Win: Risk‐Sensitive Decision‐Making in Teams

Risk‐sensitivity theory predicts that decision‐makers should prefer high‐risk options in high need situations when low‐risk options will not meet these needs. Recent attempts to adopt risk‐sensitivity as a framework for understanding human decision‐making have been promising. However, this research has focused on individual‐level decision‐making, has not examined behavior in naturalistic settings, and has not examined the influence of multiple levels of need on decision‐making under risk. We examined group‐level risk‐sensitive decision‐making in two American football leagues: the National Football League (NFL) and the National College Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I. Play decisions from the 2012 NFL (Study 1; N = 33 944), 2013 NFL (Study 2; N = 34 087), and 2012 NCAA (Study 3; N = 15 250) regular seasons were analyzed. Results demonstrate that teams made risk‐sensitive decisions based on two distinct needs: attaining first downs (a key proximate goal in football) and acquiring points above parity. Evidence for risk‐sensitive decisions was particularly strong when motivational needs were most salient. These findings are the first empirical demonstration of team risk‐sensitivity in a naturalistic organizational setting. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Counselor Ethical Reasoning: Decision‐Making Practice Versus Theory

Counselors’ decision‐making processes have received little attention in the literature. The purpose of this study was to ascertain the ethical decision‐making practices of counselors working in the field. The results of a phenomenological study indicate that linear models and an orientation to professional ethical guidelines learned in graduate training serve as a foundation, yet not a practical guide, in professional ethical decision making. The authors found that 4 themes guide counselors’ ethical decision making: personal values, clients’ best interest, transparency in decision making, and perceptions of formal training and practice. Implications for practice and counselor education are provided, with recommendations for future research.     

The Career Decision‐Making Process of Chinese American Youth

The authors investigated how negotiating two cultural expectations may influence the career decision‐making process of Chinese youth. In‐depth interviews were conducted with 8 participants addressing issues of role models, career interests, and individuals with whom they discussed career concerns. Consensual Qualitative Research (C. E. Hill, B. J. Thompson, & E. N. Williams, 1997) was used to analyze data. The findings suggest that parents' academic and career expectations influenced the career decisions of Chinese youth.     

A Scanpath Analysis of the Risky Decision‐Making Process

In the field of eye tracking, scanpath analysis can reflect the sequential and temporal properties of the cognitive process. However, the advantages of scanpath analysis have not yet been utilized in the study of risky decision making. We explored the methodological applicability of scanpath analysis to test models of risky decision making by analyzing published data from the eye‐tracking studies of Su et al. (2013); Wang and Li (2012), and Sun, Rao, Zhou, and Li (2014). These studies used a proportion task, an outcome‐matched presentation condition, and a multiple‐play condition as the baseline for comparison with information search and processing in the risky decision‐making condition. We found that (i) the similarity scores of the intra‐conditions were significantly higher than those of the inter‐condition; (ii) the scanpaths of the two conditions were separable; and (iii) based on an inspection of typical trials, the patterns of the scanpaths differed between the two conditions. These findings suggest that scanpath analysis is reliable and valid for examining the process of risky decision making. In line with the findings of the three original studies, our results indicate that risky decision making is unlikely to be based on a weighting and summing process, as hypothesized by the family of expectation models. The findings highlight a new methodological direction for research on decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Career Decision‐Making Self‐Efficacy Change in Italian High School Students

The authors explored the effects of a structured‐group career intervention among 280 Italian high school students. Hierarchical linear models indicated the intervention's effectiveness in increasing career decision‐making self‐efficacy and, consequently, career exploration, but not in decreasing career choice anxiety. In addition, partial confirmation was found for the moderating effects of participants' expectations and motivation to change on the relationship between career decision‐making self‐efficacy and career choice anxiety. The findings support the development of a systematic vocational guidance program in Italian schools.     

Intuition in Judgment and Decision Making: Extensive Thinking Without Effort

We claim that intuition is capable of quickly processing multiple pieces of information without noticeable cognitive effort. We advocate a component view stating that intuitive processes in judgment and decision making are responsible for information integration and output formation (e.g., preference, choice), whereas analytic thinking mainly guides input formation such as search, generation, and change of information. We present empirical evidence corroborating this notion and show that integration of information and preference formation works without cognitive control and is unconstrained by the amount of encoded information and cognitive capacity. We discuss the implications of our findings for the bounded rationality perspective and the multiple strategy approach to judgment and decision making. Finally we outline a connectionist framework for integrating intuitive and analytic thought processes.     

Emotional Intelligence and Career Decision‐Making Self‐Efficacy: National and Gender Differences

This study examined the effect of emotional intelligence (EI) on career decision‐making self‐efficacy (CDMSE) in an East Asian context, as well as the moderating roles of gender and country. Data were collected from undergraduate students from China (N = 149) and South Korea (N = 218). The results showed that all 4 factors of EI were positively related to CDMSE. Moreover, while the effects of 3 EI factors on CDMSE were found to be greater among the Chinese students than the South Korean students, no gender differences were detected. By introducing cultural influences, the findings provide important implications for career counseling.     

Deliberation Versus Intuition: Decomposing the Role of Expertise in Judgment and Decision Making

What produces better judgments: deliberating or relying on intuition? Past research is inconclusive. We focus on the role of expertise to increase understanding of the effects of judgment mode. We propose a framework in which expertise depends on a person's experience with and knowledge about a domain. Individuals who are relatively experienced but have modest knowledge about the subject matter (“intermediates”) are expected to suffer from deliberation and to benefit from a more intuitive approach, because they lack the formal knowledge to understand the reasons underlying their preferences. Individuals who are high (“experts”) or low (“novices”) on both experience and knowledge are expected to do well or poorly, respectively, regardless of decision mode. We tested these predictions in the domain of art. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that intermediates performed better when relying on intuition than after deliberation. Judgments of experts and novices were unaffected. In line with previous research relating processing style to judgment mode, Experiment 3 showed that the effect of processing style (global versus local) on judgment quality is similarly moderated by expertise. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Radical Interpretation’ and the Assessment of Decision‐Making Capacity

The assessment of patients' decision‐making capacity (DMC) has become an important area of clinical practice, and since it provides the gateway for a consideration of non‐consensual treatment, has major ethical implications. Tests of DMC such as under the Mental Capacity Act (2005) for England and Wales aim at supporting autonomy and reducing unwarranted paternalism by being ‘procedural’, focusing on how the person arrived at a treatment decision. In practice, it is difficult, especially in problematic or borderline cases, to avoid a consideration of beliefs and values; that is, of the substantive content of ideas rather than simple ‘cognitive’ or procedural abilities. However, little attention has been paid to how beliefs and values might be assessed in the clinical context and what kind of ‘objectivity’ is possible. We argue that key aspects of Donald Davidson's ideas of ‘Radical Interpretation’ and the ‘Principle of Charity’ provide useful guidance as to how clinicians might approach the question of whether an apparent disturbance in a person's thinking about beliefs or values undermines their DMC. A case example is provided, and a number of implications for clinical practice are discussed.     

Moral Incapacity and Deliberation

Was Luther avowing a genuine moral incapacity when he claimed that he could do no other? Bernard Williams has distinguished moral from psychological incapacity in terms of deliberation. There are three particular difficulties for the notion: in addition to (1) scepticism about whether the agent is genuinely incapable, there are (2) the possibility of conflicting moral incapacities, and (3) apparent cases where there is no actual or possible deliberation. If (1) can be countered, (2) can be met by ceteris paribus clauses, and it is shown that these do not remove the element of necessity. And (3) can be met by showing how possible deliberation is involved in putative counter-examples. Williams' account needs to be augmented to deal with cases of the morally unthinkable, and refined to allow for incipient attempts to do the morally impossible     

Self‐Control Moderates Decision‐Making Behavior When Minimizing Losses versus Maximizing Gains

We examined (1) whether people would be more responsive to the delayed consequences of their decisions when attempting to minimize losses than when attempting to maximize gains in a history‐dependent decision‐making task and (2) how trait self‐control would moderate such an effect. In two experiments, participants performed a dynamic decision‐making task where they chose one of two options on each trial. The increasing option always gave a smaller immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to increase. The decreasing option always gave a larger immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to decrease. In Experiment 1 where the two options had equivalent expected value in the long run, participants were more prone to select the increasing option, which yielded larger benefits on future trials, in the loss‐minimization condition than in the gain‐maximization condition. Trait self‐control moderated the effect of losses by enhancing the effect for low self‐control participants while attenuating it for high self‐control participants. In Experiment 2 where selecting the increasing option was suboptimal, low self‐control participants still attempted to reduce losses on future trials by selecting the increasing option more often than high self‐control participants. These results suggest that decision makers value delayed consequences of their actions more in a losses domain relative to a gains domain and low self‐control individuals are more susceptible to such an effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Topsis‐Based Approach for Prioritized Aggregation in Multi‐Criteria Decision‐Making Problems

Aggregation in multi‐criteria decision‐making environments is a process of combining the values of a set of attributes into one representative value for the entire set of attributes. Many aggregation methods—ranging from the simple averaging approach to more sophisticated methods, such as ordered weighted averaging—have been applied in previous research. One challenge in aggregation arises in special cases of prioritized aggregation, wherein the prioritized relationships between attributes must be considered during aggregation. This paper presents a new approach to aggregating attributes with prioritized relationships. First, an overview of past research is conducted to identify different aggregation methods, classes and properties. Next, the concept of prioritized aggregation is explained in detail. A prioritized aggregation method utilizing the technique of order preference by similarity to ideal solution is then presented. Subsequently, the presented prioritized aggregation method is applied on an actual case study. According to the results, the aggregation method presented in this paper is, through the application of technique of order preference by similarity to ideal solution, capable of quantifying and considering the prioritized relationship between a set of attributes undergoing aggregation. Finally, conclusions are stated, and a discussion describing future work pertinent to this paper is presented. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.