Two Challenges to Hutto’s Enactive Account of Pre-linguistic Social Cognition

Daniel Hutto??s Enactive account of social cognition maintains that pre- and non-linguistic interactions do not require that the participants represent the psychological states of the other. This goes against traditional ??cognitivist?? accounts of these social phenomena. This essay examines Hutto??s Enactive account, and proposes two challenges. The account maintains that organisms respond to the behaviours of others, and in doing so respond to the ??intentional attitude?? which the other has. The first challenge argues that there is no adequate account of how the organisms respond to the correct aspect of the behaviour in each situation. The second challenge argues that the Enactive account cannot account for the flexibility of pre- and non-linguistic responses to others. The essay concludes that these challenges provide more than sufficient reason to doubt the viability of Hutto??s account as an alternative to cogntivist approaches to social cognition.     

The intentionality and intelligibility of moods

This article offers an account of moods as distinctive kinds of personal level affective–evaluative states, which are both intentional and rationally intelligible in specific ways. The account contrasts with those who claim moods are non‐intentional, and so also arational. Section 2 provides a conception of intentionality and distinguishes moods, as occurrent experiential states, from other states in the affective domain. Section 3 argues moods target the subject's total environment presented in a specific evaluative light through felt valenced attitudes (the Mood‐Intentionality thesis). Section 4 argues some moods are experienced as rationally intelligible responses, and so epistemically appropriate, to the way “the world” presents itself (the Mood‐Intelligibility thesis). Finally, Section 5 discusses the epistemology of moods.     

Intentions are mental states

Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the ‘mental state’ theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.     

Just open borders? Examining Joseph Carens' open borders argument in the light of a case study of recent Somali migrants to the UK

This essay examines Joseph Carens' open borders argument in the light of a case study of recent Somali migrants to the UK. It argues that, although arguments for significantly more open borders are compelling, they must take into account existing domestic injustice in receiving states as well as existing global injustice.     

Working in the borderland: early relational trauma and Fordham's analysis of ‘K’

This paper outlines a view of early relational trauma as underlying borderline states of mind, and argues that Knox's 1999 paper on internal working models and the complex provides a basis for understanding such states of mind. The author argues that in addition to internal working models, the complex also embodies and contains primitive defences of the core self. He outlines how these apply on the objective, subjective, transference and archetypal levels, and in direct and reversed forms and applies this to the account of Fordham's analysis of his patient ‘K’, which ended in impasse. The paper explores the dynamic that emerged in that analysis and suggests that it could be helpfully accounted for in terms of the co‐construction and re‐construction of early relational trauma in the analytic relationship.     

The ontology of character traits in Hume

This paper argues that Hume can account for character traits as lasting mental qualities without violating his reductionist account of the mind as a changing bundle of ideas and impressions. It argues that a trait is a disposition to act according to certain passions or motivations, explained entirely with reference to the ideas and impressions constituting one's current self. This account is consistent with Hume's view of the mind, and relies solely on his accounts of the association of impressions and ideas, and of the relationship between belief and passion, to establish relations that can properly be called lasting mental qualities.     

Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments

We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind (TCM) , David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully-justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PJs are justified, because it alone can underwrite the certainty of our phenomenal judgments. I argue that Chalmers is unable to sustain this claim.     

Smith’s practicality requirement meets dual-process models of moral judgment

In The Moral Problem, Michael Smith argues that only motivational internalists can offer an adequate explanation of why changes in moral judgment tend to be accompanied by changes in motivation in morally virtuous people. Smith argues that the failure of motivational externalism to account for this phenomenon amounts to a reductio of the view. In this paper, I draw on dual-process models of moral judgment to develop an externalist response to Smith’s argument. The key to my proposal is that motivationally efficacious states are often the source of our moral judgments, and changes in judgment are typically the result of changes in these states. However, moral judgments can also be formed via an alternative pathway that does not necessarily affect motivation, and so motivation and judgment can come apart. This response not only defuses Smith’s objections to externalism, but challenges Smith to square his internalist proposal with the empirical details of moral judgment.     

Consequentialist Teleology and the Valuation of States of Affairs

Elizabeth Anderson claims that states of affairs are merely extrinsically valuable, since we value them only in virtue of the intrinsically valuable (e.g.) persons in those states of affairs. Since it considers states of affairs to be the sole bearers of intrinsic value, Anderson argues that consequentialism is incoherent because it attempts to globally maximize extrinsic value. I respond to this objection by distinguishing between two forms of consequentialist teleology and arguing that Anderson's claim is either harmless or her argument for the claim is uncompelling. On the first conception of teleology, consequentialists need not hold that states of affairs are the sole bearers of intrinsic value, which allows them to deflect this criticism. On the second account of teleology, even assuming that states of affairs are the sole bearers of intrinsic value, Anderson's argument does not necessarily defeat such views.     

“Assertion” and intentionality

Robert Stalnaker argues that his causal-pragmatic account of the problem of intentionality commits him to a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, where propositions are represented as sets of possible worlds. Stalnaker also accepts the “direct reference” theory of names, according to which co-referring names have the same content. Stalnaker’s view of content is thus threatened by Frege’s Puzzle. Stalnaker’s classic paper “Assertion” is intended to provide a response to this threat. In this paper, I evaluate Stalnaker’s claim that the causal-pragmatic account of intentionality commits one to a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, and argue that the apparatus laid out in “Assertion” is not sufficiently comprehensive to account for all versions of Frege’s Puzzle.     

IN DEFENSE OF THE WHAT‐IT‐IS‐LIKENESS OF EXPERIENCE

It is common parlance among philosophers who inquire into the nature of consciousness to speak of there being something it is like for the subject of a mental state to be in it. The popularity of the ‘what‐it‐is‐like’ phrase stems, in part, from the assumption that it enables us to distinguish, in an intuitive and illuminating way, between conscious and unconscious mental states: conscious mental states, unlike unconscious mental states, are such that there is something it is like for their subjects to be in them. The ‘what‐it‐is‐like’ phrase, however, has not gone unopposed; some very clever philosophers have vigorously disputed it. Peter Hacker, for example, argues that the phrase should be abandoned because it is ungrammatical, and Paul Snowdon argues that it should be abandoned because the propositions expressed by its usage are either trivial or false. This paper mounts a case for the claim that neither of these conclusions is warranted. Against Hacker, it is argued that the arguments he produces for the ungrammaticality of the phrase are unpersuasive; and, against Snowdon, it is argued that he fails to consider a plausible and independently motivated interpretation of the phrase and that on this interpretation, the propositions expressed by its usage are nontrivially true.     

What the Humean Should Say About Entanglement

Tim Maudlin has influentially argued that Humeanism about laws of nature stands in conflict with quantum mechanics. Specifically Humeanism implies the principle Separability: the complete physical state of a world is determined by the intrinsic physical state of each space‐time point. Maudlin argues Separability is violated by the entangled states posited by QM. We argue that Maudlin only establishes that a stronger principle, which we call Strong Separability, is in tension with QM. Separability is not in tension with QM. Moreover, while the Humean requires Separability to capture the core tenets of her view, there's no Humean‐specific motivation for accepting Strong Separability. We go on to give a Humean account of entangled states which satisfies Separability. The core idea is that certain quantum states depend upon the Humean mosaic in much the same way as the laws do. In fact, we offer a variant of the Best System account on which the systemization procedure that generates the laws also serves to ground these states. We show how this account works by applying it to the example of Bohmian Mechanics. The 3N‐dimensional configuration space, the world particle in it and the wave function on it are part of the best system of the Humean mosaic, which consists of N particles moving in 3‐dimensional space. We argue that this account is superior to the Humean account of Bohmian Mechanics defended by Loewer and Albert, which takes the 3N‐dimensional space, and its inhabitants, as fundamental.     

Nietzsche and the origin of the idea of modernism

This paper combines a phenomenological account of the types of causal transaction found in social reality with a critique of two theories, one structuralist and one Marxist, that contravene it. Part I argues that there are three types of causal transaction in social life in addition to physical causal transactions: people bringing about states of affairs by acting, states of affairs bringing about actions by inducing responses, and entities and states of affairs bringing about what makes sense to people to do by making certain factors determine this. It is also contended that social formations and structures cause actions and other social formations/structures only by way of participating in these types of transaction. The conditions under which this occurs are discussed. Part II criticizes Peter Blau's account of structural effects and Jean‐Paul Sartre's version of a materialist theory of history, two theories that either advocate or require causal transactions between social structures/ formations which do not reduce to transactions of the types described in Part I. The paper concludes by suggesting that social entities that make actions possible do not thereby cause them.     

Herman Bavinck on the Image of God and Original Sin

The organic motif is Bavinck's preferred means to communicate creation's triune shape. An archetypal unity‐in‐diversity in the Godhead implies that creation displays an ectypal unity‐in‐diversity. This article argues that Bavinck's organic ontology provides him with a theological rationale for a doctrine of original sin in which the covenant headship of Adam reflects the organic character of humanity in unity and diversity. Thus, the transmission of original guilt on account of Adam's trespass is not a mere special ordinance by an inscrutable divine will, but an expression of humanity's organic shape. The article concludes by drawing some implications of Bavinck's construction for current discussion concerning original sin.     

What Incongruent Counterparts Show

Abstract: In a recent paper, Robert Hanna argues that Kant's incongruent counterparts example can be mobilized to show that some mental representations, which represent complex states of affairs as complex, do so entirely non‐conceptually. I will argue that Hanna is right to see that Kant uses incongruent counterparts to show that there must be a non‐conceptual component to cognition, but goes too far in concluding that there must be entirely non‐conceptual representations that represent objects as existing in space and time. Kant is deeply committed to the thesis that no representation of a complex state of affairs as complex can be entirely non‐conceptual. For Kant, all representations of complex states of affairs as complex (including those of incongruent counterparts) are conceptually structured. I present an interpretation of the Transcendental Aesthetic according to which Kant not only aims at Leibnizian and Newtonian accounts of space and time, but also Hume's. Hume's account fails to make representations of complex states of affairs sufficiently determinate. Kant offers an account later in the Critique that is meant to correct this failing by requiring that all representations of complex states of affairs as complex be conceptually (inferentially) structured.     

Nietzsche on the Nature of the Unconscious

Abstract

This paper argues that Nietzsche develops a novel and compelling account of the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states: he argues that conscious mental states are those with conceptual content, whereas unconscious mental states are those with nonconceptual content. I show that Nietzsche’s puzzling claim that consciousness is ‘superficial’ and ‘falsifying’ can be given a straightforward explanation if we accept this understanding of the conscious/unconscious distinction. I originally defended this view in my ‘Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind: Consciousness and Conceptualization’ (2005, European Journal of Philosophy 13: 1–31); since then, the view has come under criticism on several fronts. Brian Leiter and others suggest that there is not enough textual evidence for the view. In addition, Leiter, Mattia Riccardi and Tsarina Doyle argue that, rather than aligning the conscious/unconscious distinction with the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction, Nietzsche endorses a higher-order thought model of consciousness. Riccardi also objects that Nietzsche must treat some unconscious mental states as conceptual. In this essay, I defend the interpretation in light of these objections. I provide new textual evidence for the interpretation, show that Nietzsche extracted aspects of the view from Schopenhauer’s work on consciousness, consider the possibility that Nietzsche endorses a higher-order thought theory, and respond to Riccardi’s objection.     

Property rights and genetic engineering: Developing nations at risk

Eighty percent of (commercial) genetically engineered seeds (GES) are designed only to resist herbicides. Letting farmers use more chemicals, they cut labor costs. But developing nations say GES cause food shortages, unemployment, resistant weeds, and extinction of native cultivars when “volunteers” drift nearby. While GES patents are reasonable, this paper argues many patent policies are not. The paper surveys GE technology, outlines John Locke’s classic account of property rights, and argues that current patent policies must be revised to take account of Lockean ethical constraints. After answering a key objection, it provides concrete suggestions for implementing its ethical conclusions.     

IN ALGORITHMS WE TRUST: MAGICAL THINKING,SUPERINTELLIGENT AI AND QUANTUM COMPUTING

This article analyzes current attitudes toward artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing and argues that they represent a modern-day form of magical thinking. It proposes that AI and quantum computing are thus excellent examples of the ways that traditional distinctions between religion, science, and magic fail to account for the vibrancy and energy that surround modern technologies.     

Normativity and Judgement: Julia Tanney

This paper attempts to describe why it is not possible to account for normative phenomena in non-normative terms. It argues that Papineau's attempt to locate norms of judgement 'outside' content, grounded in an individual's desires or reasons, mislocates the normativity that is thought to resist appropriation within a 'world that conceives nature as the realm of law'. It agrees, however, that a theory of content that locates norms 'inside' content will not be forthcoming—at least if this is to require fashioning the norms that in some sense govern judgment or thought into individually necessary conditions for contentful states.     

Oppression,Autonomy and the Impossibility of the Inner Citadel

This paper argues for a conception of autonomy that takes social oppression seriously without sapping autonomy of its valuable focus on individual self-direction. Building on recent work in relational accounts of autonomy, the paper argues that current conceptions of autonomy from liberal, feminist and critical theorists do not adequately account for the social features of belief formation. The paper then develops an alternative conception of relational autonomy that focuses on how autonomy contains both individualistic and social epistemic features. Rather than consider autonomy to reside in an impenetrable inner citadel, a place immune from external influences, the paper argues that we must acknowledge the hermeneutic relationship between individual and social processes of belief adjudication. Taking such an argument seriously results in the need to alter our conception of autonomy and the schooling needed to foster its growth.