Some Implications of Beliefs in Altruism,Free Will,and Nonreductionism

ABSTRACT

In this research, we explored correlates of individuals’ beliefs in altruism, free will, and nonreductionism, as opposed to contrasting beliefs in psychological egoism, determinism, and biological reductionism. Beliefs in altruism, free will, and nonreductionism were associated with heightened a) senses of meaning in life, b) levels of life satisfaction, c) beliefs in morality as a legitimate and important dimension of life, and d) standards of personal moral conduct; they were not associated with levels of social isolation. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

民众自由意志观及其与决定论相容性的研究

早期心理学家们主要采用量表法对自由意志观的构成及其与责任归因、惩罚态度、控制点之间的关系进行了一系列研究。近年来,学者们开始采用另一种方法考察民众的自由意志观及其形成,以及在自由意志与决定论是否相容的问题上民众持何态度。已有研究表明,自由意志问题的相关心理过程要比预先的设想更为复杂,很可能在不同条件下发挥作用的几种心理机制分别存在。今后的研究需要针对具有不同教育程度、文化背景或社会特点的人群,采取更多样的研究方法,引入更多心理变量,进一步考察该问题的内部心理机制。     

The Will to Make‐Believe: Religious Fictionalism,Religious Beliefs,and the Value of Art

I explore some of the reasons why, under specific circumstances, it may be rational to make‐believe or imagine certain religious beliefs. Adopting a jargon familiar to certain contemporary philosophers, my main concern here is to assess what reasons can be given for adopting a fictionalist stance towards some religious beliefs. My understanding of fictionalism does not involve solely a propositional attitude but a broader stance, which may include certain acts of pretence. I also argue that a plausible reason to be fictionalist about a specific set of religious beliefs and practices has to do with the value of some artistic creations; namely, those that require the adoption of a religious point of view for their understanding.     

Future‐Bias: A (Qualified) Defense

The preferences of ordinary folks typically display a future‐bias. For instance, we care more about pains and pleasures in our future than pains and pleasures in our past. Indeed, this future‐bias is so pervasive, many have taken it for granted that the preferences of rational agents will, or at least can, display this future‐bias to some degree or other. However, the rationality of future‐biased preferences has recently come in for critique. However, in this article, I offer a defense of future‐biased preferences against three recent attempts – offered by David Brink, Preston Greene and Meghan Sullivan, and Tom Dougherty – to show such preferences irrational.     

Free Will, Art and Morality

The discussion in this paper begins with some observations regarding a number of structural similarities between art and morality as it involves human agency. On the basis of these observations we may ask whether or not incompatibilist worries about free will are relevant to both art and morality. One approach is to claim that libertarian free will is essential to our evaluations of merit and desert in both spheres. An alternative approach, is to claim that free will is required only in the sphere of morality—and that to this extent the art/morality analogy breaks down. I argue that both these incompatibilist approaches encounter significant problems and difficulties—and that incompatibilist have paid insufficient attention to these issues. However, although the analogy between art and morality may be welcomed by compatibilists, it does not pave the way for an easy or facile optimism on this subject. On the contrary, while the art/morality analogy may lend support to compatibilism it also serves to show that some worries of incompatibilism relating to the role of luck in human life cannot be easily set aside, which denies compatibilism any basis for complacent optimism on this subject.     

Free Will, Chance, and Mystery

This paper proposes a reconciliation between libertarian freedomand causal indeterminism, without relying on agent-causation asa primitive notion. I closely examine Peter van Inwagen's recentcase for free will mysterianism, which is based in part on thewidespread worry that undetermined acts are too chancy to befree. I distinguish three senses of the term chance I thenargue that van Inwagen's case for free will mystrianism fails,since there is no single construal of the term change on whichall of the premises of his argument for free will–causalindeterminism incompatibilism are true. By use of a particularevent-causal indeterminist account of free action, I support thecase for free will–indeterminism compatibilism.     

Divine Foreknowledge and Freedom of the Will: Contemporary Work Revisits Calvinism

Books reviewed: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, ‘Recent Work on Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will’ in Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will Millard J. Erickson, What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?     

Free Will,Values, and Narrative Selfhood

Philosophia - Robert Kane’s libertarian theory of freedom is frequently attacked in the free will literature by the “luck objection”. Alfred Mele’s articulation of the...     

Free Will and Contextualism

This paper proposes a contextualist solution to the puzzle about free will. It argues that the context-sensitivity of statements about freedom of the will follows from the correct analysis of these statements. Because the analysis is independently plausible, the contextualism is warranted not merely in virtue of its capacity to solve the puzzle.     

Free Will and Scientiphicalism

John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom invoke Sellars's arguments against the Myth of the Given as having shown that the Given is nothing more than a myth. But most of Sellars's arguments attack logical atomism, not the framework of givenness as such. Moreover, they do not succeed. At crucial points the arguments confuse the perspectives of a knower and those attributing knowledge to a knower. Only one argument—the “inconsistent triad” argument—addresses the Myth of the Given as such, and there are several ways of escaping its conclusion. Invocations of Sellars's refutation of the Myth of the Given are empty.     

罪恶与自由意志——奥古斯丁“原罪”理论辨析

奥古斯丁是基督教“原罪”理论的重要奠基人,他明确地提出了自由意志是罪恶的原因。本文探讨了奥古斯丁“原罪”理论的基本内容,分析了奥古斯丁在自由意志问题上的思想变化和内在矛盾,并简要地说明了奥古斯丁的自由意志理论对于后世的影响。